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ABSTRACT 
Aim of Study 
The aim of this study is to add to the body of 
knowledge concerning how policies are formulated and conflicts 
resolved in large complex organisations. The essence of the 
problem studied concerns the reconciliation of demands for 
egalitarieun participation in organisational decision-
making with the competing demands for efficient bureaucratic 
control. 
Not enough is known about how participants in 
organisations arrive at an accommodation between conflicting 
views. Part of the explanation for this seems to be that many 
policy studies in the past have failed to examine the internal 
dynamics of organisational decision-making in the detail and 
depth necessary to reveal fully the underlying reasons behind 
particular policy outcomes. Informal factors involving the 
backgrounds, motivations, values and ideologies of key actors 
as well as their interpretations of the relevant policy 
environment are frequently glossed over in a effort to impose 
"rationality" on the process. The problem is exacerbated in 
the policy domain of organisational development involving the 
redesign of decision-making structures and processes. Too 
much weight is often given to excessively deterministic 
connections between organisational goals and structure and 
between organisational environment and structure in order to 
explain why one pattern of governance was selected rather than 
another. 
Soope and Method 
This study has examined the policy process associated 
with the reform of the system of governance of one large, 
complex organisation, the University of Queensland. The scope 
of the study has been limited to the University's internal 
decision-making structure and processes over the 1969-1982 
period. So that the necessary level of detail and depth would 
be achieved, the case study method was used. 
Because of the methodology used, this thesis can make 
no claim that its findings, by themselves, can be extrapolated 
without qualification to other organisations or even 
generalised to other universities. The approach has been to 
apply political and organisational theory.to the empirical 
data gathered in respect of one organisation in order to 
provide evidence for the validation or falsification of two 
theoretical propositions which are central to understanding 
the role of organisational behaviour in policy making. These 
propositions are: 
Prinoipal Hypothesie 
That the policy process is influenced by environmental 
and structural factors but that within those constraints, 
policy outcomes are shaped primarily by the political 
behaviour of strategically placed participants moderated by 
systematised bureaucratic procedures. 
Subsidiary Hypothesis 
That the tension which exists in organisations between 
internal demands for autonomy through participation in 
decision-making and the external demands for accountability 
through hierarchical control over decision-making will be 
worked out, on balance, in favour of greater 
bureaucratisation. 
Conclusions 
This study has found that the policy process associated 
with the reform of the University's system of governance was 
influenced by a range of environmental factors. These 
included historical precedent, cultural traditions, relevant 
external political issues, the level of economic resources 
made available and the effects of technology. Structural 
factors such as the need for additional layers of hierarchical 
control to coordinate the intense, horizontal differentiation 
of the University were also influential. However these 
influences fell far short of any deterministic relationship 
with organisational structure as suggested in systems 
organisational theory (Katz & Kahn, 1966) or in Strategic 
Contingencies Theory (Greenwood et al, 1975). Rather it was 
the exercise of strategic choice by key actors and their 
related political behaviour which had the greatest impact on 
policy outcomes. 
With regard to strategic choice, this study found 
evidence to support the contentions postulated by Child 
(1972), Dyson (1976) and Jenkins (1978) that key actors were 
able to exert considerable influence over the policy process 
by deciding which issues would be elevated to the political 
sigenda and by indicating strongly what their preferred policy 
options were. Leaders were able to do this by interpreting 
environmental and structural factors so that such factors were 
defined as constraints upon or opportunities for reform 
according to the leaders' ideological values and assessment of 
the University's performance. By imposing their own 
definition of environmental and structural reality on the 
University, leaders were able to give particular salience to 
the policy options that coincided with their preferences. 
The study thus found evidence to support the 
propositions expressed by Wildavsky (1979) and Pfeffer (1981) 
that policy outcomes are strongly influenced by the political 
behaviour of strategically placed participants. However this 
behaviour was moderated by the use of systematised 
bureaucratic procedures in a process described in this thesis 
as bureaucratic politics. The ad hoc committees of 
inquiry set up to reconcile conflicting views relating to 
organisational reform together with the regularised processes 
of internal review and consultation served as formal, 
constitutional checks on institutionalised power. This 
moderating effect was reflected in the fact that policy 
outcomes were not always congruent with the options advocated 
by relevant leaders. 
The main substantive outcome that occurred as a result 
of the continuing tension between internal demejids for 
autonomy through participation in decision-making and external 
demands for accountability through hierarchical control was a 
trend towards increased bureaucratisation. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 
ONE 
TWO 
THREE 
FOUR 
FIVE 
SIX 
SEVEN 
CONTENT AND METHODS 
Statement of the Problem 
Methodological Considerations 
Scope and Structure of the Study 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Democracy and Equality versus 
Oligarchy and Merit 
Academic Professionalism 
The Emergence of Academic 
Bureaucratisation 
Models of Governance 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND 
Historical Evolution of the 
University Idea 
The Origins of the University 
of Queensland 
Government Relations and Funding 
Staff and Students 
FORMAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
AND PROCESSES 
Organisational Structure 
Academic Departments 
Faculties 
The Professorial Board 
The Senate 
Central Executive Structure 
Central Committee System and 
the Budgetary Process 
Convocation 
The University of Queensland 
Staff Association 
Non-Academic Staff Representation 
The University of Queensland Union 
THE EMERGENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER, 
1969-1972 
THE LAHEY REPORT AND THE DEMISE OF 
PERMANENT HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, 
1969-1972 
THE WEBB REPORT: FACULTY BOARD 
REPRESENTATION AND PROFESSORIAL BOARD 
AMBITIONS, 1969-1972 
PAGE 
1 
1 
8 
13 
20 
20 
23 
26 
27 
42 
42 
45 
49 
59 
70 
72 
77 
79 
83 
88 
93 
101 
107 
108 
112 
114 
121 
159 
203 
EIGHT 
NINE 
TEN 
ELEVEN 
TWELVE 
THE HILL COMMITTEE AND OLIGARCHICAL 
RESURGENCE ON THE PROFESSORIAL BOARD, 
1970-1972 
THE DAVIES REPORT AND THE BATTLE FOR 
THE PROFESSORIAL BOARD, 1973-1976 
THE CULT OF ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERNAL 
ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE, 1976-1980 
THE FIELDING REPORT AND THE POLITICS 
OF EFFICIENCY, 1980-1982 
THE POLICY PROCESS 1969-1982: 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Environment 
Structure 
Leadership 
Systemi s at i on 
Democratisation 
Epilogue 
- Bureaucratisation 
236 
275 
352 
420 
505 
508 
513 
519 
530 
534 
548 
APPENDIX Appendix I: Comparison of Proposals 
to Revise the Composition of the 
Professorial Board 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
552 
553 
T.TRT OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AB(M) - Academic Board (Minutes) 
AGM - Annual General Meeting 
ARPC - Academic Resource and Planning Committee 
AST - Academic Salaries Tribunal 
AVC - Acting Vice-Chancellor 
AVCC - Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee 
CAC(M) - Combined Advisory Committee (Minutes) 
CAP(M) - Committee on Administrative Procedures 
(Minutes) 
CC(M) - Committee on Committees (Minutes) 
CRBP(M) - Committee to Review Budget Priorities (Minutes) 
CRUA(M) - Committee to Consider the Revision of the 
University Act (Minutes) 
CM - The Courier Mail newspaper 
DCC - Departmental Consultative Committee 
DHs - Departmental Heads 
DVC(Ac) - Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) 
DVC(F&F) - Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) 
EC(M) - Executive Committee (Minutes) 
EFTS - Equivalent full-time student 
FAUSA - Federation of Australian University Staff 
Associations 
FBA(M) - Faculty Board of Arts (Minutes) 
FBL(M) - Faculty Board of Law (Minutes) 
FBM(M) - Faculty Board of Medicine (Minutes) 
FBVS(M) - Faculty Board of Veterinary Science (Minutes) 
FC(M) - Finance Committee (Minutes) 
QSA - General Staff Association 
HOD - Head of Department 
IC(M) - Improvements Committee (Minutes) 
JAC(M) 
LC(M) 
PB(M) 
PC(M) 
PGSA 
Pres. PB 
QPD 
RC(M) 
Reg. 
SCC(M) 
SC(M) 
SF 
S(M) 
TEC 
ULO 
UN 
UQ 
UQASAEC(M) 
UQASA(M) 
UQSAEC(M) 
UQSA(M) 
UQTALSA 
UQTS 
UQU 
URC(M) 
URG 
- Joint Advisory Committee on Post-Secondary 
Education in Queensland (Minutes) 
- Library Committee (Minutes) 
- Professorial Board (Minutes) 
- Planning Committee (Minutes) 
Post-Graduate Students' Association 
President of the Professorial Board 
- Queensland Parliamentary Debates 
Research Committee (Minutes) 
Registrar 
Standing Committee of Convocation (Minutes) 
Standing Committee (Minutes) 
Semper Floreat student newspaper 
Senate (Minutes) 
Tertiary Education Commission 
University Legal Officer 
University News 
University of Queensland 
University of Queensland Academic Staff 
Association Executive Committee (Minutes) 
- University of Queensland Academic Staff 
Association (Minutes) 
- University of Queensland Staff Association 
Executive Committee (Minutes) 
- University of Queensland Staff Association 
(Minutes) 
University of Queensland Technical and 
Laboratory Staff Association 
University of Queensland Triennial Submission 
University of Queensland Union (known as the 
Student Union) 
Use of Resources Committee (Minutes) 
University Research Grant 
VC - Vice-chancellor 
VCCC(M) - Vice-Chancellor's Consultative Committee 
(Minutes) 
WP - Working Party 
WSU - Weighted Student Unit 
CHAPTER ONE 
fyiMTFMT AMD METHOD 
The main purpose of this study is to cast light on how 
policies are formulated in large, complex organisations. The 
means of doing this will be to examine critically how 
conflicting views over the redistribution of power and 
authority were reconciled during the various attempts to 
reform the University of Queensland's system of governance 
over a fourteen year period from 1969 to 1982. 
Stfttament of thft Problem 
0'Shea's study of governance in tertiary institutions 
concluded that the literature could be reduced to just two 
apparently incompatible principles, namely, the need for 
authority and the need for participation (1975:215). The 
substantive problem to be examined in this thesis concerns a 
central dilemma in the study of organisations, namely, how can 
demands for greater egalitarian participation in 
organisational decision-making be accommodated with the 
competing demands for more efficient bureaucratic control? 
This problem is often expressed as the tension between the 
concepts of autonomy on the one hand and control on the other 
(Dahl, 1982:1). This idea is linked to the central principles 
addressed in political and organisational theory, namely, the 
conflict between democracy and oligarchy, egalitarianism and 
meritocracy, professionalism and bureaucracy. Kamenka has 
argued that the tension between conflict and cooperation 
constitutes the underlying theme of most moral and political 
philosophy (1979:2) This study will examine how during the 
course of policy formulation, this tension creates a cycle of 
conflict and cooperation. 
Over the period 1989 to 1982 the University of 
Queensland experienced pressures for greater participation in 
decision-making from non-professorial staff and students while 
at the same time there were countervailing pressures for 
greater bureaucratic control. A major difficulty in making 
sense of the conflict and cooperation found in most policy 
studies is that cogent arguments can be mounted in support of 
opposing principles. Certainly a major problem in eunalysing 
the policy process in relation to the reform of the University 
of Queensland's system of governance was to disentangle 
apparently legitimate claims by the various constituencies 
concerning the allocation of decision-making powers. 
Much remains to be done to improve understanding of the 
extent to which the processes of decision-meiking reflect a 
capriciousness and unstructured opportunism on the one hand or 
structured interaction through formal "action channels" on the 
other. The human condition with all its behavioural 
idiosyncracies militates against rationality in the policy 
process. At the same time most human behaviour is subject to 
wide interpretation as to its true meaning because it is 
usually carried out under the cloak of rationality. 
Thus a major need in policy studies is to supplement 
descriptions of formal organisational behaviour with detailed 
case-study data on such informal factors as ex-post 
rationalisation of behaviour, symbolism and the use of covert 
power. This approach would respond to the criticism made by 
Wildavsky that many descriptions of decision-making are often 
presented in a shorthand form which gives the illusion but not 
the substance of rationality. It is illusory because the 
confusion and blind-alleys are often omitted and supporting 
evidence is often adduced only for those policy options 
actually chosen (1979:9). 
The literature on university governance by and large 
agrees that the dominant organisational behaviour along the 
professional-bureaucratic continuum is skewed towards the 
professional end (Blau, 1973:158; Etzioni, 1964:86). At the 
same time, many writers have commented on the advancing tide 
of bureaucratization in organisations, including those 
hitherto dominated by professional values and norms (Wilensky, 
1964:137-158; Haug, 1973:195-211; Krause, 1971:356). Some 
evidence of this trend is found also in universities. 
Baldridge et al have noted, for example, that traditional 
notions of collegial membership of universities was giving weiy 
to increasing bureaucratisation as academic staff and 
administrators adopted a "we-they" mentality in the light of 
pressures for greater legal rationality and efficiency in the 
interests of external public accountability (1978:118). 
But the direction and strength of this trend in 
universities is by no means clear. Becher and Kogan have 
pointed out that: 
The executive and the committee structures 
alike are . . . shot through with both collegium 
and hierarchy ... the relationships between 
the two can change as institutions go through 
different periods of history (1980:70). 
The picture is sometimes further clouded by the disjunction 
between the rhetoric of organisational norms and the reality 
of organisational behaviour. At a normative level, a 
university might espouse collegial values but at an 
operational level, show signs of bureaucratic behaviour. 
Much of this debate coheres around a consideration of 
the relative merits of centralised versus decentralised 
systems of decision-making. In the review of the literature 
it was evident that the pervasive values of democracy were 
fundamental to the notion of decentralisation. The idea 
behind this was that decentralised participation would provide 
the means for the individual fulfilment of the participants as 
well as policies which were acceptable to the majority. 
However, the management science literature over the last 
twenty five years in particular has also advocated 
decentralised participation in decision-making in the belief 
that by involving individuals and groups more in the control 
of their work situation, morale would be increased. This 
increase in morale would be reflected in individuals yielding 
more of themselves to the service of the organisation which 
employed them and the increased commitment would result in 
less disjunction between the informal goals of the individual 
and the formal goals of the organisation. This in turn would 
lead to greater efficiency (Likert, 1961:240). 
Most universities have attempted to achieve a degree of 
decentralised participation in decision-making through the use 
of extensive committee structures. According to Schaffer the 
committee structure of universities was first and foremost a 
device to express the values of universities in its machinery 
of government rather than as a managerial device for 
coordination and integration (1966:57). It is important to 
note, however, that although such committees were supposed to 
be an alternative to hierarchical coordination, in reality 
they too were part of a hierarchical system (Schaffer, 
1966:42). Even so the difficulties often experienced by 
institutions in resolving the overlap and conflicts that can 
occur between the committee system eind the legitimate role of 
the executive remains an intractable problem (Becher & Kogan, 
1980:67). 
Plowman and Williams have noted that committees occupy 
such an important part of the university policy process that 
the effectiveness of their performance was critical to the 
well-being of a university (1978:100). But notwithstanding 
the importance of their role, committees in universities have 
been accused of being too numerous, too large and too slow in 
reaching decisions (Ford, 1978:87-88; Baldridge et al, 
1978:212; Dressel, 1981:73). As a consequence they absorbed 
excessive amounts of staff time and were often incapable of 
producing decisions which were in the corporate interest of 
the institution and the community that it was set up to serve 
(Becher & Kogan, 1980:178). Given the reality of some degree 
of decentralised decision-making in most universities through 
the use of the committee system, it is important that the 
committee process be properly understood so that effective 
policy making can be fostered. The work of writers such as 
Cartwright (1975), Rhodes (1975) and Bulmer (1980) on the 
operations of committees in general and the insights of 
writers such as Bailey (1977) on committees in universities in 
particular have provided some of the tools necessary to foster 
that level of understanding. 
The organisational theory literature is full of 
analyses of the conditions in which decentralisation 
vis-a-vis centralisation would be the preferred mode of 
organisation. However much of that literature has a "cause-
effect" almost cybernetic-like quality to it. The illusion of 
precision that it engenders has found favour in much of the 
management science "explanations" of organisational behaviour 
but as Jenkins has noted, often the statistical associations 
identified replace genuine explanation leaving the true 
underlying processes to be inferred (1978:53-62). 
Nevertheless Scott (1969:47) and Pfeffer (1981:11) have both 
argued that the ethos and values of managerialism have had an 
enormously pervasive effect on the dominant values of 
efficiency and rationality in modern organisations. Indeed 
reading the organisational theory literature, one could 
perhaps be forgiven for erroneously concluding that there was 
present some sort of deterministic mechanism which inexorably 
linked environmental factors and goals with patterns of 
governance: 
... fundamental social forces appear to govern 
the development of the formal structure of 
organizations regardless of their type (Blau, 
1973:270). 
Given this determinism it is appropriate to recall 
Shattock and Rigby's caveat that, in the abstract, the debate 
over centralisation versus decentralisation was not capable of 
resolution since so much depended on the traditions derived 
from the decisions of past leaders (1983:67). A similar 
position was taken by Child: 
... environmental conditions cannot be regarded 
as a direct source of variation in 
organizational structure, as open system 
theorists often imply. The critical link lies 
in the decision-makers' evaluation of the 
organization's position in the environmental 
areas they regard as important, and in the 
action they may consequently talce about its 
internal structure (1972:10). 
Reference to the role of strategic choice inevitably 
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leads to the literature on leadership. Selznick described the 
leadership process as "social integration" and saw it as a 
means of striking a balance between the demands for 
decentralisation and autonomy vis-a-vis the need for 
centralisation and control (1957:113-118). The need for 
balance has also been highlighted by Kochen and Deutsch; they 
argued that the most productive approach was not to argue in 
terms of "either-or" but rather to discuss it more in terms of 
"how much" and "under what conditions" (1980:224) The long 
term trend in organisations seemed in their view to be for 
oscillatory swings within the range of the two extremes with 
changes in one direction resulting in undesirable cosequences 
and leading to corrective action by leaders in the opposite 
direction (1980:245). 
Finkelstein's insights on the process of reform in 
universities has also underlined the need to take into account 
individual perceptions: 
... faculty tend to evaluate change or 
innovation, ... on multiple dimensions - its 
feasibility and desirability in their own field 
... their familiarity with it . .. and how it is 
likely to affect their organizational status 
... and to reserve their support for those 
changes that pass their own idiosyncratic 
muster (1984:130). 
But at the same time allowance must also be made for the value 
placed on cognitive rationality in the university setting and 
its potential to structure idiosyncratic behaviour (Western & 
Roe, 1981:80). It is arguable that the value placed on 
cognitive rationality is entirely consistent with such 
bureaucratic virtues as technical knowledge derived from data 
collection and analysis as well as structured interaction 
based on the principle of due process. Such bureaucratic 
behaviours have the capacity to moderate conflict arising from 
unstructured and capricious political activity. Indeed it is 
the reconciliation of conflict by a mixture of political and 
bureaucratic behaviour through a process of what this study 
calls bureaucratic politics that is the focus of what follows. 
Having regard to the foregoing, the following hypotheses are 
posited: 
Prinoipal Hypothesis 
That the policy process is influenced by environmental 
and structural factors* but that within those constraints, 
policy outcomes are shaped primarily by the political 
behaviour of strategically placed participants moderated by 
systematised bureaucratic procedures. 
Subsidiary Hypothesis 
That the tension which exists in organisations between 
internal demands for autonomy through participation in 
decision-making and the external demands for accountability 
through hierarchical control over decision-making will be 
worked out, on balance, in favour of greater 
bureaucratisation. 
MethodQlogJoal Considerations 
The case study method has been chosen for the present 
study because in addition to revealing "the richness and 
Environmental factors include the historical, 
political, cultural, economic and technological 
contexts of the organisation. Structural factors 
include the size of the organisation, the nature and 
extent of horizontal and vertical differentiation, the 
degree of interdependance of sub-units as well as the 
extent of the organisation's functional diversity and 
complexity. 
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complexity of the subject" (Caiden, 1969:75), it is the most 
effective means of enabling the investigator to relate what is 
supposedly universal and generalisable in theory to the 
empirical reality of concrete situations (Meek, 1982:10). 
Accordingly the hypotheses just outlined which are derived 
from mainstream political and organisational theory will be 
tested against the empirical data collected over the period 
1983 to 1986 in the course of undertaking this case study. 
The case study approach has been criticised by a number 
of writers on the grounds that the particular subject which 
was being examined might not be a typical case from which to 
draw generalised conclusions (Rhodes, 1975:161; Jenkins, 
1978:20). This would be a valid criticism if there was an 
intention, for example, to argue that the University of 
Queensland was a typical organisation or even a typical 
university and that the conclusions reached in the present 
study could be extrapolated without qualification to other 
organisations or generalised to other universities. This, of 
course, is not the intention. Rather the approach is to apply 
political and organisational theory to the empirical data 
gathered in respect of a concrete reality in order to provide 
evidence for the validation or falsification of particular 
theoretical propositions (Meek, 1982:10). 
Virtually all of the reforms of the University of 
Queensland's governance have been the result of decisions 
taken following consideration of the recommendations of a 
diverse range of committees of inquiry. Rhodes made the point 
in the context of studying committees of inquiry that it was 
impossible to undertake detailed case studies involving a 
heterogeneous collection of committees in the depth necessary 
to advance knowledge. He advocated a policy studies approach 
which focused on a particular policy field as a case study and 
which then examined a range of factors including the roles 
played by particular committees of inquiry in the policy 
process (1976:161). A similar approach is taken in the 
present study. The focus is on a case study involving the 
policy field of university governance and it is within this 
context that the roles played by various committees which 
inquired into aspects of the University of Queensland's 
governance will be explored. 
The case study methodology is particularly well suited 
to policy studies and a number of authors have adopted this 
approach in seeking to cast light on the complex interactions 
inherent in the policy process (Hawker, Smith & Weller, 1979; 
Scott, 1980). Only detailed case studies have the capacity to 
expose the informal factors which operate in most 
organisations and which comparative studies, by electing to 
focus on breadth rather than depth, often gloss over. 
Jenkins has suggested, however, that case studies were 
often deficient in their neglect of historical factors and 
their tendency to concentrate excessively on the roles and 
personalities of the key actors in order to explain the policy 
process (1978:163-164). Baldridge et al also acknowledged 
that the principal author's earlier case study of New York 
University had focused excessively on a limited period of time 
which was characterised by student revolution and financial 
crisis; the study took on an episodic flavour and placed 
insufficient weight on the longer term patterns of 
organisational behaviour (1978:42-43). 
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The present case study has sought to meet such 
criticisms. For example, chapter three has analysed the 
historical antecedents and cultural ethos of the University of 
Queensland. Moreover, the period 1969 to 1982 was chosen 
especially because those fourteen years involved a wide range 
of external and internal environmental influences and 
witnessed both conflict and cooperation. The period reviewed 
has been sufficiently lengthy to avoid the problems inherent 
in studying an isolated possibly atypical episode and 
particular care has been taken to place the case study into 
context as part of a historical continuum. In relation to 
Jenkins' caveat about case studies being disposed towards 
placing excessive weight on the roles euid personalities of key 
actors, the present study will consciously examine the 
importance of strategic choice but always having regard to the 
environmental and structural contexts. 
The conclusions reached in this study have been based 
on eun extensive examination of primary source data. The 
writer was given access to official records held by the 
University's Central Administration including all reports on 
attempts to reform various aspects of the University's 
governance. Each report was supported by the minutes of the 
ad hoc committees which conducted those reviews. However 
because the full minutes of some University bodies contained 
confidential information about individuals which did not bear 
on the thesis topic, the writer was restricted primarily to 
subject files containing, inter alia, relevant extracts 
from minutes. In some cases this has meant that the reference 
citations to minutes of meetings and dates do not include page 
numbers since these were not always shown on the extracts. 
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Nevertheless these subject files were comprehensive and 
included background papers, correspondence, and most of the 
relevant submissions made by members of the University 
community. A considerable volume of data was also gathered on 
the general operation of the University from the minutes of 
various steuiding and ad hoc committees concerned with 
formulating policy advice. These were especially useful in 
providing insights that were not available from the narrower 
focus of the files concerned solely with University 
governance. In addition, the University of Queensland 
Academic Staff Association and the Student Union also allowed 
the writer access to their records. 
Although the main focus of this study is on the 
University of Queensland's internal decision-making structures 
and processes, reference has also been made to documentation 
relating to the University's relations with external bodies 
where this has impinged on internal arrangements. The purpose 
of considering this wider dimension was to provide the 
background context and to highlight those issues which, at the 
time, were seen to be important and which were influential in 
shaping the attitudes of senior decision-makers. 
In addition to this written material a large number of 
present and former members of the University community were 
interviewed mainly using structured questionnaires. These 
were supplemented by many informal conversations with staff 
and students at all levels within the University concerning 
the subject matter of this study. Importantly, the events of 
the period 1969 to 1982 were sufficiently recent to enable 
most of the people interviewed to recall in reasonable detail 
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either their role in or their perceptions at the time of the 
policy process; with few exceptions, all of the key actors in 
the process were still alive and available for interview.(1) 
Considerable care was taken to crosscheck respondents' 
reports in order to eliminate, as far as practicable, the 
intrusion of bias. 
The review of secondary source material has set the 
primary source data in a wider context and has highlighted 
those areas where the study might be able to add to the body 
of knowledge. In addition to theses, newspaper articles and 
the records of parliamentary debates, the coverage has 
included the numerous official reports on aspects 
of universities and other higher education policy submitted to 
the Commonwealth Government since 1957. 
Scope and Structure of the Study 
The period covered by this study (1969-1982) was 
selected because it was marked by frequent attempts to reform 
aspects of the University of Queensland's system of 
governance. From a policy studies perspective, the period can 
be seen as a continuous process of interrelated policy 
formulation which culminated in the Senate's acceptance in May 
1982 of major reform proposals made in a report of one of its 
committees known as the Fielding Report. 
In the context of the present study, the term 
"governance" refers to the University's decision-making 
structures and processes. It includes the University's formal 
(1) Mr. J.E. Ritchie, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and 
Finance) from 1971 until his retirement (due to ill 
health) in December 1986 was not available for 
interview. 
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system in which policies are formulated and executed with the 
primary object of achieving the officially sanctioned goals as 
well as the University's informal system within which 
individuals from time to time pursue personal goals that need 
not necessarily coincide with the organisation's official 
goals. Whilst acknowledging the distinction drawn by 
Baldridge et al (1978:231-232) between governance and 
management and recognising Corson's observation (1975:145) 
that "'management', 'efficiency', and 'productivity' are for 
most academicians ugly words", this thesis takes the view that 
modern universities are in fact organisations rather than 
communities. It shares Fielden and Lockwood's contention 
(1973:19-20) that the managerial functions of planning, 
coordination and control are vital and hence should be 
included in any study of a university's decision-making 
structures and processes. 
Because of the University's policy regarding the 
maximum permitted size for a doctoral thesis, the author has 
been obliged to restrict the focus to an examination of the 
University's internal academic and executive decision-making 
structures and processes. It has not canvassed the 
University's external relations except where necessary to 
explain internal reforms nor has it reviewed the amendments to 
the University of Queensland Act in 1973 and 1981 that led to 
changes in the composition of the governing body. Size 
constraints also prevented the study being extended to an 
examination of the post-1982 implementation process. 
The thesis has been organised into a further eleven 
chapters: 
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Chapter Two - Review of the Literature 
The second chapter contains a survey of the literature 
including a review of the various models of university 
governance. It concludes that much of the present research 
into the organisational behaviour dimension of policy making 
is unbalanced. Rational-scientific "explanations" 
overemphasise the alleged relationship between goals eind 
organisational structure whereas systems theory gives 
excessive stress to environmental influences. More recent 
political science studies have highlighted the roles of power 
and conflict in policy making but have neglected the 
significance of systematised bureaucratic procedures and 
cooperation. Chapter two postulates a theoretical paradigm 
which attempts to redress the balance by providing a synthesis 
of political and organisational theory as a framework to 
analyse organisational behaviour in policy making. 
Chapter Three - The Historioal Evolution of the University 
of Queensland 
Chapter three explores the historical evolution of the 
university idea and traces the origins of the University of 
Queensland. The effects of external environmental factors on 
the University's development to 1969 are examined since this 
provides the frame of reference for understanding the internal 
and external environmental context faced by key actors in 
assessing the contraints to and opportunities for 
organisational reform. 
Chapter Four - Formal Organisational Struoture and 
Processes 
Chapter four examines each of the major organisational 
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structures which constituted the University of Queensland 
around 1969. This chapter will also provide an overview of 
the way in which these structures interacted in the formal 
decision-making processes which operated at that time. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide the foundation from 
which to analyse both the formal and informal behaviour 
exhibited by those organisational elements and to reveal the 
structural context faced by strategically placed actors in 
evaluating the impediments to and potential for organisational 
reform. 
Chapter Five - The Emertfenoe of Administrative Power. 
1969-1972 
The focus of this chapter will be an analysis of 
attempts to improve the effectiveness of central executive 
decision-making structures and processes over the period from 
1969 to 1972. The study shows how strategically placed 
permanent officials within the Central Executive were able to 
control their environment to achieve their preferred policy 
outcomes. 
Chapter Six - The Lahey Report and the Demise of Permanent 
Heads of Departments. 1969-1972 
This chapter will examine the policy process relating 
to attempts to reform the decision-making structures and 
processes within academic departments over the period from 
1969 to 1972. This was a period of intense political activism 
which saw the University take its most fundamental decision on 
governance in discontinuing the appointment of permanent heads 
of departments, thereby opening up the pathway towards greater 
16 
democratisation within academic departments. 
Chanter Seven - The Webb Report; Faoultv Board 
Representation and Professorial Board Ambitions. 1969-1972 
Chapter Seven traces the attempts to reform the 
decision-making structure and processes in faculties between 
1969-1972 and examines the Professorial Board's early efforts 
to expand its policy coordination role within the University, 
Although the Professorial Board's efforts were largely 
unsuccessful, significant reforms were made to the composition 
of faculty boards to make them more representative of academic 
and student opinion. 
Chapter Eight - The Hill Committee and Olitfarohioal 
Resurgence on the Professorial Board. 1970-1972 
The unsuccessful attempt made over the 1970-1972 period 
to improve the representation of non-professorial academic 
staff and students on the Professorial Board is examined in 
chapter eight. In the same context, the role of key oligarchs 
in achieving their preferred policy outcomes in the face of 
pressures pulling in the direction of greater democratisation 
is explored. 
Chapter Nine - The Davies Report and the Battle for the 
Professorial Board. 1973-1976 
Chapter nine analyses how a compromise was reached over 
the 1973-1976 period between the predominantly non-
professorial staff and student protagonists who advocated 
greater egalitarianism in the composition of the senior 
academic body, and the professorial oligarchy who sought to 
preserve and indeed expand their central coordinating role 
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within the University. 
Chapter Ten - The Cult of Aooountabllity; IntOTOftl 
Organisational Response. lQ7fi-19B0 
The period from 1976 to 1980 was a time of sudden and 
marked environmental change which affected all universities 
including the University of Queensland. The unsettling effect 
of these changes was compounded by Vice-Chancellor Cowen's 
departure in 1977 to become Governor-General. Despite the 
uncertainty about the University's future direction, decisive 
action was held in abeyance pending the arrival of the new 
Vice-Chancellor in 1979. Chapter ten examines how Cowen's 
replacement as Vice-Chancellor (Professor Brian Wilson) was 
able to legitimise his advocacy for reform of the University's 
decision-making structures and processes by stressing the need 
to adapt to environmental pressures for greater efficiency and 
accountability. 
Chapter Eleven - The Fielding Report and the Politios of 
EffiQignoy. 1990-1982 
As the last chapter containing case study material, 
chapter eleven critically examines the efforts made over the 
period 1980 to 1982 to formulate policy for the reform of the 
University's academic and executive decision-making structures 
and processes. The nature of the trade-off between democratic 
values and organisational values which celebrate efficiency is 
described, along with an examination of the way in which that 
trade-off was negotiated. 
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Chapter Twelve - The Polioy Prooess 1969-1962; 
Analysis of Findings 
Whereas chapters five to eleven examine the attempts to 
reform the various levels of the University of Queensland's 
system of governance as a detailed case study within a 
fragmented chronological framework, the final chapter analyses 
the main themes which have emerged across the whole of the 
1969-1982 period. This analysis focuses on testing the 
hypotheses stated in chapter one having regard to the model of 
the conditions producing bureaucratic politics in 
organisational decision-making postulated in chapter two. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RFVTEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the main body 
of literature which has provided the theoretical context for 
the present study and from which the hypotheses outlined in 
chapter one have been derived. 
The present study proceeds from the position adopted by 
Dyson that macro-level political science concepts are directly 
relevant to explaining behaviour at the micro organisational 
level (1976:132). 
Demooraoy and Equality Versus Oligarohy and Merit 
It seems appropriate, therefore, to start by reviewing 
briefly some of the relevant literature on the basic political 
concepts of democracy and oligarchy. This is justified on the 
grounds that, according to Aristotle, there are really only 
two principal forms of government, namely democracy and 
oligarchy, which should be balanced pursuant to some 
conception of justice (Politics. Book IV:150). 
The word "democracy" was derived from the Greek word 
"demos" meaning "the people" fiund, as Glotz has noted, the 
constitutional theory of Athenian democracy was based on the 
principle that sovereignty was vested in the people, with 
citizenship entitling all members to equal rights in the 
governing process (1929:129,133). This principle of equality 
based on citizenship as articulated by thinkers such as 
Rousseau (The Social Contract:22) has had a great 
influence in the development of western liberal democratic 
theory. Bachrach has argued for example that it is based 
essentially on the presumption that man's dignity and 
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development as an effective and responsible member of society 
was dependent upon the opportunity to participate in the 
decisions that affected him (1967:98). Over time, however, 
the concept of democracy has taken on many meanings and has 
tended to be used and misused to describe a wide range of 
political associations. It is more meaningful, therefore, to 
clarify precisely what is meant by the expression democracy in 
terms of current usage. 
Walker (1966:31) and Pateman (1970:72) have done this 
by noting that there were really three types of democracy, 
namely, direct democracy (where everyone participated equally 
in making decisions), indirect or representative democracy 
(where everyone participated equally in deciding who should 
make the decisions) and consultative democracy (where 
decisions were made by those who wielded power but who were 
required to consult those who did not wield power). Pateman 
extended the analysis to distinguish the idea of industrial 
democracy which occurred only where there was full higher 
level participation by all employees in decision-making as 
distinct from routine decision-making. 
The excesses of extreme democracy caused Plato to 
prefer oligarchical control by an enlightened elite on the 
grounds that leadership should reflect a capacity for leading 
and for fostering law and order. This was seen by him to be a 
better criterion for ruling than the democratic criterion 
which was based solely on equal citizenship (The Republic. 
Book VIII:310-322). The word "oligarchy" was derived 
from the Greek "oligos" which meant "few". Thus the 
expression "oligarchy" referred to that form of government 
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where power was vested in the few. Plato saw rule by 
oligarchies as being based ideally on the appointment of 
executives on merit whereas democracy involved their election 
according to egalitarian preference (The Republic. 
Book VIII:310). 
Although oligarchical power structures might be 
justified on the grounds of their technical efficiency there 
has alweo^ s been the concern that the elite would cease to 
govern in the interests of the relevant constituencies but 
instead would be concerned more with their own self 
aggrandisement (Michels, 1915:408). Nevertheless Bachrach has 
noted that oligarchical control, and in particular control by 
managerial elites, has become the dominant characteristic of 
contemporary governing processes (1967:98). 
Universities have been obliged to confront the conflict 
which exists between democratic egalitarian pressures and 
elite meritocratic values. For example Rowe has argued on the 
basis of his experience as Vice-Chancellor of Adelaide 
University that: 
Egalitarianism is one manifestation of the 
massed mind which, surely, is one of the last 
things one wishes to see in a university 
(1960:128). 
On the other hand the egalitarian principle was asserted by a 
significant number of non-professorial staff and student 
activists during the early 1970s at the University of 
Queensland; they argued that the only relevant criterion for 
participation in University decision-making was membership of 
the University and that denial to them of such participation 
in view of their constitutional membership of the University 
amounted to their being treated like second-class citizens. 
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Given that the university as an institution is 
normatively concerned with the pursuit of excellence, (which 
implies emphasising merit rather than egalitarianism) it can 
be seen that there is a major ideological difference, and 
hence potential for conflict, between what Clark Kerr has 
called the "aristocracy of intellect" and democratic 
egalitarian values (1966:121). 
Although Baldridge has suggested that a majority of 
university members are relatively apathetic most of the time, 
a combination of the traditions of guild democracy, academic 
freedom, security of tenure and (usually) well developed 
critical faculties predispose many academic staff towards 
political attentiveness and occasionally activism when 
politically salient issues emerge (1971:178) The relative 
political sophistication exhibited by various university 
constituencies has tended to conflict with the organisational 
values inherent in the formal university structure. Schaffer 
concluded that the university was partly an organisation and 
partly a political community which made it particularly 
difficult to analyse and understand (1966:47) 
Aoademio Professionalism 
According to Rice there is an all-pervading culture of 
participatory democracy in universities (1970:91). Much of 
the assertion of democratic values within universities is 
derived from the norms of professionalism. Greenwood 
describes professionalisation as the process by which an 
occupation develops a distinctive sub-culture characterised by 
a set of values and norms derived from mastery of an esoteric 
body of knowledge. Professionalisation implies that as a 
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consequence of such an occupation providing high standards of 
ethical service, the community will come to recognise its 
legitimate authority and hence confer on it the privileges and 
obligations of professional status including the exclusive 
right to perform its work as well as regulate and evaluate 
standards of practice (1966:9-19). 
A major problem in analysing organisational behaviour 
in universities is that it is unrealistic to speak of an 
"academic profession" as if there is such a unified entity. 
Rather, academic work is characterised more by heterogeneity 
than homogeneity. Clark has summed up this situation in the 
following terms: 
(in universities) there are 12, 25 or 50 
clusters of experts. The experts are prone to 
identify with their own disciplines, and the 
"academic profession" over-all comes off a poor 
second ... The campus is not a closely-knit 
group of professionals who see the world from 
one perspective (1966:288). 
This heterogeneity is largely a consequence of the socialising 
influences which occur during the usually lengthy training 
undertaken by academic staff in which the distinctive norms of 
their particular disciplines are internalised. The differing 
norms of the constituent disciplines could be expected to 
manifest in different attitudes towards the major activities 
carried out within universities. 
Notwithstanding this heterogeneity which militated 
against the emergence of a unified "academic profession", it 
is possible to identify certain common denominators which are 
the essence of professionalism and which underlay virtually 
all occupations that require lengthy periods of formal 
training. According to Freidson the essence of 
professionalism is self-regulated control over personal 
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expertise (1971:33-34). Because professional work is supposed 
to be complex, it cannot be reduced to standard operating 
procedures which are amenable to control by externally imposed 
bureaucratic rules. Rather the emphasis is on individual 
professional judgement and discretion with accountability 
through peer evaluation given that only peers possess the 
necessary level of knowledge to make valid assessments of 
professional work (Etzioni, 1964:76-77). 
The foregoing bears out Scott's observation that 
although academics differ in some respects from professionals 
there are also many similarities (1979:26). The differences 
tend to arise as a consequence of academics being employed in 
universities (which are large and complex organisations) 
rather than being self-employed, although it is acknowledged 
that many professionals employed in business and government 
organisations face similar role conflicts. 
The authority of knowledge has conferred on academic 
staff a special role in the governance of organisations such 
as universities whose central mission is the advancement eund 
dissemination of knowledge (Moodie & Eustace, 1974:233). The 
nature of the university mission and the central role of 
academic staff in its prosecution have fostered the emergence 
of the principles of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy. Cowen has articulated the rationale behind those 
concepts: 
Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are 
related, but are not, in their central aspects, 
necessarily synonymous ... academic freedom is 
that freedom of the academic community which 
underlies the performance of the functions of 
teaching and research; it is freedom of 
inquiry, of competition among ideas, a freedom 
to speak and to advocate one's own and it may 
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be, unpopular ideas. It is a necessary 
condition for proper inquiry, for the search 
for new knowledge .., Institutional autonomy 
is the liberty of the university to govern 
itself free of outside controls ... to plan 
their own courses ... recruit their own staff 
and students and determine their own lines of 
development (1974:18). 
The Emergenoe of Aoademio Bureauoratisation 
While deploring the trend towards bureaucratisation in 
universities, Andreski has commented on how academic freedom 
and academic participation in decision-making have often been 
abused. He suggested that: 
It is by no means obvious that internal 
democratization within institutions of higher 
learning is in any way conducive to freedom of 
thought, because control by a crowd may be more 
stultifying than by a single boss (1976:58) 
One consequence of academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy has been the recent public perception that 
universities were inefficient. Much of this alleged 
inefficiency has been perceived as being directly the result 
of academic staff having too much say in the governance of 
their institutions without being held properly accountable. 
But it has not just been the public, which could be dismissed 
as uninformed and prejudiced, that has been critical of the 
way universities in Australia have been administered. The 
Academic Salaries Tribunal has remarked that: 
The committee structure of universities ... 
accompanied by masses of paper and days full of 
talk would horrify a person with training and 
experience in the commercial and industrial 
world. However much the notion of 
"participatory democracy" might have meaning 
and value for the academic community, 
universities must realise that there has to be 
a limit on the time and money expended on the 
many departmental and other consultative or 
advisory committees composed of all levels of 
staff and students (1976:128). 
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Cowen observed that although the governing procedures 
of universities were often slow and cumbersome they did enjoy 
the advantage, while there was some measure of consensus among 
members of the university concerning its values and goals, of 
facilitating agreement among a highly diverse range of 
individuals and groups regarding often quite contentious 
issues. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, this 
"fragile consensus" had broken down and there was no suitable 
administrative machinery immediately available to replace it 
(1974:8-12). 
Universities were forced to adapt their systems of 
governance to meet the new circumstances. While some 
democratic reforms were conceded, the conditions were created 
for a subsequent compensating swing towards greater 
systemisation and hierarchical control in the interests of 
efficiency and accountability (Baldridge et al, 1978:232). It 
has now been suggested by some writers such as Arblaster 
(1974:9,134) that this swing has gone too far and that as a 
result of excessive bureaucratisation in universities, there 
is evidence of a displacement of goals as efficiency becomes 
valued more than freedom, and democratic forms of decision-
making become equated with inefficiency and disorder. 
Models of Governanoe 
Becher argued that universities followed not just one 
but at least four models of organisational behaviour, namely, 
anarchical, collegial, hierarchical (i.e. bureaucratic) and 
political (1984:192-193). 
o Anarohioal Model 
Cohen and March described the organised anarchy model 
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of university governance as resembling a "garbage can" 
decision-making process. In this process participants 
contributed to decision-making only to the extent possible in 
the light of other competing demands on their time. Partly as 
a consequence of this but also as a result of their ill-
defined preferences as well as the characteristic unclear 
technology in higher education (i.e., the lack of a clear 
connection between many decisions and the quality of 
educational outcomes), there was very little resolution of 
policy problems (1974:3,83-91). Although Cohen and March's 
analysis has provided some useful insights, in the writer's 
view the "garbage can" model of decision-making is exaggerated 
and provides an unbalanced representation of the policy 
process by deemphasising the importance of leadership and the 
usually extensive bureaucratic systemisation which exists in 
most large complex organisations. 
o Collegial Model 
The origins of the idea of the university as a 
collegium can be traced back to the egalitarian practices of 
Athenian democracy over two thousand years ago and the 
egalitarian practices of guild democracy which were 
characteristic of medieval times. The significance of this 
for university governance can be seen by the fact that 
sovereignty i.e., the right to participate in all legislative 
processes as well as the power to appoint and dismiss the 
executive were vested equally in all citizens in the case of 
Athenian democracy and in all members in the case of the 
medieval guilds. 
The idea of a collegium was based on the concept of 
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community and the principle that by the free and open exchange 
of views among equals, a consensus would emerge which was 
derived from the force of argument rather than the force of 
bureaucratic fiat (Millett, 1962:235). Millett's perception, 
however, gives insufficient weight to the reality of hierarchy 
and denies its role in providing coordination and leadership. 
A contrary view has been taken by Parker. He has 
argued that where hierarchical authority existed, consultation 
of the membership always remained an act of grace no matter 
how assiduously it might be practised. When one cut through 
the shibboleths surrounding the use of such expressions as 
collegium, one was faced with the legal reality that 
university staff were employees of the organisation and the 
constitutional membership of academic staff had little 
practical meaning because binding rules and decisions on 
important matters were made by bodies within the university 
which were constituted by higher authority and not by the rank 
and file members. Parker concluded, therefore, that: 
... it is futile to start with the fiction of 
the "self-governing community" (1965:18). 
The rhetoric of collegiality and consensus often 
glosses over the reality that cooperation is achieved 
sometimes only after extensive conflict (Baldridge, 1971:14). 
Where conditions involving diversity of values, goal ambiguity 
and unclear technology obtained, decisions could often be 
reached only by the application of power (Pfeffer, 1981:30). 
The reason that the idealised view of the university as 
a collegium has endured in the face of the bureaucratisation 
and politicisation of universities could be attributed to 
Pfeffer's observation that great care was usually taken by the 
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real locus of power (the central executive) to give the 
appearance of faculty governance. If this symbolic 
reassurance, involving the use of elaborate committee 
structures to create the illusion of shared power was not 
given, it would violate academic and professional norms and 
this could lead to opposition (1981:208-209). 
At the same time even apathetic members of the 
university community have become increasingly aware of how 
bureaucratic "extra-system intervention" has been used to 
shorten what Willett has called the cumbersome "'natural' 
response rate" of traditional "bottom-up" decision-making 
processes. Each such intervention has the potential to expose 
the mythology of the collegium and to weaken trust in the 
traditional system (1972:112). And when trust in the 
administration was weakened, militancy tended to increase and 
a "we-they" conflict mentality emerged where proposals for 
reform were evaluated not so much on the basis of their 
relative merits but rather from subjective assessments of the 
motives of the proponents (Baldridge et al, 1978:152,169). As 
mistrust grew, the conditions of collegial decision-making 
ceased to operate and bureaucratic mechanisms were imposed in 
order to enforce accountability (Wildavsky, 1979:38,209). 
o Bureaucratio Model 
The notion of a university as a bureaucracy is 
somewhat iconoclastic since it contradicts the mythology of 
the university seen as a collegium. In this connection, 
bureaucracy evokes ideas of legal authority based primarily on 
hierarchical position for efficiency purposes rather than the 
authority of knowledge for the purpose of finding truth. 
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Arblaster has eloquently captured the criticisms relating to 
bureaucracy in universities: 
Like bureaucracies everywhere they tend to see 
everything in bureaucratic terms, in terms of 
smooth and efficient administration .., They 
lose sight of the fundamental purposes of 
education because they have lost touch with the 
fundamental activities of education. As 
bureaucrats it is natural that they should 
value freedom less than efficiency and regard 
democracy as a synonym for inefficiency and 
disorder (1974:134). 
Given that with popular usage the term bureaucracy has 
increasingly taken on pejorative overtones, it is necessary to 
define precisely what is meant by the expression. Bureaucracy 
refers to that form of organisation which is: 
o based on a hierarchy of offices each possessing legal-
rational authority over a defined sphere of competence; 
o organised on the principle of a highly specialised 
division of labour; 
o subject to systematised rules and procedures which are 
applied having regard to the principle of due process; 
o characterised by technical-rationality rather than 
sentiment or tradition; 
o concerned with the achievement of given goals in the 
most efficient manner possible (Weber, 1969:330-334). 
The need for order, stability and predictability from 
reliable role performance by members of large complex 
organisations has made the process of bureaucratisation a 
long-term historical phenomenon. Indeed according to Weber, 
"the most crucial phenomenon of the modern Western State" has 
been the inexorable trend towards increasing organisational 
bureaucratisation in the interests of greater rationality and 
efficiency (1969:337). Weber has noted that the history of 
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the western tradition in governance commenced with collegial 
bodies but has eventually succumbed to the forces of 
bureaucratisation as the need for efficient and rapid 
decision-making displaced the inefficiency of collegial 
discussion (1969:398). Referring to more recent times, Scott 
has argued that the all-pervasive ideology of modern 
managerial ism - "technological determinism" (or the search for 
the most efficient means to achieve organisational goals) has 
been the major factor in the depoliticisation (and hence the 
increasing bureaucratisation) of modern complex organisations 
(1969:43-53). The movement in universities towards increasing 
layers of hierarchical review, more systemisation and the use 
of committee structures for advisory rather than executive 
functions bears witness to this tendency towards 
bureaucratisation. 
The resource scarcity which has affected most 
universities especially over the past decade has led to a 
situation where bureaucratic resource management was 
increasingly determining academic priorities. Baldridge et al 
have commented that higher education seemed to be entering a 
period of public management - calling for increased 
formularization, system-wide uniformity, highly centralized 
authority structures and internal systemisation (1978:232). 
With the increasing complexity of the university's 
relationship with its environment (especially funding bodies) 
and with the increasing pressure to demonstrate accountability 
mainly by the efficient use of resources, university 
governance has taken on a maneigerial emphasis. This 
managerial emphasis has reflected the process of 
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bureaucratisation. Efficiency and rationality, according to 
this process, were more likely if technical knowledge of the 
law, finance, administration and computing was employed to 
cope with environmental complexity. The administrative 
process itself has become professionalised to the extent that 
it has become dependent on the application of specialised 
technical knowledge capable of competing on at least equal 
terms with academic judgement. As with the case of public 
administration generally, university administration has ceased 
to be hospitable to the "enlightened amatevjr" (Fielden & 
Lockwood, 1973:189). 
Many writers have highlighted the crucial importance of 
the administrative "guardians" who control interactions 
between the organisation and its environment (Rice, 1970:8; 
Katz & Kahn, 1966:24). The present study will suggest a 
number of historical, cultural and political reasons for this 
managerial ascendancy in universities but it is important to 
note that structural reasons may also be important. Applying 
Hickson et al's Strategic Contingencies Theory of intra-
organisational power, it is clear that senior university 
administrators, through their control over management 
information systems, their strategic location in the inter-and 
intra-organisational communication network and their legally 
sanctioned authority would be most likely to operate as a 
dominant coalition (1971:216-229). The executive's central 
location in the network of power gives it a pervasive and 
immediate impact on the organisation's activities; moreover 
its function cannot be legally exercised by other authority 
i.e., it is non-substitutable; but most importantly the 
executive's boundary maintenance role and its more uniform and 
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coherent perceptions tend to make its definition of 
environmental reality more plausible than those advanced by 
the more fragmented academic structure. The executive's 
ability to absorb uncertainty enables it to be decisive in the 
policy process because it can usually argue from the position 
of superior knowledge except in relation to that relatively 
narrow range of academic matters where there are no resource 
implications. 
o Political Model 
According to Baldridge, the political model 
represented the most realistic description of the university 
governance process (1971:15). This model is concerned with 
the study of conflict and cooperation and how power and 
authority are used as the means by which the various 
participants in the policy process seek to manipulate the 
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internal and external environment to achieve their preferred 
outcomes. 
Dahl's comments on the need to clarify where the locus 
of real power resides (as distinct from formal or potential 
power) are apposite to a comprehensive understanding of the 
policy process since the distinction between the rituals and 
the realities of power is frequently obscure (1961:89). In 
the university setting, this obscurity was a function of 
environmental and organisational complexity. Political 
conflict was a consequence of the heterogeneous values and 
goals of: 
the complex fragmented social structure of the 
university emd its "publics", drawing on the 
divergent concerns and life styles of hundreds 
of miniature subcultures (Baldridge, 1971:20). 
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Although Baldridge has remained committed to the 
political model as the closest approximation of university 
behaviour, it is noteworthy that in a subsequent co-authored 
study, this support was qualified by the observation that the 
1971 study had probably underestimated the importance of 
routine bureaucratic processes and might have given 
insufficient weight to the central role of environmental 
pressures in shaping university decision processes. Baldridge 
et al also acknowledged the need to emphasise more the formal 
structural factors of universities in relation to 
understanding their policy processes (1977:19). 
The foregoing discussion bears out Walker's remark that 
universities do not conform to any single model of 
organisation but rather that they possess elements of several 
models (1966:36). This underlines the need to develop a 
paradigm which synthesises the elements of various models in 
order to provide a freunework for eunalysing the policy process 
in universities. For the purposes of this study, the 
development of such a paradigm had its origins in Allison's 
conceptualisation of three basic policy making models. These 
comprised Model 1 - the rational actor or classical model, 
Model 2 - the organisational process model and Model 3 - the 
governmental (bureaucratic) politics model (1971:5). 
0 Model 1 - The rational aotor or olassioal model 
The rational actor or classical model of decision-
making is based on the assumption that most organisational 
behaviour is essentially goal directed and hence is not much 
affected by informal factors or environmental influences. The 
relevant organisational model is Weber's "ideal-type" of 
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bureaucracy described earlier. 
o Model 2 - The organisational prooess model 
Model One's reasoning, while still influential in the 
prescriptive world of management science literature, has been 
supplemented in more recent years by system theories of 
organisational behaviour derived from the Structural -
Functionalism school of sociology. Representative writers in 
the systems school, such as Katz and Kahn, have argued that 
organisations were open systems which exchanged outputs to the 
environment for resource inputs. Hence organisations were 
held to be concerned primarily with adapting to the 
environment to ensure their own survival (1966:23-24). 
More recent studies by structural-functionalists such 
as Greenwood et al have argued, in what is known as "Strategic 
Contingencies Theory", that organisational structure and 
behaviour tended to be shaped by the particular context in 
which they were embedded. This view asserted that such 
factors as the degree of functional differentiation were 
determined to a significant extent by environmental conditions 
such as the rate of technological change and the prevailing 
economic climate (1975:2). The level of organisational 
performance was supposed to depend on the "goodness of fit" 
between organisation structure and environment. The many 
examples of organisations which suffered from inefficiencies 
and which had structures that were inappropriate for their 
environmental context were "explained" by the catch-all 
assertion that "organisational politics" had prevented the 
natural evolution of a more appropriate match (Greenwood et 
al, 1975:3). 
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This is not to suggest that strategic contingencies 
theories of organisational behaviour have not been unaware 
of the question of power. On the contrary Hinings et al have 
argued that: 
Contingencies (theory) need rounding out with a 
consideration of the important political and 
interactive processes within organizations ,,. 
(1975:189). 
However, to the limited extent that strategic contingencies 
theorists have addressed the concept of power, it has been 
confined mainly to formal, structural patterns. This has been 
very much an artificially circumscribed, one-dimensional 
approach to the study of organisational behaviour. More 
recent writers such as Pfeffer, while acknowledging that 
individual and sub-unit power was a function of structural 
position, have gone well beyond structural-functionalist 
organisational theory to include political variables in order 
to explain organisational behaviour. These variables have 
included the nature and extent of coalition building, 
cooptation processes, the use of symbolic language, the 
manipulation of decision premises and the personal 
characteristics of organisational leaders (1981:137-229). 
The reluctance of writers in the rationalist and 
systems theory schools to apply political theory to explain 
organisational behaviour is perhaps understandable even though 
unjustified. Allison has noted that the extraordinary 
complexity of bureaucratic politics in organisations had 
resulted in many policy studies avoiding the difficult task of 
developing theoretical propositions by imposing "rationality" 
on the process - in effect describing what ought to have 
happened given certain technically-rational assumptions rather 
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than analysing what actually did happen (1971:146,174). 
Pfeffer has suggested that this is possibly because of the 
prevailing ethos of rationality and efficiency fostered by the 
management science literature (1981:8-11). 
o Model 3 - The Governmental (Bureaucratic> Politics Model 
This model focuses on the politics of organisations: 
... the Governmental (or Bureaucratic) 
Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather 
many actors as players - players who focus not 
on a single strategic issue but on many diverse 
... problems as well; players who act in terms 
of no consistent set of strategic objectives 
but rather according to various conceptions of 
... organizational and personal goals; 
players who make ... decisions not by a single, 
rational choice but by the pulling and hauling 
that is politics (Allison, 1971:144). 
Perhaps this model is also somewhat unbalanced, relying 
excessively on a political explanation of organisational 
behaviour. To the extent that it does, it is inadequate 
because it gives insufficient weight to the wide range of 
environmental and internal structural factors that should also 
be taken into account. 
Pfeffer has attempted to construct a more unified and 
balanced model which comprises systems variables (e.g. 
environment), structural variables (e.g. differentiation, 
interdependence) and political variables (e.g. distribution of 
power, conflict) (1981:69). Pfeffer suggests that conflict is 
common in complex organisations when certain conditions are 
satisfied. The origins of conflict can be traced back to the 
need for highly differentiated and interdependent role 
structures operating within an environment which is perceived 
in different ways by different organisational actors. 
According to Pfeffer's model, conflict is exacerbated by 
38 
resource scarcity especially where the policy issue is seen to 
be important and where the distribution of benefits and 
burdens is likely to produce clear winners euid losers. In 
such circumstances the policy process is said to be 
characterised by political bargaining. 
Despite the major advances made by Pfeffer's 
conceptualisation, the model fails to make sufficient 
allowance for that large area of organisational behaviour that 
is distinguished by systematised bureaucratic procedures and 
cooperation rather than conflict. In this connection 
Baldridge et al (1978:42) went so far to suggest that 
"standard operating procedures dominate in most orgsinizations" 
and Baldridge (1971:203) argued that the conflict model of 
politics needs to be modified by the recognition that tactical 
cooperation in organisations may be just as common as 
conflict. Accordingly Pfeffer's political model, when applied 
to university governance, needs to be adapted by the 
acknowledgement that university policy making typically 
exhibits both political and bureaucratic styles of behaviour 
at the same time recognising that such behaviours often 
interact to produce cooperation as well as conflict. 
An adaptation of Pfeffer's model to embody the 
bureaucratic dimension and which builds on the thinking of 
writers such as Allison (1971), Child (1972), Dyson (1976), 
and Wildavsky (1979) is shown below. This paradigm was also 
influenced by Jenkins' (1978:253) exhortation that the most 
productive direction for future research in policy studies is 
to attempt to integrate relevant concepts derived from 
political science with principles drawn from organisational 
theory. 
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Diagram 2.1: A Model of the Conditions Producing 
Bureaucratic Politics in Organisational 
Decision-Making 
This diagram suggests that large functionally diverse 
organisations with multiple sources of power which interact 
with a complex environment are characterised by heterogeneous 
values and goals. Key actors seeking to introduce change into 
such organisations often face opposition from 
institutionalised interest groups and hence are sometimes 
obliged to resort to political behaviour in order to pursue 
their objectives. A crucial aspect of such behaviour is the 
leader's interpretation of the situation and definition of the 
policy problem. Where such definitions of "reality" are 
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imposed on a policy issue regarded as important or contentious 
in an organisation characterised by heterogeneous values and 
goals and suffering from resource scarcity, the stage is set 
for political conflict. Because leaders usually prefer to 
achieve their objectives with a minimum of disruption to the 
organisation, they seek to absorb and contain dysfunctional 
conflict by providing structured processes which minimise the 
possibility of conflict spilling over and affecting the 
organisation's other ongoing activities. The use of 
ad hoc committees of inquiry together with regularised 
procedures for internal review have the effect of structuring 
interaction and bureaucratising conflict. 
In summary, systematised bureaucratic procedures 
moderate the political behaviour and conflict which would 
otherwise be likely to continue unchecked if the various 
protagonists to the policy process insisted on pursuing 
ideological purity in a less structured policy environment. 
As a consequence the policy outcome usually reflects a degree 
of tactical cooperation in reaching pragmatic compromises, a 
phenomenon described in this thesis as the process of 
bureaucratic politics. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLtlTTON OF THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide eun historical 
and cultural context within which it might be possible to 
understand the structural characteristics of the University of 
Queensland in 1969, the starting point for the analysis of 
changes within the University in subsequent chapters. 
Hiatorioal Evolution of the University Idea 
Walker's approach to explaining modern university 
behaviour was to study first their historical antecedents and 
cultural underpinnings. An understanding of these factors 
together with an appreciation of the ideals underpinning the 
institution were more likely to contribute to explanations of 
how organisational structures and processes had evolved than 
management science's presumption that most organisational 
behaviour was goal directed and that, as a consequence, 
"rational" organisational forms were directly related to 
organisational goals. As Walker observed: 
... most university administrators have little 
appreciation of the historical antecedents of 
the modern university and consequently do not 
always understand why the animal behaves as it 
does ... (Walker, 1978:1). 
The word "university" was derived from the Latin 
"universitas vestra" which means "the whole of you" i.e., 
a group of persons and in the twelfth century the term was 
used to describe the guilds of masters, students, 
professionals and artisans which were constituted as means of 
collective self-protection (Rashdall, 1936 (I):5). These 
guilds were essentially self-governing and enjoyed a 
considerable degree of autonomy from the state. By the end of 
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the twelfth century, the expression "universitas" was commonly 
used to describe specifically the scholastic body i.e., the 
corporation of masters and students. 
Control of admission to membership of the guild of 
masters became the means by which the masters were able to 
exercise a degree of autonomy and self-regulation which is 
characteristic of the learned professions today. Even though 
the issuing of the licence to teach was vested in the 
University Chancellor, full membership of the guild was 
granted by the masters only to those possessing the licence 
and who had also ceremonially "incepted", i.e., given their 
inaugural public lecture before the critical audience of their 
peers (Rashdall, 1936(1):148-153). 
In modern universities too, the selection of academic 
staff is usually the responsibility of academic staff 
predominantly drawn from the field of scholarship in which the 
vacancy exists. The principle at stake in ancient times and 
which is the hallmark of professional and academic life today 
is for collegial control of entry to the profession on the 
grounds that only peers have the necessary expertise to be 
able to judge the competence of practitioners in their field 
of esoteric knowledge. At the present stage of evolution 
universities have developed domains of authority where, 
provided the relevant constituencies within the university 
respect the boundaries of those domains and harbour no 
territorial ambitions, relative harmony may prevail. Thus 
"zones of acceptance" exist for example in relation to 
decisions made by academic staff concerning academic staff 
selection whereas budgetary decisions relating to the creation 
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of academic staff positions tend to be vested more with the 
governing body and the executive. Should either constituency 
seek to alter this distribution of decision-making authority, 
political conflict would be the expected result. 
According to Ashby, Australian universities were direct 
descendents of the British university tradition (1966:36). 
The origins of British university tradition can be found in 
the cultural ethos nurtured over the centuries at the 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge, modified in the light of 
the values and ideals which filtered into Britain from the 
German and North American experience during the nineteenth 
century. Thus, even though the concept of university self-
governance had its origins at Bologna and Paris, it was at 
Oxford that it took on the enduring strength of meaning which 
has given academic freedom and institutional autonomy such 
symbolic significance today. 
Civic university colleges were established in England 
last century because of the growing recognition of the 
importance of universities to the economic prosperity of the 
nation. When universities were of little consequence to 
material welfare there was no need for them to be publicly 
accountable for their performance. But with their potential 
to contribute to economic growth accompanied by their receipt 
of increasing financial support from the government, 
universities became subject to demands for greater public 
accountability. 
The governing bodies of civic university colleges in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century comprised mainly 
industrialists who had contributed large sums towards 
establishment costs together with other local leading citizens 
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and representatives of the relevant local authorities. The 
academic staff was not normally represented on governing 
bodies. Instead the convention emerged for the professoriate 
to constitute itself as an academic senate (Moodie and 
Eustace, 1974:29-31). 
Over time, especially after the federal structure of 
civic universities gave way to the establishment of unitary 
institutions the professoriate, individually as heads of 
academic departments and collectively as academic senates 
"while still largely advisory, began to acquire both formal 
rights and, more important, extensive customary rights of 
decision-making" (Moodie and Eustace, 1974:31). The value 
system based on the ancient guild idea of a "self-governing 
community" had set limits on the extent to which formal 
hierarchical authority was customarily exercised in early 
twentieth century examples of the modern "two-tier" 
university. 
The Origins of the University of Queensland 
Ashby has commented that when universities were 
established, they tended to be copies adapted from 
historically and culturally relevant models to suit local 
needs (1966:5). Developing that theme, Clarke has suggested 
that: 
The University of Queensland, the result of 
adaption of several models to the situation in 
Queensland, was not the result of the vision of 
a particular individual or a group of people, 
but a compromise, different individuals and 
groups playing important roles at different 
periods of time, influenced stongly by such 
theories as Utilitarianism and Social 
Darwinism, with local, state, national and 
international influences involved (1973:iii). 
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Queensland's utilitarian priorities and the need for strong 
government control over the University to facilitate their 
achievement were alluded to by the Premier of Queensland at 
the time of the University's establishment in 1909: 
... I think it is desirable that the 
representatives of the people should have 
effective control over the system of teaching 
in the University ... I do not put the 
University by any means in advance of technical 
education ... We desire ... to make the 
University in Queensland a good modern high-
class school on the lines of practical and 
scientific instruction that the newest 
Universities in America and England have 
adopted (QPD, Vol. 104, 9/11/09:106,107). 
There is little doubt that the organisation and 
educational objectives of the recently established civic 
university colleges in England and especially the so-called 
"land-grant" colleges established after 1862 in the United 
States of America were influential in the climate of opinion 
which led to the formation of the University of Queensland in 
1909 (Clarke, 1973:122). Indeed the establishment of the 
civic university colleges in England in the nineteenth century 
was heavily influenced by the practical contributions made by 
the "land-grant" colleges to the economic welfare of the 
United States. They were organised more on the need for 
business efficiency rather than to preserve such traditional 
ideals as academic freedom. The different ethos and 
objectives of such institutions were reflected in their 
pattern of governance where, according to Ashby: 
The significant feature of lay control in 
American universities and colleges is that in 
law sovereignty resides in the trustees, not in 
the faculty. The faculty members are employees 
of the trustees (1966:12). 
So the pattern of governance selected for the 
University of Queensland reflected the value placed by the 
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Government on the need for hierarchical control, institutional 
accountability and business-like efficiency. Thus the 
University of Queensland Act of 1909. which was the 
enabling legislation for the establishment of the University 
provided for a unitary institution funded by a combination of 
State Government endowment and student fees and consisting of 
a Senate, a Council as well as graduate and undergraduate 
students. The governing body was defined as the Senate and 
the Council. The Council, later called Convocation, was 
comprised primarily of graduates of the University of 
Queensland. Although the first Senate of twenty members were 
all appointed by the Governor in Council, provision was made 
for the Council to elect ten of the members of Senate leaving 
the remaining ten members to be appointed by the Governor in 
Council. There was a statutory limit of three salaried 
officers of the University who could serve on the Senate at 
any one time. The main significance of these constitutional 
arrangements was that staff were clearly seen as employees 
rather than as members of the University. 
No specific provision was made in the legislation for 
the establishment of a senior academic body equivalent to a 
Professorial or Academic Board. Rather, the Act provided for 
the establishment of three faculties (Arts, Science and 
Engineering) with the boards of those individual faculties 
having direct access to the Senate on virtually all academic 
matters within their jurisdiction. From 1911 until it was 
replaced by the Professorial Board in 1938, the central 
academic body which provided advice to the Senate on academic 
matters that affected more than one faculty was the combined 
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Board of Faculties. Despite the fact that the Board of 
Faculties consisted initially of the Chancellor, Vice-
Chancellor and the four foundation professors, much of the 
task of advising the Senate on academic matters was vested in 
a standing committee of the Senate, the Education Committee, 
established in 1911. According to Chester: 
... this method of (the Senate) working largely 
through advisory committees ... was to persist 
for many years; delegation of authority was 
minimal (1964:30,36,38). 
In common with a number of other Australian 
universities at the time (e.g. Melbourne and Adelaide) there 
was no permanent full time Vice-Chancellor as chief executive 
officer. Instead, from 1910 to 1960, the Senate elected one 
of its members to serve as Vice-Chancellor. The effect of 
this was to concentrate much of the day-to-day administration 
of the University in the Senate itself, working through the 
Administrative Committee (established in 1910), with much of 
the execution of University policy devolving on the permanent 
full-time office of Registrar. 
The purpose of outlining briefly some of the features 
of the formal organisation of the University of Queensland at 
the time of its establishment has been to show the highly 
centralised nature of the University which, although nominally 
of the "two-tier" model, was in reality more one-dimensional 
with relatively slight academic influence. On the other hand 
the control of the Government, through the Department of 
Public Instruction was strong. The first Vice-Chancellor 
(R.H. Roe) was, at the time of his election, the State 
Inspector General of Education and the foundation Chairman of 
the Administrative Committee and the Finance Committee of the 
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Senate (J.D. Story) was at the time the Under Secretary of the 
Department of Public Instruction (Bryan, 1966:53-54). But 
although the professoriate and other academic staff were in a 
de .jure weak position, the combination of an inexperienced 
Senate, eun honorary rather than paid Vice-Chancellor and the 
Senate's dependence on the experience and competence of the 
foundation professors, led to considerable de facto power 
on academic matters being devolved over time to the Board of 
Faculties (Bryan, 1966:26). 
Government Relations and Funding 
The University of Queensland's historical background 
shows that its founders expressed clear expectations that the 
University would become a vital contributor to the State's 
economic development. To ensure that these expectations were 
fulfilled the Queensland Government had taken a strongly 
interventionist line which reached its apotheosis with the 
introduction of the National Education Co-Ordination sind 
the University of Queensland Acts Amendment Act of 1941. 
This infamous Act, which provided for fourteen of the twenty 
five member Senate to be appointed by the Governor in Council 
and which guaranteed only one academic appointee on the 
governing body (the President of the Professorial Board) aimed 
to restrict the University's autonomy by providing for its 
integration into the overall State system of education. 
The importance of this piece of legislation (parts of 
which were to remain in force until the 1965 amendments) was 
that it promoted the norm of direct Government influence over 
the running of the University. In addition, it provided the 
background against which an intractable mythology developed. 
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namely, that the University of Queensland was administered as 
if it were just an extension of the Department of 
Education. (1) This mythology continued in a robust form at 
least up to the Commonwealth Government's assumption of 
responsibility for full tertiary funding in 1974; it has 
contributed to the normative base which has guided the process 
of bureaucratisation that this thesis argues was evident 
during the reform of the University's system of governance 
from 1969 - 1982. 
It is possible to identify many forms of control 
potentially available to the State Government but three 
principal mechanisms merit particular comment. They are: 
o The Government's administrative arrangements whereby 
the Minister for Education's responsibilities include 
the administration of the University of Queensland Act. 
Q The Governor in Council's appointees on the Senate 
which normally include four permanent heads of public 
service departments. 
Q The State Government's financial power in determining 
what level of funding would be provided for the 
purposes of the University. 
The Gair Government's 1957 amendment to the University 
of Queensland Act sought without success to impose an Appeals 
Board on the University and there was also the occasional 
outburst by Ministers which had the effect of demonstrating 
(1) This mythology was reinforced by the perception that 
J.D. Story as Vice-Chancellor tended to equate the 
University of Queensland as a branch of the Queensland 
Public Service. Story had served as Under Secretary of 
the Department of Public Instruction (1906-1918) and as 
Public Service Commissioner (1919-1939) (Thomis, 
1985:226-227,240). 
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the Government's lack of sensitivity to and awareness of 
University values. But the events in the few years 
immediately prior to 1969 which brought the University and the 
Government into more direct contact were the process of 
amending the University of Queensland Act in December 1965 and 
the student disturbances that occurred after 1966. 
The Staff Association in 1965 perceived the Senate as 
an instrument of the Government because of the Senate's 
rejection of the Association's proposals for greater academic 
staff representation on the Senate (Pryor, 1966:86-87). For 
its part the Government was not prepared to extend academic 
staff representation by removing the restriction on the number 
of academics who could be elected by the Convocation of 
University graduates. After the opposition mounted by the 
Staff Association to the 1957 amendments, the Government was 
wary of the possibility of allowing academic staff to gain a 
significantly increased voice on the governing body (QPD, Vol. 
242, 25/11/65:1860). 
The Government's desire to maintain control of the 
University was given greater point as a result of the student 
disturbances of the post-1966 period especially when it was 
known that some academic staff had also participated. The 
Government was aware of the fact that activist academics had 
been involved in illegal street marches and that they were 
demanding "radical reform" of the University's system of 
governance (SF, 31/3/69:2). Although the Government was 
concerned over the effect on popular opinion of media reports 
about "radicalism" at the University, it was prepared to 
acknowledge that the University had become a large and complex 
institution and that some of the earlier forms of extant 
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control were anachronistic. For example the 1965 amendments 
to the Act removed the provision for an Academic Standing 
Committee to be chaired by the Director General of Education. 
Even though Statute No. 4 (Standing Committees of the Senate) 
made pursuant to the revised Act provided for an Academic 
Committee to advise the Senate on the "academic and 
educational affairs and teaching arrangements of the 
University, " the reality was that the Senate Committee became 
inactive and the main advisory role to the Senate on academic 
matters was taken over by the Professorial Board. It was 
nevertheless important symbolically that in 1966 the Vice-
Chancellor became the chairman of the Academic Committee in 
the place of the Director General of Education. 
Prior to the establishment of the Australian 
Universities Commission in 1959, the University of 
Queensland's budgetary negotiations had been uncomplicated 
exercises based largely on relatively informal negotiations 
between Vice-Chancellor Story and the State Treasury.(2) The 
assessment of budgetary needs was on an annual rather than a 
triennial basis. These unsophisticated budgetary methods and 
the complete absence of forward planning were typical of 
Australian universities at the time (Murray Report, 1957:99). 
The establishment of the Australian Universities 
Commission was accompanied by the need for the University of 
Queensland, along with all other universities, to prepare far 
(2) Under the formula of one pound from the Commonwealth 
for every three pounds received by a university from 
tuition fees and state grants, the University of 
Queensland by 1957 was receiving the equivalent of 
$600,000 from the Commonwealth or 23.15% of its total 
revenue for that year (Statistics, 1969:260; 
Mathews, 1972:84-87; Gallagher, 1982:48-50). 
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more elaborate submissions for funding than had previously 
been the case. Developmental needs had to be assessed up to 
five years in advance. This increasing centralisation of 
control was reflected in the fact that by 1969, the Australian 
Universities Commission required Universities to collect 
statistical data for no less than eighteen forms including 
details of income and expenditure as well as data on staff, 
students, course enrolments, qualifications awarded sind 
library operations. Within the University of Queensland the 
collection and analysis of statistical data by the Central 
Administration ostensibly in response to requests from the 
Commission, provided the means by which the bureaucracy 
acquired great influence over the policy process. 
Notwithstanding the increasing standardisation and 
systemisation that became necessary as a consequence of the 
search for greater statistical regularity, there was still a 
great deal of ambiguity over where the line should be drawn 
between the need for the Commission to promote "balanced" 
development across the university sector and the rights of 
individual universities to exercise their autonomy in 
determining the pace and direction of institutional 
development (Williams, 1972:231-232). Thus for example the 
University of Queensland's action in 1962 in establishing its 
own computing facility in advance of the Commission's 
approval meant that in the years ahead, the University 
received a much lower level of support for capital expenditure 
on computing compared with other Australian universities 
(Holmes Report, 1/12/80:21). 
It might have been expected that the Queensland 
Government was in a strong position to exercise influence over 
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the University of Queensland by virtue of the latter's 
dependence on the State in 1969 for 42.6% of its recurrent 
revenue as well as for 50% of its capital funding. The State 
and the Commonwealth had agreed on a recurrent funding formula 
whereby the Commonwealth undertook to provide grants to match 
the State grants in the proportion of $1 by the Commonwealth 
for each $1.85 provided by the State. By a process of 
historical evolution the State Government required the 
University of Queensland to find approximately 67 cents 
(mainly from tuition fees) of each $1.85 it provided to match 
the Commonwealth grant (Memo, DVC(F&F) to Chairman, Augmented 
SC, 5/4/71). The key decision in this funding formula was 
that of the State Government because the Australian 
Universities Commission in discussions with the State Treasury 
would normally seek to establish the level of support to be 
provided for the University before announcing its 
recommendations to the Commonwealth Government for funding the 
various state universities. 
The level of economic development can have a strong 
influence on the shape and priorities of government policy 
(Anderson, 1975:35). Queensland's relatively low expenditure 
on education was at least partly due to the State's narrow 
economic (primary production) base which was excessively 
dependent on seasonal factors and favourable commodity prices 
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(Johnston, 1982:189).(3) There is no doubt that the 
Commission would have been prepared to recommend a higher 
level of funding for the University of Queensland in the years 
before 1969 but that in view of the unwillingness of the State 
Government to allocate the necessary matching funds, the 
overall level of funding provided was often less than what the 
Australian Universities Commission considered would be 
necessary for the University's proper development (UQTS, 1982-
1984, 1980:1). 
There is evidence to suggest that the State Treasury 
paid little notice to the elaborate triennial submissions made 
by the University and that instead the State determined its 
grant to the University as a set percentage increase above 
that which was provided for State public service departments 
(Memo, DVC(F&F) to Chairman, Augmented SC, 5/4/71). Indeed 
the University's main recurring policy problem during the 
1960s was undoubtedly the need for it to comply with the State 
Government's policy of unrestricted entry to the University to 
anyone who met matriculation requirements (which led to very 
rapid growth in student numbers) coupled with inadequate State 
Government funding which resulted in low levels of resource 
per EFTS compared with the other large Australian universities 
(Memo, DVC(F&F) to Chairman, Augmented SC, 5/4/71). 
In an attempt to exercise greater control over the 
(3) This acknowledges that with the more buoyant economy of 
the 1960s as a result of the mineral development boom, 
expenditure on education increased significantly and 
the proportion of total education expenditure allocated 
to university education in Queensland was comparable to 
some other States (Tomlinson, 1976:27-32). But on the 
key indicator of recurrent funding per equivalent full-
time student (EFTS), the University of Queensland still 
compared unfavourably with the other large Australian 
universities. 
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quantity and quality of its intake, the University moved 
progressively to eliminate its subgraduate certificate and 
diploma courses during the 1960s (which in 1963 accounted for 
18.66% of total enrolments) and increased entry requirements 
for first year courses in 1964 and 1967 (UQTS 1982-1984, 
1980:25). But it was not until 1971 that the State Government 
indicated that it would raise no objections if the University 
decided to introduce first year quotas to control growth 
(Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 3/3/72). Given this background, it 
was not surprising that by 1969, the University of 
Queensland's recurrent income per EFTS was approximately 9% 
below the average of the five other large Australian 
universities (UQTS 1982-1984, 1980:2-3). Capital funding was 
also very much below the average with building grants per 
additional EFTS enrolled at the University of Queensland over 
the period 1961-1972 being $3,900 compared with $4,700 as the 
average for the five other large Australian universities (UQTS 
1973-1975, 1970:32). 
The problems arising from the shortfall in recurrent 
funding were exacerbated by very poor coordination of academic 
proposals and building programs during the 1960s period of 
rapid growth. In the preparation of the 1970-1972 triennial 
submission, Vice-Chancellor Schonell had attempted to achieve 
better coordination by establishing in 1967 an ad hoc 
Planning Committee comprising senior academics representing 
different academic areas to hold discussions with those 
departments seeking additional accommodation; this had not 
been successful and the Committee had been unable to place 
building projects into priority order (Memo, AVC to Pres. PB, 
23/7/69). During 1968, coordination was still inadequate as 
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evidenced by the Senate's Buildings and Grounds Committee 
planning the accommodation of the proposed Department of Fine 
Arts even though the Professorial Board had already decided 
not to proceed with the establishment of that department 
(Presley, 1971:8). 
On 13 November 1968 the Professorial Board expressed 
its alarm at the University's deteriorating financial position 
and at the Central Executive's apparent inability to persuade 
the Australian Universities Commission to recognise the 
University's plight (PBM, 13/11/68:7). But the Central 
Executive was under great pressure at that time. This was 
largely the result of inadequate staffing and Schonell's 
lengthy absences from duty due to illness coming together at a 
time of rapid expansion and insufficient funding. 
Accommodation problems arising from a stalled building program 
and the distraction of an increasingly disruptive minority of 
student and staff activists seeking reform of the governance 
of the University exacerbated what was an already fragile and 
unstable situation. As if the local problems were not enough, 
the Central Executive was also heavily involved with the final 
stages of planning the conversion of the University College of 
Townsville from being a college of the University of 
Queensland to having autonomous university status from 1970 as 
James Cook University of North Queensland. 
Following Schonell's death on 22 February 1969, Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor Teakle, who himself was due to retire in 1970, 
assumed the mantle of "caretaker" acting Vice-Chancellor for 
the remainder of 1969. At a meeting of the Standing Committee 
on 7 .July 1969 Teakle argued in favour of the establishment of 
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a very small planning committee comprising the two part-time 
acting Deputy Vice-Chancellors, the President of the 
Professorial Board and the Registrar or Deputy Registrar as 
secretary and adviser to the committee (SCM, 7/7/69:4). 
Teakle envisaged that this planning committee would operate as 
a Vice-Chancellor's committee and as such would report through 
the Vice-Chancellor to the Professorial Board and then to the 
Senate (Minute, DVC, 27/8/70). However the Standing Committee 
did not support the executive domination inherent in the 
proposed composition and argued successfully that the Standing 
Committee, suitably augmented, would be a more appropriate 
nucleus for a planning committee (SCM, 7/7/69:4). Teakle was 
persuaded by the Standing Committee's logic and on 23 July 
1969 he informed the President of the Professorial Board that 
the augmentation of the Standing Committee should include 
himself as acting Vice-Chancellor, the two part-time acting 
Deputy Vice-chancellors as well as the chairman of the 
Senate's Buildings and Grounds Committee (Memo, AVC to 
Pres. PB, 23/7/69). 
The Planning Committee exhibited the characteristics of 
Bailey's "elite" type of committee. It was expert in that its 
members included only the most senior staff possessing 
specialised knowledge relevant to planning and its relatively 
small size (ten members) as well as its specific task gave it 
a coherence and sense of mission not normally evident in large 
representative "arena" type committees with more diffuse 
objectives (Bailey, 1977:71-72). The formation of this 
Committee was an example of how external influences, namely 
the pressure from an increasingly interventionist Australian 
Universities Commission together with internal perceptions 
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that existing planning mechanisms were ineffective, resulted 
in an internal structural response. 
gt.ftff and Students 
Baldridge et al have argued that the organisational 
behaviour and decision-making processes of any given 
university were strongly influenced by its relative size and 
complexity and by the degree of prestige that it enjoyed 
(1978:10-15,67). The complexity of universities was dependent 
on, inter alia, the level and diversity of its degree 
offerings and the nature and extent of its postgraduate and 
research program. The complexity and the relative prestige of 
a university in turn depended to a significant extent on the 
quality of its academic staff. Baldridge et al concluded that 
universities which employed a larger percentage of academic 
staff holding a high proportion of doctoral degrees were more 
likely to be productive in research and more likely to attract 
better students to support a lively and extensive postgraduate 
program. The larger more prestigious institutions which were 
engaged in relatively more complex tasks were more resistent 
to the process of bureaucratisation which tended to 
characterise the less prestigious, predominantly undergraduate 
teaching institutions (1978:118-150). These latter 
institutions habitually suffered from scarce material 
resources, employed fewer well qualified staff and as a 
consequence had a comparatively weak postgraduate and research 
output. 
The better qualified staff in the more prestigious 
universities were in a stronger position to bargain for 
greater professional autonomy and to demand more staff 
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participation in decision-making (Blau, 1973:187). This in 
turn produced higher staff morale and there was little need to 
resort to militant behaviour to have their views seriously 
considered. On the other hand institutions which employed 
proportionately fewer academically distinguished staff were 
more likely to be characterised by strong bureaucratic control 
because such academic staff usually lacked the standing and 
hence bargaining power to successfully demand genuine 
participation in decision-making. This often led to staff 
dissatisfaction and low morale as relatively powerless staff 
sought representation of their interests through militant 
unionism (Baldridge et al, 1978:93-99, 154-174). 
By 1969, the University of Queensland had grown to 
become the third largest university in Australia (using 
student headcount - fourth largest using EFTS), offering a 
range of courses equalled only by the long established 
University of Sydney and University of Melbourne (AUC Fourth 
Report, 1969:15). This was largely due to the fact that it 
was the only university in the State and, as a consequence, 
had had to respond to the local demand to supply trained 
manpower without relying on the output of universities in the 
southern States. Thus by the time the Australian Universities 
Commission was established in 1959 to coordinate university 
development across the Commonwealth, eleven faculties had been 
established including those offering degrees in areas 
requiring expensive facilities such as agriculture, dentistry, 
engineering, medicine and veterinary science. The 
University's teaching and research was conducted in fifty five 
academic departments and the 14,919 students were studying for 
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qualifications ranging from the subgraduate to higher 
doctorate levels in twelve faculties. 
The receipt of increased funding for Australian 
universities arising from the recommendations of the Murray 
Report in 1957 followed by the effects of the so-called post 
World War II baby boom meant that from 1957 to 1966, the 
University of Queensland experienced very rapid growth in 
student numbers rising by 154.94% from 5,615 to 14,315. 
Notwithstanding the raising of the matriculation level in 
1967, there was an increase of 1,454 (9.74%) in enrolments in 
1970, the largest increase in student numbers in the 
University's sixty year history (UQTS 1973-1975, 1970:1-5). 
As the University of Queensland was the only university in the 
State prior to 1970 and because prior to 1967 the non-
university advanced education sector in Queensland was at a 
very embryonic stage of development, the University was 
expected by the State Government to provide a wide range of 
courses including some that in other States were offered 
through either institutes of technology or technical colleges. 
As a consequence. University resources were spread very thinly 
and the staff and student composition was even more 
heterogeneous than might otherwise have been the case. 
From its very beginning the University of Queensland 
was expected to serve the whole State by offering courses by 
external study to those whose place of residence precluded 
attendance at classes. The non-availability of alternative 
universities in locations which would enable full-time 
internal attendance resulted in a student body composition 
which was quite different from the Australian pattern. 
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Mode of Attendance All Universities University of Qld, 
Full-time 
Part-time 
External 
l l niversit 
% 
62 . 
30 . 
6. 
100. 
9 
6 
5 
0 
i  
48 . 
34 . 
17. 
100. 
5 
5 
0 
0 
Table No. 3.1: Student Enrolments as a Percentage of 
Total Enrolments. 1969 (AUC Fourth Report, 
1969:17). 
These high part-time and external enrolments were significant 
in that most student activism was associated with full-time 
internal students. As a general rule only the latter students 
had the time and the opportunity to be involved in the post-
1967 student demands for a greater seiy in University 
governance (Spigelman, 1968:117). Moreover a high proportion 
of University of Queensland students (71% in 1969) were 
enrolled in the vocational/professional faculties. Habermas 
has argued that student activism had its roots in the non-
vocational humanities/social science subject fields. He felt 
that this was where a critical questioning of the assumptions 
underpinning the status quo was encouraged and where the key 
socialisation process was socio-political awareness rather 
than technological determinism and the depoliticisation that 
went with it (1971:121). Applying this reasoning to the 
University of Queensland, the prime socialising process 
operating on the great majority of students was therefore 
likely to have been professionalisation rather than 
politicisation. 
In other ways too, the student body of the University 
of Queensland differed from the usual pattern. For example in 
1969, Queensland had the lowest EFTS higher degree enrolment 
of any of the six largest Australian universities (AUC Fourth 
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Report, 1969:13). Only 9.6% of the funding assistance 
available for full-time higher degree students at the 
University of Queensland ceone from University funds compared 
with 24.6% for all Australian universities (AUC Fifth Report, 
1972:61). It is not surprising therefore that the higher 
degree student load at the University of Queensland as a 
proportion of total student load was 11.7% compared with 16.1% 
for all Australian universities (AUC Fifth Report, 1972:63). 
The emphasis on undergraduate training in the first sixty 
years of the University of Queensland's life is borne out by 
the evidence that, of the 27,155 academic awards conferred up 
to June 1969, only 1,171 or 4.3% were higher degrees. Indeed 
6,052 or 22.3% of awards conferred were at the subgraduate 
diploma or certificate level (Statistics, 1969:233). 
The University of Queensland had argued consistently 
in its triennial submissions to the Australian Universities 
Commission that it had been historically underfunded. Given 
these parsimonious circumstances, the first priority in the 
period prior to 1969 had to be the provision of undergraduate 
teaching services; hence a disproportionately high share of 
resources was allocated to the employment of teaching staff in 
an attempt to maintain an acceptable student/staff ratio. 
This meant that the share of funds available for other 
functions such as research and for the purchase of equipment 
was correspondingly smaller. By 1970, for example, Queensland 
University was spending 76.1% of its recurrent revenue on 
teaching and research (compared with 70.7% for all Australian 
universities) whereas only 17.5% of its research funds were 
derived from its recurrent grants, compared with 22.2% for 
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Australian universities as a whole (AUC Fifth Report, 
1972:105,119). Indeed the University in the years leading up 
to the period under review saw itself as primarily a large 
undergraduate teaching institution with a relatively slight 
commitment to research. 
The rapid increase in the size of the University of 
Queensland coupled with the increasing specialisation which 
was evident in the rapidly expanding body of knowledge were 
reflected in the increase of 226.04% in the number of academic 
staff employed over the 1957 to 1969 period. Although this 
increase exceeded the 165.70% growth in student numbers over 
the same period, this was necessary to overcome the 
unfavourable student/staff ratio of earlier years which, in 
1960, had reached 15.3 EFTS per academic staff (Statistics, 
1969:213). By 1969, the ratio had improved to 12.8 but still 
compared unfavourably with the Australian average of 11.9 (AUC 
Fourth Report, 1969:22). 
Although the academic staffing position had improved in 
terms of numbers, this had been achieved by appointing a 
disproportionately high number of junior staff at the 
tutor/senior tutor level and a correspondingly low proportion 
of staff at the level of senior lecturer and above. Indeed in 
1969, only 39.9% of Queensland University teaching staff 
were senior lecturer and above compared with an average of 
49.3% for the six largest Australian universities (AUC, Fourth 
Report, 1969:27-28). 
The composition of academic staff has behavioural as 
well as structural implications. For example the amount of 
time spent on research by academic staff (lecturer and above) 
at the University of Queensland suggested that there was a 
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tendency for more effort among the senior lecturer and above 
grades (Burnett Report, July 1977:182). This seems to bear out 
Finkelstein's observation that publication did not necessarily 
slow down when the incentive provided by the prospect of 
promotion was no longer available. Rather, Finkelstein argued 
that research output tended to increase among the higher 
academic ranks. This suggests the importance of providing an 
organisational structure that fostered intrinsic motivation 
and which relied less on bureaucratic coercion for encouraging 
greater research involvement (1984:101). The University of 
Queensland's policy of appointing a higher proportion of 
junior staff within a fairly hierarchical and sometimes 
authoritarian decision-making system could therefore have had 
a negative impact on research output and institutional 
prestige. This in turn could have negative consequences for 
academic bargaining power and, therefore, reduce the extent of 
academic participation in decision-making. 
While it is easy to tabulate the relative numbers of 
academic staff it is more difficult to provide an impression 
of their quality. Certainly the qualifications of academic 
staff within the University of Queensland have improved over 
the years with 45% of academic staff (lecturer and above) 
possessing doctoral qualifications in 1969 compared with 37% 
in 1964 and 31% in 1961 (Submission Review of Efficiency & 
Effectiveness in Higher Education, 1985:13; Calendar, 
1969:54-75). However even though this proportion had 
increased to 49% in 1972, it still compared unfavourably with 
the situation in the United States at that time where 77% of 
academic staff in public "multiversities" and 53% of academic 
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staff in the less complex public "comprehensive" universities 
possessed doctoral qualifications (Baldridge et al, 1978:64). 
With some notable exceptions, the academic staffing of 
the University of Queensland even by the late 1960s still 
reflected some of the earlier impediments to recruiting a 
sufficient number of truly distinguished scholars against the 
competition provided by other long established and more 
prestigious Australian and overseas universities. For example 
prior to 1960 the State Government had refused to fund the 
University to enable it to contribute to staff superannuation 
based on the Federated Superannuation Scheme for Universities 
(FSSU) (Thomis, 1985:202,295) and salaries had traditionally 
lagged behind those paid to academic staff in other major 
Australian universities (AST Review, 1976:55). Moreover it 
was not until 1962 that the University did away with five and 
seven year employment contracts for academic staff and 
substituted a system of tenure (Thomis, 1985:297). 
According to Bryan, these peculiarities had an 
adverse effect on the ability of the University to attract 
overseas and interstate talent (1966:44). Indeed there was 
some evidence that the Senate had supported the appointment of 
long serving local candidates to vacant chairs over 
academically superior outsiders and the Labor Premier of 
Queensland in 1957 (V.C. Gair) had expressed concern that 
certain Catholic members of the academic staff had been passed 
over for promotion because the Masons at that time allegedly 
dominated the University's power structure (Droughton, 
1977:18-19). By 1969, Queensland University had only one 
Fellow of the Royal Society on its staff and two Fellows of 
the Australian Academy of Science, a record which compared 
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unfavourably with the other large Australian universities 
(Statistics, 1969:206). 
Given this background it was perhaps not surprising 
that no less than 35% of the 509 members of the academic staff 
who had been lecturers and above for at least three years, had 
published nothing in the three year period 1968-1970 and why 
the University of Queensland in 1965 received the second 
lowest research funding in Australia from the Australian 
Research Grants Committee (Burnett Report, July 1977:48; 
Thomis, 1985:294). These differences arose at least partly 
from what one senior academic described as Queensland's 
"regional provincialism" (Interview, G. Greenwood, 6/8/84); 
it seems likely that this environment contributed towards an 
organisational culture that was skewed more towards the 
"local" end of the "local - cosmopolitan" continuum of 
academic behaviour identified by Gouldner (1957:281-306), 
It would be naive to attribute narrowly specific causes 
for this state of affairs. At the same time it needs to be 
acknowledged that J.D. Story's role as a member of the Senate 
from 1910-1963, his chairmanship of the Senate's 
Administrative Committee (1911-1963) and the Finance Committee 
(1913-1963), his contribution an an honorary non-academic 
Vice-Chancellor from 1938 to 1960 and especially his role as 
the State Government's "liaison officer" with the University 
had clearly left an indelible imprint on the University's 
development well into the period reviewed in the present 
study. Story's value to the Queensland Government was his 
ability to exercise strong administrative control and tight 
financial management over the University and to remind the 
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Professorial Board when the need arose that it was merely one 
of a number of advisers to the Senate (Thomis, 1985:205, 219-
221,226,253). 
The first full-time Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Adelaide has written of his personal experience of being 
appointed to that office after it had been occupied for 
decades by a person who exercised strong personal authority 
over the University with little by way of systems and 
procedures to enable due process to be observed in decision-
making (Rowe, 1960:36-38). Just as the University of 
Adelaide in 1948 was living in an age when charismatic and 
coercive authority was gradually being superseded by the norm 
of legal-rational authority, so too the University of 
Queensland in 1960, after fifty years of personal dominance by 
Story, was facing the same new era. There is little doubt 
that Story's watching brief on behalf of the State Government 
to enforce economy rather than efficiency had left the 
University dangerously exposed. The University had an 
inadequate base from which to take full advantage of increased 
Commonwealth funding eind an administrative structure which, 
initially at least, experienced difficulty in coping with the 
more sophisticated demands for management information that 
began to emanate from the Australian Universities Commission 
in the post-1959 period (Interview, G. Greenwood, 6/8/84). 
Blau has noted that the lengthy tenure of a university 
chief executive promoted the institutionalisation of power in 
that office; a residue of power was inclined to remain in the 
office and this attached to successive chief executives. A 
low rate of executive succession was said to foster 
centralisation of authority and to inhibit the development of 
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democratic processes (1973:181-183). To some extent this 
phenomenon was evident at the University of Queensland 
following Story's departure. His successor. Professor F.J. 
(later Sir Fred) Schonell was the first academic to become 
Vice-Chancellor. A number of interviews revealed many 
examples of Schonell's benign authoritarianism and his 
propensity to deal with matters in a highly personal sometimes 
idiosyncratic way. This administrative behaviour was also 
facilitated by the relative lack of codification and 
systemisation of policies and procedures. Schonell's habit of 
not delegating authority meant that in the two years prior to 
his death in February 1969 when he was required to take 
periods of extended leave due to recurring ill health, the 
University was, in one senior professor's words, "almost 
brought ... to a standstill" (Presley, 1971:9). 
It is at least arguable that many of the University's 
problems would have been ameliorated by more effective 
decision-making structures and processes. The University had 
inherited a highly centralised system which was probably 
effective in the mid 1950s when the institution was 
approximately one third of its 1969 size. But with the rapid 
growth in size and complexity, the more complex external 
environment and the relative lack of systemisation in the 
University's policies and procedures, decision-making became 
bogged down at the Senate and Central Executive levels. The 
emphasis had been on vertical accountability and economy at 
the expense of efficiency and effectiveness. 
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pHAPTER FOUR 
FORMAL ORQANTRATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES 
Allison has suggested that a vital element in analysing 
why one policy outcome occurred rather than another is to 
discover as much as possible about the various groups that 
interact in the policy process (1971:146). 
By the early 1960s the University of Queensland's 
decision-making system was under severe strain. In 1962 the 
President of the Professorial Board had expressed concern at 
the inability of the Board to deal effectively with the 
business that came before it (Memo, Pres. PB to D.W. McElwain, 
26/9/62). A committee set up by the Professorial Board in 
July 1962 to examine these concerns drew attention to a number 
of serious inefficiencies in the institution's decision-making 
structures and processes (McElwain Report, 1962:1-12), 
Even after the implementation of the McElwain 
Committee's reforms, a former member of the Committee arrived 
at the unhappy conclusion that: 
The system does not appear to work very well, 
either as a decision-making and controlling 
apparatus or as a co-ordinated system of 
government (Schaffer, 1966:58). 
The problem, according to Schaffer, was that in an effort to 
avoid too much reliance on permanent officials, the 
University's attempts to achieve coordination depended too 
much on a system of overlapping membership centred on the 
professoriate, a situation typical of many universities of the 
period which Chester described as an oligarchy or junta of 
professors (1964:219). 
By 1969, the situation had not improved. Whereas in 
1963 there had been sixty nine formal standing committees 
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(Chester, 1964:94,178) (1) and despite the McElwain 
Committee's attempts at rationalisation, six years later the 
number of committees had grown to 105.(2) Given Plowman and 
Williams' (1978:100) caveat that the pervasive influence of 
committees in university decision-making made the quality of 
their performance crucial to the well being of a university, 
the stage of development reached by the University of Queensland's 
decision-making structures and processes towards the end of 
the 1960s will now be considered. Before this can be done, 
however, it is necessary to make brief reference to the formal 
legal and administrative framework within which the University 
was obliged to operate. 
As a statutory authority incorporated under an Act of 
the Queensland Parliament (the University of Queensland 
Act of 1965). the University was subject to the 
constraints imposed by that Act as well as an extensive array 
of subordinate legislation. Most of the basic constitutional 
provisions providing for the governance eund management of the 
institution were contained in the Act. However because of the 
level of generality contained in that instrument, many of the 
detailed controls were contained in statutes made pursuant to 
the provisions of the Act and in rules which were designed to 
carry into effect the objects of the statutes. In addition, 
matters relating to much of the day to day administration of 
(1) This count did not include Vice-Chancellorial 
committees, departmental committees, staff-selection 
committees nor various ad hoc committees. 
(2) This count included fifteen Vice-Chancellorial 
committees as well as the two convocation bodies but, 
like Chester's study, did not include departmental 
committees, staff-selection committees nor various 
ad hoc committees. 
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the University were contained among the dozens of Senate 
policy resolutions made over the years and embodied, since 
1963, into a Handbook of Administrative Procedures. By 
1969, although the basic legal framework was in place, the 
level of systemisation of policies and procedures for such a 
large and complex organisation was quite limited. Part of the 
reason for this was the relatively undeveloped state of 
bureaucratisation which characterised the University at that 
time. Indeed with a University Act that was silent regarding 
delegation of authority, there was considerable ambiguity over 
the extent to which decision-malcing could be delegated from 
the Senate with the result that much decision-making was 
centralised within the Senate and the Vice-Chancellor rather 
than devolved, as appropriate, to other senior executive and 
senior academic officers. 
OrganIsfttionftl StruotMrc 
The starting point for an analysis of the 
organisational structure of any statutory authority has to be 
the governing legislation. Section 6 of the University of 
Queensland Act described the University as a body corporate 
which consisted of: 
(a) the members of the Senate; 
(b) the members for the time being of Convocation; 
(c) the academic staff employed for the time being by the 
University; and 
(d) all persons who are for the time being enrolled 
students of the University. 
The heart of any organisation is the staff who are employed by 
it and it is through a closer understanding of the structures 
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in which they work that a better appreciation of the dynamics 
of organisational behaviour may be gained. 
In 1969, the University of Queensland's staff structure 
was divided up as follows: 
Orgnl.Gp. Ac. Admin. Res. Lib. Tech. Maint. Total 
Academic 
Depts. 
Central 
Admin. 
Central 
Services 
Faculties 
950 
Nil 
2 
1 
240 
218 
63 
24 
215 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
Nil 
141 
Nil 
504 
46 
38 
13 
15 
250 
Nil 
33 
1924 
613 
244 
71 
Total 953 545 215 141 600 298 2762 
Table 4.1: Staff Establishment. University of Queensland. 
by OrgfthisatiQn&l GrQup: 1969 (Statistics, 
1969:169). 
It can be seen from the above that by far the largest 
organisational component of the University of Queensland was 
the academic departments to which 69.9% of the total staff 
were attached. Only 49.4% of the staff employed in academic 
departments were teaching staff. Of the remainder, 12.6% were 
administrative personnel and indeed 44% of the total 
administrative staff of the University were employed in 
academic departments. It would be wrong to conclude, however, 
that because this exceeded the proportion of administrative 
staff employed in the University's Central Administration 
(40%), the administration was decentralised. Rather, the 
staffing suggested a highly centralised model. Of the 230 
administrative positions on the establishment of academic 
departments actually filled, 220 or 95.7% were at the clerk-
typist level whereas a total of sixty-three or 69.2% of the 
total filled administrative staff positions at the level of 
administrative officer grade 1/graduate assistant and above 
were located within the Central Administration. Only ten 
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administrative staff at the administrative officer grade 
1/graduate assistant level and above were employed in the 
fifty-five academic departments (Statistics, 1969:164). 
One of the reasons for the great variability in the way 
in which departments were administered related to their 
differences in size and in the nature of their task. For 
example the academic staff establishment in departments ranged 
from four in Social and Preventive Medicine to forty-eight in 
Physics. An even more extreme range existed in relation to 
general staff from one in Music to fifty-three in Dentistry 
(Statistics, 1969:166-167). Some departments with relatively 
few academic staff were quite large when their general staff 
establishment was teiken into account. These tended to be 
departments which required extensive support services such as 
farms, laboratories and clinical facilities. 
The differences among departments manifested in many 
forms. For example the average student/staff ratio in 1969 
measured in terms of Weighted Student Units (WSU) per 
established full-time teaching position was 11.9 but the range 
extended from an average of 6.1 in the health sciences to 17.3 
in the social sciences and 27.3 in external studies 
(Statistics, 1976:125-128). Moreover the proportion of higher 
degree enrolments to total enrolments (WSU) in 1969 revealed 
great diversity among departments from Accountancy with 0.76% 
to Parasitology with 50%. When it is realised that five 
academic departments accounted for 44.06% of the 236 PhD 
degrees awarded prior to 1969, the diversity in the teaching 
and research roles of the various departments becomes 
particularly evident (Statistics, 1969:24,27,72,81,235). 
It can be seen that each department tended to have a 
distinctive profile and peculiar needs which were often 
reflected in wide ranging demands for a share of resources. 
For example, the direct departmental costs per WSU varied from 
$291 in Economics to $3018 for Veterinary Clinical Studies 
(Statistics, 1970:271). 
It could be expected that the needs of departments 
with, for example, high costs per WSU, extensive physical 
facility and equipment needs, a high research output together 
with a large postgraduate enrolment would be quite different 
to a department with modest resource demands, an emphasis on 
scholarship rather than research and a large undergraduate/low 
postgraduate student load. Large departments such as 
Economics (793 WSU) might be expected to have stronger 
bargaining power than small departments such as Surveying (52 
WSU) (Statistics, 1969:43, 98). Moreover departments in the 
high student demand prestigious fields of Medicine and 
Dentistry where there were irreducible professional 
accreditation requirements might also be expected to enjoy 
disproportionately high political and bureaucratic leverage 
compared with foreign language departments which were 
suffering a relative decline in their popularity. The 
traditional notion of "parity of esteem" among the academic 
disciplines need not necessarily be translated into equal 
influence in the decision-making process. 
This diversity suggests that there is at least a strong 
theoretical case for a relatively more decentralised, less 
systematised pattern of governance which would allow 
individual departments considerable discretion in their 
internal decision-making processes on academic and resource 
75 
matters. The grounds for this view are that each department 
has quite distinctive objectives, values, clientele and 
therefore needs which can not be fully taken into account by 
remote central University bodies. At the same time the 
contrary view which favours relatively more centralisation is 
based on the desire to foster greater uniformity in resource 
utilisation and academic steuidards across diverse departments 
without at the same time violating the inherent differences 
among them. The protagonists of more bureaucratic 
systematised decision-making structures and processes assert 
that the standards of weaker departments would be raised to a 
more even level across the University without necessarily 
reducing productive departments to the mediocrity of the 
lowest common denominator. 
In reviewing the structure and processes of decision-
making it is necessary to recognise that the crude 
centralised-decentralised organisational paradigm, although 
widely referred to in the literature, is only a partial 
framework for analysis. It needs to be augmented by noting 
that it is possible, indeed desirable, for organisations to 
foster both devolution and integration simultaneously and to 
acknowledge that devolution and integration are not synonymous 
with decentralisation and centralisation. As Fielden and 
Lockwood noted: 
Integration must not be equated or confused 
with bureaucratic centralisation. On the 
contrary it can provide a framework within 
which more effective devolution can take 
place (1973:35). 
By the conclusion of the present chapter, the picture 
will have emerged that the University of Queensland in 1969 
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was characterised by both structural centralisation and 
decentralisation while at the same time exhibiting minimal 
devolution and very little integration of its decision-making 
processes. 
Aoftdemio Departments 
As a consequence of the knowledge explosion, the main 
direction of development within the University of Queensland, 
in common with many other large universities, has been in the 
more specialised division of labour. In the period from the 
end of World War II to 1969 no less than thirty seven new 
academic departments were created (Statistics 1969:23-103). 
The University of Queensland was relatively unusual 
in that since 1955 its academic departments have enjoyed 
statutory recognition. Statute No. 10 (which was first 
approved by the Senate on 17 December 1969) provided for the 
Senate to establish such academic departments as in its 
opinion were needed to carry on the teaching and research work 
of the University; the Statute also specified that the 
function of each department was to provide the teaching and 
other services for such of the courses in the various 
faculties as fell within the competence of the department 
(Calendar, 1969:147). 
Thus departments were not sub-divisions of faculties. 
Whereas departments were primarily responsible for deciding on 
the composition of subjects, how subjects should be 
taught and which staff should teach particular subjects, 
the faculties were responsible for defining what subjects 
should be included in a particular course and to 
administer the rules of the various courses that were 
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offered through the faculty. Because of the emotional and 
intellectual commitment that members conventionally had to 
their subject, which was reinforced by the statutory 
independence of departments, there existed the potential for 
conflict between different departments and between departments 
and faculties. In the University of Queensland it was part of 
the Professorial Board's role to consider such disputes and to 
advise the Senate on a resolution of the conflict. 
The management of the affairs of academic departments 
in 1969 was vested in the permanent head of department. The 
head was permanent by virtue of the fact that he was appointed 
as such by the Senate. With the exception of a few small 
departments, the head was a professor and, in the latter 
capacity, he was an ex officio member of the Professorial 
Board. Prior to the late 1950s, the role of the professor in 
the University of Queensland was uneimbiguous. The professor 
was expected to exercise academic and administrative 
leadership of a department and to act as the departmental 
authority on boards and committees within the University. 
Those departments which had a professor had only one and, as a 
consequence of being a professor, the appointee was 
automatically head of department (The Role of Professors in 
the University, 1983:Appendix A). 
But with the rapid expansion that occurred at the 
University especially after 1959, second professors began to 
be appointed in larger departments. These appointments caused 
the traditional notion of the permanent professorial head as 
the repository of departmental authority to be called into 
question and some of the new appointees felt aggrieved that 
they had no opportunities either to serve as head of 
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department or to share decision-making with the professorial 
head. With sixteen of the departments employing in 1969 a 
total of forty professors, the problem was beginning to take 
on political salience (Calendar, 1969:64-76), This was 
heightened by a growing resentment among non-professorial 
staff and students over what they perceived as the "God-
Professor" hegemony exercised by some permanent heads over 
departmental affairs. Chapter six will examine the dynamics 
of the process of conflict eund cooperation associated with the 
reform of departmental governance. 
Faoultiea 
In order to ensure that subjects offered by a range of 
departments were embodied into degree programs in a coherent 
way so that candidates were subject to consistent standards 
and workloads, decisions relating to courses were determined 
at the faculty level. 
When each academic department had been located in and 
had been subject to the supervision of a particular faculty, 
the faculties had been much smaller bodies comprising the 
Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor (ex officio). the 
professors plus such of its lecturers and other persons as the 
Senate determined. However with the separation of the roles 
of academic departments and faculties into different executive 
fields and with larger numbers of departments teaching in 
various faculties, the need for faculty boards comprising 
representation from the various departments that provided 
teaching services to the faculty became evident. The 
organisational consequence of this development was the 
emergence of some very large and cumbersome faculty boards 
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with membership ranging from twenty six in Music to 139 in 
Arts (Webb Report, 18/8/69:22).(3) 
Statute No. 9 provided for the Senate to determine the 
composition of each faculty board. Subject to the condition 
that Senate required each faculty board to include among its 
membership University staff who were also members of the 
Senate, faculty boards were allowed wide discretion in 
formulating a composition that best suited their individual 
needs. Although there was no statutory prescription for their 
ex officio membership, professors were always appointed to 
relevant faculty boards by virtue of their role either as the 
professorial head of a department which provided teaching 
services in a faculty or as the senior academic in a distinct 
field of study within a subject discipline which formed part 
of a course of study offered by the faculty. In three 
faculties (Dentistry, Engineering, Music) academic staff 
representation was restricted to senior lecturers and above, 
and in a number of other faculties (Agriculture, Science, 
Veterinary Science), while the constitution allowed for some 
participation at the lecturer level, the membership was 
heavily skewed in favour of senior staff representation. One 
area where there was a high degree of uniformity was in the 
lack of representation of tutorial staff and students. Only 
the Board of the Faculty of Medicine allowed for student 
representation (Webb Report, 18/8/69:3). With the exception 
(3) The increase was also partly due to the early effects 
of the participatory democracy movement in some 
faculties and in addition because some heads of 
departments had been successful in their efforts to get 
more departmental representation in order to strengthen 
their voting power (S.A. Rayner, Private 
Communication, 12/4/87). 
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of the Faculties of Arts and Science, all other faculty boards 
contained external members drawn mainly from the relevant 
professional bodies and the major employing authorities who 
recruited staff from among the graduates of faculty courses. 
Because of the large size of some faculty boards and 
their tendency to address matters of detail relating to 
courses and students rather than general policy matters, 
attendance at meetings was often very poor, sometimes 
resulting in difficulty in finding a quorum. As a consequence 
of the inability of some faculty boards to deal efficiently 
with the business which came before them, the trend had 
emerged by 1962 for faculty board executive committees to be 
formed (McElwain Report, 5/11/62:7). The main functions of 
faculty executive committees were to deal with individual 
student matters and to "pre-digest" policy matters in order to 
facilitate more meaningful discussion at subsequent meetings 
of the full faculty board. For reasons of efficiency such 
executive committees comprised on average only six members. 
They met on average twelve times per annum compared with an 
average of only four times a year for the faculty boards (Webb 
Report, 18/8/69:6). It can be seen that the normative ideal 
of collegiality in academic decision-making had been 
attenuated by the imperative of efficiency. In this case the 
efficiency imperative manifested in the form of elite 
executive committees where policy positions could be 
formulated and decision premises articulated, leaving the 
arena-style faculty boards with more of a formal, ceremonial 
role (See Bailey, 1977:71-72 for elite/arena committee 
distinction). 
Statute No. 9 provided for the Senate to appoint a dean 
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of each faculty on the recommendation of the faculty board for 
a term of one year. The dean was required to be chairman of 
meetings of the faculty board and to serve as executive 
officer of the faculty. The powers of the deans were heavily 
circumscribed; in essence, they were authorised to implement 
the decisions of the faculty board and to take executive 
action only on urgent matters with the concurrence of the 
President of the Professorial Board and on minor or routine 
matters associated with the application of rules relating to 
courses of study leading to awards within the faculty. 
Although the position of dean possessed little formal power 
(except in the eyes of students where deans were seen to be 
powerful figures because of their authority over individual 
student programs), it was a position which enjoyed 
considerable prestige. During the 1960s, deanships were 
invariably filled by a senior professor, usually for two or 
three consecutive annual terms. 
It was not until 1969 that the first full-time dean 
was appointed. This was in the Faculty of Medicine where the 
position, which was established at professorial level, was for 
a term of five years in the first instance; the Dean was 
expected to provide coherence to the activities of the Faculty 
and in this connection was authorised to appear before the 
central resource committees to provide advice on resource 
matters relating to clinical departments associated with the 
Faculty. The full-time Dean was explicitly regarded as part 
of the administrative staff of the University but it was 
equally explicitly stated by the Senate that the position did 
not have the power to overrule the Faculty Board (SM, 6/7/67). 
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The appointment of a full-time dean as an 
administrative officer by a process of selection rather than 
election was clearly further evidence of the continuing 
process of bureaucratisation. This was an extension of the 
trend started in 1960 with the appointment of the first full-
time paid Vice-Chancellor, followed in 1963 with the 
appointment of the first full-time Deputy Vice-Chancellor, 
both discussed later. 
The ProfeBsorial Board 
The constitutional basis for the existence of the 
Professorial Board was contained in Statute No. 7 (Calendar, 
1969:138-143). Under that Statute, the powers and duties of 
the Professorial Board were described as being subject to the 
supreme control of the Senate and to the statutes and rules 
approved by the Senate as well as subject to the authority of 
any committee of the Senate. In essence they provided for the 
Professorial Board to serve as an advisory body to the Senate 
concerning: 
(a) any matter that was not within the province of any one 
faculty board and which might affect the University as 
a whole; 
(b) all matters relating to the employment of the teaching 
and research staff of the University; 
(c) any matter associated with the establishment of new 
faculties, academic departments, courses of study, 
academic awards and the promotion of teaching and 
research generally within the University. 
The Professorial Board was also given authority, subject to 
any decision of the Senate's Academic Committee, to determine 
83 
all matters not within the province of one faculty board 
concerning the conduct of courses of study, research and 
examinations. It can be seen that the Board's main role was 
advisory to the Senate and to the Senate's Academic 
Committee;(4) it possessed quite limited executive powers of 
determination. With the exception of academic staffing 
matters, the Board was not directly concerned with advising 
the Senate on resource acquisition nor allocation. 
Statute No. 7 provided for the composition of the 
Professorial Board to include the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, 
Deputy Vice-chancellor, the Warden of the University College 
of Townsville, the full-time professors and acting professors, 
such honorary and part-time professors as the Senate on the 
recommendation of the Board might determine, the University 
Librarian together with the Director of External Studies as an 
associate member. Because each professor possessed a 
de jure right to membership of the Professorial Board, its 
size was limited only by the number of chairs established. 
This number had almost doubled from thirty six in 1960 to 
seventy one in 1969 (Statistics, 1969:202), Whereas 
constructive discussion might have been possible in 1960, by 
1969, with a total membership of eighty seven, Vice-Chancellor 
Schonell articulated the growing concern: 
how can sixty or seventy, or even fifty 
professors come to effective decisions ... 
(1968:18). 
(4) The Academic Committee comprised twelve members (four 
academics and eight non-academics) all of whom were 
senators. The membership in 1969 consisted of the 
acting Vice-Chancellor (chairman). Deputy Chancellor, 
President of the Professorial Board, Director-General 
of Education, six other non-academic senators, the 
Staff Association appointed senator plus one academic 
senator appointed by Convocation. 
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Applying Bailey's conceptualisation of elite and arena 
committees, it had become evident by 1969 that the 
Professorial Board, as it had grown larger and less effective 
in its deliberations, was exhibiting the characteristic 
features of an arena committee (Bailey, 1977:114). This 
behaviour involved considerable "front sta^e" ceremonial and 
ritual speech making activity before a large audience, many of 
whom were concerned more with representing the interests of 
their departments rather than fostering the interests of the 
institution as a whole. This sort of self-indulgent behaviour 
probably reflected the perception held by many members of the 
Board that the substantive decisions on most major issues, 
especially concerning resources, were taken elsewhere in the 
University's system of governance, by the Senate and by the 
Vice-Chancellor in his capacity as the Senate's executive 
officer. The Professorial Board had unsuccessfully sought to 
participate in the budget process in 1961 by having early 
access to draft budget plans to assist with planning academic 
developments; but this had been rejected by the Senate on the 
advice of J.D. Story (who remained as Chairman of the Finance 
Committee until 1963) on the grounds that the Board was 
attempting to usurp the roles of the Academic Stauiding 
Committee, the Finance Committee and the Vice-Chancellor 
(Thomis, 1985:253). Since Story's departure, however, the 
Board had become more assertive in its advisory role. The 
Central Executive was not at that stage seen as a separate 
power centre in its own right and hence was not perceived as a 
serious rival to the Board's ambitions for a greater say in 
policy making. 
Whereas the Professorial Board was essentially an 
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arena-style collegial body, its real work was carried out by 
two elite groups, the Standing Committee and the Education 
Committee. The role of the Standing Committee was specified 
in Section 10 of Statute No. 7; this provided for the 
Standing Committee to act as the Board's executive committee. 
In addition, the Standing Committee's role in 1969 involved 
advising the Board regarding the academic staff establishment, 
academic staff promotions as well as study leave and 
conference travel. Given that academic staff salaries and on-
costs accounted for some 49% of total recurrent expenditure, 
the importance of those recommendations in determining the 
direction of future academic developments conferred 
considerable power on that Committee. 
Undoubtedly part of the Standing Committee's power was 
derived from the nature of its composition. The Committee 
consisted of the President and Deputy President of the 
Professorial Board plus four other members elected by and from 
the Board and it was the only Board committee for which the 
number of nominations for election invariably exceeded the 
number of vacancies. Because of the crucial and sensitive 
nature of the Committee's role, its members were expected to 
conduct their deliberations as disinterested "statesmen" who 
were concerned to foster the development of the University as 
a whole without the bias of departmental affiliations. 
The formation of the Education Committee in 1963 was on 
example of the increasing differentiation that frequently 
accompanied the growth in size and complexity of 
organisations; this differentiation tended to occur along the 
horizontal dimension (to allow functional specialisation based 
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on the division of labour principle) and along the vertical 
dimension (to enable improved coordination by adding 
additional hierarchical levels of review) (Blau, 1973:49-51). 
Thus whereas prior to 1963 all faculty boards reported direct 
to the Professorial Board, the increase in the size and 
complexity of the University by that time was such that an 
additional layer was needed to be interposed between the 
eleven faculties then established and the Professorial Board. 
The purpose of the Committee's establishment was to provide 
specialised advice to the Board on educational matters so that 
the flow of recommendations from the faculty boards might be 
better coordinated. The Education Committee comprised the 
President and Deputy President of the Professorial Board plus 
six other members elected by and from the Board. 
The President and Deputy President of the Professorial 
Board and the elected members of the Standing Committee and 
Education Committee comprised a strong oligarchy that was 
moderated only by the fact that office holders and committee 
members were subject to election. Some members of the Board 
followed a path which involved service on the Education 
Committee and Standing Committee as precursors to the 
Presidency of the Board. The path from the Presidency to 
central executive positions was also a well trodden one. When 
it is recalled that the Planning Committee which was appointed 
by the Vice-Chancellor in July 1969 was basically an augmented 
Standing Committee, the oligarchical nature of decision-making 
centered on the senior members of the professoriate and 
Central Executive becomes evident. 
Monthly meetings of the Board were convened by the 
President who was appointed annually by the Senate on the 
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recommendation of the Board following an election by and from 
the members of the Board. The formal duties of the President 
required the incumbent to serve as executive officer of the 
Board and to exercise such other powers that were within the 
province of the Board as the Senate from time to time 
prescribed. The primary role of the President was to consult 
with senior (usually professorial) colleagues in committee and 
to represent the views of the senior academic community at 
meetings of the Senate, Senate committees and to members of 
the Central Executive. 
Prior to 1969, Presidents had undertaken their 
administrative duties from their departmental office but with 
the appointment of Professor Edwin Webb, the President's 
office was located permanently in the J.D. Story 
Administration Building (Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). The 
symbolic importance of this move should not be underestimated; 
the J.D. Story Administration Building was the location of the 
offices of the Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellor and 
Registrar. A position which had once been seen as one which 
could be filled by a "gifted amateur" on a more or less part-
time basis, had become by the end of the 1960s increasingly 
full-time and bureaucratised.(5) 
The Senate 
Section 11 of the University of Queensland Act of 
1965 provided that: 
(5) The order of succession provided for the President to 
act as Deputy Vice-Chancellor in the latter's absence 
from duty and it had become the norm for the President 
to be included, in collaboration with the Vice-
Chancellor, Deputy Vice-chancellor and Registrar, in 
briefings of the Chancellor prior to Senate meetings. 
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The Senate shall be the governing body of the 
University. Subject to this Act and the 
Statutes, the Senate shall have full power and 
authority from time to time to appoint and 
dismiss all deans, professors, readers, 
lecturers, examiners and other officers and 
servants of the University, and shall have the 
entire management and control of the affairs, 
concerns, and property of the University and 
may act in all matters concerning the 
University in such manner as appears to it best 
calculated to promote the interests and 
purposes of the University. 
While the powers and duties of the Senate were subject to the 
provisions of the legislation, as well as public policy and 
funding constraints, the Senate nevertheless was the locus of 
formal power in the University; it was the only body with the 
authority to make statutes and rules, to veto recommendations 
from any source within the University, to appoint and dismiss 
all staff including the Vice-Chancellor, and to receive and 
apply moneys for the purposes of the University. 
Given these wide powers, the question of the 
composition of the Senate assumed particular significance. 
The constitution of the Senate in 1969 comprised thirty three 
members, pursuant to Section 6 of the University Act: 
(a) Director General of Education (ex officio): 
(b) Vice-Chancellor (ex officio): 
(c) President of the Professorial Board (ex officio); 
(d) one member of the Professorial Board appointed by the 
Board; 
(e) one member of the Staff Association appointed by the 
Association; 
(f) one member being a graduate of the University, 
appointed by the Council of the University of 
Queensland Union; 
(g) eleven persons appointed by the Governor in Council; 
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(h) Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane or his nominee; 
(i) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane or his nominee; 
(j) one person appointed by the Queensland Council of 
Churches; 
(k) one person appointed by the advisory council of each 
college or university institution established under 
Section 27 of the Act; 
(1) ten persons appointed by Convocation but including no 
more than: 
(i) two full-time members of the teaching staff of the 
University; and 
(ii) three full-time members in the aggregate of the 
teaching staffs of secondary schools, technical 
colleges, institutes of technology and similar 
educational institutions; 
(m) not more than two members (not being members of the 
teaching staff of the University) appointed by the 
Senate. 
Although the composition of the Senate had been amended 
in the 1965 amendments to the Act to provide for one extra 
academic member, there was a belief among some University 
staff that the Senate was dominated by too many government 
appointees and that there was insufficient academic 
representation. This violation of the alleged ideal of 
institutional autonomy was seen as a threat to academic 
freedom.(6) 
(8) The AVCC's Nov 1968 analysis of the constitutions of 
the governing bodies of Australian universities 
confirmed that the guaranteed academic participation on 
the governing body at the University of Queensland was 
the lowest (Partridge, 1969:32-42). 
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The strength of feeling in relation to the composition 
of the governing body had been heightened by the passive role 
adopted by the Senate in the events leading up to the 
rjnjversitv of Queensland Acts Amendment Act of 1957. 
This Act had provided for a three member Appeals Board 
modelled along the lines of the Public Service Appeal Board to 
consider appeals against appointments, promotion and 
disciplinary action involving University staff. The Appeals 
Board was to be presided over by a Chairman appointed by the 
Governor in Council and this intervention by the Government in 
a traditional area of institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom was objectionable to many members of the University 
community. However what was particularly damaging to the 
standing of the Senate was the belief that: 
... had the Senate been a body vigorously 
representing the academic point of view and had 
the Government consulted the Senate, then it is 
unlikely that the Appeal Board provisions would 
have been embodied in the Act. The Senate, as 
a body, made no strong move to safeguard 
academic freedom in Queensland; 
Regrettably the Senate as such made no 
pronouncement on the issue, presumably in order 
not to embarrass the Government nominees on the 
Senate (Droughton, 1977:103). 
Because of the primacy of the Senate's role, most of the 
provisions concerning its constitution and associated matters 
were contained in the Act rather than in the statutes. Thus 
Section 8 provided for the term of office of senators to be 
three years and Section 12 made provision for the Senate to 
elect annually two of its members to be Chancellor and Deputy 
Chancellor respectively. Pursuant to Section 13, the 
Chancellor was required to chair all meetings of the Senate at 
which he was present. Apart from this requirement, the Act 
did not define the duties of the Chancellor although Statute 
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No. 4 made reference to the fact that the Chancellor was an 
^Y^ officio member of each Senate standing committee. It 
was clear, however, that there was no formal impediment to the 
role of Chancellor being as interventionist or as ceremonial 
as the incumbent desired or the circumstances warranted. 
The Senate's capacity to be an effective policy making 
body was attenuated by its unwillingness to delegate authority 
and also by its immersion in determining matters of detail. 
By December 1969 this had resulted in an agenda which 
comprised twenty one separate documents, ninety eight separate 
items for noting and 443 pages of documentation (Loveday 
Report, 31/3/70:1), The University's cumbersome decision-
making processes which Schonell had described as being "based 
too often on unsustained opinions and hunches" (1968:19) were 
an example of what Corson has called the "problem of vertical 
elongation" (1975:278). This occurred where there were too 
many layers of review between the originating body and the 
final decision-making body. These layers of review in theory 
might have facilitated the reaching of consensus but they also 
resulted in lengthy delays and a slowness to adapt to 
environmental demands (Presley, 1971:6). 
The main reason for the excessive number of layers of 
review was the heavy concentration of authority within the 
governing body. For example even though the Professorial 
Board had the statutory authority to advise the Senate on any 
matters relating to teaching and research, the Senate also had 
its own Academic Committee to advise on such matters as well 
as its own Research Committee to maintain a program of 
research within the University (Calendar, 1969:128,132), 
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According to Presley this apparent duplication of functions 
was a reflection of the composition of the Senate and the 
Professorial Board respectively. The Professorial Board was 
an exclusively academic body and the Senate, which was 
predominantly non-academic, was not always prepared to accept 
advice from the Board without the opportunity to seek an 
independent opinion from a committee comprising mainly its own 
members (1971:7).(7) It has also been suggested that 
politically astute academic senators such as Professors G. 
Greenwood and T.G.H. Jones had supported the Senate retaining 
its own Library and Research Committees because as Senate 
committees with academic senators as chairmen, they were much 
better placed to influence the Senate to provide more funding 
than would have been the case if those committees had reported 
to the Professorial Board (S.A. Rayner, Private Communication, 
12/4/87). 
Thus the Senate was not immune from the inefficiencies 
in decision-making that were evident in other parts of the 
University. It was unable to give the attention to major 
policy matters which might have remedied the University's 
relatively poor performance compared with comparably sized 
universities in southern states. 
Central Exeoutive Struoture 
For the purposes of this study, the central executive 
structure comprises those permanent senior positions appointed 
(7) Nevertheless Schonell had described the Academic 
Committee as "an anachronism" and following his 
appointment to the chair of that committee in 1966, it 
ceased to play a significeunt role in advising the 
Senate on academic matters (Presley, 1971:7). 
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by the Senate with responsibility for the University as a 
whole rather than merely some part of it. Applying this 
definition, the central executive structure is taken to 
include the positions of Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-
Chancellor, and Registrar. 
o Vioe-Chancellor 
Section 14 of the Act provided for the Vice-Chancellor 
to be "the chief administrative officer of the University". 
The appointment of Vice-Chancellor was made by the Senate on 
such terms and conditions as it determined, but the 
legislation included also a provision not found in any other 
university act in Australia, namely, that such appointments 
were subject to confirmation by the Governor in Council. The 
purpose of this provision was recognition of the crucial 
importance of the role of the Vice-Chancellor in providing 
leadership within the University and the consequential need 
for the Queenslaund Government to maintain at least some 
control over the type of person recruited to take the helm; 
it acknowledged also that the Queensland Government was a 
major provider of funding for the University. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the vice-
chancellorial role, the literature makes frequent reference to 
the high responsibilities but ambiguous authority of the 
office (Becher & Kogan, 1980:65). However this predominantly 
British literature has been based on the British pattern where 
the vice-chancellor also served as chairman of the senior 
academic body. Moodie and Eustace for example considered that 
it was "particularly appropriate" that vice-chancellors should 
occupy this combined role (1974:132). Indeed the desirability 
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of the office of vice-chancellor and chairman of the senior 
academic body being fused into one was proposed in the Murray 
Report for the Australian situation where the pattern at the 
time had been to separate the offices (1967:96). 
On the other hand although the fusion of the two roles 
might seem to offer some advantages in terms of the 
coordination of academic and resource policy madcing, Fielden 
and Lockwood have drawn attention to the problem of confusing 
the distinctive leadership role expected of a chief executive 
with the consensus facilitating role of a chairmeui (1973:51-
52). As an ex officio member eund executive officer of the 
Senate, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Queensland 
was in a position to provide the Senate with independent 
advice on recommendations submitted by the Professorial Board 
through its elected President. The Vice-Chancellor was also 
expected to advise the Senate on resource matters which were 
the subject of recommendations from the various central 
committees. Finally as executive officer of the Senate, the 
Vice-Chancellor was responsible for the execution of all 
Senate decisions through the administrative machinery headed 
by the Registrar. 
Although the Act did not prescribe the duties of the 
Vice-Chancellor, Section 11 defined the powers of the Senate 
and the University's Handbook of Administrative Procedures 
simply authorised the Vice-Chancellor, as the chief 
administrative officer, to perform "such duties as the Senate 
may from time to time direct" (1963:3.22(1)). These duties 
were contained in a host of Senate resolutions which had 
evolved over the years but many Vice-Cheuncellorial powers had 
not been defined because prior to 1960, Story had considered 
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that to do so would be to limit them (S.A. Rayner, Private 
Communication, 12/4/87). Hence there was little by way of 
systematised procedures or any consolidated set of formal 
delegations of authority to guide administrative behaviour 
with the result that much was left to the idiosyncratic 
discretion of the Vice-Chancellor. The outcome was that the 
Vice-Cheuncellor had insufficient time available for the 
essential chief executive roles of strategic planning and 
evaluation and became immersed instead in routine 
administrative minutiae. 
To some extent this concentration of power in the 
Senate and, de facto in the Vice-Chancellor, was the 
result of very rapid growth. The University had not been able 
to divert sufficient resources to develop an adequate senior 
administrative structure in order to keep pace with that 
growth and Schonell had been moved to lament the "patently 
inadequate line of top level people to facilitate the flow of 
decisions" (1968:18). As one observer of the University of 
Queensland during the 1960s remarked: 
In an organisation so centralized, almost 
everything turns about one fulcrum and the 
pressure upon the one man who is this fulcrum 
is enormous. This man is, of course, the Vice-
Chancellor (Presley, 1971:9). 
o Deputy Vioe-Chanoellor 
Section 14 of the Act provided for the Senate to 
appoint one or more Deputy Vice-Chancellors "each of whom 
shall perform such functions as the Senate may from time to 
time determine". The first Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Queensland was appointed on 1 January 1963 to 
relieve the Vice-Chancellor of some of the growing 
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administrative burden. The establishment of this position had 
been advocated by the McElwain Committee as a meeuns of 
spreading some of the workload which at the time was so 
heavily concentrated in the Vice-Chancellor that the decision-
making network had become clogged (McElwain Report, 
5/11/62:12). It was a measure of the influence wielded by the 
Registrar that the powers eund duties of the first Deputy Vice-
Chancellor were as recommended by the then Registrar, Mr. C.J. 
Connell (Memo, Reg. to VC, 14/1/63). The powers of the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor were restricted to acting for the Vice-
Chancellor in his absence "in all matters not affecting major 
University policy" as well as a number of relatively minor 
responsibilities.(8) 
By 1967 the foundation Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Professor L.J.H. Teakle) had been required to serve as acting 
Vice-Chancellor on increasingly frequent occasions due to 
Schonell's chronic ill health and, in eunticipation of the 
latter's pleunned retirement, the Senate approved a 
recommendation from Tealcle for the appointment of two part-
time acting Deputy Vice-Chancellors - one to be responsible 
for the property component and the second to assume 
responsibility for the staffing element of the full-time 
(8) These responsibilities included: (a) approval of 
appointments of library and technical staff as well as 
teaching staff up to the level of senior tutor; (b) 
approval of recommendations from a number of committees 
only one of which (the Equipment Sub-Committee) could 
be regarded as having major policy significance; (c) 
approval of submissions for minor building works; (d) 
student discipline. 
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Deputy Vice-chancellor's functions (SM, 13/2/69).(9) 
With the University experiencing great difficulty in 
developing its building plans for the 1970-1972 triennium (due 
to the lack of administrative and planning support staff) the 
then Deputy Chancellor (Lieut. Colonel A.S. Gehrmann) was 
seconded to the University for a three year period from 1967 
to 1969 to work in collaboration with the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor in order to overcome the planning backlog. A 
number of interviewees suggested that Gehrmeunn's secondment 
was imposed on the University by the State Government. Be 
that as it may, Schonell and Teakle both resented this 
intervention and the secondment made very little impact on the 
backlog. The sheer work overload resting on a few shoulders 
combined with the lack of planning and procedures and 
exacerbated by the pressures generated by a rapidly expanding 
and more complex University resulted in a growing dependence 
on senior non-academic staff in the meunagement of the 
institution. 
o Registrar 
The Central Administration of the University of 
Queensland, the body of full-time permanent administrative 
officers, was headed by the office of Registrar. This office 
was not mentioned in the Act but the absence of a full-time 
Vice-Chancellor prior to 1960 coupled with Story's preference 
for a strong but economical Central Administration had led to 
an unusually wide range of responsibilities being placed under 
(9) Schonell died on 22 February 1969. These part-time 
acting positions were the forerunners of the two 
permanent full-time positions established in 1970, 
designated Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) and Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance). 
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the Registrar's direct control. In addition to the 
traditional role associated with the administration of 
academic eund secretariat services, the Registrar was also 
responsible to the Vice-Chancellor for the administration of 
business services (including budgeting), legal services, 
buildings and grounds matters (other than those associated 
with the construction of new buildings), personnel services 
and public relations (Reiyner, 1970:9). 
Of the 218 administrative staff employed in the Central 
Administration all but sixteen were responsible in both a line 
and functional sense to the Registrar (Statistics, 1969:168). 
The only senior staff who did not report functionally to the 
Registrar were the University Architect (and his three 
professional staff responsible for the coordination of the 
University's building program) and the Assistant to the Vice-
Chancellor. These officers were eunswerable to the Deputy 
Vice-Cheuncellor and Vice-Chancellor respectively (Rayner, 
1970:9). This meant that the Vice-Chancellor eund Deputy Vice-
Chancellor's access to a wide range of fineuncial, legal and 
administrative services was through the strategically placed 
Registrar. 
Because the Registrar and his staff were responsible 
for servicing all of the University's committee system and had 
initiated back in 1958 statistical collection procedures which 
had been extended significantly over the years, this office 
became the repository for all of the University's management 
information. (10) The location of control over management 
(10) The initiative for collecting this data from 1958 was 
taken by the newly appointed Assistant Registrar 
(Academic), Dr. S.A. Rayner (Interview, S.A. Rayner, 
24-25/7/84). 
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information is a key indicator of the locus of power: 
Information is key to both the economic 
efficiency eund the political rationality of a 
university ... possession of information by 
individuals or groups ceun increase their 
capacity to achieve influence and power. In 
this sense, information is not a neutral force 
and the weiys in which it is handled and 
organised in a university context are rightly 
the subject of concern (Fielden & Lockwood, 
1973:145). 
Fielden and Lockwood argued that any organisation's 
information system can have a considerable effect on the 
structure and processes of the system of governance, either as 
a force for devolved decision-making or as a force for 
centralised control (1973:149). 
At the University of Queensland the centralisation of 
management information was a force for greater centralisation 
of power in the hands of the Central Executive. Although the 
formal decision-meiking role of the Registrar was limited to 
non-policy matters, the great influence of the position on 
major policy issues was to a significant extent a function of 
control over information. Control over data concerning 
proposed academic developments and their budgetary 
implications enabled the then Deputy Registrar (Dr. S.A. 
Rayner) to prepare virtually all of the major discussion 
papers for key University committees, including the 
University's triennial submission to the Australian 
Universities Commission (Memo, Dep.Reg. to VC, 20/3/68). 
Moodie and Eustace have warned that it was mainly in these 
areas of planning which required knowledge of the 
sophisticated manipulation of information which could 
influence policy decisions that there was a danger of 
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"bureaucratic aggrandisement" (1974:165-169).(11) 
The appointment of Rayner as Registrar on 1 January 
1970 followed by the appointment of Professor Zelmeun Cowen as 
Vice-Cheuncellor two months later, marked the start of a new 
era of a much more professional Central Administration 
interested in the development of more systematised policies 
and procedures and, by virtue of its control over management 
information, much more assertive in the policy process. 
Central Committee System and the Budgetary Prooess 
There were some thirty seven central standing 
committees in 1969 which reported directly to either the 
Senate, Vice-Chancellor or Professorial Board. Of that number 
seven had major budgetary responsibilities. The scope of this 
study does not permit a detailed exposition of the role played 
by all of the central committee system in the budgetary 
process. However important aspects of the process need to be 
examined having regard to Jenkins (1978:182) and Blau's 
(1973:278) observation that an understanding of the budgetary 
process is crucial to comprehending the distribution of 
political power in organisations. 
Whereas proposals for academic development were 
customarily initiated by academic departments within the 
University of Queensland, the annual budgetary process prior 
to 1969 was very much the province of the Central 
Administration and the central resource committees. The main 
central committees concerned with teaching and research 
(11) Rayner possessed considerable expertise in the 
manipulation of data having spent two years with the 
Australian Council for Educational Research, Melbourne 
for training in test construction, statistical analysis 
methods and research design (UN, 9/4/86:3). 
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included: 
j@ committees of the Professorial Board such as the 
Standing Committee; 
o committees of the Senate such as the Library Committee 
and Research Committee; 
o sub-committees of Senate committees such as the 
Equipment Sub-Committee of the Finance Committee; 
o Vice-Cheuncellor's committees such as the Technical eund 
Laboratory Staff Advisory Committee. 
Rayner has noted that the question of whether a central 
committee was a committee of the Senate, the Professorial 
Board or the Vice-Chancellor determined in part how each 
committee operated (1980:3). For example committees such as 
the Library Committee and the Research Committee stressed 
resource acquisition in addition to resource allocation eund 
had traditionally sought substeuntial additional funds each 
year; in so doing, these committees acted in effect as 
pressure groups. Some other committees, however, such as the 
Equipment Sub-Committee when dealing with maintenance funding, 
had been primarily concerned with the more passive role of 
resource allocation rather than resource acquisition. This 
had been reflected in greater emphasis on the allocation of 
incrementally increased funding among departments rather than 
acting as a special interest advocate seeking substantial 
additional funding. The Library Committee enjoyed special 
access to the Finance Committee and was able to discuss its 
proposals for expenditure on the Library with the Finance 
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Committee before the budget was submitted to the Senate.(12) 
To some extent, differences in modus operandi were 
due to the composition eund role of the various committees. 
For example the nineteen member Research Committee enjoyed the 
credibility of having both a strong academic eund non-academic 
senatorial composition. On the other hand the ten member 
Equipment Sub-Committee was unbalanced in that it was 
dominated by academics eund members of the Central Executive 
leaving only minimal non-academic Senate representation. It 
was merely eun advisory sub-committee to the predomineuntly non-
academic Fineunce Committee whereas the Research Committee 
enjoyed direct access to the Senate.(13) 
The resource allocation processes of the University of 
Queensland during the 1960s were, with the exception of those 
relating to academic staffing, relatively undeveloped. Given 
the large size of the University by 1969, it was surprising 
that the bureaucratic technique of classifying like 
departments into more or less homogeneous groups in order to 
facilitate informed assessment of bids by specialised sub-
committees was not widely employed. For exeunple, the 
Equipment Sub-Committee simply received submissions from each 
of the fifty-five departments and based its recommendations in 
the case of the maintenance estimates mainly on historical 
allocations adjusted as required to take account of shifts in 
student load (Interview, J.L. Tolhurst, 25/5/84). As the 
(12) This access ended when the Library Committee became a 
committee of the Professorial Board in 1977 (Interview, 
G. Greenwood, 6/8/84). 
(13) The Equipment Sub-Committee was renamed the Equipment 
and Maintenance Committee on 12 February 1970 (SM, 
12/2/70:16). 
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Assistant Bursar of the time noted: 
If, in eun earlier year, the department received 
a special allocation, or more theun its 
equitable share of the total eunount available, 
this additional eunount tends to be perpetuated 
under this system (Memo, Asst.Bursar to DVC 
(F&F), 10/3/72). 
Equipment allocations were rarely supported by any statement 
of priorities nor indication of proposed usage. The 
Committee's criteria for choice were derived from a subjective 
assessment of need (Interview, J.L. Tolhurst, 25/5/84). 
Prior to 1967 submissions for a share of the University 
Research Grant (URG) were made by individual departments 
direct to the Senate's Research Committee eund, following the 
Senate's approval of the research budget, the Research 
Committee allocated the URG directly among the various 
departments (Burnett Report, July 1977:86; Interview, J.S. 
Macqueen, 24/5/84). By 1969 this cumbersome and inefficient 
process had been superseded by a system of sub-committees 
based on academic areas. Allocations made by the Research 
Committee to each academic area were based mainly on a staff 
"head count" formula with "scientific" departments receiving 
1.25 times the grants of the other departments in view of the 
high cost of equipment associated with research in those 
fields outside the humanities and social sciences (Burnett 
Report, July 1977:86; Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 8/6/73). 
Allocations by the sub-committees to the departments in their 
area were based on a wide range of criteria including 
assessments of merit in medical science departments, complex 
formulae in the physical science departments and essentially 
"head count" calculations in the arts departments (Interview, 
J.S. Macqueen, 24/5/84). 
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Because separate bids were made to a reunge of central 
committees, it was possible for a department to receive 
funding from one committee for resources that had a low 
priority yet be unsuccessful in the quest for funds from 
another committee for resources which had a very high 
priority. Moreover because it was University policy that 
departments could not exercise virement (that is, transfer 
funds from one budget allocation to another) without special 
approval from the Finance Committee, there was in effect very 
little discretion available to heads of departments to 
optimise the use of scarce resources. 
Having considered briefly the methods used by some 
central committees in determining funding allocations, it is 
appropriate now to turn to the actual preparation of the 
annual budget itself. In 1969 the initial work on the budget 
was undertaken within the Central Administration by the Bursar 
and involved him calculating the cost of existing commitments 
and indicating the amount likely to be available for 
allocation to support new developments (Interview, J.L. 
Tolhurst, 25/5/84). At no stage was the Professorial Board 
given an opportunity to comment on the draft budget although 
the Senate, on 21 August 1969, resolved that the reports of a 
number of its committees with resource management 
responsibilities should be sent to the Professorial Board for 
comment at the same time as they were submitted to the Senate 
(SM, 21/8/69). Under this arrangement, comments made by the 
Professorial Board were noted by the Vice-Chancellor and 
weighed up in consultation with his principal advisers (the 
Deputy Vice-chancellor and Registrar) against the competing 
claims from other (including non-academic) areas within the 
105 
University, having regard to needs already identified in 
triennial submissions to the Australian Universities 
Commission. It was only at the stage of finalising the draft 
budget and determining firm priorities for new developments 
that the chairmeun of the Finance Committee was called in for 
the process of conditioning him to accept the budget proposals 
(Interview, J.L. Tolhurst, 26/5/84). The draft budget was 
then treunsmitted by the Finance Committee to the Senate for 
approval. 
The University's relieunce on the mechanism of 
overlapping membership to overcome the lack of structural 
integration of academic and resource decision-making extended 
also to the Finance Committee. That Committee, for example, 
in addition to non-academic senators with a business, 
professional and public service background, included four 
members of the Professorial Board - the Vice-Chancellor, 
President of the Professorial Board, the senator appointed by 
the Professorial Board and the senator appointed by the Staff 
Association. But reliance on overlapping membership to bring 
about a measure of coordination between academic and financial 
decision-making was not an adequate substitute for structural 
integration. The lack of integration of academic and resource 
decision-making at the department, faculty and Professorial 
Board levels had led to a situation where new courses had been 
approved for introduction without knowing the costs involved 
other than the staffing costs (PBM, 24/2/71:19). 
It can be seen that although the central committee 
participation in the budgetary process was oligarchical in 
nature involving mainly small elite committees, the actual 
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preparation of the budget itself, eund the crucial decisions on 
the development of the University as a whole (including the 
inevitable trade-offs between academic and non-academic areas) 
was largely a bureaucratic decision-making process involving 
the Vice-Chancellor and his principal permanent advisers. 
Acceptance of the Vice-Chancellor's budget by the Finance 
Committee without significant amendment was the norm, as was 
the Senate's acceptance of the budget as submitted by the 
Finance Committee. 
Cnnvooation 
In accordeunce with the provisions of Sections 6 eund 16 
of the University of Queensleund Act of 1965. Convocation 
was empowered to elect a proportion (which in 1969 amounted to 
30.30%) of the total membership of the University's governing 
body. These elected members alweiys included the meiximum 
allowable two members from the teaching staff of the 
University and a range of distinguished persons mainly from 
the professions.(14) 
The members of Convocation were also authorised to 
consider any matters relating to the University and to meike 
recommendations to the Senate on euny matter arising from such 
consideration. However because Convocation usually met only 
once a year, Statute No. 6 authorised the nineteen member 
Standing Committee of Convocation to undertake this review 
(14) In common with convocations in most other Australian 
universities, the University of Queensland body was 
comprised mainly of the University's graduates. The 
graduate body was supplemented by other groups, the 
most significant being the members and past members of 
the Senate and the full-time members of the academic 
staff who were not graduates of the University (UQ Act, 
1965:Section 15). 
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function on behalf of the parent body. 
Attendance at meetings of Convocation was usually poor, 
rarely exceeding fifty in number and at the election of the 
eighteenth Senate whose term commenced on 1 January 1966, only 
3,773 votes were recorded out of a possible 10,000 on the 
Convocation Roll (SM, 3/8/67 : 6).(15) Concern had been 
expressed that the Staff Association had influenced the voting 
of its members by advising them to vote for academic members 
of the University staff (SM, 3/8/67:7). But apart from 
exercising their freunchise as members of Convocation, members 
of the Staff Association had shown little interest in 
participating in the affairs of Convocation, preferring 
instead to criticise the: 
limited vitality of Convocation as a body ... 
having regard to the remoteness from the 
current affairs of the University of meuny 
electors in Convocation (UQSA, Suggested 
Amendments to the UQ Act, 14/6/72:2). 
Notwithstanding the formal legal status of Convocation, 
the fact that it was a large heterogeneous, somewhat eunorphous 
body without its own permanent executive structure meant that 
in reality. Convocation's influence on the governance of the 
University was almost totally indirect through its elected 
members on the Senate. 
Tho UnlYftrsitY of Qyognsland Staff AssQQidtiQn 
The University of Queensland Staff Association was the 
professional body of the academic staff employed by the 
University. The Association's legal status in 1969 was that 
(15) This was a relatively higher voter response compared 
with the more recent history of Convocation where the 
proportion casting formal votes has been - 1974 
(20.49%), 1977 (19.11%), 1980 (17.06%), 1983 (15.42%) 
(W.R.A. McAlpine, Private Communication, 11/3/86). 
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of an unincorporated association; it did not become a 
registered industrial union until December 1976. 
Despite the all-inclusive nature of its name, the Staff 
Association's membership was restricted almost entirely to 
teaching and research staff only.(16) By 1968, the 
Association claimed some 617 members - 90% of the possible 
maximum. The prevailing attitude was that the teaching staff 
(eund especially the professoriate) were the embodiment of the 
University and non-academic staff were very much second-class 
citizens with no right of participation in decision-making. 
This attitude prevailed notwithstanding the fact that two out 
of three staff employed at the University were engeiged in non-
academic "support" areas. 
The Staff Association faced the difficult task of 
trying to represent the interests of a very diverse range of 
members, from tenured senior professors to junior tutors on 
short-term appointments. Until the late 1960s the Association 
had been spared most of the discord that might have been 
expected from its diverse composition and its dual 
professional/industrial role. It was not an accident of 
constitutional drafting that the first object of the 
Association was to promote the interests of the University 
whereas the fostering of the interests of staff was only the 
second priority. There was no perceived conflict in these 
objects in the minds of many members of the Association since 
the interests of the University and those of the teaching 
(16) Senior non-academic staff whose salaries were aligned 
to academic salary scales were also eligible for 
membership. The Staff Association beceune the Academic 
Staff Association when it registered as a union in 
1976. 
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staff were believed to be indivisible. With few exceptions 
there was no industrial adversary stance and the "them eund us" 
mentality which was to develop later was, by and large, absent 
during the period preceding 1969. 
Pursuant to Section 6 of the Association's 
Constitution, the Executive Committee possessed delegated 
authority to carry out the Association's objects. Prior to 
1971 the election of office bearers eund executive committee 
members was conducted at the annual general meeting rather 
than by a postal ballot of all members. However attendances 
at annual general meetings were often small and at the meeting 
held on 26 March 1969 only sixty members were present (UQSAM, 
26/3/69:1). The Association had exhibited distinct 
oligarchical tendencies over many years, with the Executive 
Committee being dominated by members who had served as office 
bearers for extended periods of time. 
The Presidency of the Association was a position that 
was coveted by meuny senior professors and over the years a 
number of influential and politically active figures had 
occupied that post. Indeed election as President was often 
regarded as a step towards the filling of leadership positions 
within the University central committee system or the Central 
Executive. It was significeunt that between 1924-1968, thirty 
eight of the forty four presidential incumbents had been 
professors. 
Although the Staff Association had regarded itself as 
the professional body of the academic staff, it had shown 
little interest in formulating policies on academic matters 
and indeed most of its time had been devoted to industrial 
issues and recreational matters. Possibly because the Staff 
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Association had rarely adopted an adversarial stance towards 
its members' employer (the Senate) nor towards its members' 
chief paymaster (the Queensleund Government), the employment 
conditions of academic staff at the University of Queensland 
compared unfavourably with their counterparts in southern 
universities. 
The Association's relaxed operating style extended also 
to its attitude towards University governance. The 
Association was in effect an extension of the oligarchical 
control exercised by professors at the department, faculty and 
Professorial Board levels. It was not surprising that many of 
them saw little to be gained by advocating reform of the 
University's decision-malcing processes. Furthermore many non-
professorial staff in the Association were reluctant to 
agitate for reform because this would inevitably involve 
confrontation with the professoriate, the very group that 
ambitious non-professorial staff aspired to join. One former 
non-professorial member of the Staff Association Executive who 
was subsequently an eminent political scientist noted that: 
It seemed very foolish to one aspiring to 
membership of "The Club" to point out its 
defects, and to criticise its rules. 
Decidedly, it did not seem the way to commend 
oneself to members as likely to make a good 
club-man (Truman, 1963:4). 
Thus prior to 1969 the main eigitation by the Staff 
Association for reform of the University's system of 
governance was confined to the question of institutional 
autonomy. The origins of the more active body that was 
evident after 1969 could be traced directly to the heightened 
political awareness that arose from the Association's 
opposition to the Queensland Government's proposal to provide 
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for the establishment of an Appeals Board referred to 
earlier. According to Thomis, that event saw the coming of age 
of the Association as a political force: 
... mobilising, for the first time, an 
impressive demonstration of its capacity to 
act, its willingness to speak out clearly on 
the vital issue of university autonomy, eund its 
understeunding of the need to enlist the support 
of students in a joint endeavour ([1985]:16). 
In general, however, the prevailing climate among staff, 
according to one observer at the time, reflected apathy rather 
theun activism and cooperation rather than conflict (Truman, 
1963:5). 
It is possible that this tame "company union" behaviour 
reflected the Association's coopted "insider" status in that 
it was the only body of its type in Australia with direct 
representation on the governing body of the University. This 
gave the Staff Association direct representation in the 
strategic policy making of the University. There was little 
recognition, however, that this incorporation of a potential 
source of opposition, giving the Association token access to 
enable it to work within the established system rather theun 
attack it from without, could be a hindrance as well as a help 
in raising the voice of academic staff in the decision-making 
forums of the University. 
NQn-Aoademio Staff Representation 
In 1969 the 1,711 non-academic staff employed by the 
University were not organised in any coordinated manner for 
industrial relations purposes and indeed it was not until 1976 
that a State Industrial Agreement was agreed to between the 
governing bodies of the three universities in Queensland and 
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the seventeen unions then claiming an interest in the 
demarcation of non-academic work. Because there was no 
compulsory unionism prior to that agreement, union membership 
density in most areas of work was relatively sparse and to the 
extent that the more militant unions such as the Federated 
Clerks were active in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was 
to achieve compulsory unionism within the University. They 
were not interested in internal matters such as University 
governance. Indeed the lack of non-academic staff 
participation in University decision-making had not arisen as 
an issue prior to 1969. There was not even an internal 
umbrella organisation that could speak on behalf of all non-
academic staff. 
Technical and laboratory staff were represented by the 
Technical and Laboratory Staff Association, a body which was 
formed in 1966 with objectives that strongly resembled those 
of the (academic) Staff Association, namely: 
(fi.) To promote the advancement and interests of the 
University of Queensland; 
(b) To promote the professional interests and advancement 
of members of the Technical and Laboratory Staff of the 
University of Queensland (UQTALSA Constitution, 
1969:1). 
The prevailing climate of the time in most Australian 
universities did not encourage participation in university 
governance by non-academic staff and the Technical and 
Laboratory Staff Association played no significant role in 
seeking such an involvement. The Association's main function 
was to maintain liaison between members and the University 
Administration and, in consultation with the relevant unions, 
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to advocate the improvement of wages and conditions of work. 
Whereas the origins of the Technical and Laboratory 
Staff Association can be traced to "bottom-up grass roots" 
pressure for more effective internal advocacy of their 
interests, the more docile clerical staff had to wait until 
July 1973 for similar representation with the formation of the 
University of Queensleund Employees Association. Before this, 
initiatives relating to organisational matters affecting 
clerical eund administrative staff were very much subject to 
"top-down" control by the Registrar. 
The University of Queensland Union 
The University of Queensleund Union was formed in 1922 
without any legislative foundation, as an unincorporated 
association for the purpose of: 
(a) affording a recognised means of communication between 
the students and University authorities; 
(b) promoting social life in the University; 
(c) representing the students in all matters affecting 
their interests; 
(d) promoting among graduates a permanent interest in the 
University; 
(e) securing the cooperation of the University authorities, 
staff, graduates and undergraduates and to advance in 
every weiy possible the interests of the University as a 
whole (Calendar, 1969:11). 
As has already been shown, prior to 1969 student 
representation in the University of Queensland at the 
departmental, faculty and Professorial Board levels was almost 
non-existent. But in those areas that were within the direct 
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control of the Senate, student participation was more 
widespread. For exeunple after the 1965 eunendments to the 
University of Queensland Act, the Council of the Union had the 
right to appoint a graduate of the University to the Senate. 
The Council also elected five members to the Senate's Combined 
Advisory Committee eund enjoyed the right to nominate one 
representative to the Vice-Chancellor's Disciplinary Committee 
constituted pursuant to Statute No. 13 to consider matters 
relating to student discipline. In 1968 a Senate/Student 
Liaison Committee was created, with five of the ten members 
nominated by the President of the Union (McAulay, 1968:8). 
Membership of the Union was open to members of the 
University Senate, Convocation, teaching staff, principals of 
affiliated colleges, graduates and past students as well as 
current undergraduates and postgraduates. The Union's 
constitution provided for its governance to be vested in a 
Council which comprised in 1969, fifty one voting members 
elected on an eunnual basis by eund from the Union membership. 
The Council included, in addition to ex officio members, 
up to thirty five elected representatives divided among the 
faculties on a proportional basis. 
The student body in most Australian universities prior 
to the mid-1960s saw themselves eund were perceived by others 
as being in statu pupillari. These were the days before 
the drafting of young men to fight in the Vietnam War had 
raised the political consciousness of students; there was 
little by way of critical questioning of traditional 
assumptions and values in society and the extent to which 
institutions such as universities perpetuated them; the 
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university was a place of privilege and civility and due 
deference was paid to those members placed in positions of 
authority (Cowen, 1974:7). 
According to McQueen (1979:43-49) and Johnston 
(1982:149-151) Queensland's political, social eund economic 
culture was quite distinctive compared with the rest of 
Australia. Queensland's utilitarianism was reinforced by a 
robust form of eunti-intellectualism and this was reflected in, 
inter alia, a proclivity to adopt relatively more 
authoritarian forms of organisation. Observing how Queensland 
University students appeared to exhibit greater compliance and 
conformity theun their contemporaries in other Australieun 
universities, a Professor of Law at the University of 
Queensland noted that student activism at the University was 
almost unheard of before 1967 (Tarlo, 1968:144). A review of 
the student newspaper has confirmed that before 1966, most 
election ceunpaigns for the Presidency of the Student Union 
had been fought on issues such as student clubs and the cost 
of food in the refectory. During 1966, however, Semper 
Floreat began to run articles in an effort to raise the 
political consciousness of students. It asserted that: 
Most Australian university students are 
apathetic, bored, geared to factory education 
... they conform because they feel powerless. 
The students at Berkeley Campus showed last 
year in their revolt against factory education 
and lack of civil liberties, that they were far 
from impotent. They brought the machine to a 
halt temporarily and won reforms (15/9/66:4). 
In the presidential election campaign held during 1967, 
the issue of University governance was made a major issue by 
one of the two candidates, Mr. Brian Laver, a History honours 
student. Perhaps more than any other student activist in the 
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history of the University of Queensleund, Laver focused 
attention on what he alleged was eun authoritarian eund 
paternalistic University Administration (SF, 14/7/67:8). 
Although Laver failed to gain office, the election generated 
unprecedented interest with a record 54% of the eligible 
electorate casting votes (UQU Electoral Officer's Report, 
1/9/67). The successful candidate, Mr. A.J. Nucifora, a 
conservative third year Arts/Law student, achieved 32% of the 
votes, polled on a platform of trying to work within the 
system rather than revolutionary action (SF, 14/7/67:9). 
Despite the fact that mainstream student politics at 
the University were still dominated by the moderates, the 
various reform groups at the time, [especially the 
Revolutionary Socialist Students Alliance (RSSA), the 
Revolutionary Socialist Alliance (RSA) and the Students for 
Democratic Action (SDA)] through a process of public forums, 
street marches, pamphleteering and sit-in occupations of the 
J.D. Story Administration Building, were able to generate an 
atmosphere of continuing crisis. This atmosphere of crisis 
generated by what Tarlo (1968:145) described as "powerfully 
motivated left-wingers" was later exploited by the moderates 
to win significant reforms to the University's system of 
governance in the early post-1969 period. 
If the various student reform groups were unable to 
agree on specific proposals for the reform of the University's 
system of governance, they were able to reach some consensus 
on the general need to be critical of the established order 
and to demand an end to the restrictions on civil liberties. 
The Civil Liberties Co-ordinating Committee was formed in 
April 1967 and on 8 September 1967 some 3,500 students 
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together with a handful of academic staff (including Professor 
E.C. Webb who later became President of the Professorial 
Board), marched from the St. Lucia campus to the city to 
protest against the requirement that processions could only be 
held by obtaining a Police Department permit. The belief that 
this gave the Queensland Government arbitrary powers of 
censorship over which opinions could be expressed through 
street marches and which opinions should be suppressed was an 
example of the irrational authoritarianism which student 
radicals claimed was being perpetuated by conservative 
institutions such as the University of Queensland (SF, 
12/3/70:13). Given this critique of the role that 
universities were imagined to play, it was not surprising that 
groups such as the RSSA demanded the radical democratisation 
of all institutions, especially universities, with full 
control to be vested in all members of the self-governing 
community. 
The University's main concern regarding student and 
staff activism at this time was the bad impression that it was 
creating in the minds of State leaders and the community 
generally. The 8 September 1967 street march had led to 114 
arrests by police (CM, 9/9/67); the Minister for Education 
named in Parliament nine members of the academic staff who 
participated and queried whether they had been absent from 
duty without proper cause (CM, 14/9/67). Newspaper reports 
talked of a "Red Takeover of Students" and student vandalism 
evoked images of a collapse of law and order at the University 
(Telegraph, 14/9/67; Truth, 6/10/68). As the acting Vice-
Chancellor noted: 
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There is little doubt that excesses associated 
with the University, whether it be student 
veundalism, irresponsibility of a staff member, 
or uneconomical administration have profound 
effects on community attitudes and 
support (AVC's Report to Convocation, 1968). 
At the same time there were severe limits on the extent to 
which the Senate and the University Administration could 
control or influence union affairs. Because the University 
Act contained no reference to the Union there were no statutes 
or rules that could be formulated to regulate its activities. 
During the late 1960s the University authorities had to rely 
mainly on the power of persuasion in their dealings with the 
Union. 
In seeking to understand the impact of student 
activists and the Student Union on the reform of the 
University of Queensland's system of governance, it is crucial 
to appreciate that the mainstream student body and the Union 
itself remained for the most part in the hands of the 
moderates. The role of moderate Presidents such as Mr. R.N. 
Wensley was important during 1969 in convincing the University 
Administration to work with the mainstream body of the Union 
by acknowledging the need for students to be consulted on a 
regular basis on those matters that affected them. It was 
made clear to the University that, should modest reforms of 
this type not be conceded, then there was a strong risk that 
moderate students would become alienated and be more amenable 
to the demagoguery of the New Left (PBM, 25/6/69 & 
30/6/69:98). 
A study of the Union in 1967 suggested that the 
Council was divided into two distinct alignments - right-wing 
conservative and left-wing radical - and that as a general 
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rule the former prevailed in determining policies at Council 
meetings because of their pragmatic concern for bureaucratic 
efficiency (McAulay, 1968:137-140). Certainly the Union was 
exhibiting increasing signs of bureaucratisation. By 1969, 
the Presidency had become a full-time paid position eund the 
Council had been described as a "rubber stamp" for Executive 
decisions (McAulay, 1968:76). 
Because this bureaucratisation was coupled with the 
Union's tendency to seek incremental rather than revolutionary 
change, the radical students turned more toward operating 
outside of what they called pejoratively the "toy parliament" 
in order to achieve their ends (Interview, R.N. Wensley, 
3/8/84). However, despite this lack of unity in the student 
movement, the activists of the late 1960s could legitimately 
claim credit for raising the issue of University governance to 
the forefront of political salience. 
The environmental and structural conditions were now 
ready for the right combination of sympathetic and dynamic 
leadership to exploit that salience by placing the issue of 
organisational reform on the political agenda of the 
University. The need to reform the University's system of 
governeunce which was said by one professor at the time to "sag 
... under its own weight" was urgent (Presley, 1971:3). 
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(CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EMERGENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWER. 1969-1972 
Having described the Central Executive's relationship 
with other elements of the University's formal decision-making 
structures and processes at the beginning of the period under 
study, it is now appropriate to examine in more detail the 
behaviour exhibited within the Central Executive as efforts 
were made over the next three years to improve the quality and 
efficiency of decision-making at that level. 
Willett has suggested that one of the most serious 
problems affecting the performance of older universities (such 
as the University of Queensland) was that the additional 
funding made available from the recommendations of the 
Australian Universities Commission over the period 1961-1969 
was allocated primarily to the employment of additional 
academic staff in order to cope with rapidly expanding 
enrolments. Very little was spent on improving administrative 
systems and, as a consequence, the central administrative 
structure of many universities became run down and indeed some 
were in disarray (1972:113).(1) 
There is no doubt that the Central Administration of 
the University of Queensland was acutely understaffed compared 
with other Australian universities, the majority of which at 
that time also followed variations of the centralised 
administration model. The University spent only $130 per EFTS 
(1) Williams has pointed out, however, that of the 77% real 
recurrent expenditure per EFTS increase over the 1957-
1970 period, only 16% related to staff increases. The 
biggest component (51%) was due to the increase in real 
salaries and wages plus an increase in full-time staff 
relative to part-time staff (1972:108). 
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on its Central Administration in 1969, the lowest of any 
Australian university and compared with an Australian average 
of $203 per EFTS (Selby Smith, 1976:16). Moreover the number 
of administrative staff per 1,000 EFTS with a salary above the 
minimum for a lecturer employed by the University of 
Queensland in 1969 was 0.9 compared with eun Australian average 
of 3.8 (UQTS 1973-1976,1970:26-27). 
The problems associated with eun overworked eund under 
staffed Central Administration were most in evidence in the 
difficulties faced by the University in planning. There was 
no comprehensive long term pleunning which sought to match 
academic developments with expected human, fineuncial and 
physical resources. Such pleunning that did exist was confined 
essentially to ad hoc attempts every three years in the 
context of preparing the triennial submission to the 
Australian Universities Commission. In July 1969, after the 
Deputy Cheuncellor and Chairman of the Buildings and Grounds 
Committee (Lieut. Colonel A.S. Gehrmann) had completed most of 
his three year secondment to the University helping coordinate 
the building program, the Staff Association complained that 
University policy malcing appeared to be carried out without 
any thought to the overall development of the University and 
argued that there was a need for the Vice-Chancellor to 
establish effective planning machinery. The Association also 
demanded that the role of the University Administration be 
examined as a matter of urgency (UQSA IC Submission No. 71, 
July 1969). 
Previous chapters have commented on the cracks in the 
University's Central Executive which became increasingly 
obvious with Schonell's prolonged illness during 1967 and 
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1968. Schonell had been forced to cope with the sheer volume 
of administrative detail by making some decisions which did 
not always follow due process (Interviews, K.W. Knight, 
16/8/84; Z. Cowen, 8-9/5/85). Even so, a very large volume 
of administrative detail was submitted to the Senate for 
decision or noting. Following Schonell's death in February 
1969, the acting Vice-Chancellor (Professor L.J.H. Teeikle) saw 
the need to examine calls from influential senators such as 
Mr. N.J. Loveday for improvements in the organisation of 
Senate business eund clearer delegations of authority to the 
Vice-Cheuncellor and his senior officers (N.J. Lovedsiy, IC 
Submission No. 20, 1969). On 18 December 1969 the Senate 
appointed a committee chaired by Loveday for the purpose of 
examining, inter alia, the establishment of guidelines to 
determine which matters should be for Senate decision and 
which matters should be for executive decision (SM, 
16/12/69).(2) 
The Committee completed its report on 31 March 1970 and 
concluded that, although it was not practicable to lay down 
specific guidelines as to exactly what the Senate should do 
and what the Vice-Chancellor should be responsible for, it was 
clear that the Senate should act more like a board of 
directors concerned with policy matters and leave the senior 
executive officers of the University to manage day to day 
affairs (Loveday Report, 31/3/70:1). Accordingly the Senate 
(2) The Committee comprised - Mr. N.J. Loveday (chairman); 
Dr. J.G. Atherton and Professor G. Greenwood (both 
academic senators appointed by Convocation); Dr. K.W. 
Knight (President of the Staff Association 1968-1969); 
Sir Douglas Eraser (senator and former State Public 
Service Commissioner) with the Registrar as secretary. 
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resolved on 16 April 1970 that the Vice-Chancellor should be 
authorised to act executively on routine matters where no 
deviation from any steundard rule was involved and that he 
should submit to Senate for noting only those matters which he 
considered to be of "high importance". The Vice-Chancellor 
was also authorised to refer matters direct to the appropriate 
committees and to place matters before the Senate only when 
the material was in a form appropriate for decision-making. 
The most importeunt outcome of the Loveday Committee was 
that it regularised the location of considerable power in the 
Vice-Chancellor and, indirectly, in the remainder of the 
Central Executive. This was to have major implications for 
the future governance of the University in that, in a formal 
sense, it reinforced the underlying trend towards greater 
bureaucratic control over decision-making within the 
institution. The Lovede^^ Committee's other recommendations 
were concerned mainly with rationalising the Senate's 
committee structure (SM, 16/4/70:12-15). The effect of that 
change was to clarify to some extent the relationship between 
the Senate, its committee structure and the Vice-Chancellor 
but the central committee system was still extremely untidy. 
The Webb Committee report had noted in August 1969 for example 
that there appeared to be no rationale behind the reporting 
paths of the eight central service committees, with three 
reporting to the Professorial Board, four reporting direct to 
the Vice-Chancellor and one being a sub-committee of a Vice-
Chancellor's committee (Webb Report, 18/8/69:19). 
At the Senate meeting on 12 February 1970 the Senate 
noted that the Vice-Chancellor-Designate (Professor Zelman 
Cowen), who was due to take up duty the following month, had 
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agreed with Teakle's assessment that the experience during 
1969 with two part-time acting Deputy Vice-Chancellors 
indicated that there was a need for two permeunent full-time 
Deputy Vice-Cheuncellors to be appointed, one on the "academic" 
side and the other on the "finance/building" side in order to 
strengthen the University's dangerously thin senior executive 
structure. It was envisaged that the Deputy Vice-Cheuncellor 
(Academic) would be responsible to the Vice-Chancellor for 
coordinating academic developments including teaching and 
research as well as having general oversight of student 
affairs and that the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric eund 
Finance) would take over from the Registrar responsibility for 
all fineuncial matters as well as coordinate the University's 
building program eund central equipment services (SM, 
12/2/70:7). 
Cowen took up duty on 1 March 1970, his appointment 
being preceded by Dr. S.A. Rayner's appointment as Registrar 
on 1 January 1970. Professor E.C. Webb was appointed Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor (Academic) on 28 September 1970 and Mr. J.E. 
Ritchie's appointment as Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric eund 
Finance) beceune effective on 1 February 1971. Teakle retired 
on 31 December 1970. These major changes in the space of a 
few months represented a sharp discontinuity with the past and 
could be expected to be reflected in changes in the 
University's decision-making structure and processes. 
Cowen was a distinguished jurist having served as 
Professor of Public Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law, 
University of Melbourne (1951-1966) and Vice-Chancellor, 
University of New England (1967-1970). Well before he took up 
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office at the University of Queensleund, Cowen had developed 
clear ideas on the problems of university governance: 
... the committee system in universities is an 
abominable waste of talent and a misconception 
of function. Many professors teach too little, 
and write less. Going to committees breeds an 
appetite for more committees and destroys the 
capacity for sustained thought. This is the 
central problem of university government - to 
extract what is central and essential to the 
democratic functioning of universities, and 
discard the rest (1961:55-56). 
Because of the propensity of some interviewees to describe 
Cowen in terms of simplistic stereotypes it is necessary to 
appreciate from the outset that Cowen was a complex enigmatic 
individual. Notwithstanding his liberal pretensions, Cowen 
was essentially a conservative, very much concerned with law 
and order and having a deep respect for university values and 
ideals and their importance as key institutional elements in 
civilised democratic societies. Cowen saw himself as a 
custodieun of the university culture but, like many reflective 
intellectual conservatives, he was able to adapt to emerging 
trends such as the demands for participation in university 
decision-making by conceding rights of consultation and 
participation in some areas eund holding firm to a set of 
guiding principles which celebrated the virtue of elite 
decision-making in other areas. Cowen's belief in the need to 
search constantly for a defensible dividing line between the 
demands for democratic participation vis-a-vis the demands 
for bureaucratic efficiency was a recurring theme in his 
attitudes to university governance. 
Rayner had joined the University staff in 1958. His 
elevation to the position of Registrar after having served 
first as Assistant Registrar (Academic) and later as Deputy 
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Registrar was of major significance to the University. Rayner 
was highly qualified (holding a doctorate in education 
specialising in educational administration from the University 
of Illinois) with a very strong background in educational 
research including service as the Queensland representative on 
the Australieun Council for Educational Research from 1966 
until 1983 (UN, 9/4/86:3). Given this background, Rayner was 
not prepared to adopt an acquiescent attitude of passively 
implementing academic decisions. He was a very able, self 
confident and energetic administrator who had firm ideas on 
the way the University should be administered and was not 
afraid to put his views forward aggressively within the 
University committee network. With the creation of two Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor positions it might have been expected that 
the power and influence of the position of Registrar would 
have declined but, as Pfeffer has suggested, sometimes 
personal characteristics can compensate for disadvanteiges in 
formal structural position (1981:132). Although his ability 
and drive were greatly admired by most senior academics, his 
acerbic interventions were resented by others. 
Professor Edwin Webb had served as President of the 
Professorial Board from 1969 to 1970 and enjoyed a reputation 
as a liberal with a keen interest in democratic reform. His 
department (Biochemistry) had been one of the few identified 
in the Staff Association's 1963/1964 survey as providing 
appropriate opportunities for academic staff to make their 
views known in departmental policy formulation (UQSA, 
Departmental Consultation Report, [1964]:2). This reflected 
his strong commitment to the idea that universities ought to 
be like a community of scholars where all but the most 
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inexperienced staff should be involved in the decision-making 
process. Webb's beliefs had been shaped by his experience at 
Cambridge University (as an undergraduate and graduate student 
and later as Director of Studies in Biochemistry at St. 
Catherine's College, Cambridge) eund his time spent as eun 
elected Labor member of Cambridgeshire County Council bore 
testimony to his belief in the principle of democratic 
participation (Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84; UN, 6/10/75:1). 
Prior to his appointment as the University of 
Queensland's first Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Fineunce) 
Richie had served in the civil service posts of Assistant 
Treasurer (1965-1970) and Treasurer (1970) in the Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea. Ritchie, who was a graduate in Commerce 
from the University of Queensland, had also served in various 
other senior executive capacities in New Guinea including 
official membership of the House of Assembly (1969-1970 and 
official membership of the Administrator's Executive Council 
(1970). The University had high expectations that Ritchie's 
experience would help transform the University's somewhat 
antiquated administrative systems in relation to finance and 
building matters. 
The early 1970s was the period which has been described 
as: 
... the years of "the troubles", when student 
protest assumed proportions never previously 
encountered and St. Lucia became literally a 
battleground for conflicting forces (Thomis, 
1985:313). 
During 1970 in particular the new Vice-Chancellor, in addition 
to coming to terms with his new responsibilities, had to 
contend with a series of violent incidents involving radical 
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students eund staff. These included the forced entry by 
students at the University of Queensland Regiment, 
demonstrations against certain employers recruiting on campus, 
vandalism, the student confrontation of the Governor-General 
when he opened the Schonell Theatre on 22 September 1970 and 
the melee with the police over the notorious "Queung Incident" 
which occurred on 4 September 1970 when radical students eund 
staff attempted to forcibly detain Mr. Quang, First Secretary 
of the South Vietnamese Embassy in Australia during his visit 
to the campus (SM, 8/10/70:1-4). 
As well as the problem of radicalism, the University 
was beset with serious financial difficulties partly arising 
from the record increase of 1,454 in enrolments for 1970. 
Because the University was required by the Queensland 
Government to raise 23% of its recurrent revenue from tuition 
fees in order to attract the maximum State and Commonwealth 
contributions of 42% and 35% respectively, it was obliged to 
increase its fees by 18% from the beginning of 1970. 
Queensland was the only State where such a large proportion of 
University income had to be raised from tuition fees.(3) 
(3) Under the formula agreed to between the Commonwealth 
and the States, the Commonwealth provided 35% of the 
University's recurrent grants leaving 65% to be made up 
by the State. The State, in turn, undertook to provide 
42% of recurrent income thereby leaving the remaining 
23% to come from University fees. If the University 
failed to obtain 23% of its recurrent needs from fees 
there would be a shortfall in the State contribution 
under the formula with the "disastrous consequence" 
that the University would then not receive the 
Commonwealth maximum of 35%. Thus it was this 
budgetary pressure applied by the State Government 
which left the University with no alternative but to 
raise such a high proportion of its recurrent income 
from fees since the level of State and, therefore. 
Commonwealth funding was dependent on the fee revenue 
base (VC's Report to Convocation, 1971:11). 
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In addition to these recurrent income worries, the 
University's efforts to improve the coordination of its 
capital works program through the secondment of Deputy 
Chancellor Gehrmann to the staff of the University from 1967-
1969 had not been successful (Interview, Z. Cowen, 8-
9/5/85). (4) The meagre staff resources available in this area 
were further stretched by the decision that from 1970, the 
planning, design and execution of the University's building 
program was to be transferred from the State Government's 
Coordinator General of Public Works to the University. By the 
time it came to finalise the 1973-1975 triennial submission to 
the AUC at the end of 1970, the University's capital works 
program was in a shambles and the University was suffering 
from a chronic shortage of accommodation (Interview, Z. Cowen, 
8-9/5/85). Despite the existence of the Planning Committee, 
which met eight times during 1970, Cowen found it extremely 
difficult to coordinate the University's cumbersome decision-
making processes and at the same time cope with the disruption 
caused by radical protests on the campus.(5) All of these 
(4) As one interviewee put it. Colonel Gehrmann was a 
former military man who tended to think vertically 
rather than laterally. He experienced difficulty 
coming to terms with the less rigid University 
environment and Schonell as well as Teakle were never 
exactly sure what the State Government and the 
Chancellor expected Gehrmann to accomplish during his 
secondment. 
(5) There were many examples of these confused, poorly 
understood decision-making processes. For instance the 
Senate's Buildings and Grounds Committee noted with 
concern that the submission to the AUC for the 1973-
1975 triennium had been finalised without at euny stage 
having been referred to that Committee for comment 
regarding the building proposals (SM, 10/12/70:29). As 
Cowen was reported to have said shortly after taking up 
office, "the problem is to keep the thing working at 
all" (Presley, 1971:11). 
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pressures almost got the better of Cowen eund towards the end 
of 1970 he was obliged to take extended sick leave suffering 
from severe nervous exhaustion (Interview, K.W. Knight, 
16/8/84; E.C. Webb, 16/8/84), 
Cowen's hope for the University's future good health, 
not to mention his own, was based to a significant extent on 
the prospect of being able to delegate more of the day to day 
running of the University to the two newly appointed Deputy 
Vice-Chancellors eund to the Registrar. At a meeting attended 
by the Vice-Cheuncellor, both Deputy Vice-Cheuncellors and the 
Registrar on 30 September 1970, duties were allocated to the 
Deputy Vice-Chancellors (Minute of Meeting, 30/9/70); 
(Ritchie was in attendeunce at that meeting even though he did 
not take up duty until 1 February 1971). The Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Academic) was given a significant policy role by 
virtue of his membership of a range of key central committees 
and he assumed full responsibility for approving academic and 
non-academic staff appointments below the salary level of 
lecturer. On the other hand, whilst the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) was given similar committee 
membership rights, very little resolution had been reached as 
to what his specific executive responsibilities would be. 
Although the duties of the Registrar were not addressed at 
that meeting, Cowen had earlier impressed upon Rayner the 
imperative of enforcing "stringent economy" throughout the 
University and the need to develop "regular procedures" 
(Corres., Reg. to VC, 12/7/72). 
The Vice-Chancellor had quickly recognised however that 
the Registrar's ability was not limited to routine 
administrative matters and Cowen increasingly used Rayner to 
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scrutinise a wide range of matters before they came to him for 
final determination. For example all recommendations for 
staff appointments above the level of lecturer had to be 
initialled by the Registrar before being given to the Vice-
Chancellor (Corres., Reg. to VC, 12/7/72). Rayner's "guardian" 
role in drawing the Vice-Cheuncellor's attention to possible 
anomalies occasionally caused friction with other senior 
academic eund administrative staff. This was especially the 
case when he considered it necessary to contradict their 
advice where in his view it was based on inadequate 
information (Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). 
Four months after assuming office, Ritchie submitted a 
memorandum to the Vice-Chancellor in which he gave his 
impressions of the University's administration. Ritchie's 
views were instructive, given that he had been able to observe 
the University from the veunteige point of having had recent 
managerial experience in a non-university environment. He 
stated that: 
The most significant reaction I have is that 
the present position of the University is the 
result of reaction to circumstances rather than 
a natural consequence of an orderly system of 
forward planning and control (Memo, DVC(F&F) to 
VC, 9/6/71). 
Ritchie favoured bringing in outside maneigement consultants to 
examine the University's administrative systems but he 
realised that this would have provoked opposition from within 
the University. He argued instead in favour of developing a 
long term master plan consisting of a physical site plan eund 
an academic plan which together would set out: 
the optimum limit which would provide for the 
kinds of education and research considered 
appropriate and the numbers of students and 
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staff commensurate with the physical and 
architectural limits of the site (Memo, DVC 
(F&F) to VC, 9/6/71), 
The Vice-Chancellor's Planning Committee had been 
established on 23 July 1969 to undertake triennial budgeting 
for the 1970-1972 triennium and to prepare the submission for 
the 1973-1975 triennium. It continued on an experimental 
basis until the end of 1970. During the intervening period 
the University confronted a major problem of rapid growth in 
enrolments from 14,919 in 1969 to 17,485 in 1971 and 
insufficient resources to cope with that expansion. 
Considering the University's continuing financial crisis 
throughout the 1969-1972 period, it was remarkable that the 
Planning Committee was allowed to lapse in 1971 and not be 
reconvened until 6 October 1972.(6) The gaps in the 
University's coordination of academic and resource decision-
making and the absence of effective forward planning were of 
major concern to the Professorial Board. Indeed the absence 
of effective coordination between academic and resource 
decision-making became the arena for a continuation of the 
earlier contest between the Board and the Vice-Chancellor for 
control over planning within the University. 
At the Professorial Board meeting on 24 February 1971 
the University Librarian complained that expenditure on 
library books had been reduced by 20% in 1970 and he argued 
that in future the University would have to examine its 
(6) The relative deprivation in funding suffered by the 
University of Queensland had been a continuing saga. 
Williams has estimated that in 1972, the University's 
general recurrent grant per EFTS was only 88.7% of the 
average for all Australian universities (1972:217). On 
the non-recurrent side, building grants per increase in 
EFTS over the 1958-1973 period had been only 71% of the 
grant for the other five large Australian universities. 
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priorities more carefully and plan more rigorously when 
considering academic developments so that their full cost 
implications could be weighed up (PBM, 24/2/71:19). However 
the Librarian's proposal that the Professorial Board consider 
the imposition of student quotas in 1972 was opposed by the 
Vice-Chancellor because of the negative effect that it would 
have on tuition fee income. Cowen favoured instead eun 
examination of how the University made use of its existing 
resources eund he raised the spectre that by eliminating 
courses that failed to attract students, more effective use 
could be made of those resources (PBM, 24/2/71:20). 
In order to address this issue the Professorial Board 
set up an ad hoc committee consisting of the Standing 
Committee augmented by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and 
Finance), University Librarian, Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine and the Registrar to investigate the problems of 
inadequate fineunce in relation to the growth in student 
numbers (PBM, 24/2/71:20). This committee came to be known as 
the Use of Resources Committee and, after temporarily solving 
the immediate problem of uncontrolled growth in student 
numbers by recommending that the matriculation level be 
increased in 1972 from 22 to 24 points, the Committee became 
the focal point for control over University planning. Two 
influential members of the Standing Comjuittee (Professors 
Lyons and Presley) were keen to ensure that the Standing 
Committee assumed a continuous planning role so that this work 
would be kept in academic hands and, in particular, be under 
the control of the Professorial Board. 
At the same time Ritchie had been unimpressed by the 
Use of Resources Committee's inability to underteike academic 
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planning, even though this had become more essential theun ever 
in the light of the Senate's recent decision to approve the 
Buildings and Grounds Committee's recommendation for work to 
commence on the preparation of a master physical pleun to cover 
the next ten years. Ritchie was concerned that the 
development of a physical plan would be extremely difficult 
without euny clear idea of long term academic developments. 
The main obstacle to planning by a predominantly academic 
body, however, had been the Committee's unwillingness to 
undertake a department by department review in order to assess 
whether resources were being used effectively and to plan for 
future resource needs having regard to identified performance 
deficiencies and future goals (Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 3/3/72). 
In view of these considerations, Ritchie advised the 
Vice-Chancellor to establish a permanent planning committee to 
undertake long term and triennial planning as well as 
investigate new methods of resource allocation (Memo, DVC 
(F&F) to VC, 3/3/72). At about the same time Presley gave 
notice to the Use of Resources Committee that he would move 
that the Committee recommend to the Professorial Board that it 
set up a planning committee which would advise the Board on 
resource allocation as the means of enabling the Board to 
advise the Finance Committee and the Senate on such matters 
(URCM, 8/3/72:4). However at the Committee meeting held on 21 
June 1972 a majority agreed to the compromise proposal that a 
planning committee be established by the Vice-Chancellor but 
that it transmit its recommendations through the Professorial 
Board and the Finance Committee to the Senate (URCM, 
21/6/72:3) (The Committee also recommended its own abolition). 
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The issue of whether the proposed planning committee 
would be a Vice-Chancellor's Committee or a Professorial Board 
Committee was not finally resolved until the meeting of the 
Standing Committee on 20 September 1972. At that meeting the 
Committee agreed to the Vice-Chancellor's request that the 
statement in the minutes of the Standing Committee meeting 
held on 13 September 1972 that the Planning Committee would 
report to the Senate through the Professorial Board be deleted 
(SCM, 20/9/72:1). 
Jenkins has observed that in policy studies it is 
important to consider the "non-decisions" as well as the more 
obvious overt decision-making process. The so-called "non-
decisions" tend to relate to the actions of powerful actors to 
suppress issues that could threaten their own power or values 
from ever being placed on the political agenda for public 
debate (1978:110). Senior officers of the Central Executive 
had been successful in the past in diverting the occasional 
expression of interest in reviewing the role of "the 
Administration" . 
At the meeting of the Improvements Committee on 18 
February 1971, for example, when the question of examining the 
function of the Administration came up, the strategy applied 
by Webb was to label the Administration as being merely to 
support the academic operations of the University in an 
"unobtrusive" way (ICM, 18/2/71:9).(7) This strategy of 
powerful actors labelling some issues as being of low priority 
or unimportant in order to keep certain issues off the 
political agenda was identified by Pfeffer (1981:92). In the 
(7) References to the origins and composition of the 
Improvements Committee are contained in chapter six. 
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present context the strategy was successful in that it was 
agreed that an examination of the Administration's role by the 
Improvements Committee was not warranted (ICM, 18/2/71:9). 
Indeed the issue of the organisation of the Central 
Executive was a matter which the Vice-Cheuncellor and his 
senior colleagues wished to discuss privately away from the 
glare of scrutiny by the University community. Private 
meetings involving Cowen, Webb, Ritchie eund Rayner were held 
on most Friday mornings at 8.00 a.m. during 1971 and early 
1972, before Rayner left for overseas on 10 February 1972 on an 
Association of Commonwealth Universities Fellowship 
(Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). 
Nevertheless, in a University setting where there are 
many different power bases it was not possible to suppress the 
growing concern felt by some members of the academic community 
that the Central Administration was not responding to their 
needs sufficiently quickly or efficiently. The issue of the 
Central Administration's organisation was catapulted onto the 
political agenda by the almost simultaneous lodgement with the 
President of the Professorial Board of notices of motion from 
the Professor of Regional and Town Planning (L.B. Keeble) and 
the Professor of Biochemistry (B. Zerner) (Corres., L.B. 
Keeble to Pres. PB, 10/12/70; Corres., B. Zerner to Pres. PB, 
30/3/71). 
At its meeting on 5 April 1971 the Professorial Board 
debated Keeble's concern over the alleged confusion and 
inefficiency which was evident in the overlapping roles of 
Senate, Vice-Chancellor and Professorial Board as well as 
Zerner's criticism of the "cumbrous administrative procedures 
of this University". Zerner was concerned over bottlenecks in 
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the office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) that 
caused lengthy delays in approving tutorial appointments and 
which were having a deleterious effect on teaching and 
research. He argued that much more decision-making should be 
devolved to the departmental level and that the Professorial 
Board should establish a Committee to review, inter alia, 
the functions and responsibilities of heads of departments in 
relation to the Central Administration as well as the 
functions eund responsibilities of the Deputy Vice-Chancellors 
and other senior administrative officers, including the 
Registrar (Interview, B. Zerner, 26/7/84). 
The Professorial Board resolved that a committee be 
appointed to consider methods of examining in detail the 
issues raised during the debate on the motions submitted by 
Keeble and Zerner eund that the committee comprise - Professor 
D. Hill, President of the Professorial Board (chairman); E.C. 
Webb, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic); L.B. Keeble, 
Professor of Regional and Town Pleunning; R.D. Milns, 
Professor of Classics and Ancient History; C.F. Presley, 
Professor of Philosophy and B. Zerner, Professor of 
Biochemistry. The Registrar was appointed as the Committee's 
secretary (PBM, 5/4/71:19). 
Biographical data on Webb and Rayner have already been 
supplied and will not be repeated here. Hill was regarded as 
the most distinguished professor in the University, having 
been made a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1965 in recognition 
of her contribution to research in the field of Geology 
(Thomis, 1985:287). Prior to her appointment as President of 
the Professorial Board, Hill had had little exposure to 
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administration or involvement with the University committee 
system, having devoted herself almost entirely to research. 
As an internationally acclaimed researcher. Hill had scant 
cause to be concerned with alleged bureaucratic stultification 
of academic work because she was rarely personally affected; 
her reputation enabled the University to bathe in her 
reflected glory and grateful University decision-malcers 
accorded her due deference. 
Keeble was a radical devolutionist who believed in 
virtually full academic self-governance, with the Senate 
exercising essentially a ceremonial role and academic 
departments having autonomy over most matters including staff 
appointments up to senior lecturer level subject only to the 
availability of funds (Memo, L.B. Keeble to CAP, 3/6/71). At 
the same time Keeble's exaggerated hostility towards the 
principle of Central Executive involvement in policy making 
and his belief that the Central Executive was there simply to 
execute academic decision-meiking was an extreme position which 
alienated some powerful actors and caused meuny of his 
colleagues not to talce his proposals seriously. 
Milns had witnessed first hand the dysfunctions of 
imperfectly accountable academic administration, having 
recently taken over the headship of the Department of Classics 
from a permanent head whose behaviour had been so erratic and 
whimsical eund had caused such discontent among academic staff 
that Schonell had been forced to intervene. Schonell had 
reprimanded the former head (who retired in 1970) but his 
advice to staff not to "rock the boat" caused considerable 
resentment against the so-called "God-Professor" syndrome. As 
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a graduate of the University of Cambridge, Milns was 
sympathetic to the concept of a community of scholars with 
participation by staff at all levels of university governeunce. 
This philosophical position had been strongly reinforced by 
his inheriteunce of a department which had suffered greatly 
under the regime of a permanent head whose rule had not been 
subject to the moderating influences of other members of the 
department. 
Presley was well known for his liberal views on 
university governance and had written and spoken of the 
dangers of bureaucracy in administration. As long ago as 1965 
Presley had advocated the abolition of permanent headships of 
departments eund their replacement by a system of limited-term 
appointments to be rotated among professors and readers (PBM, 
10/11/65). More recently he had suggested that the position 
of Vice-Cheuncellor should be rotated among the three most 
senior staff of the University with each incumbent serving for 
a triennium (1971:12). Presley enjoyed the confidence of 
academic staff throughout the University, having served as 
President of the Staff Association in 1964 and as a member of 
the Standing Committee (1971-1972). In 1972 he was elected as 
the Professorial Board representative on the Senate. 
Zerner was highly regarded as an active and successful 
researcher and had been awarded a personal chair. He realised 
that in order to be successful in influencing policy outcomes 
within the University, it was necessary to become involved in 
the central committee network and accordingly he served as a 
member of the Education Committee (1971), Standing Committee 
(1972-1977) and Research Committee (1973-1975, 1978-1980). 
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Zerner was a tough-minded academic who believed in the 
inevitability of goal displacement in bureaucracies, whereby 
members of the Central Executive eventually became so immersed 
in day to day administrative routine that they ceased to 
provide academic leadership and instead beceune "clerks". 
Keeble sent a lengthy memoreundum to members of the 
Committee on 3 June 1971, just prior to its first meeting, in 
which he stated his strong belief that the Committee had been 
appointed to suggest ways of reforming the University eund not 
just to examine possible streamlining of administrative 
procedures. He outlined what he saw as agenda items for 
possible consideration by the Committee including: 
Q a review of the constitution and functions of the 
Senate (notwithstanding the fact that a committee of 
the Senate was actively engaged at that time in 
drafting proposed revisions to the University Act); 
© a review of the constitution of the Professorial Board 
(notwithstanding the fact that another committee 
chaired by Hill was actively engeiged at that time in 
reviewing the composition of the Professorial Board); 
o a review of the powers eund functions of eund the 
relations between the Senate, Professorial Board, 
Chancellor, Deputy Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Deputy 
Vice-Chancellors and Registrar. 
Keeble's memorandum was a full frontal attack on the 
alleged evils of the present centralised administrative 
arrangements and the alleged virtues of decentralised academic 
autonomy: 
Enormous deleo^ , irritation, frustration and 
indignation are caused by having here a 
University orgeunisation which is neither clear 
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nor rational. Confusion about the distribution 
of powers, responsibilities and duties is self-
nourishing and self-aggravating. It provides a 
fog within which the lazy, the inefficient, the 
self-importeunt and the ill-intentioned can 
meunoeuvre with comparative immunity. It 
facilitates the operation of lawless tyranny 
and it breeds suspicion of tyrannous 
malfeasance where only innocent inefficiency 
really exists (Memo, L.B. Keeble to CAP, 
3/6/71). 
Keeble accused the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-
Chancellors and the Registrar of forming an unholy alliance, 
with the Vice-chancellor making "full use of the confusion of 
the University machine" in order to get his weiy. He argued 
that some of the decrees issued by the Central Administration 
had no legal standing and were "a joint invention of the Vice-
Chancellor and the Registrar" eund that it was: 
... sometimes difficult to know whether what we 
read is a resolution of the Senate or the 
Registrar's recollected interpretation of what 
the Senate meant, mixed with his own ideas 
about how to implement the Senate's intentions 
(Memo, L.B. Keeble to CAP, 3/6/71). 
Although the Committee was chaired throughout by 
Professor Hill, the most vocal and active member was Keeble 
who indicated from the outset that he was "personally 
determined" that the Committee would achieve its objectives, 
even if that involved meeting weekly until the end of November 
1971 with the view to reporting to the Professorial Board 
early in 1972 (Memo, L.B. Keeble to CAP, 3/6/71). The 
Committee in fact met only a total of six times (five meetings 
from 9 June 1971-18 November 1971 leading to an interim report 
and a final meeting being held on 9 May 1972). 
In terms of the objectives that it set itself the 
committee could only be described as a failure. Keeble had 
correctly anticipated that there would be some within the 
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University who would hope that the Committee's discussions 
"may finally run aweiy into the sand" but his personal 
determination to keep the Committee focused on major 
organisational reform ran up against the bureaucratic 
technique of "snowing" - overloading the agenda with 
peripheral issues so that attention could be diverted away 
from the substeuntive issues for which the Committee was 
ostensibly set up to address (See Cohen & March, 1974:210-
212). So, although the Committee agreed at its first meeting 
on 9 June 1971 that it would be canvassing the major 
organisational problems identified during the Professorial 
Board debate on 5 April 1971 eund by Keeble in his memorandum 
dated 3 June 1971, the Committee was soon immersed in 
minutiae. This included, for example, whether there was a 
continuing need for the Vice-Chancellor's Photographic 
Committee, the procedures for appointing tutors eund part-time 
teaching staff and the criteria for evaluating the competence 
of departmental secretaries (CAPM, 21/9/71:2; 9/5/72:2). 
Indeed the Interim Report of the Committee noted by the 
Professorial Board on 29 November 1971 contained only two 
substantial recommendations - that the Photographic Committee 
should be abolished and that the Photographic Section should 
be placed under the control of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Fabric and Finance) (CAP Interim Report, Nov., 1971:2). 
Wildavsky has drawn attention to the problems which can 
arise from the high level of interdependence in policy fields, 
especially where more than one agency attempts to address 
similar policy problems thereby leading to overlap and 
confusion (1979:63-65). This phenomenon was evident with 
I'egard to the Committee on Administrative Procedures' concern 
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to improve the arrangements for the internal allocation of 
resources in departments; no action was initiated because the 
Committee was informed that another group (the Use of 
Resources Committee) was engaged in a similar review (CAPM, 
19/10/71:1; URCM, 13/10/71:3). As indicated earlier, 
however, the Use of Resources Committee became caught up in 
the debate over who should be responsible for University 
planning and the question of resource allocation in 
departments was eigain deferred. 
Keeble wrote to the Committee Section on 6 April 1972 
requesting more items to go on the agenda of the Committee, 
including a further proposal to examine the role of the 
Registrar and the need to limit his functions to the provision 
of clerical eund secretarial services except where otherwise 
provided in the statutes (Corres., L.B. Keeble to D. Glynn 
Connolly, 6/4/72). The Registrar was overseas from 10 
February 1972 to 29 June 1972 but Webb was aware that the 
Vice-Chancellor in consultation with himelf and Ritchie had 
for some time been considering the possible rationalisation of 
responsibilities among both Deputy Vice-Chancellors and the 
Registrar. Cowen and Webb both felt that Keeble's crusade was 
becoming an embarrassment and at the Committee's final meeting 
on 9 May 1972 discussion was confined mainly to the question 
of appointment procedures for tutors and part-time teaching 
staff and the duties of departmental secretaries (Interview, 
E.C. Webb, 16/8/84; CAPM, 9/5/72:2). 
In response to a query from the Committee Section on 31 
August 1972 that the Committee on Administrative Procedures 
appeared to be drifting "rather aimlessly", the Registrar 
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directed that the Committee be not reconvened for the time 
being (Memo, D. Glynn Connolly to L.R. Page, 31/8/72). Senior 
officers of the Central Administration were heavily involved 
by then in issues of a much higher priority than those which 
concerned Keeble. Those issues included: 
o the large volume of work which was generated by the 
Senate's decision on 9 December 1971 to introduce a 
semester system from the beginning of 1974; 
Q the efforts during 1972 to finalise the revision of the 
University Act; 
o the continuing financial crisis of the University which 
had necessitated major increases in tuition fees of the 
order of 26% in 1972.(8) 
o the numerous eund often irritating requests for 
information received from the Senate's Improvements 
Committee.(9) 
o the efforts to establish the Planning Committee as a 
Vice-Chancellor's committee rather than as a committee 
of the Professorial Board; 
(8) The fee crisis was so serious that towards the end of 
1972 following a meeting between a deputation from the 
University and the State Treasurer (Sir Gordon Chalk), 
the Government provided a special grant of $830,000 to 
the University on condition that fees were not 
increased in 1973 (VC's Report to Convocation, 
1972:9); Chalk was admitted to the degree of Doctor of 
Laws honoris causa in 1974, in recognition of his 
services to the University. 
(9) The Improvements Committee had decided to call for 
additional submissions from the University community on 
2 March 1971 on how the University might be improved; 
the committee's reconstitution on 10 February 1972 to 
include an equal number of nominees (three) from each 
of the five major constituencies (Senate, Professorial 
Board, Staff Association, non-academic staff. Student 
Union) possibly explained the zeal with which it played 
a de facto role of University ombudsman (SM, 
10/2/72:19). 
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o the controversy (discussed later) which had been 
generated by the proposals advanced by the Committee 
chaired by Hill during 1972 for the reform of the 
Professorial Board's composition eund which culminated 
in the resolution on 30 October 1972 to rescind the 
Board's decision to add representation from non-
professorial staff. 
The Professorial Board took a decision on 27 November 1972 to 
establish an ad hoc committee to examine the powers, 
duties and responsibilities of the Professorial Board in 
relation to those of Senate, faculties eund departments and to 
investigate the organisation most appropriate to those powers, 
duties and responsibilities. Following this, Keeble wrote to 
the Chairman of that ad hoc committee, (the newly elected 
President of the Professorial Board, Professor G.N. Davies), 
advising that in the light of the ad hoc committee's 
establishment, the Committee on Administrative Procedures 
should be either dissolved or reactivated. This was necessary 
since in Keeble's view it was doubtful that the two committees 
"with such greatly overlapping functions" could coexist 
(Corres., L.B. Keeble to G.N. Davies, 28/11/72). 
Keeble was somewhat disillusioned by the lack of 
cooperation he had received from the Central Administration 
and in noting that the Registrar had never responded to the 
request to supply a statement on how the University's 
decision-making machinery actually worked, he concluded in 
uncharacteristic understatement, that the Committee had failed 
in its efforts to address the "bigger issues" because "there 
was a certain lack of that burning enthusiasm necessary for a 
committee of that kind to succeed". Keeble felt that the 
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Committee from the outset had been deliberately steered in the 
wrong direction by the way the discussion at the Professorial 
Board meeting on 5 April 1971 which created the Committee had 
been minuted (Corres., L.B. Keeble to G.N. Davies, 28/11/72). 
Rayner's control of the University's committee 
secretariat certainly gave him the opportunity to exert 
effective control over the preparation of agendas eund reports 
of decision-making bodies with which he was personally 
interested. His advice to aspiring university administrators 
was that in preparing committee reports they: 
must highlight productive themes eund should 
ignore the irrelevancies, the errors and the 
destructive themes which will have emerged at 
times in the committee deliberations. In 
preparing a draft report (the administrator) 
will often find it convenient in reviewing the 
evidence to fill gaps and to extrapolate beyond 
what was said or to include recommendations 
that would have been made if the committee had 
had the opportunity to review the draft 
report (1978:38). 
This advice was a candid exposition of how many modern senior 
administrators increasingly saw themselves - as professionals 
in the field of educational administration, in effect as 
guardians of the institution with the task of fostering its 
efficient development and minimising the impact of what they 
perceived as the "destructive themes" advanced by part-time 
academic dilettantes who dabbled in educational administration 
as an avocation. 
Keeble was certain that the Committee had been set up 
to examine the major organisational matters raised by himself 
and Zerner at that meeting and not merely to consider the 
methods of examining them, which had been the Registrar's 
"interpretation" of the discussion. As if to add insult to 
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injury, the statement in the report of the Professorial Board 
meeting on 6 April 1973 that the Committee appointed to 
examine administrative procedures had been dissolved because 
it had fulfilled its purpose illustrated the way the Registrar 
was able to manipulate the uncertain recollections of past 
events and take advantage of the desire by most participeunts 
to find rationality in the policy process (PBM, 5/4/73). Thus 
the official record of the Committee's dissolution put to 
rest, in a weo^  which did not violate expectations of 
rationality, a Committee whose outcome could fairly be 
described as a fiasco (For a discussion about how successful 
organisational actors are able to manipulate their environment 
by the "creative resolution of uncertainty about the past", 
see Cohen and March, 1974:215). The Committee had paid the 
price for making an unwelcome intrusion into the policy domain 
of the Central Executive (For a discussion on Domain Theory, 
see Kouzes and Mice, 1979:449-469). 
The Committee on Administrative Procedures' lack of 
success in reforming the senior administrative structure was 
mirrored by the failure of the Vice-Chancellor eund the Deputy 
Vice-Cheuncellor (Fabric eund Finance) to finalise their own 
review of this area. Indeed a number of interviewees 
suggested that one of Cowen's most significant "non-decisions" 
concerned his decision not to proceed with a reorganisation of 
the University's senior administrative structure. 
In addition to the problems associated with the 
University's planning machinery, Ritchie had identified the 
serious shortage of senior and middle maneigement level 
administrative staff and the confused organisational structure 
with its conflicting line and functional responsibilities as 
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major contributors to the University's malaise (Memo, DVC 
(F&F) to VC, 9/6/71 & 29/7/72). On the academic side, Ritchie 
supported the concept of greater decentralisation with 
departments being grouped into schools each headed by a full-
time director or dean eund each supported by a full-time 
business manager drawn from the Central Administration. He 
envisaged each school having responsibility for the 
formulation eund maneigement of its budget subject to the broad 
oversight of a University-wide management committee comprising 
the Vice-Cheuncellor, both Deputy Vice-Chancellors eund all 
full-time Deans with the Registrar as secretary (Memo, DVC 
(F&F) to VC, 9/6/71). 
In order to appreciate why Ritchie's proposed reforms 
were not tedcen up it is necessary to understand more about the 
role of the Registrar. Fielden and Lockwood (1973:149) and 
Blau (1973:171-172) have observed in Britain eund America 
respectively that an information system can be used as a basis 
for centralised oligarchic control, in that data can be 
collected and analysed by those in positions of authority to 
evaluate the use of resources in relation to output thereby 
enabling informed judgements to be made on future requests for 
resources. Much of the criticism levelled at the Central 
Administration in general and at the Registrar in particular 
arose from the latter's requests to heads of departments for 
data for the purpose of developing a data base that would 
facilitate decision-making by central University bodies. Data 
on every aspect of the University's operations were needed in 
order to justify the arguments for additional resources which 
were embodied in the triennial submissions prepared for the 
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Australieun Universities Commission. Applying Strategic 
Contingencies Theory (Hickson et al, 1971:216-229), those 
centrally placed actors in universities who could reduce their 
dependence on academic judgement and also diminish uncertainty 
by systematic data collection and analysis were in a position 
to accumulate power. 
With his access to data, Rayner's role resembled that 
of an "eminence grise" - a ubiquitous, somewhat shadowy 
presence working assiduously behind the scenes preparing 
papers and offering advice to the Vice-Chancellor on a wide 
range of policy matters. Although the Vice-Chancellor's 
Planning Committee was in existence in 1970 and 1973 to 
consider the preparation of the 1973-1975 and 1976-1978 
submissions respectively, the crucial task of actually 
drafting the submissions was undertaken by Rayner. By 
building up the Central Administration's data base, the 
Registrar was able to apply apparently rational procedures to 
support his views on academic developments and to greatly 
reduce the influence of those academics on central committees, 
including the Planning Committee, who tended to rely more on 
anecdotal evidence and hunches euphemistically described as 
"academic judgement".(10) 
Rayner was implacably opposed to any changes which 
would have had the effect of weakening the role of his office 
and the Central Administration. In this connection the 
Registrar was not interested in personal aggrandisement but he 
(10) The development of a data base by the Central 
Administration was a contributing factor to the very 
rapid growth in administrative computing costs. By 
1977, 44% of central computer time was allocated to 
Central Administration processing compared with 29% on 
teaching and research (Holmes Report, 1/12/80:21). 
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held strongly to his conviction that the present arrangements 
and his personal control over the Central Administration were 
all that stood between a semblance of order and organised 
chaos. Rayner eventually conceded the case for some 
additional middle management support in the Central 
Administration but Ritchie's ideas for some devolution of the 
Central Administration's budgetary responsibilities to schools 
were shelved, ostensibly on the grounds of cost and because of 
the alleged educational advantages of the existing faculty-
department structure. It is reasonable to speculate, however, 
that the "hidden agenda" in retaining the status quo was the 
Registrar's countervailing view that the balance of advantage 
lay with retaining the Central Administration's budgetary 
responsibilities on the grounds of economy and control. 
Ritchie, however, was eun experienced political 
campaigner and was not easily diverted in his quest to 
dismantle the Registrar's stranglehold over the staff 
resources of the Central Administration. On 12 July 1972 
Ritchie wrote to the Vice-Chancellor with a proposal to 
rationalise the present line eund functional responsibilities 
in the Central Administration (Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 
12/7/72). The central problem was that more than eighteen 
months after the creation of the two Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
positions, virtually all staff in the Central Administration 
with the exception of the University Architect's office were 
still responsible in a line sense to the Registrar even though 
in a functional sense major divisions of the Registrar's 
office, for example the Bursar and the Staff Officer were 
responsible to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Fineunce) 
and Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) respectively. This 
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division of responsibility had caused problems. For example 
the Staff Officer had complained to the Vice-Chancellor that 
the Registrar's intervention in the negotiations between the 
University and the Federated Clerks Union over a special 
award to cover University clerical staff had upset relations 
with the Union. As a result of this, Cowen requested the 
Registrar to stay out of industrial relations negotiations and 
authorised the Staff Officer to report directly to the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor (Academic) on such matters (K.H. Sheffield, 
Private Communication, 25/6/86). 
Ritchie's proposal to overcome these difficulties was 
to "rationalise" responsibilities between the Deputy Vice-
Chancellors and the Registrar. He advocated transferring all 
administrative matters concerned with staffing, industrial 
relations and academic services (such as enrolments and 
examinations) from the Registrar to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic) and relocating all administrative matters 
associated with biadgeting, accounting, buildings and grounds 
as well as custodial services (such as traffic control, 
parking, security, cleaning) under the control of the Deputy 
Vice-chancellor (Fabric and Finance) (Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 
12/7/72). This proposal, if approved, would have transferred 
some 79% of the Registrar's existing staff to the control of 
the two Deputy Vice-Chancellors and would have significantly 
reduced Rayner's influence in the day to deiy running of the 
University. Rayner interpreted this proposal as a criticism 
of his efficiency and the strength of his response was such as 
to cause the Vice-Chancellor to let the status quo remain 
(Corres., Reg to VC, 12/7/72). Cowen believed that, even 
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though the existing structure was untidy and cumbersome, any 
benefits to be gained by introducing a more logical 
arrangement from an orthodox organisational theory perspective 
would have been outweighed by the costs of alienating the 
Registrar (Interview, Z. Cowen, 8-9/5/85). As Webb put it, 
the reorganisation of the University's senior executive 
structure was put "in the too hard basket" (Interview, E.C. 
Webb, 16/8/84).(11) 
Ritchie's efforts to impose order based on clearly 
defined functional responsibilities were premised on a 
structural and a process approach. Although the structural 
reorganisation approach had failed, Ritchie had more success 
with systematising the process of decision-making authority 
delegations in relation to financial eund contractural matters. 
It was remarkable that by 1971 a large complex 
institution with 17,485 students eund 2,814 staff had no 
comprehensive system of authority delegations. Prior to 1971, 
virtually all but the most routine fineuncial and contractural 
decisions were dealt with personally by the Vice-Chancellor 
although after the creation of the position of Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Fabric eund Finance), Ritchie took over some of 
this burden. 
At the seune time, the Senate Committee appointed to 
(11) It was not until after Rayner's retirement in April 
1986 that the Vice-Chancellor altered the reporting 
paths so that the Registrar no longer had line 
responsibility over the Bursar and Staff Officer. From 
April 1986 the Bursar reported directly to the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) and the Staff 
Officer (redesignated as Director of Personnel 
Services) reported directly to the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) concerning general 
staff matters and to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic) concerning academic staff matters. 
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consider the revision of the University Act had addressed the 
question of delegation of authority by the Senate. On 27 
September 1971, that Committee proposed that the Act be 
amended to include a new Section llA to enable the Senate by 
resolution to delegate any of its powers (except the power of 
delegation and the statute making power) to any committee or 
officer of the University (CRUAM, 27/9/71). Ritchie expressed 
concern to the Vice-Chancellor on 8 November 1971 over the 
amount of routine decision-making which ended up on the 
overcrowded desks of senior staff and in relation to the way 
authority was being exercised at that time without proper 
legal sanction pursuant to the Act or in accordance with 
Senate resolutions. Ritchie argued that there was eun urgent 
need to apply to the Senate to have the delegated authorities 
on financial eund contractural matters that he had prepared 
implemented in 1972 (Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 8/11/71). Senate 
approved this proposal on 13 April 1972 without waiting for 
the University Act to be amended (SM, 13/4/72:15). 
Hickson et al (1971:217,220) and Hinings et al 
(1974:23-30) have both noted the general propensity of 
bureaucracies to limit autonomy through the process of 
routinisation. The purpose of that process is to reduce 
uncertainty in order to exercise control and there is little 
doubt that Ritchie's desire to systematise authority 
delegations was a manifestation of the process of 
bureaucratisation. The need to impose order via a legal-
rational system based on formal rules for the purpose of 
enabling those at various levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy 
to exercise more effective control was essential, given the 
ambiguity arising from the confused system of line and 
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functional reporting paths. 
The picture which emerges from the foregoing is that of 
a Central Executive which, while united in maintaining control 
over planning eund policy coordination (notwithstanding efforts 
by the Professorial Board to extend its influence in such 
areas at the expense of the Central Executive) was 
nevertheless divided insofar as its internal division of power 
was concerned. Well entrenched participeunts such as the 
Registrar were ideally placed, in accordance with Strategic 
Contingencies Theory, to outmanoeuvre the attempts by other 
actors to colonise the Central Administration which had 
developed into a major power centre in its own right. This 
process was facilitated by Cowen's dependence on Rayner for 
information and local knowledge, as well as the absence of any 
comparable source of expertise. 
Cowen saw his major role as Vice-Chancellor as being to 
transform gradually what was in 1970 a large, relatively 
undistinguished, primarily undergraduate teaching institution 
into a University of national standing. Much of his efforts 
to achieve this metamorphosis were directed towards improving 
the University's imeige within the wider environment, 
especially with political and community leaders in the hope 
that eventually attitudes towards the University would change 
and improved funding would follow. One such mechanism for 
enhancing the "Town and Gown" relationship was the so-called 
"Thirty Club", which consisted of a group of fifteen senior 
persons from the University and the same number from business, 
politics and the professions. Membership of this exclusive 
group was by invitation and, by dining together several times 
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each year, senior University personnel were able to "plug in" 
to the political-economic establishment and were thus able to 
ensure that the University remained attuned, at an informal 
level, to what opinion-leaders in the community were thinking 
(Interview, Z. Cowen, 8-9/5/85; F.D.O. Fielding, 23/7/84). 
Cowen's involvement in "showing the flag" through endless 
external consultation and speech-making meeunt that much of the 
detailed day to deiy maneigement of the University was left in 
the hands of the Deputy Vice-Chancellors and the Registrar 
(Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). Cowen has acknowledged that 
although in a de jure sense the University of Queensland 
had only two Deputy Vice-Chancellors, in a de facto sense 
Rayner performed the role of a third Deputy Vice-Chancellor, 
leaving much of the traditional Registrar's role to be 
performed by the Deputy eund the Assistant Registrars 
(Interview, Z.Cowen, 8-9/5/85). The President of the 
Professorial Board was never formally coopted to the Central 
Executive Group although he/she prior to 1973, in 
collaboration with the Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-
Chancellors and Registrar, had traditionally participated in 
briefing the Cheuncellor before Senate meetings. This practice 
ended in 1973 when the then President (Professor G.N. Davies) 
felt that his participation in such briefings could compromise 
his position on the Senate as the chief elected spokesman of 
the academic body (Interview, G.N. Davies, 27/7/84). 
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter by noting 
that the much greater size and complexity of the University by 
1973, the continuing financial stringency and the 
strengthening of the Central Executive's staffing undoubtedly 
provided the environmental and structural conditions which 
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were necessary to facilitate the beginning of a shift in power 
away from the Senate and the Professorial Board to the Central 
Executive. This emerging trend was reinforced by the modest 
but much needed strengthening of the University's middle 
management structure especially in the building projects, 
financial management eund planning areas which occurred over 
the 1970-1972 period. University administration was becoming 
far more professionalised and was starting to attract much 
better qualified practitioners. For the first time since 
rapid growth commenced in the late 1950s, the University 
possessed the administrative means to systematise large areas 
of academic and non-academic administration. 
The establishment of the Committee on Administrative 
Procedures reflected the desire of some senior academics to 
curtail this bureaucratic expansion and to make the Central 
Executive more accountable to the academic body. Ironically 
the failure of that Committee to achieve its objectives was 
due primarily to the ease with which the strategically located 
Central Executive could unobstrusively frustrate inquiries 
which it found threatening or inconvenient. 
Indeed the attempts to reform the decision-making 
structure and processes of the Central Executive provide 
evidence of how well-established bureaucratic actors were able 
to control their environment and achieve their preferred 
policy outcomes. A key to this control was access to and 
mastery of information as well as having access to the 
professional support of the bureaucratic machine. Even the 
superficially prosaic secretarial function of preparing 
agendas and minutes of meetings was an important part of the 
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process of bureaucratic politics, as the interpretation given 
to discussions had a very considerable effect on the way 
issues were defined and the options that were available to 
address them. In particular the Registrar's ability to 
exploit these factors and to reduce the uncertainty of a 
rapidly changing environment by the systematic use of 
management information and the pervasive routinisation of 
policies and procedures imposed a semblance of order which 
probably more than any other single factor at that time, 
prevented the University's organised chaos from descending 
into irretrievable confusion. 
Much of the confusion at that time was due to the 
effects of the wave of democratisation that was beginning to 
shake the oligarchical foundations of the University. This 
was to become a diverting seiga, distracting the attention of 
key decision-makers away from the latent problem of inadequate 
coordination of academic and resource decision-making. The 
next chapter will examine how these pressures for greater 
democratisation eventually overcame oligarchical control 
within academic departments. 
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^^APTER SIX 
THF LAHEY REPORT AND THF DEMISE OF PERMANENT HEADS OF 
PEPARTMKNTS. 1969-1972 
Because academic departments were the nuclei around 
which most staff and students were concentrated and since it 
was in academic departments that the oligarchical nature of 
the University's orgeunisation was most obvious, it was not 
surprising that it was here that the pressure for reform of 
the University's system of governance was felt first. 
This chapter will examine the process of reforming the 
governance of academic departments over the 1969-1972 period 
and in particular how the practice of appointing permeunent 
heads of departments was discontinued and a system of term-
appointment heads advised by departmental consultative 
committees (DCCs) was introduced. 
Although the principal focus of the chapter is the 
1969-1972 period, it would be wrong to imagine that the policy 
process commenced at the beginning of that period. The 
emergence of the policy problem was evident before then eund it 
is necessary, therefore, to trace its development from the 
beginning since, according to Wildavsky, the process of 
defining the problem is crucial in shaping the policy outcome 
(1979:57). Those participants who are able to articulate the 
decision premises and define the nature of the problem are 
normally able to control what issues are placed on the 
political eigenda and what issues should be suppressed 
(Pfeffer, 1981:115-117, 147-153). 
The origins of the governeunce of the University of 
Queensland being perceived as a problem can be traced as far 
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back as the reaction of the Staff Association to two articles 
that appeared in the December 1961 edition of Vestes. 
These concerned the domination of Australieun university 
decision-making by governing bodies, the administration and 
the professoriate eund the lack of opportunity for non-
professorial staff to participate (Hartwell, 1961:35-38; 
O'Neil, 1961:39-43). The democratically elected decision-
making bodies of Oxford and Ceunbridge, involving all levels of 
academic staff, were cited as appropriate models and the 
reform of the departmental level of governance was targeted as 
the first priority. These articles inspired similar comment 
in Vestes from a Queensland University academic soon after 
(Truman, 1963:3-9). 
Following a series of Staff Association sponsored 
symposia in July eund August 1963 to discuss "problems of 
university governance", the Association established a 
committee to survey its 376 members over the November 1963 -
February 1964 period in order to assess the degree of 
consultation by permanent (usually professorial) heads of 
academic departments. Although only 176 questionnaires were 
returned, the picture emerged that there was no regular 
pattern followed in departmental consultation. The majority 
of departments held staff meetings but not on a regular basis 
and often they were called only on the instigation of the 
head. The view was put that the lack of systematic 
consultation was damaging morale in departments and that this 
had made it difficult for the University to attract and hold 
sufficient numbers of truly outstanding staff (UQSA, 
Departmental Consultation Report, [1964]:3). The committee's 
report to the Annual General Meeting of the Staff Association 
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on 1 April 1964 was accepted and it became Staff Association 
polioy that, inter alia, all academic departments should 
hold regular meetings to formulate departmental policy eund 
that the University should experiment with the concept of 
"rotating chairmanship eund assistance in administration by 
members other theun the head" to assess whether this would be 
an improvement on the existing arrangements (UQSAM, 1/4/64:2). 
It should be noted that the governeunce of the 
University of Queensleund being recognised as a "problem" 
cannot be attributed to any single event. Rather there was a 
growing awareness of a problem emerging during the 1960s. 
Very little happened as a result of the Staff Association's 
1964 actions, partly because the problem of departmental 
governance was overtaken by the events surrounding the largely 
unsuccessful attempts by the Staff Association to persuade the 
Senate to include in the 1965 amendments to the University of 
Queensleund Act, provision for a substantially increased 
academic staff representation on the governing body. At the 
same time the willingness of the Vice-Chancellor eund the 
Senate to open up channels of communication with staff and 
students possibly delayed the realisation that major reforms 
and not just improved communications were required. The 
establishment by the Vice-Chancellor from the commencement of 
1967, (at the suggestion of the President of the Staff 
Association, Professor Edwin Webb) of the University 
Administration/Staff Association Liaison Committee and the 
formation by the Senate in 1968 of the Senate/Student Liaison 
Committee were examples of this preparedness to concede minor 
reform as a means of heading off the possibility of demands 
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for more fundeunental change. 
It was not until 1967 that University governance 
started to be defined as a problem by staff and student 
activists and linked to the wider radical movement operating 
in many western universities at that time. The governance of 
the University of Queensland was perceived to be a 
manifestation of a fundamental problem of organised society, 
namely, the problem of irrational coercive authority 
frustrating the legitimate rights of individuals to 
participate in the decisions that affected their lives. As 
the student newspaper Semper Floreat observed: 
Equally important is the democratization of all 
social cultural and economic institutions ... 
every effort would have to be made to secure 
socialism on a basis of the self-government eund 
self-meuneigement of the internal political and 
internal economic and social arreungements of 
all institutions (12/3/70:13). 
Universities were singled out for special attention. The 
Revolutionary Socialist Students' Alliance argued that no 
other institutions in western society, save the Church, were 
"so feudal and hierarchical, so status-ridden eund insistent in 
the last resort on the exercise of irrational authority" 
(SF, 12/3/70:13). 
The University's Central Executive however perceived 
the problem more as the creation of a few extreme radicals who 
had exploited a breakdown in communication between University 
authorities eund the general body of staff and students. 
Schonell asserted that: 
What is alarming is that all too often the 
conflict with authority is backed by a vocal 
militant minority who flout democratic methods 
and seek to impose their opinions, the ideas of 
a very few, on the very great bulk of the 
students as well as on the university (1968:14). 
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Schonell saw the problem as being inadequate communications 
between University decision-makers and the student body and he 
perceived the remedy as being more systematised consultation 
with and participation by students in decision-making 
(1968:13-14). 
On 15 July 1968 the Senate's Combined Advisory 
Committee set up a sub-committee "to consider the question of 
improving communications to University students" (CACM, 
15/7/68:5). The Combined Advisory Committee had been 
established in 1922 as a body primarily to serve as a cheunnel 
for communications between the Senate eund the student body.(l) 
Notwithstanding its representative composition, the Committee 
had proved to be a dismal failure. Meetings were held 
infrequently eund normally only trivial matters were referred 
to the Committee for advice. Dr. H.W. Thiele, the Director of 
Counselling Services, was reported to have informed the sub-
committee that students would feel more strongly that they 
were part of the University if the system of communications 
could be improved (CACM, 15/7/68:5). 
It is importeunt to recall here Baldridge's caveat 
concerning what he called the "Communications Fallacy", which 
he identified as a piece of conservative mythology based on 
the argument that conflict in organisations was primarily due 
to a breakdown in communications and that the underlying 
harmony which normally prevailed could be restored by the 
(1) The Committee comprised three senators, three nominees 
of Convocation, three University staff members, six 
graduates, six undergraduates (mainly office bearers 
and council members of the Student Union), Chairman of 
the Student Benefactions Committee, Director of 
Counselling Services and two representatives of the 
heads of residential colleges (CACM, 26/10/70). 
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opening up of effective channels of communication. As 
Baldridge has noted: 
Communications meo^  help, but it is usually not 
enough to resolve genuine conflicts of 
interest. The "communications fallacy" must be 
avoided if we are to understeund the political 
dynamics of conflict. No strategy for 
effectively dealing with conflict is likely to 
emerge from a naive view that denies the 
conflict even exists (1971:202). 
Whereas the Student Union had previously been 
ambivalent as to the extent to which students should be 
involved in university governance, the Union's submission to 
the sub-committee for the first time identified the problem as 
being a general dissatisfaction with the University's courses 
and teaching methods and a feeling that students were not 
involved in the determination of those matters that affected 
them. The remedy proposed by the Union was a review of all 
aspects of the University's organisational structure but, 
because the immediacy of experience for both students and 
younger staff was with departmental administration, this 
became the starting point for focused demands for reform. 
The proposal was for the head of department to be stripped of 
his autocratic powers, acting instead as chairman of a 
representative (staff/student) committee and being bound by 
the committee's decisions. 
The Combined Advisory Committee displayed a 
characteristic inability to deal effectively with the causes 
of the alleged poor communications within the University and 
its response to the Union's proposals for a review of 
departmental governance was to recommend to the Senate that 
the proposal be referred to the Senate/Student Liaison 
Committee (CACM, 21/10/68:6). However when the Committee's 
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recommendations were considered by the Senate in February 1969 
the 1967 President of the Student Union (Mr. F.R. Gardiner), 
who had been elected to the Senate by Convocation, suggested 
that the unrest within the University would not be remedied by 
accepting the limited recommendations of the Combined Advisory 
Committee. What was needed, he argued, was for the Senate to 
establish a committee to call for submissions from all 
interested members of the University on how they felt the 
University might be improved (SM, 13/2/69:36). 
Thus the Senate Committee to consider improvements to 
the University (hereafter referred to as the Improvements 
Committee) was born.(2) The Committee publicised its role 
within the University as being to receive submissions from any 
member of the University on matters relating to the nature and 
content of the teaching provided, the administration of the 
University at all levels and the communications within the 
University (ICM, 28/2/69:2). The Improvements Committee was 
important in that it represented a regular action channel for 
placing University governance on the political agenda, thereby 
weakening much of the extra-constitutional eigitation for 
reform that activists such as Dan O'Neill and Brian Laver had 
been advocating.(3) The Committee provided a structure eund a 
(2) The Committee comprised the Deputy Chancellor (as 
chairman), Vice-Chancellor, President of the 
Professorial Board, four other Senators (including one 
academic staff member, Mr. Gardiner and the Student 
Union nominee on the Senate), the President of the 
Staff Association and the President of the Student 
Union (SM, 13/2/69:36). 
(3) Reference to Laver has appeared in an earlier chapter. 
O'Neill was a lecturer in the English Department and 
was the driving force behind the publication in 1970 of 
a major radical critique of the organisation and 
functioning of the University of Queensland entitled 
UP the Right Channels. 
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mechanism for grievances to be aired and the wide publicity 
given to its formation fostered a climate that was receptive 
at least to the idea of reform. 
In addition to noting the environmental and structural 
conditions operating at that time, it is appropriate as well 
to consider the effects of informal organisational factors and 
especially the roles of key individuals in the policy process. 
This approach demands an appreciation of how the key actors 
interpreted their environment and requires eun understanding of 
the extent to which structural eund environmental factors 
operated as constraints eund therefore affected organisational 
behaviour. As Jenkins argued: 
. .. one needs to conceptualise over time the 
political eund organisational system from which 
policy emerges eund the changing environment in 
which this system operates. Such eun approach 
would be designed to capture the nature of the 
internal politics operative in such systems; 
also to give weight to and to utilise actors' 
interpretations of their situations (1978:254). 
The importance of key actors in the policy process should not 
be underestimated. At one level it is possible to examine 
organisational behaviour by examining the interaction of 
formal roles. In this connection, Bensman and Rosenberg have 
suggested that: 
society is a fairly stable network of social 
relationships based on relatively uniform and 
predictable behavior maintained between 
specific individuals in specified 
positions (1977:149) 
But this structural-functionalist, rather formal approach 
fails to recognise the rich tapestry of personal experiences 
and interests, as well as idiosyncratic values and goals that 
individuals bring to the policy process. Their individuality 
can at times spill over the boundaries of their formal roles 
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and a knowledge of the key actors as persons in addition to a 
knowledge of their roles is essential. Allison has explained 
why this is so: 
... each person comes to his position with 
baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities 
to certain issues, commitments to various 
projects ...(1971:166). 
As a consequence each participant in the policy process rarely 
sees the same reform issue from the same perspective. 
Individual steunds on policy issues are therefore dependent at 
least to some extent on the perceptions that are held in terms 
of the actor's personal background and stake in the policy 
outcome (Allison, 1971:176-178). The saga on the demise of 
permanent headships illustrates the importance of individual 
interpretations of their situation in the light of their 
background and values. 
Whereas the President of the Professorial Board during 
the period 1966 to 1968 (Professor J.C. Mahoney) was known for 
his very traditional, conservative views on the primacy of the 
professoriate in academic decision-making his successor. 
Professor E.C. Webb, was genuinely interested in fostering 
democratic reform of the University's decision-making 
structures eund processes. But Webb's interest in reform 
was by no means the only factor impinging on the policy 
process at that time. 
The University was in a state of some disarray 
following Schonell's death and the avuncular Teakle, who was 
due to retire the following year, was not regarded as a person 
who could provide the dynamic leadership that the University 
needed at a time when enormous pressures for reform were 
starting to make their presence felt. A combination of 
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factors were influential in overcoming the inertia that had 
prevented earlier reform attempts from succeeding. These 
included: 
O the impact of the student movement in western 
universities which provided an intellectual critique of 
the legitimacy of traditional authority structures; 
o the agitation for reform by local staff and student 
activists who saw themselves as part of the wider civil 
liberties movement of the late 1960s; 
o the growing awareness that the very rapid growth of the 
University accompanied by a shortage of resources had 
contributed to some conspicuous examples of inadequate 
teaching and poor research performance; 
o the perception that decision-making structures and 
processes which had worked well when the institution 
was small were inappropriate given the University's 
size at the beginning of 1969; 
o the establishment of the Senate Improvements Committee 
as official recognition of the need to explore the 
possibility of reform. 
Caiden has noted the inherent conservatism of people 
and institutions and he observed that reform generally tended 
not to take place unless it was consistent with basic 
organisational values and was compatible with the general 
direction of the surrounding environment (1969:176). There is 
no doubt that the demands for the reform of decision-making 
processes which were occurring in many universities in 
Australia and overseas at that time provided a propitious 
climate for reforms being advocated by staff and student 
activists at the University of Queensland in 1969. However it 
168 
was the discontinuity, indeed vacuum, created by Schonell's 
death and the direction given to the University by Webb at a 
time of great uncertainty when the institution was seeking to 
chart its way in a threatening and unfamiliar environment, 
that provided the necessary eund sufficient conditions to 
actually precipitate the reform process. 
Webb agreed with the Student Union's perception that 
the key to bringing about reform in the University's system of 
governance was to focus on the basic unit level. Any changes 
made to the methods of appointing heads of departments would 
be reflected in other levels of government where heads were 
represented. At the same time Webb understood that extension 
of the principle of participation at the Faculty Board level 
would be less difficult to achieve, because the principle of 
participation by non-professorial staff in some faculties was 
already well established. The problem Webb faced was to 
initiate the process of reform in academic departments in a 
manner which did not provoke a negative reaction from some of 
his conservative collesigues on the Professorial Board whose 
powers were derived from their being permanent heads of those 
departments. 
The issue of headships of departments had been raised 
in September 1965 in the context of the role of professors in 
multi-professorial departments vis-a-vis the role of 
permanent professorial heads (SCM, 20/9/65). At that time 
there were twelve departments with more than one professor and 
concern had been expressed over the lack of euny delineation 
between the duties and responsibilities of the head of 
department and the other professors; this lack of delineation 
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meant that there was no machinery in place for resolving 
differences of opinion eunong professors in multi-professorial 
departments (PBM, 10/11/65). 
A paper prepared by Rayner (then Deputy Registrar) eund 
adopted by the Standing Committee on 27 October 1965 supported 
the concept of fixed term (five year renewable) appointments 
of heads of departments made by the Senate. The Standing 
Committee considered but offered no comment on the possibility 
of heads being elected by all departmental staff (SC Paper, 
Headship of Departments with Multiple Chairs, 27/10/65). The 
issue was a sensitive one because even though Statute No. 10 
made no reference to the powers of a head of department, they 
were appointed as such by the Senate and the terms and 
conditions of their permanent appointment as head were set out 
in their letters of appointment. Many enjoyed the power and 
prestige which accompanied appointment as head of department. 
While some would have been prepared to relinquish the position 
in favour of a system of a rotating headship involving the 
other professors and/or readers in the department, it was 
considered that in view of the widely differing circumstances 
of individual departments, it would be undesirable and 
impracticable to impose a uniform practice throughout the 
University. The Professorial Board decided therefore that any 
change in the headships of departments with multiple chairs 
should be left to the initiative of the professors in those 
departments and that each case should be considered on its 
individual merits (PBM, 1/11/65), 
By the beginning of 1969 there were sixteen multi-
professorial departments containing a total of forty chairs 
and during the years since the issue of multi-professorial 
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departments had been last considered, some of the second 
professors had grown to resent the unreasonably dictatorial 
behaviour of some long-serving departmental heads. Towards 
the end of February 1969 Webb wrote to the heads of the fifty 
five departments seeking information about their arrangements 
for formal eund informal "staff meetings". The findings of 
this survey showed that all was not well with departmental 
consultative processes. Although only five departments failed 
to hold regular staff meetings, the frequency of staff 
meetings varied widely with some holding meetings only once or 
twice a year. Only nineteen departments involved staff down 
to tutor level in staff meetings and only one allowed direct 
student participation in regular staff meetings (Memo, Pres. 
PB to DHs, 20/8/69). Since Webb had become President of the 
Professorial Board many members of staff had complained to him 
about the lack of opportunity to participate in departmental 
decision-making (Memo, Pres. PB to DHs, 20/8/69). The 
discontent evident among many professors who were not heads of 
departments together with the more widespread concerns 
expressed by non-professorial staff convinced Webb that there 
was a need to place the issue of departmental governance on 
the political agenda. 
On 23 April 1969 Webb suggested to the Professorial 
Board that a small working party be set up to consider the 
functions of professors who were not heads of departments as 
well as the more general question of the headship of academic 
departments. As well as raising the issue of term 
appointments for heads, Webb indicated that the working party 
should examine whether staff down to senior lecturer level 
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should be eligible for headships and whether recommendations 
for appointments to the position should involve the Vice-
Chancellor consulting with the other professors, the Standing 
Committee or all of the teaching staff of the department 
concerned. The possibility of professors who were not heads 
of departments serving on departmental management committees 
was also listed as an area in need of investigation (PBM, 
23/4/69:17-18). 
One of the key sub-units in the process of reforming 
departmental governance within the University of Queensland 
was the committee appointed by the Professorial Board on 23 
April 1969 to examine this matter. In his wide-ranging study 
of comrflittees of inquiry, Cartwright (1975:83) has argued that 
the success or failure of a committee depended first and 
foremost on the selection of its members and Rhodes, (1975:95) 
in a similar study, has suggested that the key to 
understanding the selection of membership centred on the 
intentions behind the committee's appointment. 
Webb was a person of considerable political sagacity 
and although he was anxious that the committee would produce a 
report that recomrriended against a continuation of permanent 
heads of departments and provide greater opportunities for 
non-professorial staff and students in departmental decision-
making, he also appreciated the need to ensure that the 
membership was not seen to have an excessive bias in that 
direction. As Rhodes observed, the membership of a committee 
is frequently a compromise which attempts to balance 
simultaneously the objectives of trying to avoid unwelcome 
proposals and trying to produce a credible report (1975:79). 
After weighing up these considerations, Webb proposed and the 
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Professorial Board approved the following composition for the 
committee - Professor F.N. Lahey, Head of Department of 
Chemistry, (chairman); Dr. J.G. Dare, Reader, Head of 
Department of Pharmacy; Professor K.G. Hamilton, Head of 
Department of English; Professor R.J. Mcllroy, Department of 
Agriculture (non-Head of Department); Dr. R.D. Lumb, Reader, 
Department of Law (non-Head of Department); Professor C.F. 
Presley, Head of Department of Philosophy; Dr. W.J. Pryor, 
Reader, Department of Animal Husbandry (non-Head of 
Department) and Professor R.R. Stephens, Professor of 
Restorative Dentistry (non-Head of Department) (PBM, 
23/4/69:18). 
Professor Lahey was a senior professor who had served 
on the Standing Committee (1966-1967). During 1965 there had 
been considerable discussion among the three professors in the 
Department of Chemistry concerning the right of Lahey to 
remain permanent head of department vis-a-vis the relative 
lack of status of the other two professors. Although Lahey 
had wanted to retain the permanent headship he and the other 
professors had indicated support for the concept of the 
existing Department becoming a School of Chemistry to be 
headed by Lahey and with the existing three sections becoming 
individual departments each headed by a professor (SCM, 
5/10/65). This proposal was not proceeded with at the time 
and notwithstanding Lahey's initial opposition to the concept 
of rotating headships, the three professors eventually reached 
agreement to rotate the headship among their number on a four 
year term basis. 
Dr. Dare was the non-professorial head of department in 
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a discipline that was still finding its \/ay in the University 
after being established as a separate department in 1961 and, 
with the Department of Education, sharing the dubious 
distinction of being the last department to receive 
accommodation at the main St. Lucia campus (Thomis, 1985:273). 
Because Pharmacy was still at the developmental stsige as a 
separate department. Dare was anxious to preserve the role of 
non-professorial heads and for them to have voting rights on 
the Professorial Board. 
Hamilton, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and a member of 
the Professorial Board's Education Committee (1966-1968) was 
regarded as a conservative who believed in decision-meiking by 
those whose academic attainments, as reflected in their 
academic status, bore testimony to their merit. Hamilton had 
witnessed the ructions of activists on the staff of his own 
department such as Dan O'Neill and this experience reinforced 
his conviction that there was virtue in the principle of 
professorial heads. 
Mcllroy, Dean of the Faculty of Agricultural Science, 
was regarded as being essentially a conservative but 
interested in reform to the extent that professors such as 
himself who were not heads would have the opportunity to serve 
in that capacity on a limited term basis. 
Lumb was considered to be a conservative and very 
supportive of the traditional role of professors in the 
governance of the University. 
(Biographical data on Presley were supplied in chapter 
five and will not be repeated here). 
Pryor's reputation was that of a person interested in the 
reform of university governance in the direction of greater 
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non-professorial involvement in decision-making. He had 
served on the Staff Associat ion Executive Committee as 
secretary (1967-1968) and was appointed the f i r s t non-
professor ia l Dean of the Facul ty of Veter inary Science in 
1970. 
Stephens was nominated to the Committee because there 
was a need to appoint someone from the Medical/Dental 
disciplines, preferably a second professor who did not have 
any vested interest in preserving the role of the permanent 
professorial head. 
The Committee appeared, prima facie, to be a 
balanced representation of heads of departments and non-heads 
of departments. The balancing of interests extended also to 
three persons who were interested in maintaining the status 
quo, three members who were proteigonists for reform and two 
members who, while essentially conservatives, were keen to see 
second professors being given the opportunity to serve as 
head. 
The Committee met on only two occasions in May and July 
1969 before a draft report dated 6 August 1969 was prepared by 
Lahey for consideration by the Committee. The Committee's 
rapid progress was due in part to the preparedness of the 
Committee to be guided by the responses received to 
questionnaires sent to selected members of departments. Webb 
had written to all professors in multi-professorial 
departments shortly after the Professorial Board meeting on 23 
April 1969 and the replies received from the then twenty one 
departments showed that a majority favoured headships rotating 
among the professors (Lahey Committee, Minutes, 19/5/69). But 
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these data needed to be supplemented by more comprehensive 
information and accordingly the Committee resolved that 
questionnaires be sent to the head and professors in all 
departments eund that in addition each head be requested to 
arrange for a single questionnaire to be completed by a small 
committee of three or four of the most senior non-professorial 
staff in each of their respective departments (Lahey 
Committee, Minutes, 19/5/69). 
This survey population was extremely unrepresentative 
of University opinion on this issue. Whereas all heads of 
departments and professors were given the opportunity for 
their individual views to be made known, the views of three or 
four of each department's other senior staff were to be 
distilled into a single group response for each department. 
Moreover the latter group was to be selected by the head, 
thereby raising the possibility of bias, and limiting the 
survey to the most senior departmental staff meant that 
lecturers and sub-lecturing staff were largely excluded from 
the sample. Also students were not surveyed. (Although up to 
34% of the total 868 academic staff were consulted in the 
survey, the views of up to 25% of the total academic staff 
were reduced to fifty five consolidated departmental 
responses.) Respondents were given three weeks to return the 
completed questionnaires and a total of eighty four were 
received, a response rate of 63.6% (Lahey Report, Appendix II, 
6/8/69). 
The results of the survey showed that: 
Q the overwhelming majority of the respondents (seventy 
three) favoured rotating headships; 
o a substantial majority (thirty four) favoured all 
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teaching staff in departments being consulted by the 
Vice-Chancellor before recommending the appointment of 
a head to the Senate; 
o a substantial majority (forty five) favoured 
eligibility for appointment as head of department being 
restricted to professors and acting professors only 
although a significant minority (thirty six) would have 
extended eligibility to professors "and others" (4). 
o there was no clear consensus on the functions of second 
and subsequent professors in multi-professorial 
departments and the extent to which they should form 
part of a departmental advisory committee or joint 
management committee. 
Having regard to the responses received to this 
questionnaire the committee arrived at a number of major 
decisions at its second meeting on 11 July 1969: 
Q that in future heads of departments be appointed for a 
period of not less than three years and not more than 
five years; 
o that in future heads of departments be appointed by the 
Vice-Chancellor in consultation with the Standing 
Committee and the permanent senior teaching staff of 
the department concerned; 
o that headships be restricted to professors except in 
(4) The Committee's questionnaire was very "closed" in its 
data collection on the question of who the "others" 
should be, the relevant question being: "Should only 
professors be eligible for appointment as head of 
department, or should readers and/or senior lecturers 
of long standing also be eligible?" The possibility of 
lecturers being appointed head of department was 
apparently too radical a proposition to be 
contemplated. 
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those departments where there was only one professor; 
o that in all multi-professorial departments the 
professors other than the head would be expected to 
share the administrative work with the head and to be 
members of a departmental advisory committee with the 
head as chairman (Leihey Committee, Minutes, 11/7/69). 
At its third meeting on 12 August 1969 the Committee 
considered a draft report prepared by Lahey and clarified a 
number of ambiguities in the earlier resolutions. The 
Committee confirmed, inter alia: 
o that no further appointments to permanent headships be 
made; 
o that the senior teaching staff to be consulted in 
appointing heads of departments be the permanent 
teaching staff at the level of senior lecturer and 
above; 
O that in departments where there was only one professor, 
readers should be eligible for appointment as head of 
department; 
o that in euny department where there was a rotating 
headship the head of department was expected to share 
the decision-making with the other professors and 
readers eligible for headship and to establish an 
appropriate committee structure to achieve this (Lahey 
Committee, Minutes, 12/8/69:1-3), 
The Committee agonised over whether the head of 
department should continue to be designated "head" or whether 
"chairman" would be more appropriate. Instead of relying on 
the quite legitimate justification that the term "head" was 
more appropriate in view of the position's final 
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responsibility and authority in respect of all departmental 
matters whereas the expression "chairman" implied being bound 
by the decisions of the deliberative body, the Committee 
sought to de-emphasise the sensitive issue of the head's 
authority over other senior academic staff. It was spuriously 
argued that the designation "head" was necessary because the 
position was required to deal with disciplinary matters 
involving students and ancillary staff without reference to 
the departmental advisory committee (Lahey Report, 6/8/69:5). 
It can be seen that the main beneficiaries of the 
Committee's deliberations were the second and subsequent 
professors in multi-professorial departments and the readers 
in departments where there was only one professor, an outcome 
that perhaps was not surprising given the composition of the 
Committee and the population surveyed. 
Allison has drawn attention to the confusion and muddle 
that characterises what he called governmental or bureaucratic 
politics where many individuals and sub-units in organisations 
interact in the policy process (1971:146). This muddle and 
confusion was evident in the crucial decision taken by the 
Professorial Board on 25 June 1969 to add non-professorial 
heads of departments and acting heads to the Professorial 
Board (PBM, 25/6/69 & 30/6/69:17). Even though the Lahey 
Committee was at that time examining the question of 
departmental headships, the decision to extend membership to 
include non-professorial heads arose in the Standing 
Committee's consideration of the proposal to appoint a 
lecturer as acting head of the Department of Philosophy while 
Presley was on study leave from 11 August 1969 to 10 August 
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1970 (PBM, 25/6/69 & 30/6/69:16). Whereas readers were 
eligible to serve as acting professors when a professorial 
head of department was absent (and thereby enjoy full 
membership rights of the Professorial Board while serving as 
acting professor), lecturers and senior lecturers were 
eligible only to become acting head eund in that capacity they 
could attend but not vote at meetings of the Professorial 
Board (SCM,2/10/67). 
The significance of that decision was that if the 
Report of the Lahey Committee was to recommend a liberalising 
of the eligibility eund selection criteria for departmental 
headships, the future composition and role of the Professorial 
Board could alter dramatically. However because the Lahey 
Committee had held only one meeting (on 19 May 1969) prior to 
25 June 1969 and was at that time analysing the replies to its 
questionnaire, it was not involved in that decision. On the 
other hand the Webb Committee on Sub-Professorial Board 
Organisational Structure (chaired by Webb) appointed on 26 
March 1969 had held seven meetings by 25 June 1969 and had 
indicated its support on 18 June 1969 for the Standing 
Committee's proposal (Webb Committee, Minutes, 18/6/69:1). 
The Professorial Board's recommendation was accepted by the 
Senate and Statute No. 7 was amended on 29 July 1969 to 
provide for deans, heads and acting heads to become members of 
the Professorial Board irrespective of their academic rank. 
These events illustrate the point made by Wildavsky 
that because of the interdependence in complex organisations 
there is often considerable crowding as various sub-units make 
decisions that affect each other sometimes resulting in 
unforeseen consequences; solutions to a problem in one arena 
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often create a new problem in another arena (1979:64-65). At 
the time the decision was teiken to extend membership of the 
Professorial Board to heads of departments, the feeling on the 
Board was that this would have little impact on its 
composition. The Professorial Board envisaged that only the 
six non-professorial heads at that time would become members 
plus the occasional acting non-professorial head. Even the 
Lahey Committee at that time saw future headships being 
restricted mainly to professors especially with the trend 
towards multi-professorial departments (although it was clear 
that some members of the Committee were favourably disposed 
towards future headships being rotated among professors and 
readers in those departments where there was only one 
professor). As the Lahey Committee was a committee of the 
Professorial Board and because the Board believed that 
decisions affecting departmental headships were firmly within 
its own sphere of influence, members were not concerned over 
the fact that the Board's future long term composition was 
contingent to a significeunt extent on the eligibility and 
selection criteria adopted for heads of departments. The 
views of the Staff Association and Student Union had not been 
sought and little thought was given to any influence that the 
recently appointed Improvements Committee might be able to 
bring to bear on what was seen as essentially an internal 
Professorial Board matter. 
There is no doubt that the Professorial Board's 
decision to allow heads of departments to become members of 
the Board, while offering a partial solution to the policy 
problem of representation on the Board, made the issues of 
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selection eund eligibility for headships even more 
problematical than they might otherwise have been. To quote 
Wildavsky again: 
... policy problems rarely appear to be solved 
because past solutions create future problems 
faster than present troubles can be left 
behind (1979:70). 
By 31 August 1969 there was further evidence of the 
difficulties faced in attempting to achieve coordination in 
policy formulation in a large complex organisation. The 
Senate Improvements Committee had received seventy five 
submissions, seventeen of which were directly concerned with 
suggesting where the governance or management of the 
University might be improved. On 20 August 1969, i.e. after 
the Lahey Committee had completed its draft report, the 
Improvements Committee forwarded six submissions considered to 
be relevant to the question of headships of departments. 
These included one from the Staff Association but excluded the 
submission from the Student Union since this was not received 
by the Improvements Committee until the end of August (ICM, 
20/8/69:3). 
The Staff Association submission to the Improvements 
Committee argued that there should be no further appointments 
of permanent heads. Rather it advocated the institution of a 
system of rotating chairmanships elected from the full-time 
teaching staff of lecturer status and above for a period of 
three years. The electorate was to be at least all full-time 
members of the academic staff of the department. All policies 
and decisions of major importance were to be determined by a 
departmental committee at regular meetings where minutes would 
be kept and the committee was to include representation of 
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undergraduate and postgraduate students (UQSA, IC Submission 
No. 71, July 1969). 
The submission from the Student Union shared many of 
the principles advocated by the Staff Association differing 
only in the degree of emphasis given on particular points. 
For example the Union supported the concept of a departmental 
committee to be responsible for all policy formulation. The 
committee was to be chaired by the head of department who was 
to be a member of the academic staff of senior lecturer status 
and above, to be elected by staff and representatives of 
students enrolled in subjects offered in the department. 
Staff were defined as members of the academic staff at the 
level of senior tutor and above. The departmental committee 
was to consist of staff elected by and from the staff in the 
department and provision was to be made for undergraduate and 
postgraduate students to be represented. The Union believed 
that the role of the chairman should be to execute the policy 
decisions of the committee. His authority to make executive 
decisions on major matters would be limited to situations 
where the departmental committee could not be consulted and he 
was to be responsible to the committee for ensuring that such 
decisions were consistent with relevant departmental policy. 
The Union also recommended the establishment in each 
department of staff-student consultative committees to include 
student representatives from the various subjects offered in 
the department for the purpose of providing feedback to staff 
on such matters as teaching methods and subject content. The 
proposal enviseiged that the student representation on the 
departmental committee would be more effective if submissions 
from the staff-student consultative committee were made 
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available to the departmental committee. This recognised the 
difficulty one or two student representatives would otherwise 
have in reflecting student viewpoints across a wide range of 
subjects (UQU, IC Submission No. 75, August 1969). It was 
typical of the coordination difficulties faced by busy actors 
in a complex policy environment that the Report of the Lahey 
Committee was transmitted to the Professorial Board on 22 
October 1969 without the Committee having considered the 
Student Union submission. 
At the meeting of the Professorial Board on 22 October 
1969 it was agreed, inter alia, that: 
o no further appointments to permanent headships of 
departments should be made (47votes to 8); 
o future heads of departments should be appointed for a 
period of not less than three years nor more than five 
years (unanimous); 
o in future the head of department should be appointed by 
the Senate on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor 
after consultation with the Standing Committee and the 
permanent full-time teaching staff (senior lecturers 
and above) of the department concerned (2 against); 
Q in any multi-professorial department the head of 
department share the decision-making on departmental 
policy in all major issues with at least the other 
professors and other persons eligible for headships and 
to establish an appropriate committee structure to 
achieve this (26 votes to 3). 
The recommendation that headships of multi-professorial 
departments be restricted to professors and that in 
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departments in which there was only one professor a reader 
should be eligible for appointment was referred back to the 
Committee (PBM,22/10/69). 
By this time the opinion leaders on the 
Professorial Board had become aware of the substance of the 
Staff Association and the Student Union submissions to the 
Improvements Committee and that the Improvements Committee was 
sympathetic to some of their proposals. What had earlier been 
regarded by the Professorial Board as essentially an internal 
Board review had taken on a new dimension. It had become 
apparent that the Lahey Committee's desire to retain headships 
for professors in multi-professorial departments and to allow 
readers to be eligible for headships in departments only where 
a department had one professor was becoming increasingly 
untenable. After all the University's own promotion policy 
stated that the qualifications required for promotion to 
reader should not be significantly less that those required 
for appointment to a chair (Handbook of Administrative 
Procedures, Section 73030, 11/68). Indeed five departments in 
1969 were headed by readers and one was headed by a senior 
lecturer, all of whom were now eligible to become members of 
the Professorial Board. The Professorial Board concluded its 
initial consideration of the Lahey Committee Report by adding 
a further resolution for transmission to the Senate, namely: 
that in determining policy on all major issues, the head of 
department was expected to consult with the full-time 
teaching staff of the grade of lecturer and above and to 
establish appropriate machinery to achieve that. 
It was significant that the survey conducted by the 
Lahey Committee showed that there was very clear support for 
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the proposition that in appointing a head, the Vice-Chancellor 
should consult all teaching staff of the relevant department 
and much less support for the alternative proposition that the 
Vice-Chancellor consult the Standing Committee and the 
professors of the department concerned. The survey results 
revealed the following preferences for consultation - with 
professors of the department (18), Standing Committee (14), 
all teaching staff of the department (34) and Standing 
Committee together with professors of the department (4) 
(Lahey Report, Appendix II, 6/8/69). The report of the Lahey 
Committee, amended to embody the Professorial Board's 
observations, claimed that the results of the survey had been 
inconclusive and that the recommendation to limit departmental 
consultation to staff of the rank of senior lecturer and above 
was a compromise (PB Report, Departmental Organisation, 
22/10/69:4). A less charitable interpretation would be that 
on this crucial question of selection of the head of 
department, the Lahey Committee and the Professorial Board had 
become concerned that some departments might decide to select 
nominations for head after an electoral process involving all 
grades of academic staff and that as a result, relatively 
junior (and possibly radical) staff might be nominated for 
appointment. 
The Professorial Board's additional resolution made 
explicit the major distinction between sharing decision-making 
and consultation. Whereas the Lahey Committee was supportive 
of the idea of the head of department sharing decision-making 
among the professors and the readers eligible for headship in 
the department, the report made no recommendation concerning 
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the need for the head to consult staff below that level and 
the report was silent on the question of consultation with 
student representatives. The Professorial Board resolution 
also ignored the question of consultation with student 
representatives. 
The introduction of a departmental consultative 
committee structure involving all full-time teaching staff of 
the grade of lecturer and above went beyond the fairly narrow 
terms of reference given to the Leihey Committee, which had 
been set up ostensibly to consider problems associated with 
the development of multi-professorial departments. This 
extension was consistent with Webb's expectations and the 
widened recommendations were reflected in the metamorphosis 
which occurred in the name of the Committee's report from 
"Report of Committee on Headships of Departments, the 
Functions of Professors who are not Heads of Departments and 
Related Matters" to "Report of Committee - Departmental 
Organisation". This illustrated the phenomenon noted by 
Braybrooke and Lindblom whereby problems are often redefined 
during the course of the policy process to ensure that they 
are congruent with the resultant of that process (1970:98). 
In the present case, the resultant of the policy process was a 
proposal for a new form of departmental organisation; this 
reflected a redefinition of the policy problem away from the 
problems associated with headships in multi-professorial 
departments towards the lack of opportunities for non-
professorial staff to participate in departmental decision-
making. 
Because the Professorial Board had referred the 
question of eligibility for headships back to the Lahey 
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Committee it did not constitute part of the Committee's report 
(as amended by the Professorial Board) to the Senate. 
Moreover because the same report was referred to the 
Improvements Committee for independent comment to the Senate, 
the Improvements Committee was also not apprised of the Lahey 
Committee's recommendations concerning eligibility for 
headships. The Improvements Committee expressed concern that 
the recommendations made by the Staff Association and the 
Union appeared not to have been fully considered (ICM, 
11/11/69:2). Wliereas the Improvements Committee endorsed the 
recommendation relating to the introduction of three to five 
year term appointments for heads, it asked the Senate to refer 
back to the Improvements Committee the recommendations 
relating to the procedures for selecting heads, the proposal 
that the sharing of departmental decision-making be limited to 
professors and readers, the proposal for wider consultation 
within departments and the suggestion that the designation 
"head" be retained in preference to "chairman" (ICM, 
11/11/69:2). 
On the same day the Senate was due to consider the 
Professorial Board's recommendations relating to the Lahey 
Report, the Lahey Committee met to re-examine the question of 
eligibility for appointment to headships. The Lahey Committee 
by this time was aware that its earlier recommendation (that 
headships in multi-professorial departments should be 
restricted to professors and that departments in which there 
was only one professor, a reader should be eligible for 
appointment) would not be acceptable. The matter of 
eligibility for headship had taken on new meaning with the 
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decision to allow non-professorial heads membership of the 
Professorial Board. There was also some concern that, 
although the pressure for widening the eligibility criteria 
for appointment to headships could not be ignored, it had to 
be balanced by recognition that great harm might be done to 
the University's reputation if relatively junior staff were 
given the responsibility of academic leadership in departments 
and also given a seat on the Professorial Board itself. The 
compromise reached by the Lahey Committee was to extend the 
eligibility criteria to include all professors and readers in 
all departments and in those departments where there was no 
professor or reader, the Committee recommended that headships 
be restricted to "the senior member of staff only" (Lahey 
Committee, Minutes, 13/11/69). 
At its meeting held on 13 November 1969 the Senate had 
before it the Lahey Report as amended by the Professorial 
Board on 22 October 1969 and the report of the Improvements 
Committee from its meeting held on 11 November 1969. The 
Senate accepted the Professorial Board's recommendations, 
which had been endorsed by the Improvements Committee that: 
0 no further appointments to permanent headships be made; 
b future heads of departments be appointed for a period 
of not less than three nor more than five years. 
However the Senate accepted the Improvements Committee's 
recommendation that the matters the Committee identified on 11 
November 1969 as requiring further study be referred to the 
Improvements Committee. The issue of eligibility for 
headships was not discussed by the Senate and it was therefore 
not included in the reference to the Improvements Committee 
(SM, 13/11/69:19-20). The Lahey Committee's meeting held on 
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13 November 1969 was its fourth and last meeting; because the 
Committee then dissolved it was not able to follow up the 
Central Administration's omission to transmit its 
recommendations to the Professorial Board on eligibility for 
headships. 
In view of the fact that the Lahey Committee's crucial 
and final recommendation failed to surface on the Professorial 
Board agenda, attention shifted to the Improvements Committee. 
The Senate saw the Improvements Committee as a "safety valve" 
which would be able to serve as a central point of reference 
for all those who felt aggrieved by any matter concerned with 
the University. Its constitution was broadened during 1969 to 
include Mr. Ivor Cribb the Chairman of the Combined Advisory 
Committee and a person who was known as a strong supporter of 
the need for broadly based consultative processes within the 
University plus two further persons, one nominated by the 
Staff Association from the academic staff at the level of 
lecturer and below and the other nominated by the Student 
Union from the undergraduate student body. Mr. Wensley, the 
retiring Union President was appointed a member of the 
Committee in his own right on 18 December 1969 and Professor 
Webb was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Committee on 17 
December 1969 (SM, 13/3/69:15; 8/5/69:25; 18/12/69:17; ICM, 
17/12/69:6). This meant that of the total membership of 
thirteen on the Improvements Committee by the end of 1969, 
five members were either nominees of the Student Union or had 
very strong past connections with the Union, two were drawn 
from the Staff Association and one (Dr. J.G. Atherton) who had 
been elected to the Senate by Convocation had been a member of 
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the Staff Association Executive Committee from 1966 to 1969. 
This composition, together with Webb's involvement first as an 
py officio member and later as Deputy Chairman meant that 
the Improvements Committee was sympathetic to at least some of 
the proposals put forward by the Staff Association and the 
Union, much to the discomfiture of the Chairman, Lieut. Colonel 
A. S. Gehrmann. (5) 
Gehrmann was a conservative who had been somewhat 
disillusioned by the challenges to the authority of the Senate 
by staff and student activists demanding reform of the 
University's system of governance. On 2 July 1969 a forum 
attended by 3,000 students and staff had been convened by the 
Student Union ostensibly to discuss "The role of the 
University" and, more directly, what they saw as the lack of 
participation in decision-making by staff and students. 
Semper Floreat has recorded their concern: 
We have asked (the Senate) to justify their 
position of authority. We have asked them to 
debate the direction the University should take 
... We have been ignored ... This 
University consists of students and staff. Why 
do we have no say in the running of the 
institution? How long will you allow the 
decision making process to be monopolised by a 
body of men, who by their actions and words 
have shown they are not concerned with our 
development as full human beings but rather 
with serving the needs of the present status 
quo. Their role is to turn out thousands of 
students who do not question but merely accept 
a position in society as it is now constituted. 
The role of the University in society, to what 
ends should the University be directed, the way 
this institution is governed are questions that 
affect us all ... With respect to the question 
of who should control the power of decision 
making in the University, the onus we argue is 
on the senators, professors and other sections 
(5) References to the Deputy Chancellor, Colonel Gehrmann, 
have been made in chapters four and five. 
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of the hierarchy to justify the premises on 
which they believe that some men should control 
other men (21/7/69:4). 
Gehrmann did not encourage the Improvements Committee 
to take up reform issues and the President of the Student 
Union (Mr. J.M. Chapman) expressed anger over the frequency 
with which Committee meetings kept getting cancelled (Corres., 
J.M. Chapman to A.S. Gehrmann, 30/6/70). While the Committee 
was being diverted to examine the possibility of conducting 
another seminar on the role of the University, Chapman 
stressed that the Committee should concentrate on the question 
of reorganisation since he believed that the reforms achieved 
in this area would have the greatest impact on improving the 
University (ICM, 24/3/70:6). Thus at its meeting on 14 May 
1970 the Committee gave consideration to the recommendations 
of the Professorial Board arising from the report of the Lahey 
Committee that had been referred to the Improvements Committee 
by the Senate on 13 November 1969. 
At that meeting the President of the Staff Association 
(Mr. F.D.O. Fielding), a person widely known for his civil 
liberties advocacy, pressed for reform along the lines 
recommended in the Staff Association submission and the 
President of the Student Union (Mr. Chapman) argued the case 
for departmental decision-making to be vested in a 
representative committee with the head of department serving 
as chairman. Professor Lahey who was present by invitation 
posited that a reform of that type would be very damaging to 
the University's standing. Instead of locating the 
responsibility of academic leadership in one person who had 
been appointed on the basis of merit there would, under the 
Staff Association and Student Union proposals, be a situation 
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where the head could take no initiatives but would be reduced 
essentially to glorified clerical status, merely implementing 
the committee's decisions. However both Professor Webb and 
the immediate Past-President of the Staff Association (Dr. 
K.W. Knight) favoured the concept of a head of department 
being responsible to the Vice-Chancellor for the running of a 
department for a limited term, having regard to the advice of 
a consultative committee representing staff eund students. A 
narrow majority of the committee was persuaded by this view 
and voted (four in favour versus three eigainst) for the 
establishment of consultative committees in each department 
consisting of or being representative of the full-time 
lecturing staff of the department eund representatives of 
tutors, postgraduate and undergraduate students and such other 
technical and administrative staff as might be appropriate. 
The inclusion of non-academic staff in the formal consultative 
process broke new ground and emerged at the meeting without 
any preceding advocacy (ICM, 14/5/70:3-4). The Improvements 
Committee also recommended that: 
Q future heads of departments be appointed by the Senate 
on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor after 
consultation with the Standing Committee and the 
departmental consultative committee; 
0 that the term "head" be retained in preference to the 
term "chairman"; 
o that all full-time members of the teaching staff of the 
status of lecturer and above be eligible for 
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appointment as head of department.(6) 
The Improvements Committee's recommendations, if 
approved by the Senate, would have had major implications for 
the future composition of the Professorial Board so the Senate 
agreed to seek the Board's views (SM, 21/5/70:8). At about 
this time some conservative members of the Professorial Board 
were becoming more vocal about the prospect of moving away 
from permeunent professorial heads; it was argued that 
Queensland University might not be able to attract "the most 
able and distinguished people" to take up chairs if the 
reforms being contemplated were to put the University out of 
step with the situation in other Australian universities 
(Corres., J. Francis to Reg., 8/9/70). 
At its meeting held on 4 August 1970 the Professorial 
Board endorsed the Improvements Committee's proposal 
concerning the establishment of departmental consultative 
committees although it qualified the representation of tutors, 
non-academic staff and students by providing for such 
representation only "where appropriate". Moreover the 
Professorial Board continued to draw a distinction between 
consultation with a broadly based consultative committee and 
the need for heads of departments to "share the decision-
making" with at least the other professors. On the question 
of selection the Professorial Board also gave ground, 
conceding that the Vice-Chancellor could consult the Standing 
Committee and the permanent full-time teaching staff (lecturer 
(6) Although this matter had not been specifically referred 
to the Improvements Committee by the Senate for advice, 
Fielding had drawn attention to the omission and had 
successfully pressed the Staff Association's position 
on that matter (ICM, 14/5/70:3,5). 
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and above) of the department concerned (PBM, 4/8/70:3). At 
its meeting on 14 September 1970 the Professorial Board 
further resolved that the retention of the term "head" should 
be taken to signify that the head of department was to be 
guided rather than bound by the vote of the departmental 
consultative committee (PBM, 14/9/70:2). 
But it was on the vexed question of eligibility for 
headships that the Board was most opposed. The Professorial 
Board's relucteunce to extend eligibility for headships to 
relatively junior lecturing staff was coloured to some extent 
by the extreme radicalism of some such staff in violent 
demonstrations on campus during September 1970.(7) The new 
Vice-Chancellor (Professor Zelman Cowen) was extremely 
concerned at the "violent and ugly atmosphere inside and 
outside the campus" and the harm that this was causing the 
University's standing in the community. Cowen saw the 
Improvements Committee as a means whereby staff and students 
could make suggestions for the improvement of the University 
without having to resort to violent and disruptive tactics to 
have their demands for reform brought to the attention of the 
University authorities (SM, 8/10/70:1-4). Cowen was therefore 
keen that the Improvements Committee was viewed by all members 
of the University community as the legitimate constitutional 
means through which the aspirations of the moderates could be 
given full weight. However the Professorial Board felt that 
enough had already been conceded in responding to the 
recommendations of the Improvements Committee and the proposal 
(7) On 4 September 1970 radical students and staff had clashed 
with police in the notorious "Quang Incident" referred 
to in chapter five. 
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that the eligibility for headship be extended to all full-time 
teaching staff at the lecturer and above level was soundly 
rejected. The matter finally lapsed after a series of 
defeated motions eund straw votes with no resolution having 
been made (PBM, 14/9/70:3). At its meeting on 8 October 1970 
the Senate approved the Professorial Board's recommendations 
without amendment. In the confusion of referring matters 
between decision-making forums and despite definite 
recommendations having been made by both the Lahey Committee 
and the Improvements Committee, the question of eligibility 
for headships had still not been settled (SM, 8/10/70:14-15). 
Jenkins has suggested that policy implementation is 
essentially a struggle for control as each party affected by 
the policy seeks to negotiate the situation in his own favour 
by manipulating those aspects of the policy environment over 
which he can exert control (1978:218): 
... each actor struggles to impose his 
definition of the situation on others and 
consequently appeals for co-ordination may be 
next to useless, since each wants co-ordination 
on his own terms. Implementation concerns 
organisations manoeuvring to control their 
environment ... (1978:212). 
In his capacity as the University's foundation Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor (Academic) Professor Webb prepared a report 
for the Senate in September 1971 on the extent to which the 
Senate's resolutions on departmental governance had been 
implemented (Report on Arrangements in Academic Depts for 
Implementation of Senate Resolutions on Consultative 
Committees, 21/9/71). It was evident that because the 
Professorial Board and the Senate made allowance for the 
diverse circumstances of departments and therefore did not 
seek to impose uniform requirements, there was great variety 
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in the forms of implementation. Virtually all departments had 
now established some form of consultative committee but only 
seven consisted of full-time teaching staff (lecturer and 
above) and representatives of tutors, non-academic staff and 
students and in two of those seven departments, non-academic 
staff attended meetings only when matters concerned them. 
Fourteen departments felt that student participation in such 
committees was not appropriate at that stage. Of the fifty 
five departmental consultative committees, twenty met either 
monthly or on a "regular" basis with most committees 
(eighteen) meeting only once per term. Some heads had 
circumvented their departmental consultative committee by the 
use of a wide range of sub-committees to deal with particular 
matters such as the allocation of funds, research and course 
planning which reported either directly to the head of 
department or to the academic staff meetings. Thirty seven 
departments reported that they had regular academic staff 
meetings and that it was those meetings which contributed to 
the satisfactory functioning of departments. 
In a further review undertaken in July 1972 Webb noted 
that there was still great reliance placed on separate 
academic staff meetings with fifty three departments using 
this method of consultation (in addition to departmental 
consultative committees which could incorporate students and 
non-academic staff) leaving only three departments 
substituting departmental consultative committees for regular 
academic staff meetings. Twenty departments still did not 
involve non-academic staff on departmental consultative 
committees and nine departments still excluded student 
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representation almost two years after the Senate resolutions 
were passed (Memo, DVC(Ac) to Chairmen, DCCs, 25/7/72). 
Because all professorial heads of departments prior to 
13 November 1969 had been appointed on terms and conditions 
which provided for their headship to be permanent, they could 
not be required to relinquish their position. Indeed a number 
of long serving heads declared that they had no intention of 
stepping down voluntarily and proposed to stay on as head 
until their retirement. By the end of 1972, forty eight of 
the fifty nine departments were still headed by professorial 
staff. Five of the six departments with non-professorial 
heads in 1969 remained in that condition by the end of 1972 
and two departments formed after 1969 (Occupational Therapy 
and Speech Therapy) did not have any professors on staff. A 
further two appointments of acting non-professorial heads 
occurred in the Departments of External Studies and Philosophy 
following the retirement and resignation in 1971 and 1972 
respectively of their professorial heads. This left two 
departments (Dentistry and Mathematics) where there had been a 
change from professorial heads of departments still on staff 
to non-professorial staff. In the case of the Department of 
Dentistry the permanent head (Professor G.N. Davies) stood 
down voluntarily at the end of 1970 but in the Mathematics 
Department, the permanent head (Professor C.S. Davis) stood 
down reluctantly in 1972 when it became clear that the 
departmental consultative committee wanted the headship to 
change (Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84; K.W. Knight, 16/8/84). 
Davis had been a very dominant head who had served on 
the Senate from 1961 to 1971 as the Staff Association 
appointee on the governing body bvit his conservative views on 
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many University matters, including University governance, had 
put him out of touch with the ethos of participation that was 
on the ascendancy at that time. Davis lost the election as 
Staff Association nominee on the Senate at the end of 1971 to 
a noted advocate of participatory decision-making, Mr. F.D.O. 
Fielding, the University Librarian and the President of the 
Staff Association from 1970-1971. The Vice-Chancellor 
(Professor Cowen) had indicated that one of the other four 
professors should be nominated as head but the departmental 
consultative committee voted for the headship to be given to a 
reader, Mr. B.L. Adkins. This recommendation was reluctantly 
accepted by Cowen (Interview, G.N. Davies, 24/7/84). 
In concluding this review of the policy process it is 
appropriate to acknowledge that over the four year period from 
1969-1972, a major reform was achieved. The Senate's 
decisions of 13 November 1969 and 8 October 1970 marked the 
beginning of the end of the era of oligarchical control of 
departments by permanent professorial heads and paved the way 
for the transition towards a more participatory regime. That 
regime, while still containing elements of bureaucratisation 
(to the extent that the head was appointed from above and 
advised rather than bound by DCCs) also embodied some elements 
of non-bureaucratic organisation. The movement away from 
appointments to headships based on strict adherence to the 
hierarchical principle and the more democratic selection 
process were concessions to the contemporary ethos of 
democratisation. It remained to be seen, however, whether 
these shifts in power would provide the impetus for greater 
democratisation in other areas of the University's system of 
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governance or would precipitate a compensating swing in some 
other part of the system towards greater bureaucratisation. 
With regard to the process of decision-making, it was 
evident that environmental factors played an important part in 
the outcome. The impact of the radical movement at the time 
demanding democratic reform definitely created a favourable 
climate for change in that the issue of permanent head power 
at the expense of the participatory rights of others had 
become heavily politicised. The concerns expressed were used 
by Webb as a trigger to precipitate the reform process in a 
manner which would enable him to set the political agenda. 
The establishment of the Lahey Committee was an attempt to 
contain the rising groundswell of opinion on the need to 
reform aspects of departmental governance in a way that would 
defuse radical agitation and at the same time facilitate 
moderate reform. 
Although the establishment of the Lahey Committee and 
the Improvements Committee had the effect of bureaucratising 
much of the political conflict which was starting to emerge in 
1969, the policy process was still characterised by a great 
deal of political activity. Webb's choice of membership for 
the Lahey Committee (which with the benefit of hindsight erred 
on the side of conservatism), the confusion of other bodies 
introducing major reforms such as allowing non-professorial 
heads of departments to become members of the Professorial 
Board at the same time as the Lahey Committee was examining 
the role of heads, the conflict on the Improvements Committee 
to have that Committee become more involved in organisational 
reform, the Lahey Committee's lack of consideration given to 
the Student Union submission to the Improvements Committee and 
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the failure to resolve the crucial question of eligibility for 
headships exemplified the muddle and confusion.(8) 
Notwithstanding this instability and manoeuvring, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the process of bureaucratic 
politics evident within the Lahey Committee and the 
Improvements Committee did structure interaction and provide a 
framework for the resolution of conflict which would not have 
existed had the issue been allowed to drift unresolved as a 
focal point for discontent eund conflict elsewhere in the 
University. Finally, despite the agreement reached by the 
major participants on the reforms, the structural diversity of 
the University's academic departments meant that it was not 
practicable to be too prescriptive regarding the arrangements 
made in individual departments. Hence there was considerable 
scope for political activity in the implementation of the 
reforms. Some permanent heads exercised their legal right to 
remain as head until their retirement while others stood down 
voluntarily. A few fell victim to political pressure and 
relinquished their posts with marked reluctance. Some 
departments exploited the "where appropriate" proviso in the 
Senate's decision as a means of excluding non-academic staff 
and student participation whereas others embraced the spirit 
(8) The failure to resolve the question of eligibility for 
headships was not drawn to the Vice-Chancellor's 
attention until March 1976. Cowen had coped with the 
problem in the intervening period by not recommending 
anyone for a headship unless they were senior lecturers 
or above although lecturers had been appointed as 
acting heads (Corres., Pres. PB to VC, 22/3/76). The 
matter was finally resolved in accordance with Cowen's 
wishes and with the support of the Professorial Board 
and the Senate, following an abortive attempt by the 
Department of French to elect and nominate a senior 
tutor to serve as Acting Head (SM, 8/4/76:30; PBM, 
11/10/76:202). 
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of the reforms to allow much wider consultation in 
departmental decision-making. 
During the 1969-1972 period, in addition to coping with 
attempts to reform the University's senior administrative 
structure and departmental governance, decision-makers were 
also called upon to address proposals to reform faculty 
boards and the Professorial Board as well as consider proposals 
for the amendment of the University Act to enable changes to 
be made to the Senate's composition and to facilitate more 
efficient administration. In addition, senior officers were 
heavily involved in trying to overcome the University's 
troublesome accommodation backlog as well as cope with record 
increases in enrolments, inadequate funding, student 
radicalism and initial planning for the major academic and 
administrative changes associated with the introduction of 
semesterisation from the beginning of 1974. This phrenetic 
activity allowed key actors little time to give their 
undivided attention to individual problems such as the reform 
of aspects of the University's system of governance. However 
the issue of organisational reform had started to gather the 
momentum of a political juggernaut with no less than five 
separate committees each examining some aspect of the 
University's decision-making structure and processes over that 
period. It is to the role of one of those committees (the 
Webb Committee on Sub-Professorial Board Organisational 
Structure) that this study now turns. 
202 
fflAPTER SEVEN 
THE WEBB REPORT: FACULTY BOARD REPRESENTATION AND 
PROFESSORIAL BOARD AMBITIONS. 1969-1972 
During the 1960s, most of the criticism of University 
governance in Queensleund was directed towards the alleged 
oligarchical influences in academic departments, the 
Professorial Board, the Central Executive eund the governing 
body. Relatively little criticism was directed by activists 
towards the operations of faculties. 
There was an awareness, however, that all was not well 
with the University's faculty board structure eund decision-
making processes. It was generally recognised that most 
faculty boards were excessively large and that they had widely 
varying compositions across the democratic - oligarchical 
continuum. It was also felt that they spent too much time on 
administrative detail rather theun on the formulation of policy 
based on carefully developed principles (Interview, E.C. Webb, 
16/8/84). Nevertheless, because the decision-med?.ing power 
over resources was not vested in faculty boards eund because 
the implementation of a system of faculty board executive 
committees over the 1962-1964 period had compensated for many 
of their inefficiencies, there had not been euny event prior to 
the mid-1960s sufficient in its intensity to precipitate 
demands for reform. 
As President of the Staff Association in 1966-1967, 
Webb had been concerned with the particular issue of external 
interference by the non-academic legal establishment in the 
running of the Faculty of Law. During 1966, the Dean and Head 
of the Department of Law (Professor E.I. Sykes) proposed that. 
203 
for the first time, three lecturers in law be added to the 
Faculty Board. However the protagonists for this innovation 
were outvoted by the external legal members of the profession 
on the Faculty Board and it was not until the following year 
that the Board acquiesced to Sykes' insistence that staff at 
the lecturer level be added to the membership. Further 
controversy erupted over alleged external interference in the 
appointment of a head of department who would simultcuneously 
hold the Garrick Chair in Law following Sykes' resignation on 
11 May 1967 (Interview, R. Byrom, 26/7/84). These upheavals 
convinced Webb that a high priority following his appointment 
to the Presidency of the Professorial Board would be to 
initiate reform of the composition of all faculty boards in 
order to avoid a recurrence of what he considered to be 
unwarreunted external interference in internal academic 
affairs. 
Professor C.A. Hughes, Head of the Department of 
Government eund a person with a professional interest in 
university governeunce had been coopted on 7 February 1966 to 
an abortive committee appointed by the Professorial Board on 
10 November 1966 to report on the functions of the Board and 
its committee structure. Hughes suggested to the Professorial 
Board on 13 November 1968 that the earlier committee or a 
similar one be reappointed to examine the issue of University 
governance in the light of the experience with Law (PBM, 
26/3/69:25). Hughes went on study leave during 1969 eund he 
was thus unable personally to pursue the matter at that time. 
However Webb, the newly elected President of the Professorial 
Board, had already been planning such a review. He was keen 
to capitalise on the momentum generated by Hughes' 
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exhortations and have the matter placed firmly on the 
political agenda. 
At the meeting of the Professorial Board on 26 March 
1969, the Board accepted Webb's view that the time had come 
for an ad hoc committee of the Board to review the 
University's academic decision-making structures and 
processes. Webb wanted a committee that would recommend 
general principles for the composition of faculty boards, in 
particular, that all faculty boards should provide for 
representation of all levels of academic staff including 
tutors as well as representatives of students. At the seune 
time Webb wanted external influence on the Faculty Board of 
Law to be substantially reduced and for guidelines to be 
developed for all faculty boards in order to avoid a situation 
where non-academics started to dominate academic decision-
making. And, as non-professorial heads of departments were at 
that time denied a place on the Professorial Board, Webb 
wanted Statute No. 7 (The Professorial Board) to be reviewed 
with the object of ensuring representation of all academic 
departments on the senior academic body. 
There was little opposition to his proposal that the 
committee be asked to examine, inter alia: 
o the functions and composition of faculty boards 
including whether students should be 
represented on them; 
o the administrative support required by faculty boards 
eund departments; 
o whether faculty board executive committees should be 
delegated more authority; 
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o how Statute No. 7 (The Professorial Board) should be 
amended to bring it into line with desirable practice; 
o how departments without professorial heads should be 
represented on the Professorial Board; 
o whether any Senate committees should become responsible 
to or report through the Professorial Board; 
q what changes should be made to the powers, duties eund 
interrelationships of other University committees (PBM, 
26/3/69:26). 
It can be seen that Webb eund the Professorial Board at the 
beginning saw this review as a broad one which was to include 
the Professorial Board as well as faculty boards. Although 
there was eun awareness of the danger, the potential for 
overlap eund confusion with the planned review of departmental 
governance was clearly present. 
Webb went to the Professorial Board with a proposed 
composition for the Committee (Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). 
His selection of members was again calculated to increase the 
probability of a set of recommendations which would coincide 
with his perceptions of the direction that reform should take, 
without at the same time being vulnerable to the charge that 
the Committee was unrepresentative of University opinion. The 
Committee to be chaired by Webb comprised - Dr. W.E. Fox, 
(Reader, Department of Agriculture); Professor D. Gordon 
(Head of Department of Social and Preventive Medicine; acting 
Professor K.W. Knight (acting Head of Department of 
Government); Professor R.G. Neale (Department of History); 
Dr. B.J. O'Mara, (Lecturer, Department of Physics); Professor 
M. Shaw (Head of Department of Mechanical Engineering) and 
Professor J.C. Mahoney (Head of Department of French) (PBM, 
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26/3/69:27). 
Trained as a solicitor, mathematician and soils 
physicist. Fox was known to Webb as a person who shared 
similar ideals to his own concerning the need for more 
efficient and more representative University government. Fox 
strongly supported Webb's push for democratic reform eund, 
whilst disagreeing with the tactics of the radical student 
movement at the University, he felt that they had served a 
useful purpose in forcing some reform-minded senior people to 
begin to examine the assumptions which underpinned the "God-
Professor" syndrome which existed in the University at that 
time. 
Gordon was a former Dean of the Faculty of Medicine who 
had advocated reform of the duties eund responsibilities of 
deans vis-a-vis heads of academic departments. A major 
problem was the head's general line responsibilities to the 
Vice-Chancellor and central committee structure and his 
specific functional responsibilities to faculty boards in 
relation to course matters. In order to overcome the problems 
arising from this in faculties such as Medicine, Gordon had 
suggested a strengthening of the dean's role through the 
appointment of full-time deans by the Senate with authority to 
coordinate the academic eund resource decision-making of 
clinical departments (FBMM, 17/10/66). Having ideas such as 
this, Gordon was not perceived as being committed to the 
status quo. (It was significant that Gordon served on the 
Staff Association Executive Committee in 1974 at the height of 
the Association's advocacy for democratic reform of the 
Professorial Board. He was the only professor on the 
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seventeen member body in that year.) 
Knight was well known within the University as a 
person who was professionally interested in eund personally 
committed to finding ways in which the University's decision-
making structures and processes could provide for wider 
participation for non-professorial staff and students and at 
the same time ensure that the procedures adopted enheunced both 
the efficiency eund the quality of decision-making. Knight had 
served on the Executive of the Staff Association from 1960-
1964 and 1966-1971 and was President of the Association at the 
time of his appointment to the Committee. 
Neale's membership of the Professorial Board's 
Education Committee (1966-1968) and Standing Committee at the 
time of his appointment to the Webb Committee was eun 
indication of his acceptability to his peers on the Board. 
His appointment to the Webb Committee added to the Committee's 
credibility in the eyes of the Board. Just as important from 
Webb's viewpoint was his perception that Neale was 
disenchanted with some aspects of University governeunce, given 
that he had suffered under the domination of an academically 
distinguished but particularly authoritarian head of 
department. Webb was confident, therefore, that Neale's mind 
would not be closed to arguments advocating the need for 
reform. 
O'Mara was selected for the Committee essentially to 
reflect the viewpoint of staff at the lecturer level who were 
denied representation on some faculty boards. The paucity of 
representation at the lecturer level in O'Mara's field of 
Physics and in related science fields was underlined by the 
fact that in the 131 member Science Faculty Board only two 
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were lecturers eund in the seventy three member Engineering 
Faculty Board there were no representatives of that grade. 
Having served as a member of the Professorial Board's 
Education Committee from 1966 to 1968 Shaw was regarded as a 
traditional but not hard-line head of department. He had the 
advantage of having some knowledge of university governeunce as 
a member of the McElwain Committee set up by the Professorial 
Board in 1962 to examine the committee structure of the 
University eund the administrative duties of senior academic 
staff. It was anticipated that Shaw's presence on the 
Committee would be seen as providing some balance to euny 
excessive zeal for democratic reform. Webb felt that this 
would be reassuring to the Board without at the same time 
saddling the Committee with eun intransigent member. 
Mahoney, who had been President of the Professorial 
Board from 1966 to 1968, was known as a very conservative head 
of department. He believed strongly in the principle that 
university policy medcing should be concentrated among those 
members of staff who, by virtue of their attainments based on 
merit, had achieved senior academic status. Webb had 
nominated Mahoney to the Committee to give the impression of 
balance. Webb's judgement was that the benefits to be gained 
by Mahoney's presence on the Committee, in terms of giving the 
Committee credibility eund avoiding the criticism that the 
membership had been "stacked", greatly outweighed the costs of 
his countervailing influence in favour of the status quo. 
The Professorial Board had requested the Webb 
Committee to submit its final report within approximately six 
months. Given these time constraints, the Committee had 
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little time for a systematic sampling and analysis of the 
views of the University community on the matters in question 
and in fact no consideration was given to gathering such data. 
The approach was to rely on the wisdom eund experience of the 
Committee members and trust that their views were not too far 
out of step with prevailing opinion within the University. In 
that sense the Committee resembled Rhodes' concept of an 
advisory committee where advice was proffered on the basis of 
the member's own knowledge, in contrast to a committee of 
inquiry where advice was usually based on data collection and 
analysis (1975:25-26). 
At the first meeting on 18 April 1969, the Committee 
had a wide-ranging discussion touching on meuny aspects of its 
terms of reference. Webb suggested that faculty boards were 
seeking to do two incompatible things. On the one hand they 
were trying to retain responsibility for med^ ing executive 
decisions involving the application of policy to individual 
cases and on the other hand they were trying to serve as a 
widely representative forum for the debate of general matters 
of principle (Webb Committee, Minutes, 18/4/69:1) The 
Committee felt that faculty boards were generally too large 
and met too infrequently to consider matters which should have 
been delegated to the faculty board executive committee or to 
the dean to take executive action; at the same time they were 
often not representative enough to serve as a forum for the 
expression of all of the faculties' viewpoints. 
Two remedies for these shortcomings were suggested. 
These concerned the establishment in each faculty of a smaller 
more representative body with power to make all of the 
decisions of the existing faculty boards leaving each faculty 
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board or a larger more representative version of them to operate 
essentially as a vehicle for more effective communication. 
Alternatively the existing faculty boards could be made 
smaller eund more representative eund retain their existing 
powers, leaving room for the establishment in each faculty of 
a larger body representative of all persons in the faculty eund 
which would serve purely as a means of communication for 
decisions taken by the faculty board and elsewhere in the 
University (Webb Committee, Minutes, 18/4/69:1). 
The Committee devoted its next four meetings mainly to 
a consideration of a memoreundum from the Dean of the Faculty 
of Arts (Professor K.G. Hamilton) in which he suggested that 
the existing faculty board should be replaced by a new faculty 
board with a membership of approximately sixty and that a new 
body to be known as a faculty assembly and consisting of all 
members of the full-time teaching staff of the status of 
lecturer eund above, other members of the faculty board eund one 
representative of each student society should be created. 
Hamilton had envisaged that the faculty board would be bound 
by the decisions of the faculty assembly (Webb Committee, 
Minutes, 18/4/69:2). A majority of the Committee was 
attracted to this suggestion and by the end of the second 
meeting the view had emerged that in large faculties such as 
Arts and Science, a three-tier structure would be appropriate. 
This would comprise a large faculty assembly, a widely 
representative faculty board but smaller than at present and a 
faculty board executive committee (Webb Committee, Minutes, 
1/5/69:2). 
Webb felt that this would be an appropriate trade-off 
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between the competing demands of efficiency and participation. 
The small executive committee could be convened easily and 
frequently to apply policy to individual cases. The faculty 
board with a membership of about sixty (compared with the 
existing 131 and 139 for the Science and Arts Faculty Boards 
respectively) would be sufficiently small to facilitate 
effective discussion yet sufficiently large to enable 
representation of staff at all levels as well as students. 
Such a body could meet regularly; because its discussions 
would be more meaningful, the maintenance of a quorum might no 
longer be so problematical. The faculty assembly on the other 
hand would be a very large body with over 200 persons in the 
case of Arts and Science. It might meet only once per year or 
as required to serve as a forum for communication about any 
matter which affected the faculty's responsibilities, but its 
resolutions would not be binding on the faculty board. 
The Webb Committee's discussion on the proposed three-
tier freunework was relatively free of dissension. The most 
vocal critic was Fox who consistently argued that it would be 
preferable to increase the efficiency and representativeness 
of the existing two-tier (faculty board and faculty board 
executive committee) structure (Webb Committee, Minutes, 
6/5/69:1). In order to facilitate the reaching of a 
consensus, Webb persuaded the Committee to establish a sub-
committee consisting of Fox, Rayner (the Committee's 
secretary) and himself to see if a compromise could be worked 
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out.(l) Webb and Fox both agreed on the principle of trying 
to accommodate a sensible balance between the competing 
demands for bureaucratic efficiency on the one hand aund 
representative democracy on the other, but it was on the 
practicalities of applying that principle in operational terms 
that they differed. After considerable discussion, Rayner was 
able to develop a compromise which reconciled their views and 
which resulted in eun agreement that while the main policy 
thrust would be to develop smaller, more efficient and more 
representative faculty boards, it would be appropriate as well 
to have faculty assemblies in large faculties such as Arts eund 
Science. If such faculties were to accept the need for much 
smaller faculty boards, it would be necessary to soften the 
loss of direct participation rights then enjoyed by meuny staff 
by introducing the new concept of faculty assemblies which 
would at least allow such staff to continue some involvement 
in decision-making (Webb Committee, Minutes, 13/6/69:1; 
Interview, W.E. Fox, 10/7/86). 
The particular terms of the sub- committee's 
agreement were that a faculty assembly would be appropriate 
where the members of the faculty board together with all other 
full-time teaching and research staff of the status of senior 
tutor and above who were certified by the head of their 
department to be involved in the teaching of the faculty 
concerned exceeded 100 in number. The agreement acknowledged 
(1) Bailey has drawn attention to the way committees, when 
faced with a difference eunong members over a matter of 
principle, frequently form a small sub- committee of 
the members concerned to go "back-stage" in order to 
work out their differences through more private 
discussion eund to reach a compromise based on 
pragmatism (1977:62-121). 
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the point made by Fox that an assembly without any powers to 
bind the faculty board would be seen as little more theun 
"window dressing"; although the resolutions of the proposed 
faculty assembly would not be binding on the faculty board, 
the latter would be required in the event of non-
acceptance, to justify both to the Professorial Board and to 
the next meeting of the faculty assembly, the reasons why the 
recommendation had not been endorsed (Webb Report (Draft), 
14/7/69:9). 
Having agreed that the three-tier model would be 
appropriate for large faculties such as Arts and Science, the 
sub-committee resolved eund the Webb Committee endorsed the 
view that no faculty board should be allowed to exceed sixty 
members and that they should be restructured to provide for: 
o elected representatives of non-professorial lecturing 
staff on a departmental basis in terms of teaching load 
within the faculty; 
o related departments with very small teaching 
responsibilities within the faculty to be grouped to 
elect a representative; 
o junior staff representatives; 
o undergraduate eund postgraduate student representatives; 
o eun appropriate proportion of representatives of outside 
interests (Webb Report (Draft), 14/7/69:8). 
The Webb Committee had intended to provide explicitly for the 
head of every department with substantial teaching 
responsibilities in the faculty to be a member of the faculty 
board but had inadvertently omitted this fundamental 
provision. 
The Committee's terms of reference included a review of 
214 
Statute No. 7 (The Professorial Board) and in particular an 
examination of how departments without professorial heads 
should be represented on the Professorial Board. However the 
Committee's discussion on the composition of the Professorial 
Board was limited essentially to giving support to the 
recommendations of the Standing Committee which were submitted 
to the Board on 25 June 1969 for all non-professorial heads 
and acting heads of departments to become members of the Board 
(Webb Committee, Minutes, 18/6/69:1). The Committee's narrow 
interpretation of its terms of reference was based on Webb's 
expectation that he would not need to take the matter of the 
Professorial Board's composition further on the Committee 
because he anticipated that by the time the Lahey Committee's 
recommendations had been fully ceunvassed, the way would be 
open for more non-professorial heads to be appointed, thereby 
widening the base of non-professorial representation on the 
Board (Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). 
The Webb Committee's deliberations covered a wide range 
of issues which have not been commented upon in the present 
study because they had only eun indirect bearing on the topic. 
It is reasonable to speculate, however, that the considerable 
time spent by the Conunittee addressing such incidental matters 
as administrative/clerical support for faculty and 
departmental offices, relief staffing in departments and the 
method of circulating minutes reduced the amount of time 
available to the Committee to devote to the more substantive 
issues contained in the terms of reference. For example 
considering that the terms of reference specifically required 
consideration to be given to the functions of faculty boards. 
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remarkably little attention was given to that matter. 
Some concern was expressed over the fact that 
departmental requests for various resources bypassed faculty 
boards and the Professorial Board.(2) It was suggested that 
faculty boards should engeige in forward planning "of all 
kinds". However the only substantive comment advanced by the 
Committee was to note the Board of the Faculty of Medicine's 
involvement in prioritising the establishment of chairs in 
those departments that offered subjects in courses 
administered by that Faculty (Webb Committee, Minutes, 
18/6/69:1) Because departmental submissions on staffing 
bypassed faculty boards, it was awkward for faculties to plan 
academic developments. At the same time it was conceded that 
in large faculties such as Arts the heterogeneous range of 
departments teaching in that faculty would make it extremely 
difficult to reach a consensus on staffing priorities. 
Experienced University staff, especially heads of 
departments and professors on large faculties, were often 
content to "let sleeping dogs lie" during debates on matters 
they did not support. Such oligarchs realised that they would 
have politically less risky opportunities to intervene as 
members of the Professorial Board or through one of that 
Board's committees should it be necessary to scuttle an 
inconvenient faculty board recommendation. Intervention at 
the later stage was more likely to be successful because of 
the greater diversity of departmental viewpoints and the more 
(2) Such requests were dealt with separately by individual 
central committees without any coherent examination of 
the whole of each department's requirements in relation 
to the overall needs of other departments being made 
except at the Vice-Chancellor and Finance Committee 
levels. 
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disinterested composition of elite Professorial Board bodies; 
it would also avoid the ignominy of defeat at the hands of the 
more egaliterieun faculty board membership. At the same time 
this strategy had the advantage of not violating the 
democratic ideals of egalitarieunism which sustained the image 
of collegiality enjoyed by the large faculty boards at that 
time. Given the reality of Professorial Board power in 
relation to the academic affairs of concern to faculty boards 
and the unwillingness of the Webb Committee to disturb that 
relationship by proposing changes to the functions of faculty 
boards, the Committee concentrated on strengthening the role 
of the Professorial Board vis-a-vis the Senate. 
The main focus of this attention was the apparent 
disjunction between the Professorial Board's statutory 
responsibility to advise the Senate in relation to teaching 
and research eund the fact that budgetary matters relating to 
research, library, equipment, maintenance and accommodation 
(which directly affected academic developments) were the 
responsibility of Senate committees that did not report 
through the Professorial Board. The Webb Committee's remedy 
for this was to argue that the Research Committee and the 
Library Committee should become joint committees of the Senate 
and the Board and that the report of the Buildings and Grounds 
Committee should be referred to the Board for comment before 
going to the Senate (Webb Committee, Minutes, 24/6/69:1-3). 
However no recommendation was made pending 
consultations with the Chairmen of the Committees concerned 
and the University Librarian. For some years the Senate had 
authorised the minutes of the Research Committee to be 
forwarded to the Professorial Board for comment before being 
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transmitted to the Senate and the Chairman of the Research 
Committee, Professor C.S. Davis (who served as the senator 
appointed by the Staff Association from 1961 to 1971), agreed 
that provided that the Research Committee retained a 
substeuntial Senate representation, it should become a 
committee of the Board (Webb Committee, Minutes, 8/7/69:1), 
At the seune time both the Librarian and the Chairman of 
the Library Committee (Professor Gordon Greenwood) strongly 
opposed that Committee becoming a committee of the Board. 
Fielding was worried that if that happened, the Library would 
become subject to the pulling and hauling of departmental 
pressure groups who would place their own interests over the 
corporate needs of a central service (Webb Committee, Minutes, 
1/7/69:1-2). His views were reinforced by Greenwood who 
displayed his antipathy towards the Professorial Board by 
describing it as "an ineffectual body overloaded with 
business" (Webb Committee, Minutes, 8/7/69:1). They argued 
that the gains made by the Library were due to the fact that 
it was a Senate committee that was chaired by an academic 
staff member eund which enjoyed direct access to the Fineunce 
Committee in staking its claim on resources. However in the 
Webb Committee's view that was a cogent argument to bring the 
Committee under the control of the Board because it was 
recognised that the gains made by the Library might well have 
been at the expense of such items as academic staffing (Webb 
Committee, Minutes, 1/7/69:1-2; 8/7/69:1). Notwithstanding 
the objections raised, the Webb Committee eigreed that the 
Library Committee should, like the Research Committee, become 
a joint committee of the Professorial Board and the Senate; 
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both committees were to have equal academic and Senate 
membership, reporting to the Senate through the Board, with 
both bodies having the right to refer matters to them (Webb 
Committee, Minutes, 8/7/69:2). 
Having developed this joint committee model, the Webb 
Committee extended it to the Senate's Buildings eund Grounds 
Committee and the Equipment Sub-Committee, envisaging that the 
latter would report through the Professorial Board to the 
Finance Committee. 
The Webb Committee's expansionist pretensions did not 
end there. The Committee agreed that the Professorial Board 
should colonise the Vice-Chancellor's sphere of influence also 
by recommending that the letter's Technical eund Laboratory 
Staff Advisory Committee become a joint committee of the Vice-
Chancellor and Professorial Board with equal representatives 
appointed by both parties and reporting to the Vice-Chancellor 
through the Board. However the Committee's hegemonic 
eunbitions for the Professorial Board were insatiable eund the 
logic of these proposals required clerical staff also to be 
included under this umbrella with the object of giving the 
Board a major say in all non-academic staffing through the 
proposed Technical, Administrative and Laboratory Staffing 
Committee (Webb Committee, Minutes, 11/7/69:2). The 
Committee's justification for this intrusion into the domains 
of other individuals and sub-units within the decision network 
was essentially that the Board's responsibilities to advise 
the Senate on teaching and research were central to achieving 
the organisation's objectives. Because virtually all other 
activities within the University either supported or impinged 
upon those central activities, the Board had to have a 
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decisive seo' in the activities of eund the resources allocated 
to those areas. At one point the Webb Committee flirted with 
the provocative idea that the logical extension of that 
argument would be to propose that the Senate's powerful 
Administrative and Fineunce Committee become a joint committee 
of the Senate and the Board in view of the need to assess 
"overall priorities" but discretion rather than valour 
prevailed and no such recommendation was made (Webb Committee, 
Minutes, 8/7/69:2; Interview, E.C. Webb, 16/8/84). 
The draft report was completed on 11 July 1969 after 
nine meetings of the Committee and was compiled by a sub-
committee consisting of Webb, Fox eund Rayner. It was agreed 
at the Committee's second last meeting on 15 July 1969 that 
the amended draft be circulated to all members of the 
Professorial Board, Staff Association and Student Union for 
comment before transmitting it to the Board for formal 
consideration. Webb observed that the Improvements Committee 
had received a number of proposals which related to the topics 
addressed by the Committee although at that stage neither the 
Staff Association nor the Student Union had made their 
submissions. It was agreed that the releveunt submissions to 
the Improvements Committee would be considered at the Webb 
Committee's next meeting (Webb Committee, Minutes, 16/7/69:1). 
Webb circulated the draft report on 16 July 1969 to the 
individuals and groups mentioned above as well as to members 
of the Senate with the request that they submit their comments 
by 29 July 1969. Webb had allowed only two weeks for comment 
because the Senate wanted to receive the Professorial Board's 
advice by September so that any changes to the constitution of 
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faculty boards could be implemented for 1970. In addition, 
Webb wanted to submit the Committee's report to the 
Professorial Board in August as he was going overseas for 
three weeks in early September (Memo, Pres. PB to Senate, PB, 
DHs, Sub-Deans, Pres. UQSA., Pres. UQU, 14/7/69). 
The Webb Committee held its twelfth eund final meeting 
on 1 August 1969 and considered the responses together with 
the eight submissions made to the Improvements Committee which 
were releveunt to the Committee's terms of reference. A wide 
range of views were received. Two senators (both senior 
public servants) strongly supported the proposed limit of 
sixty members on faculty boards while some academic 
respondents expressed doubts on the need for any limit. It 
was pointed out that the proposal to provide for elected 
representatives of "non-professorial lecturing staff" without 
reference to professorial representation left open the 
interpretation that professors were to have automatic 
membership. Some conservative respondents were concerned 
about the trend away from what they saw as efficient decision-
making by those most qualified towards democratic decision-
making based on the false principle of egalitarianism. One 
such professor hoped that: 
... we will not gullibly accept every 
suggestion for having all ranks of staff and 
students on all decision making bodies. 
The "revolutionary socialists" at St. 
Lucia eund elsewhere talk of freedom 
and participation, but history would indicate 
that they, and those associated with them, 
really want personal power. The "equality and 
fraternity" of the French Revolution produced 
Napoleon and the glorious Russian Revolution 
Joseph Stalin. Countries with British 
institutions have managed to avoid these 
extremes and I trust we will be able to retain 
a reasonably experienced and efficient 
administrative and academic structure (Corres., 
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J. Francis to Pres. PB, 24/7/69). 
Neither the Staff Association nor the Student Union 
submitted comments but, in the absence of minutes for that 
meeting, it is reasonable to speculate that Knight would have 
conveyed the policy as contained in the Association's recent 
submission to the Improvements Committee. On the other hand 
the Union's submission to the Improvements Committee was not 
finalised until towards the end of August 1969 and hence would 
not have been available to the Webb Committee on 1 August. 
Nevertheless the Union's lack of response was capable of the 
interpretation that it did not cavil at the Committee's 
proposals for student representation on faculty boards and the 
proposed faculty assemblies. Be that as it meiy, the Union 
would have been well aware that it could still influence the 
policy process through its representation on the Senate's 
Improvements Committee. 
By obtaining reactions from members of the Professorial 
Board and some senators, the Webb Committee was able to gauge 
the feeling of a significeunt number of opinion leaders within 
the University and, by eund large, the Committee was gratified 
by the generally positive tone of the responses. By obtaining 
feedback prior to submitting the report formally to the 
Professorial Board, the Committee was able to develop its own 
responses to the issues raised eund to amplify its views on 
some of the more contentious matters which had attracted most 
comment. For example, the Committee stated that it would 
strongly oppose any suggestion that faculty boards should be 
allowed to exceed sixty members. The Committee indicated that 
it would have preferred a smaller maximum size but it 
acknowledged that a limit of up to sixty was necessary to 
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allow adequate representation of the twenty departments which 
had substantial teaching responsibilities in the Bachelor of 
Arts degree administered by the Board of the Faculty of Arts 
(Webb Report (Supplementary), 2/8/69:1-2). Although some 
respondents had indicated that they had doubts about the 
practicability of the proposed faculty assemblies and felt 
that their role needed to be prescribed in more detail, the 
Committee argued that the proposal was for such bodies to be 
established on an experimental basis and that their role and 
procedures would evolve over time within the broad 
constitutional framework to be approved by the Professorial 
Board and the Senate. 
By highlighting issues raised by the various 
respondents, the Webb Committee gave itself the opportunity to 
rebut them in its written comments to the Professorial Board. 
Thus rather than simply rewrite the draft report to take 
selective account of the views expressed, the Webb Committee 
submitted to the special meeting of the Professorial Board on 
6 August 1969, a summary of all of the diverse comments made 
by the respondents (including verbatim comments by neuned 
individuals) as well as the Committee's comments together with 
a set of revised recommendations. Very few cheunges were in 
fact made to the draft recommendations and the eunendments were 
mostly confined to correcting the infelicitous drafting of 
some aspects of the first draft report. These eunendments made 
it clear that heads of departments with substantial teaching 
responsibilities in faculties were automatically to be members 
of faculty boards and that professors were not to be members 
of faculty boards by right but rather they were to be elected 
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along with non-professorial staff on a departmental basis in 
terms of the teaching load of the department within the 
faculty (Webb Report (Supplementary), 2/8/69:1-2). 
The discussion at the meeting of the Professorial Board 
on 6 August 1969 was characterised by a strong defence by a 
number of professors who were concerned that as a consequence 
of the new wave of democratisation then sweeping the 
University, they might not be elected to faculty boards under 
the smaller, more representative constitutions being proposed. 
After a protracted debate Webb declared that he was not 
prepared to eigree to eun adjournment until a conclusion had 
been reached, whereupon the Board immediately resolved not to 
accept the proposal to limit the size of faculty boards to 
sixty. With the obstacle of limited size removed, the Board 
agreed with the proposals for more representative faculty 
boards (PBM, 6/8/69:2; Interview, W.E.Fox, 10/7/86). There 
was ready acceptance of the Committee's recommendations 
concerning the various Senate and Vice-Chancellor's Committees 
becoming joint committees of the Board and Senate or Board and 
Vice-Chancellor respectively. The Professorial Board resolved 
to refer those aspects of the report relating to the structure 
and composition of faculty boards to the various faculty 
boards for comment and at the same time to submit the 
Committee's report, together with the Board's comments, to the 
Senate. 
Realising that the opportunities to influence the 
policy process were running out, the President of the Student 
Union (Mr. R.N. Wensley) acted on his belief that the Senate 
would be sympathetic to the idea of student representation on 
faculty boards. At Wensley's urging, the Improvements 
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Committee on 20 August 1969 agreed that 6% of the total 
strength of each faculty board with a minimum of two should be 
students and that 6% of the total strength of each faculty 
board with a minimum of two should be junior teaching staff of 
the status of tutor eund above (ICM, 20/8/69:6). Thus even 
though the Student Union at no stage made its views known to 
the Webb Committee via a formal submission, the Union's 
presence on the Improvements Committee allowed it indirectly 
to play an influential role in the policy process. 
On 21 August 1969 the Senate convened a special meeting 
to discuss the Webb Report. The Senate deferred consideration 
of the Committee's recommendation that membership of faculty 
boards be limited to sixty in view of the fact that the 
faculty boards heui not yet formally considered the Committee's 
final report nor the Professorial Board's comments on it. 
However the Senate did not hesitate to approve the 
recommendations of the Improvements Committee concerning 
representation of junior staff and students on faculty boards 
even though faculty boards had not at that stage had an 
opportunity to comment on that proposition (SM, 21/8/69:3-
4).(3) 
By contrast, the Webb Committee's recommendations 
concerning various Senate committee's becoming joint 
Senate/Professorial Board committees were rejected by the 
Senate. The ostensible reason given was that the Government 
(3) This approval was qualified on 11/9/69 as being 
"in principle" when the Senate's attention was drawn to 
the concern expressed by the Board of the Faculty of 
Agriculture over the Senate's decision to impose fixed 
proportions of junior staff and student representatives 
on faculty boards without prior consultations (SM, 
11/9/69:8). 
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would not willingly accept a proposal to amend the statutes to 
enable committees of the Senate to report to the Professorial 
Board. The real reason, however, was that the Senate took 
exception to the unseemly way the Webb Committee eund the 
Professorial Board were seeking to expand the influence of the 
Board in decision-making at the expense of the Senate 
(Interview, G. Greenwood, 6/8/84). In a spirit of compromise, 
however, the governing body agreed to concede some of the 
Professorial Board's claim by allowing the Senate committees 
in question to forward a copy of their minutes to the Board 
for noting eund conunent at the same time as those committees 
reported to the Senate. The same spirit of compromise 
extended also to the Vice-Chancellor's Technical and 
Laboratory Staff Advisory Committee. The Senate renamed it as 
the Technical, Administrative and Laboratory Staffing 
Committee and authorised the Committee to send a copy of its 
report to the Professorial Board for comment at the seune time 
as it reported to the Vice-Chancellor (SM, 21/8/69:6-7). 
Jenkins has pointed out that when eun organisation has 
had an institutionalised set of arrangements for meuny years, 
euny policy reform which threatens to change those arrangements 
needs to be assessed in terms of the compatibility of the 
proposed changes with the values of the recipient organisation 
in addition to assessing the changes in terms of any promise 
of increased efficiency. Policy reforms tend to be assessed 
by the recipient organisation against the established way of 
doing things eund, to be successfully implemented, the reform 
needs to be seen as being an improvement which does not 
threaten the existing distribution of power (1978:189-191). 
Thus in the case of the Faculty Board of Arts with 139 members 
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in July 1969 including all lecturers with one year's service, 
one could expect resisteunce to euny exhortation to limit its 
membership since this would mean that some of the 
beneficiaries of the existing status quo would lose the right 
to participate. Similarly resisteunce might be eunticipated 
from the 131 member Faculty Board of Science. 
By December 1969 eight of the twelve faculty boards had 
agreed on new compositions and in five of those eight the 
proposals were to increase rather than decrease their sizes 
(Pres. PB Paper, Revised Faculty Board Structures, 17/12/69). 
The Board of the Faculty of Science, for example, proposed to 
increase its membership from 133 to 217 and only four boards 
in relatively small faculties (Agriculture, Dentistry, 
Veterinary Science, Music) had proposed memberships of fewer 
than sixty although Architecture and Law were expected to 
contain fewer than sixty when their compositions were 
finalised. 
Webb readily acknowledged that each faculty board was 
different and therefore no uniformity in their composition was 
necessary or desirable. Nevertheless he was concerned at the 
high level of apparently needless variation. In his report to 
the Senate on 18 December 1969 Webb drew attention to the 
discrepancies in the level of representation in the various 
categories (SM, 18/12/69:20). For exeunple although several 
faculty boards had eigreed to elect representatives of 
particular groups e.g. lecturers eund above as well as junior 
staff, the methods of election varied widely. Similarly 
although all faculty boards with revised constitutions now 
provided for student representation, their methods of election 
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were not uniform. The number of external representatives 
reunged from none in the case of the Science Faculty Board to 
twenty in the Board of the Faculty of Engineering. Moreover 
of the eight faculty boards that had considered the 
desirability of establishing a faculty assembly, four had 
determined that no assembly would be established eund only two 
(Medicine eund Agriculture) had approved of the concept "in 
principle". 
In view of these discrepeuncies the Senate accepted 
Webb's recommendation that his report be referred to the 
Professorial Board for comment. In response to this the 
Professorial Board appointed a sub-committee on 25 February 
1970 comprising five of the original Webb Committee members 
(Webb, Fox, Gordon, ECnight, Shaw) plus Mr. J.M. Chapman 
(President of the Student Union) to investigate (PBM, 
25/2/70:17). The Sub-Committee met three times between 1 
April 1970 and 26 October 1970 and reiterated the view of the 
Webb Committee that the central issue in the reform of faculty 
governance was to reduce the size of the faculty boards and to 
make them more representative. Members felt that the 
Professorial Board had erred on 6 August 1969 when it had 
rejected the recommendation that membership be limited to 
sixty (Webb Sub-Committee, Minutes, 1/4/70:1). The Sub-
Committee noted that student representation on faculty boards 
ranged from 4.3% of total membership (Agriculture) to 7.5% 
(Arts and Medicine) and was satisfied that, by and large, the 
number of representatives of both students and junior staff 
was appropriate. The Sub-Committee's recommendations, 
therefore, were limited to standardising the method of 
electing such representatives. However some concern was 
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expressed over the Law Faculty Board's continuing effort to 
have proportionally more Senate and external representatives 
compared with academic staff than any other board. The Sub-
Committee noted also that external members were heavily 
represented on the Music and Engineering Faculty Boards and it 
was decided, therefore, to recommend a meiximum level of 
outside representation of 25% of total membership. A limit of 
two members of Senate for each faculty board was also 
suggested (Webb Sub-Committee, Minutes, 22/9/70:2-3). 
At the meeting of the Professorial Board on 30 November 
1970 Webb again argued the case for faculty boards to be 
limited to a maximum of sixty members. Having conceded the 
case for a structured faculty board composition comprising 
Senate, ex officio, academic staff, junior academic staff, 
students, and external members and having acknowledged that 
all heads of departments with substantial teaching 
responsibilities in a faculty should automatically be members 
of relevant faculty boards, the Professorial Board was not 
prepared to agree to a limit of sixty members. This was 
because such a limit would have meant that the boards of big 
faculties such as Arts and Science could not accommodate a 
large enough proportion of senior academic staff. In the 
bargaining over this issue it was finally agreed that while it 
would be inappropriate to prescribe eun arbitrary fixed upper 
limit, the membership of faculty boards should be limited in 
number and that representation of academic staff in large 
faculties should be on a proportional basis involving all 
grades (PBM, 30/11/70:6). 
Allison has drawn attention to the way decisions 
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resemble "collages" in that they are the resultant of 
bargaining by key actors eund sub-groups (1971:146). This 
bargaining or mutual partisan adjustment was evident in the 
Professorial Board's somewhat vacuous agreement to "limit" the 
size of faculty boards without specifying what the upper limit 
should be. He has also commented on the way the policy 
process is characterised by "incredibly busy players" who are 
obliged to address many problems simulteuneously eund who are 
frequently pressured into medcing decisions to comply with 
deadlines imposed by the flow of business through the regular 
decision-making structures eund processes (1971:163). 
Certainly the 1970-1971 period was for the University of 
Queensland a time of intense pressure for senior officers of 
the University. Cowen, Webb and Rayner in particular were 
heavily involved in coping with activist students and staff 
protesting, sometimes violently, over Australia's involvement 
in Vietnam, apartheid and the South African Springbok Rugby 
tour of Australia as well as other civil liberties issues. 
This was the time when, as the University's Historieun put it: 
... the University of Queensland underwent its 
sternest test, when, according to some, its 
credibility as an institution was at 
stake (Thomis, 1985:313). 
Many of these protests came to a climax in July 1971 
with the Queensleund Government's proclamation of a State of 
Emergency in order to compulsorily secure the Brisbeune 
Exhibition Grounds for a rugby match between the visiting 
South Africeun Springbok teeun and a local team. Activists at 
the University had planned to bring the University to a halt 
through a strike in order to protest against the State of 
Emergency and there had been media speculation that the State 
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Government would "take very serious action in respect of the 
University eund its staff" if the strike went ahead (VC's 
Statement, 29/9/71:1). This event was merely one in a series 
of protests over the 1970-1971 period which distracted senior 
officers of the University from devoting the time that would 
normally have been available for giving close attention to 
more prosaic issues such as the implementation of reforms 
associated with the composition of faculty boards. 
At its meeting held on 2 August 1971 the Professorial 
Board noted a report prepared by Webb concerning the action 
taken by the faculty boards in response to the Professorial 
Board's suggestions. However the Professorial Board was 
unable to debate Webb's report at that meeting because 
discussion was given over to the events of the preceding month 
relating to the State of Emergency and the University strike. 
The Vice-Cheuncellor had been heavily involved in discussions 
with the Premier, Deputy Premier and Police Commissioner over 
the State of Emergency and the reaction of University 
activists to it. Student activists had clashed with police on 
29 July and again on 31 July and the Vice-Chancellor was 
anxious to meike it clear that while he supported legitimate 
and peaceful dissent, he was opposed to the way some radicals 
had used the State of Emergency and the strike as part of 
their plan "to bring down this University" (VC's Statement, 
29/9/71:4). 
Webb's report showed that, with the exception of the 
Faculty Boards of Arts eund Science, the spirit of the 
Professorial Board's recommendations had generally been 
implemented. However both of these Faculty Boards had once 
again refused to limit their size and had also refused to 
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include any external representatives. The Arts Faculty Board 
now had 178 members (an increase of 45 since October 1970) and 
the Science Faculty Board now had 150 members (DVC(Ac) Paper, 
Revised Faculty Board Structures, July 1971). Arts extended 
membership to all members of the teaching staff of the rank of 
senior tutor and above in any department with substantial 
teaching responsibilities in the Faculty and Science allowed 
membership of any person with the status of lecturer eund above 
in a department listed in the Faculty handbook. On the other 
hand, the Faculty Board of Engineering with a membership of 
seventy eight had interpreted the Professorial Board's 
recommendations so as to give automatic membership of all 
professors eund readers while limiting senior lecturers eund 
lecturers to half of their respective number to be elected 
annually at departmental staff meetings. The Faculty Board of 
Law had reiterated its wish to have three Senate members but 
this had been over-ruled by the Professorial Board eund the 
Senate earlier in 1971. 
While a comparison of the size of faculty boards in 
July 1971 with July 1969 shows that all boards with the 
exception of Agriculture and Commerce/Economics increased in 
size, the increases were relatively small, reflecting mainly 
the broader representation sought by the Webb Committee of all 
grades of academic staff and students. Six faculty boards 
comprised fewer than sixty members in July 1971, the same as 
two years earlier. The Professorial Board accepted Webb's 
advice that in view of the pressure for increased 
participation in decision-making by all levels of staff and 
students at that time, no purpose would be served by pressing 
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the Faculty Boards of Arts and Science to act on the 
Professorial Board's recommendations. 
It is appropriate to conclude this chapter by 
acknowledging that the Webb Committee was at least partly 
successful in achieving the immediate objectives that Webb set 
for it. After all the Committee was instrumental in reducing 
external influence on faculty boards eund in enabling 
representatives of junior academic staff eund students to 
participate in academic decision-meJcing. The rejection of any 
limit on the size of faculty boards made room for the 
representation of all levels of staff and students and in that 
sense was a triumph for the principles of democracy and 
collegiality. However it achieved this outcome at the cost of 
perpetuating eun inefficient decision-making system in the case 
of the large faculties. 
But inefficiencies were not just confined to large 
faculty boards. Indeed the Committee's preoccupation with the 
issues of faculty representation and Professorial Board power 
blinded it to the need to address major structural problems 
associated with the functions of faculty boards. For example 
no consideration was given to overcoming the inefficiencies 
inherent in small faculties dominated by one department. This 
arrangement enabled some staff to use faculty board meetings 
to duplicate eund "second guess" departmental decision-making 
without being subject to the discipline of having to contend 
with inputs from other departments. Even more serious was the 
Committee's failure to appreciate fully the significance of 
poor coordination on the University's performance. In this 
connection, the abortive attempt to create joint Senate-
Professorial Board committees reflected the Board's ambition 
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to extend its sphere of influence in determining the nature 
and extent of future academic developments. This failed to 
anticipate the emerging influence of the Central Executive in 
that domain. By not addressing the crucial question of how to 
coordinate academic and resource decision-med?.ing more 
effectively at the faculty board level, the Committee allowed 
room for the Central Executive to make the running through 
enhanced "top down" control. This outcome was of decisive 
importance in the subsequent development of middle meuneigement 
coordinating structures in lieu of improved "bottom up" 
integration at the department/faculty levels. 
The policy process was characterised by bargaining and 
compromise, as the objective of smaller faculty boards for the 
sake of efficiency was traded-off against the perception that 
large faculty boards were needed to provide scope for wide 
representation. Compromise was also exhibited by the Senate 
in its rejection of the notion of joint Senate-Professorial 
Board committees. By allowing the Professorial Board to 
comment on the minutes of certain Senate committees, the 
Senate was able for the time being to maintain substantive 
control over decision-maleing while at the same time giving 
some symbolic recognition to the Board's pretensions. The 
process of apparent compromise was invariably distorted by 
self-interested groups seeking to manipulate their environment 
so that the costs of reform were borne primarily by others 
while the benefits of reform were enjoyed by themselves. For 
instsunce the action of those professors who were able to 
persuade the Board to place no limit on the size of the 
faculty boards was carried out under the veil of democracy but 
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the hidden agenda was their concern that a limit on the size 
of faculty boards might result in some of their number being 
excluded from membership. There was after all concern, 
especially among the traditionalists on the Professorial 
Board, that some faculty boards such as Arts appeared to have 
fallen under the influence of radical junior staff whose 
attitudes suggested that they were hostile to the 
professoriate's traditional authority eund privileges. 
Indeed the Professorial Board's concern to preserve the 
influence of the professoriate against the forces of 
democratisation and to expand the Board's authority in 
relation to the Senate presaged the policy process which was 
to dominate organisational reform for the next five years. It 
is to this phase of the policy process, namely the attempts to 
reform the Professorial Board, that the following two chapters 
are devoted. 
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(;;HAPTER EIGHT 
THE HILL COMMITTEE AND OLiaARCHICAL RESURGENCE ON THE 
PROFERfinRTAL BOARD. 1970-1872 
Since 1938 the Professorial Board had been the senior 
academic body of the University of Queensleund and, as the neune 
implied, its composition was essentially restricted to the 
professoriate. This arreungement was eun outgrowth from the 
period when there were relatively few academic departments and 
when departments were built on the nucleus of a founding 
professor who, traditionally, beceune the head of the 
department (Parker, 1965:18). The department beceune the 
cornerstone of the University eund, while each department had 
only one professor who served as the undisputed head, the need 
for professorial heads of departments to constitute 
collectively a Professorial Board was never in question. 
By 1969 the composition of the Professorial Board was 
perceived as a problem. As mentioned previously, the origins 
of the problem can be traced back in part to 1 January 1960 
when the University began to appoint second professors in a 
number of departments. This development was occurring at the 
same time as some departments which were still trying to 
establish themselves within the University had no professorial 
heads. Because the University was Queensland's only genuine 
tertiary institution prior to the establishment of the various 
institutes of technology in 1967, it was sometimes called upon 
to offer courses in fields which in other states would 
normally have been offered in the non-university sector. The 
availability of suitable staff to warrant the creation of 
chairs in those subject areas was often a problem. Evolution 
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to separate departmental status was usually under the guidance 
of a reader or senior lecturer and the supervision of separate 
courses leading to awards in such fields was often delegated 
to separate boards of studies which reported to the relevant 
faculty boards. This meant that by 1969, sixteen departments 
were represented on the Professorial Board by a total of forty 
professors whereas six departments which had no professors on 
staff were not represented on the Professorial Board at all. 
It was alleged that this imbalance in representation on the 
Professorial Board contributed to uneven academic development, 
with those departments not represented tending to do less well 
than those departments which enjoyed numerically strong 
representation on the Board. 
However the general relationship between professorial 
eund non-professorial staff in relation to decision-medcing on 
the Professorial Board was not seen as a problem at the 
University of Queensland in the early 1960s. For example 
Professor McElwain's Committee which in 1962 examined ways eund 
means of reducing the meeting load of members of the 
Professorial Board made no mention of the possible role that 
non-professorial staff might have in sharing the decision-
making load beyond the faculty board level (McElwain Report, 
5/11/62:12). The exclusivity of the Professorial Board was 
underlined by the policy of allowing non-professorial heads to 
attend but not vote at meetings of the Board and by the 
decision of the Standing Committee to allow readers appointed 
as acting heads of departments to be designated acting 
professors but to withhold that designation from lecturers and 
senior lecturers who served as acting heads (SCM, 2/10/67). 
In many ways the quality of a university's 
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professoriate is one of the major determinants in the quality 
of the institution. Professors who themselves have achieved 
first class reputations often tend to have an all-pervading 
effect, attracting the most able academic colleagues to their 
department, generating more research funding and fostering 
more interest in quality postgraduate research eund 
scholarship. It is not surprising, therefore, that following 
a period during the 1950s when the University had been 
criticised for parochialism in appointing some local staff to 
chair vacancies on the grounds of experience rather theun 
excellence, the University by 1969 consciously followed a 
policy of seeking to recruit persons who had achieved at least 
a national and desirably eun international reputation for 
excellence in their field. As a measure of the importance 
attached to filling chair vacancies, special Senate selection 
committees were appointed to consider applications and only 
the governing body was authorised to make appointments. This 
procedure compared with the generally less rigorous selection 
procedures followed for appointment to non-professorial 
positions. Whereas it was possible for academic staff to 
apply for and be promoted to senior lecturer and reader 
positions, it was not possible for staff to be promoted to a 
chair except in filling a vacancy or, in exceptional 
circumstances, in receiving appointment to a personal chair. 
There were examples of academic excellence among the 
professoriate of the University of Queensland during the 1960s 
but, according to one participant observer in those years of 
rapid growth and competition for staff, there were also cases 
where the professor was not the outstanding academic in a 
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department and it was necessary: 
... to make do with second-rate academic 
leadership bolstered up by the very high status 
of a professorship (Truman, 1963:6). 
The rapid increase in professorial appointments during the 
1960s (with some departments such as Mathematics having up to 
five chairs) caused quality to be spread more thinly. This 
resulted in some non-professorial staff starting to question 
whether professors were providing the level of academic 
leadership which was supposed to set them apart from their 
non-professorial colleagues. The belief by some staff that 
any former differentiation in quality was now less marked 
coupled with the perception that the professoriate was 
clinging to its exclusive membership of the Professorial Board 
contributed to a loss of goodwill towards the Board and a 
feeling that the legitimacy of its authority was open to 
question. 
It is against this background that it is possible to 
identify a number of factors which by 1969 had contributed to 
raising the issue of the function and composition of the 
Professorial Board from obscurity to political salience. 
Firstly there were widespread demands for the reform of 
university governance by activists around the western world 
including within the University of Queensland. These demands 
although directed more at the departmental and governing body 
levels (as described earlier) nevertheless spilled over to 
agitation for change to the composition of the Professorial 
Board. Members of the Board could not avoid being acutely 
aware of the fact that their oligarchical role was for the 
first time in the University's history under serious 
challenge. Activist staff and students organised sit-in 
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occupations of the J.D. Story Administration Building and 
demonstration rallies. As one participant at the time 
remarked, the University was "awash with pamphlets" demanding 
reform of courses, teaching methods and University decision-
making processes (Interview, D.F. O'Neill, 26/7/84). 
Secondly the Senate's decision taken on 29 July 1969 to 
amend Statute No. 7 to enable deans and heads of departments 
to become members of the Professorial Board even where they 
were not professors was clearly important. It was symbolic in 
that the principle of representation of departmental interests 
was now acknowledged as being at least as important as the 
principle of decision-making by the University's professorial 
elite. 
Thirdly in July and August 1969, the Staff Association 
and the Student Union respectively made submissions to the 
Improvements Committee relating to the governance of the 
University. Both organisations argued for the Professorial 
Board to be reconstituted as an academic board consisting 
primarily of the chairmen of each of the academic departments. 
The approach of the Association and the Union was to argue 
that the major problem in University governance was the 
domination of academic departments by permanent professorial 
heads. If this arrangement could be replaced by a system of 
elected chairmen who would be bound by the decisions of 
departmental committees representing all grades of academic 
staff and students, then the elected chairmen collectively 
could comprise an academic board in lieu of a Professorial 
Board. An academic board so constituted would, the argument 
went, be able to represent faithfully the democratically 
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expressed views of staff and students at all levels (UQSA, IC 
Submission No. 71, July 1969; UQU, IC Submission No. 75, 
August 1969), The Association eund the Union saw the 
achievement of democratically elected chairmen of departments 
in lieu of permeunent professorial heads as the key to 
reforming the composition of the Professorial Board, 
Fourthly the Senate's decision of 13 November 1969 
arising from the Lahey Report that in future no permeunent 
heads of departments would be appointed eund the related 
decision of 8 October 1970 which, by providing for broad 
consultation in the method of appointing heads, increased the 
likelihood of more non-professorial heads being appointed. 
Statute No. 10 (The Academic Departments) did not set out the 
responsibilities of the head since it had been assumed in the 
past that the traditional joint role of professor and head of 
department to provide academic leadership needed no 
explication. However as soon as it was accepted that even in 
departments with more than one professor the headship might in 
future be assigned to a member of the non-professorial staff, 
the status differentiation previously enjoyed by the 
professoriate became less legitimate since the decision 
effectively meant that non-professorial staff were regarded as 
being quite capable of providing academic leadership, even 
to professors. 
Fifthly the Professorial Board would become unduly 
large eund cumbersome if the professoriate retained de jure 
membership and there was in addition a high proportion of non-
professorial heads of departments in the future. This 
unwieldiness would be exacerbated by the fact that the 
University was planning a significant increase in the number 
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of chairs eund some increase in the number of departments. 
There was some concern among Board members that the 
University's recent decision to appoint two Deputy Vice-
Cheuncellors and the establishment of a Vice-Chancellor's 
Pleunning Committee bore testimony to the failure of the 
Professorial Board with its present unwieldy form and limited 
powers of coordination to provide coherent policy advice to 
the Senate (Interview, R.W. Parsons, 3/8/84). As Parker has 
noted, to the extent that the Professorial Board became more 
cumbersome eund less effective, there was a strong tendency for 
influence to shift into the hands of University administrators 
(1965:17). 
Sixthly the Webb Committee reform of the faculty board 
structure to allow for greater representation of junior 
academic staff and students was perceived by some opinion 
leaders within the University as having been successful to the 
extent that the wider participation had not hindered and 
indeed had improved the quality of decision-making at the 
faculty board level (Interview, J.G. Atherton, 30/7/84). This 
was posited as evidence that large, representative bodies were 
not necessarily inefficient at decision-making. The view was 
put that the principles of participation adopted in respect of 
faculty boards should logically be extended to the 
Professorial Board. 
It can be seen that, after decades of professorial 
domination of the academic departments and providing advice to 
the Senate on academic matters, the pressures for reform in 
1969 and 1970 had produced eun identity crisis for the Board. 
After all, the Board had pretensions to a far greater say in 
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University policy making as reflected by its ready acceptance 
of the Webb Conunittee's recommendations for a number of key 
committees of the Senate to become joint committees of the 
Senate and Professorial Board and by its resentment over being 
excluded from the eunnual budgeting eund triennial planning 
process. Some members claimed that any widening of the right 
to participate on the Professorial Board would open up the 
Board to the intrusion of partiseun interests eund radical 
viewpoints that would not reflect the corporate spirit of the 
University. This would cause the credibility of the Board as 
a source of mature advice to the Senate to be called into 
question and would weaken euny claims for greater participation 
in University policy making (Interviews, R.C. Gates, 1/8/84; 
L.E. Lyons, 2/8/84). At the same time if it was no longer 
necessary for heads of departments to be professors eund if 
representation of heads of departments on the Professorial 
Board was at least as important as ex officio professorial 
membership, the role of the professor in the University and 
the role of the Professorial Board no longer enjoyed the same 
degree of certitude as they had prior to 1969. 
The pressure for reform starting to gather momentum was 
initially insufficient to overcome the inertia that had 
preserved the status quo for several decades.(1) The trigger 
which actually precipitated action was the Webb Committee's 
(1) Despite the Webb Committee's terms of reference 
empowering it to review the Statute governing the 
Professorial Board, the Committee's rather 
pusillanimous response in August 1969 had been limited 
to merely drawing the Board's attention to the fact 
that its size and lack of representation from non-
professorial staff might make it vulnerable to 
criticism in the light of the Committee's 
recommendations calling for wider participation on 
faculty boards (Webb Report, 18/8/69:18). 
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half-hearted examination of Statute No. 7 in June and July 
1969 where it was agreed that consideration ought to be given 
to amending the Statute in order to correct a number of 
routine machinery-type eunomalies such as the date of election 
of the President and Deputy President of the Board (Webb 
Committee, Minutes, 18/6/69:1; 1/7/69:1). During the course 
of its examination of this matter the Standing Committee 
queried why it was that the election by the Professorial Board 
of its President was subject to approval by the Senate and it 
was agreed that an amendment to the Statute be prepared to 
give the Board unrestricted power to appoint its own President 
(SCM, 18/8/69:3). 
It is significant that the Standing Conamittee's 
review of Statute No. 7 confined itself to only those 
machinery matters referred to it from the Webb Committee. At 
that time the Steunding Committee's membership included two 
influential professors (R.C. Gates eund L.E. Lyons) who were 
strenuously opposed to any change in the composition of the 
Professorial Board. It is reasonable to conclude that the 
Standing Committee felt that the July 1969 extension of the 
Board's membership to include non-professorial heads of 
departments had gone far enough. Thus the revised Statute 
approved by the Board on 28 September 1970 merely embodied the 
changes in the Board's composition approved in July 1969 
together with the provision for the Board to appoint its own 
President. 
However, in the context of the Professorial Board's 
examination of Statute No. 7, the view was expressed that as 
there had been recent major reforms within the University at 
the departmental and faculty board levels and having regard to 
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the problems of communications in a large University from the 
senior academic body to and from other levels of the academic 
structure, there was a need to examine the composition of the 
Professorial Board itself. The Board resolved therefore: 
That a committee be constituted to consider 
whether the composition of the Professorial 
Board is appropriate as set out in (section) 
(2) of the draft new statute bearing in mind 
that the Professorial Board is the senior 
academic body in the University 
(PBM,28/9/70:19). (2) 
Webb had resigned as President of the Professorial 
Board in September 1970 following his appointment as the 
University's foundation Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) eund 
his place as President was taken by the permanent Dean of the 
Faculty of Medicine, Professor Eric Saint. Saint was a 
liberal academic whose faith in the benefits of increased 
participation by junior staff and students in decision-making 
had been borne out by the positive experience within the 
Faculty of Medicine during 1970. Saint had a reputation for 
being flexible eund conciliatory in seeking to reach consensus 
through discussion rather than confrontation. At the 
Professorial Board meeting on 4 November 1970, Saint drew 
attention to the fact that recent changes at the departmental 
and faculty levels had undermined the credibility of equating 
the attainment of a chair with some specially conferred 
capacity or ability to accept responsibility for decision-
(2) The concern expressed at that meeting of the Board was 
echoed by some of the more attentive members of the 
University community. For example the Board of the 
Faculty of Veterinary Science adopted Mr. J.A. 
Springhall's motion that the Professorial Board should 
be replaced by an academic board that was smaller in 
size than the present Professorial Board but more 
representative of academic staff (FBVSM, 14/10/70:12). 
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making (PBM, 4/11/70:9). 
Saint had consulted with Webb in proposing that the 
d^ hoc Committee to review the composition of the Board 
should comprise the following membership - Professor E.G. 
Saint (chairman); Professor J. Francis, Head of Department of 
Veterinary Preventive Medicine; Professor J.C. Mahoney, Head 
of Department of French; Professor C.A. Hughes, Head of 
Department of Government; Mr. M.P. O'Donnell, Senior 
Lecturer, Department of Mathematics; Professor R.D. Milns, 
Head of Department of Classics; Professor D.P. Singhal, 
Professor of History; Mr. F.D.O. Fielding, University 
Librarian and Mr. J.A. Springhall, Senior Lecturer, Department 
of Animal Husbandry (PBM, 4/11/70:9). 
Freuncis was regarded as a very conservative figure who 
was concerned to ensure that the Professorial Board should 
continue as a body composed mainly of the professoriate. He 
had written to the Registrar expressing concern that the 
University of Queensland should be careful that the proposed 
reforms to departmental headships did not end up malcing the 
University unattractive to the most able and distinguished 
people (Corres., J. Francis to Reg., 8/9/70). He felt that if 
the privileges of permanent headships and ex officio seats 
on the Professorial Board were to become available to persons 
who had not achieved professorial status, then there was little 
left to distinguish professors from other staff. In the 
longer term this would have an adverse effect on the 
University's quality and reputation. 
Hughes had been the person who, prior to his departure 
on study leave in 1969, had advocated the establishment of a 
committee to review the Professorial Board and its committee 
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structure. He had also been coopted on 7 February 1966 to the 
committee appointed by the Professorial Board in 1966 to 
review its functions and committee structure. Hughes was a 
person with eun academic interest in the structure and 
processes of government and was open to the idea of reform as 
evidenced by the fact that his Department of Government was 
one of the few identified by Webb in 1969 as having a formal 
mechanism for consultation between staff and students. 
O'Donnell was a person with a deep conviction on the 
virtue of collegial decision-medcing by elected staff and 
student representatives eund was known to be an admirer of the 
collegial systems of governance adopted at the Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge. O'Donnell was eun attentive observer of 
the University's attempts to reform its structure and 
processes of governance at all levels during the early 1970s; 
his appointment as a nominee of the Staff Association on the 
Improvements Committee in 1971 and his election to the Staff 
Association Executive Committee in 1974 recognised his 
interest in eund knowledge of such matters. 
Singhal was an elitist who enjoyed an international 
reputation as a scholar in the field of Indian History. 
Despite his accomplishments, he had suffered under the 
authoritarian rule of a permanent head whom some academic 
staff believed monopolised the department's research budget 
and who had made it known that he had no intention of stepping 
down as permanent head even in favour of the second professor. 
Singhal was anxious to ensure that second professors such as 
himself who were not heads of departments retained their seats 
on the Professorial Board. He was not especially sympathetic 
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to the claims of non-professorial staff for representation on 
the Board. 
Fielding was philosophically committed to the idea of 
democratic participation by academic staff at all levels on 
the Professorial Board. As Vice President eund President of 
the Staff Association in 1969 and 1970-1971 respectively, he 
had been influential in developing the Association's policy on 
University governance. Fielding was widely respected within 
the University community for his concern for the legitimate 
rights of individuals and as a member of the University's 
Anti-Censorship Group in the late 1960s out of which grew the 
Queensland Council for Civil Liberties, he was sensitive to 
the need to oppose situations where institutionalised power 
was used in an irrational eund illegitimate manner to fetter 
individual freedom. As the only non-academic member of the 
Professorial Board, Fielding had a somewhat jaundiced view of 
that body, especially its belief that the professoriate should 
be able to advise the Senate on academic and non-academic 
matters alike on the grounds that all latter activities were 
merely support services.(3) 
Springhall's presence on the Committee was largely due 
to his recent advocacy on the Board of the Faculty of 
Veterinary Science for the replacement of the large 
Professorial Board with a smaller more representative academic 
board. 
Of the nine members of the Committee, six could be 
regarded as being sympathetic to the need to reform the 
(3) A second non-academic administrator, Mr. J.E. Ritchie, 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) became a 
member of the Professorial Board following his 
appointment to the University on 1 February 1971. 
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Professorial Board.(4) There is little doubt that Saint and 
Webb had a very clear perception of the need for a more 
representative Professorial Board and Vice-Chancellor Cowen 
had quickly come to the conclusion that the Board was "a very 
large and somewhat unwieldy institution" (VC's Report to 
Convocation, 1970:9-10). The composition of the Committee 
reflected the views of those key actors. 
Pfeffer has suggested that choices can be influenced by 
key actors in the policy process who are able to control the 
decision premises. By articulating the goals, values and the 
constraints which impinge on the policy decision, key actors 
are able to define "reality" and in so doing restrict the 
range of policy alternatives considered (1981:115-135). As 
chairman of the Committee, Saint sought to do this in eun "aide 
memoire" sent to members of the Committee five days after the 
Committee had been constituted and before the first meeting. 
Saint defined the problem essentially in terms of the natural 
growth of the Board which he estimated might reach 150 members 
within five years with its existing composition. With the 
clear premise that a Professorial Board of 150 members would 
be unworkably large. Saint raised a number of leading 
questions: 
o Should the Board continue to grow at that rate? 
o Would large multi-professorial departments gain an 
undue advanteige? 
o Could such a large body make sound decisions speedily? 
o Should there be non-professorial representation? 
(4) Biographical data on Mahoney and Milns have been 
supplied in earlier chapters and will not be repeated 
here. 
249 
o And finally, if there was to be some restriction on the 
size of the Board, what electoral procedures should be 
contemplated?(Memo, E.G.Saint to Hill Committee, 
9/11/70) 
However Saint's strategic position from which to give 
direction ended on 30 November 1970 with his decision to 
withdraw his nomination as President for 1971. This decision 
was tedcen when it became clear that a significeunt minority on 
the Professorial Board felt that it was inappropriate for a 
full-time appointed administrative officer such as the Dean of 
Medicine to hold simulteuneously the elected senior academic 
position in the University (PBM, 30/11/70:13). Saint's 
replacement as President for 1971 and as chairmeun of the 
Committee to consider the composition of the Professorial 
Board was Research Professor Dorothy Hill. Hill's appointment 
was significant because it was an attempt by the Board to 
restore its prestige. Some concern had been expressed that 
during the 1969-1970 period the wave of democratisation that 
had affected departments and faculties might now engulf the 
Professorial Board. It was hoped that by the Board electing 
its most distinguished professor as President, the focus would 
be on the fitness of the Board's existing composition to make 
decisions on sound academic grounds thereby "spiking the guns" 
of the proponents seeking radical change. 
Saint remained on the Committee and before standing 
down as chairman he wrote to all fifteen Australian 
universities requesting information on the composition of 
their senior academic bodies. The information gathered, which 
was supplemented by a similar survey undertaken by the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee in 1971, revealed 
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considerable variation in the sizes of the various senior 
academic bodies.(6) 
Saint's eunalysis of the data was that two patterns had 
emerged - firstly a tendency to depart from the traditional 
professorial board structure and to create an academic board 
which consisted of a smaller group such as the heads of 
schools eund deans and secondly, the preservation of the 
traditional pattern of a large professorial board but with 
small, powerful executive committees to do much of the 
detailed work that large bodies were capable of doing only 
with great difficulty. Saint highlighted the fact that an 
"important principle" that had emerged was that in some 
universities, non-professorial staff and students were 
represented on the senior academic body (Hill Committee, 
Minutes, 2/2/71:1). While that comment might have been valid 
in respect of non-professorial staff, the data showed that 
student representation on such bodies in 1971 was very much 
the exception than the rule. 
(5) Notwithstanding this variation, certain patterns were 
more common than others. For example a majority of 
universities provided for the professoriate to have 
ex officio membership and hence the size of their 
senior academic bodies tended to be large, sometimes 
exceeding 100. However in the case of the newer 
universities, there was often no explicit provision for 
ex-officio professorial membership and partly as a 
consequence of that, the size of their senior academic 
bodies tended to be less than twenty five. Almost all 
of the universities made provision for heads of 
departments to be members of the senior academic body 
either explicitly or by their practice of appointing 
professorial heads. Less than half of the universities 
expressly allowed for representation of non-
professorial staff. Moreover only one university 
enabled student representation although another 
university allowed student "observers" to attend 
meetings (AVCC, Constitutions of Professorial Boards, 
11/5/71). 
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The Hill Committee met nine times from 2 February 1971 
to 28 October 1971 in the course of preparing its report. The 
first three meetings of the Committee were characterised for 
the most part with a clear division between a majority 
(usually six members wanting eun academic board with 
representation to include non-professorial staff eund students) 
and a minority of two weunting to preserve essentially the 
existing Professorial Board structure. From the outset Hill 
sought to apply a rational-scientific approach to the policy 
problem by trying to get the Committee to clarify what the 
Board's functions were on the basis that the Board's 
composition should follow logically from its functions (Hill 
Committee, Minutes, 2/2/71:2). This was the feuniliar "form 
follows function" principle of management science and its 
introduction was an attempt to elevate the discussion to the 
clinical, ostensibly neutral world of objective analysis.(6) 
It was made very clear by non-professorial members of 
the Hill Committee that they saw the policy problem in terms 
of insufficient representation of non-professorial staff and 
students and that this, rather than some theoretical 
abstraction about the supposed link between function eund 
composition, should be addressed first. Their view was that 
irrespective of the functions of the Board it was clear that 
(6) Wildavsky has drawn attention to the problems inherent 
in this sort of approach, trying to impose a purely 
intellectual mode of analysis on policy problems 
without recognising their political dimension. Where 
account is taken of the political dimension, solutions 
are found by a process of discovering preferences 
largely through the interaction of the participants in 
the policy process instead of relying solely on 
"intellectual cogitation" where preferences are assumed 
to be embedded in objective fact and, therefore, not 
subject to bargaining and negotiation (1979:121-129). 
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the majority of the University community wanted "substantial" 
representation of non-professorial staff and students on the 
Board. On the other hand conservative members of the 
Committee weunted all professors to retain their membership of 
the Board. The result of these positions was that there was 
early agreement that it was more importeunt to have adequate 
representation on eun enlarged body than having a small Board 
in the belief that a small body was more efficient at 
decision-making theun a large one (Hill Committee, Minutes, 
2/2/71:2-3). By the second meeting, despite Meihoney's 
argument that the Committee should examine the variety of ways 
that non-professorial staff could be heard without the need to 
alter the Board's composition, the discussion had moved more 
towards support for the establishment of an academic board 
composed of the existing members of the Professorial Board but 
including representatives of non-professorial staff and 
students (Hill Committee, Minutes, 12/2/71:2). 
Saint was unable to attend the Committee's third 
meeting but his letter to Hill conveying his apologies 
contained a clear exposition of his support for the 
establishment of a large academic board comprising the 
existing members of the Professorial Board plus non-
professorial representation in the proportion of 20% of the 
membership, together with limited student representation. 
Saint conceded that this larger body would require more formal 
rules of debate and a more efficient committee system to 
facilitate decision-making (Corres., E.G. Saint to D. Hill, 
22/3/71). Fielding had also written drawing attention to the 
Staff Association's "vital interest" in the Committee's work 
and requesting that the Association be consulted before any 
253 
action was taken to alter the existing arrangements (Corres., 
F.D.O. Fielding to Reg. 18/3/71). The Committee agreed that 
the Professorial Board should not debate the Committee's 
report until the Association had commented on it. 
It was at this meeting that the Committee resorted to 
the "straw vote" method of crystallising opinion on 
contentious issues and by this process it emerged that the 
Committee did not wish to constrain itself by some arbitrary 
limit on the Board's size; by a vote of 6 to 2, there was 
support for the "principle" of adding non-professorial staff. 
With regard to ex officio professorial membership it was 
argued that professors who were not heads of departments were 
especially useful members because their lack of administrative 
commitment allowed them to be unbiased. At the seune time 
protagonists for a more democratic composition claimed that 
the professoriate should not be treated as a privileged group 
that was separate from other academics. The "straw vote" 
outcome of this difference of opinion was that for the first 
time, the safe option of merely enlarging the existing 
Professorial Board broke down with five members opposing 
automatic professorial membership and three supporting it 
(Hill Committee, Minutes, 26/3/71:2-3). 
Hill realised that the direction of the Committee's 
thinking would be unacceptable to her colleagues on the Board 
and at the next meeting she and a number of supporters argued 
the case for a large board which included all of the 
professoriate (Interview, D. Hill, 27/7/84). It was pointed 
out that because of the historical tradition of many older 
universities, including the University of Queensland, it would 
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create great resentment if some professors were suddenly 
disfranchised as a result of the Committee's recommendations. 
However despite Mahoney and Francis' advocacy for 
f.y, officio membership of the professoriate, the Committee 
was not prepared at that stage to accept that as an immutable 
position and a "straw vote" was only able to eigree that the 
Committee was opposed in principle to the concept of a small, 
narrowly representative board (Hill Committee, Minutes, 
22/4/71:1). A majority of members on the Committee was more 
interested in breaking new ground and addressing the question 
of extending membership to include non-professorial staff and 
students. 
Bailey has drawn attention to the way individuals in 
debating issues as members of large "front stage arena" type 
bodies such as professorial boards often show a propensity to 
stand on principle and to play to an audience. However the 
same individuals are often prepared to bargain and to 
compromise their principles in the interest of reaching some 
consensus in the "back steige" privacy of a small committee: 
Up front is a daylight world based on ... the 
principle of rational endeavour. But because 
principles may conflict and because the 
conflict ceunnot be resolved by reason, there is 
behind a twilight world where principles are 
compromised in the interest of getting 
something done, ...(1977:121). 
Against a background of strong advocacy from a majority of 
members in support of the concept of a substantial non-
professorial staff representation and the trade-off position 
that if this was allowed there would be no objection to a 
continuation of automatic professorial membership, there was 
unanimous agreement in a "straw vote" that the Board add 
thirty elected members of the non-professorial academic staff 
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(lecturer and above) to its membership. Having taken a "straw 
vote" in support of non-professorial staff representation, the 
Committee unanimously agreed that the Board's composition 
should also be extended to include five undergraduate and two 
postgraduate students (Hill Committee, Minutes, 22/4/71:1-2). 
Hill attended a meeting of chairmen of senior 
academic bodies of Australian universities at Macquarie 
University on 18 May 1971. She took some comfort from the 
fact that a number of other universities were moving in the 
direction of providing for non-professorial membership, but at 
the meeting of her Committee on 4 June 1971, she indicated 
concern that the proposal to add seven students to Queensland 
University's Professorial Board was comparatively excessive. 
Hill had been influenced by the fact that all of the other 
universities, with the exception of the Australian National 
University and Flinders, believed that the recent student 
troubles made it a most inopportune time to allow student 
representation on the senior academic body. Hill was worried 
that with students on the Professorial Board there might be 
breaches of confidentiality; she was also concerned that they 
would have insufficient experience to make a meaningful 
contribution. Their presence might even inhibit senior 
members from participating fully and result in decisions being 
made outside of Board meetings (Hill Committee, Minutes, 
4/6/71:1). 
However a majority of the Committee defended the 
proposal as a logical extension of the University's decision 
taken in 1969 to allow student representation on faculty 
boards. At a more pragmatic level, the Committee argued that 
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the admission of students to the membership of the Board would 
be a "positive tactical move" in a symbolic sense. In any 
event it was felt that the "nuances of debate would probably 
be missed by undergraduates" but that, after all, the 
decisions taken by the Board did affect students and there was 
even the possibility that "their unprejudiced fresh outlook 
could be helpful" (Hill Committee, Minutes, 4/6/71:1-2). With 
some reservations, the Committee reaffirmed its support in 
principle for student representation. 
Notwithsteunding the knowledge of preferences gained 
from no less than eleven "straw votes" which appeared to 
favour an enlarged Professorial Board with non-professorial 
academic staff eund student representation, there were still 
major divisions on the Committee. At its fifth meeting the 
Committee stepped up the process of discovering preferences as 
it proceeded. Without having addressed the issue of the 
Board's functions (the matter which had been raised by Hill at 
the first meeting as being importeunt to settle before 
finalising the question of composition) the Committee resolved 
that the preparation of the draft report should commence. 
Saint was given the task of developing a set of principles to 
underlie the yet unresolved questions of function eund 
composition; Hughes and Hill were asked to develop the case 
for a small and large board respectively. 
In order to contain the range of policy preferences 
considered in the preparation of the draft report, the 
Committee resolved to avoid introducing "outside viewpoints" 
at this steige (Hill Committee, Minutes, 4/6/71:2). This 
resolution needs to be seen in the context that the 
Committee's deliberations had relied almost entirely on the 
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views of its members supplemented by data on the situation in 
other Australian universities. The Committee had not sought 
or received submissions from any group within the University 
such as the Staff Association or the Student Union and no 
survey of the wider University community's opinions on the 
composition of the Professorial Board had been undertaken. 
Moreover, although the Improvements Committee had received 
submissions which raised the question of reforming the 
Professorial Board, the Hill Committee had not initiated any 
action to obtain access to those submissions. 
At the Committee's sixth meeting, consideration was 
given to the question of the function of the senior academic 
body and how this might be related to its composition and 
committee structure. However the application of this 
"rational" organisational theory form of analysis to the 
papers prepared by Saint, Hughes and Hill failed to 
crystallise opinion on the Committee (Hill Committee, Minutes, 
5/7/71:1-2), It could be argued that the Committee was 
handicapped from the beginning by what Shonfield has called 
the "pragmatic fallacy" - the trap fallen into by many 
committees which plunge straight into their work without 
seeking first to inform their discussions by coming to terms 
with the relevant body of theory (1980:59). It is more 
realistic to suggest, however, that the application of the 
somewhat tenuous theoretical connections between 
organisational strvjctures and decision-making quality would 
have had little direct impact in their own right. After all 
the main purpose of invoking ostensibly rational decision-
making criteria at this late stage in the policy process was 
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political - to provide an elegant rationalisation for 
preferred policy outcomes. Such criteria were tools in the 
exercise of political power. 
Because the Committee remained divided it was agreed 
that four alternatives had to be considered in drafting the 
report, ranging from a smaller board to a larger board and 
including the option of retaining the existing Professorial 
Board. While still seeking to clarify the Committee's views 
on a range of options it was apparent that the Committee, at 
least implicitly, was continuing to favour the concept of a 
larger board assisted by a more specialised committee system. 
Thus Hughes eund Saint were requested to collaborate in 
producing a committee structure that could facilitate 
decision-making for a large board eund O'Donnell was asked to 
investigate the establishment of electoral constituencies 
which would enable thirty non-professorial staff to be elected 
(Hill Committee, Minutes, 6/7/71:2). 
The Improvements Committee had been conscious of the 
remarkably closed nature of the Hill Committee's deliberations 
given that it was common knowledge that a number of 
submissions to the Improvements Committee from members of the 
University community had been critical of the Professorial 
Board's composition. Given the Hill Committee's hesitation to 
seek outside opinion, the Improvements Committee questioned 
whether the Professorial Board was capable of examining its 
own composition objectively. In view of the circumstances, 
the Improvements Committee felt that the best course of action 
would be to transmit the six relevant submissions to the Hill 
Committee with the suggestion that the authors be invited to 
appear before the Committee (ICM, 24/8/71; 14/9/71). Those 
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submissions included ones from the Staff Association and 
Student Union but the Hill Committee felt that, with the 
exception of the Union, nothing would be gained by 
interviewing the other authors because the points raised had 
already been considered. The Committee resolved to invite the 
President of the Student Union to meet with members because to 
the Committee's surprise, the Union sought only for its 
President to be made a member of the Board (Hill Committee, 
Minutes, 14/9/71:1). 
The Hill Committee noted O'Donnell's papers on non-
professorial staff and student representation eund, despite 
Mahoney's opposition to the concept of elected members on the 
Board, a majority favoured the franchise being extended to 
include senior tutors (Hill Committee, Minutes, 14/9/71:2).(7) 
By now the Committee's views on the desirability of having a 
large more representative academic board had become firmer eund 
the practicability of those views was given substance by 
Hughes and Saint's submission on the establishment of a new 
committee system which would enable a larger board to work 
effectively. The Committee also accepted their recommendation 
that the senior academic body be represented on five Senate 
Committees - Academic, Finance, Buildings and Grounds, 
Legislative and Library (Hill Committee, Minutes, 14/9/71:3). 
Without waiting to interview the President of the 
Student Union first, the Committee agreed that Hill, Hughes 
and Saint should collaborate in the preparation of a draft 
(7) This was a significant breakthrough given the antipathy 
which existed between some members of the professoriate 
and some junior academic staff members due to the 
letter's high profile involvement in the vanguard of the 
University's radical movement. 
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preliminary report. At the Committee's eighth meeting the 
Student Union President (Mr. David Luck), in a remarkable 
display of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, 
indicated that whereas it was possible for the full-time 
President to attend meetings of the Board it would not be 
practicable to expect students to attend lengthy meetings 
regularly because of their other commitments. In the light of 
these views, the Committee withdrew its draft provision for 
seven students to be represented on the Board and substituted 
instead the President and President-elect of the Union as 
ex officio members (Hill Committee, Minutes, 7/10/71:3-6). 
A revised draft, incorporating these eunendments was 
considered on 28 October 1971 at what was to be the 
Committee's ninth eund final meeting before submitting the 
report to the Professorial Board. The final report 
recommended, inter alia, that: 
o the neune of the Professorial Board be cheunged to 
Academic Board; 
o the Board widen its membership by the addition of 
thirty non-professorial staff down to senior tutor 
status elected by faculty electorates; 
o the President and President-elect of the Student Union 
be ex officio members of the Board; 
0 two new Board committees be established, namely, a 
Higher Degrees Committee which would teike over the 
administration of PhD degrees from the Education 
Committee and a Promotions and Reappointments Committee 
which would take over the Steunding Committee's 
responsibilities for academic promotions thereby 
enabling the latter to play a larger role in planning; 
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o the Board be represented on the five Senate Committees 
referred to earlier (Hill Report, October 1971). 
Hill had discussed the Committee's recommendations with 
Cowen who was somewhat apprehensive as to what the 
Professorial Board's reaction would be regarding the proposed 
changes to the Board's composition. He was content, however, 
for the matter to be resolved through debate on the Board 
(Interview, D. Hill, 27/7/84). Even though the Hill Committee 
felt that the report should be referred by the Professorial 
Board to the Staff Association, Student Union eund Improvements 
Committee for comment, the report was written very much to 
persuade what was expected to be a sceptical Board. 
Notwithsteunding the fact that the reconunendations envisaged 
the seventy eight professors retaining 100% representation and 
716 non-professorial staff being limited to 4.2% 
representation, the addition of thirty such staff 
(approximately 32% of the current Board's membership) was, in 
absolute if not relative terms, much more theun a marginal, 
incremental adjustment. 
Pfeffer has suggested that contentious issues are often 
steered through the policy process by resort to symbolic 
rhetoric: 
Political language helps to not only legitimate 
the decisions reached, but also to give those 
that have fared less well in the decision 
process beliefs about the process and its 
results which produce a commitment to the 
decisions and support of the organizational 
political process (1981:205). 
Thus the report stated that the "most compelling, all-
embracing argument" for the proposed reforms: 
... is the view that as a body of teachers we 
comprise one society, one which shares a common 
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purpose; in the discussion and administration 
of our academic affairs, therefore, we should 
share our responsibility not only at 
departmental and faculty level, but at the 
higher level of government (Hill Report, 
October 1971:9). 
It concluded with the soothing reassurcunce that: 
... much of what has been proposed follows on, 
logically and inevitably, from decisions 
already taken: decisions to add second and 
subsequent professors from the one Department, 
to admit non-professorial deans and heads of 
departments, to make it easier for junior staff 
to join Faculty Boards eund to add students to 
the Faculty Boards (Hill Report, October 
1971:15). 
In summary the fifteen page report was drafted in a persuasive 
style which argued inexorably in favour of the recommendations 
but which, not surprisingly, conveyed little of the confusion 
and division that characterised much of the Committee's 
deliberations. Mahoney had opposed to the end the concept of 
an academic board with elected non-professorial representation 
but finally decided not to submit a minority report. On the 
other hand O'Donnell, while subscribing to the report in 
general, set out his reservations in an appendix.(8) 
The report was considered by the Professorial Board at 
a special meeting convened for the purpose on 11 February 
1972. Despite the report's persuasive tone, there were a 
number of members who were unconvinced by the radical nature 
of the proposals. With two of the Board's most able defenders 
of the status quo effectively "nobbled" by their subscription 
to the Hill Report and in view of the lack of time for the 
other conservatives to mount a coherent opposition to the 
(8) O'Donnell argued that the new board should contain at 
least fifty elected non-professorial members and that 
student membership should be in line with the 5% 
formula suggested by the Senate for faculty boards 
(Hill Report, October 1971, Appendix II). 
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proposals, the main strategy at the meeting was to prevent a 
final decision being taken before the issues raised had been 
fully canvassed. Thus it was suggested that consideration 
should be deferred until the Senate Committee which was at 
that time reviewing the University Act had finalised its 
recommendations concerning the related matter of the Senate's 
composition. Following a lively discussion, it was finally 
agreed that the report should be referred back to the Hill 
Committee for further consideration in the light of the 
alleged eunbiguity and uncertainty surrounding the Board's 
optimal size with the request that eun eunended report be 
submitted to a special meeting of the Board within three 
months. The Board further agreed that the revised report 
should be circulated together with the Board's comments to the 
Staff Association, Student Union and all faculty boards for 
comment before a recommendation was made to the Senate (PBM, 
11/2/72:1-3). 
O'Donnell had travelled to Britain on study leave 
during 1972. On receiving news that the Professorial Board 
had requested the Hill Committee to provide further advice, he 
wrote from Oxford supplying considerable data on current 
British practice, highlighting the trend towards senior 
academic bodies where professors were no longer members as of 
right and where non-professorial staff and students were 
allowed substantial representation (Corres., M.P. O'Donnell 
to D. Hill, 30/4/72). However O'Donnell's correspondence 
missed the meeting of the Hill Committee reconvened on 26 
April 1972 to review the advantages and disadvanteiges of 
different sized bodies, as requested by the meeting of the 
Board. 
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The Committee concluded that a small board would 
concentrate power in too few hands whereas representation of 
all heads of departments eund deeuns would meeun that the minimum 
membership would be at least seventy four. Once a membership 
of that order was contemplated it was not worth the political 
cost to deny membership to the other groups recommended by the 
Committee since any of the benefits of a relatively small 
board would be lost once membership exceeded fifty. Indeed as 
the Committee's original report stated, there was no evidence 
that a fifty member board would be more effective theun a board 
of 100 or 150. Accordingly the Committee recommended that the 
Professorial Board adopt the recommendations of the earlier 
report (Hill Conmiittee, Minutes, 26/4/72:2). 
Because the Professorial Board considered the Hill 
Report during the term vacation on 2 June 1972 only forty six 
members were present. The Board agreed (36 votes to 9) with 
the recommendation that it accept a continuation of its 
natural increase in membership but there was heated opposition 
to the proposition that the Board widen its membership by the 
addition of thirty non-professorial staff. Some members 
engaged in filibustering, arguing emotionally that an issue as 
importeunt as the Board's composition should not be decided at 
a meeting where fewer than half of its 101 members were 
present. When the President ruled against a postal ballot 
being held, eun unsuccessful motion of dissent was moved 
against the President's ruling (PBM, 2/6/72:3). An attempt by 
seven members to defer a decision until a later meeting was 
also lost. Some professors were concerned that by allowing 
thirty non-professorial staff to be elected to the Board 
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coupled with the recent decision to allow non-professorial 
heads of departments on the Board, the influence of the 
professoriate would be greatly diminished. Instead of having 
the best decisions made by those most qualified by virtue of 
their academic attainments, such decisions could become the 
playthings of radicals whose electoral success was no 
substitute for academic excellence (Interview, L.E. Lyons, 
2/8/84), 
The Professorial Board at the time prided itself, 
according to the Hill Committee, on its "tradition of 
conservatism" and this stood in sharp contrast to an 
increasingly radical Staff Association (Hill Committee, 
Minutes, 4/6/71:1). Over the 1970-1974 period no professors 
were elected to the Staff Association Executive Committee and 
many professors refused to attend meetings of the Association 
because they felt alienated by what they considered to be a 
"takeover" by the radicals. Some professors objected to the 
way junior staff activists had on earlier occasions used their 
presence as an opportunity to harangue the professoriate as an 
oligarchical relic whose stranglehold over academic decision-
making no longer enjoyed legitimacy (Interview, K.W. Knight, 
16/8/84). (9) Moreover at an extraordinary general meeting of 
the Association on 26 April 1972 it had even been resolved 
that: 
(9) Even Davis' membership of the Executive 
Committee by virtue of his election by the Staff 
Association to the Senate for the 1969-1971 period 
ended with his replacement in 1972 by Mr. F.D.O. 
Fielding as the staff senator. Davis' reluctance to 
stand down as the head of the Department of 
Mathematics damaged his standing within the Staff 
Association whereas Fielding's support for extending 
participation in decision-making at all levels to non 
professorial staff was well known. 
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Consideration should be given to an overhaul of 
the entire structure of University government 
with a view to abolishing the Senate and the 
Professorial Board and substituting for them a 
single governing body with full representation 
of teachers and students (UQSAM, 26/4/72:1). 
Notwithsteunding the Board's anxiety that its "tradition 
of conservatism" and its concentration of oligarchical power 
might be threatened by the proposed democratic reforms, twenty 
seven members voted in favour of the principle that the Board 
should widen its membership by the addition of non-
professorial academic staff down to senior tutor status. 
Fifteen were opposed. This eigreement in principle was 
achieved after it became clear that the addition of thirty 
such staff was seen as excessive whereas twelve such persons 
(one representing each faculty) might be more realistic. With 
an amendment to reduce non-professorial academic staff 
representation to twelve the recommendation was passed, twenty 
five voting in favour with twelve opposed. Some concern was 
expressed that large and small faculties would have 
disproportional representation from that arreungement and the 
Hill Committee was requested to devise eun appropriate method 
of election which would minimise that problem. Only one 
member of the Board opposed the recommendation that the 
President and President-elect of the Student Union become 
ex officio members of the Board eund only six were against 
the name of the Board being changed to Academic Board (PBM, 
2/6/72:3-4). 
Since the 1960s the Board had been seeking to extend 
its influence in advising the Senate especially in relation to 
those areas where the Senate already had its own advisory 
committees. The Board had been rebuffed in August 1969 with 
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its suggestion that a number of Senate committees become joint 
committees of the Senate eund Professorial Board. However at 
the present meeting the Board seized this latest opportunity 
by recommending unanimously that the Senate be requested to 
add members of the Board, in addition to the President, to the 
following committees: 
o Academic Committee - a member of the Education 
Committee; 
o Fineunce Committee - a member of the Standing Committee; 
o Buildings eund Grounds Committee - a member of the Board; 
o Legislative Committee - a member of the Board drawn 
from the Faculty of Law; 
o Library Committee - two members of the Board (PBM, 
2/6/72:6). 
Considerable uncertainty and division gripped the Board 
as a result of this debate eund conservative members were 
successful in having a decision on the circulation of the 
Committee's report eund the Board's comments deferred until the 
next meeting. (10) Private discussions were subsequently held 
among some of the members who had voted against the Hill 
Committee's recommendations. These discussions were initiated 
by the Professor of Physical Chemistry (L.E. Lyons) and the 
Professor of Russian (B. Christa). Lyons was one of perhaps 
seven or eight "hard-line" conservative professors who 
favoured a continuation of automatic professorial membership 
(10) Circulation was to be to the Staff Association, Student 
Union as well as to all faculty boards and there was a 
suggestion that the Improvements Committee should also 
be invited to comment. Conservative members of the 
Board needed time to rally support for their cause and 
delay was the most appropriate tactic to employ in 
these circumstances. 
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of the Professorial Board and who were unshakable in their 
opposition to the concept of elected membership of staff and 
students on the Board. As a former President of the Staff 
Association (1965) and member of the Standing Committee (1970-
1971) Lyons had emerged as a spokesman for those who wanted to 
"hold the line" at the Professorial Board against what was 
perceived as the erosion of the legitimate rights of those 
most qualified to make academic decisions, namely the 
professoriate, by usurpers who had not yet earned that right. 
Christa was a member of the Professorial Board's Education 
Committee and although he did not play as prominent a role as 
Lyons, he was nevertheless concerned that a talceover by 
elected members in an institution that was supposed to be 
concerned with academic excellence would have a deleterious 
effect on educational standards and on the reputation of the 
University. After a period of intense lobbying eunong the 
waiverers on the Board, Lyons eund Christa were confident that 
they would have the numbers to overturn the Board's earlier 
decision to allow elected non-professorial membership. 
Accordingly they gave notice that they would move at the next 
ordinary meeting of the Board that the earlier decision be 
rescinded (PBM, 24/7/72:4-6). 
At the Board meeting on 28 August 1972 the 
supplementary report of the Hill Committee relating to the 
matters referred to it by the Board on 2 June 1972 was 
received. The supplementary report canvassed two forms of 
faculty groupings which could serve as electorates for the 
purpose of electing the twelve non-professorial staff eund the 
Board agreed that the Committee's original and supplementary 
report together with the Board's comments be circulated to the 
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Staff Association, Student Union, the faculty boards and the 
Improvements Committee for comment so that the Board could 
conclude the debate on its composition on 30 October 1972. 
The Staff Association convened an extraordinary general 
meeting on 26 October 1972 which was attended by only thirty 
four members to consider the Executive Committee's 
recommendations. The meeting resolved that the Professorial 
Board be renamed the Aceulemic Board and that professors should 
no longer have automatic membership of that body. The 
Association favoured a composition comprising the Vice-
Cheuncellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellors (ex officio). heads 
of departments, deans of faculties, the University Librarian, 
the President of the Staff Association, plus a number of 
persons (equal to the number of heads of departments) to be 
elected by eund from the academic body together with the 
President and President-elect of the Student Union 
(ex officio) as well as five additional students elected 
by the student body (UQSAM, 26/10/72:1-2). 
The Improvements Committee's meeting on 19 September 
1972 considered that the Professorial Board's proposal that 
non-professorial membership be limited to twelve was "but a 
token gesture". Members felt that the Board should accept a 
continuation in its natural increase in membership as well as 
widen its membership by the addition of thirty non-
professorial staff down to senior tutor status as recommended 
by the Hill Committee. The Improvements Committee also argued 
that in addition to the President eund President-elect of the 
Student Union there should also be eun additional two members 
appointed from the Union Council (ICM, 19/9/72:6-7). 
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Ten of the twelve faculty boards responded to the 
Professorial Board's requests for comment. With few 
exceptions, they overwhelmingly supported the Professorial 
Board becoming a large, representative body incorporating a 
substantial elected non-professorial academic membership 
together with a limited student presence (FBM (various), 
26/9/72-25/10/72). 
The Student Union failed to respond to the 
Professorial Board's request for comment notwithstanding the 
fact that a recent plebiscite conducted by the Union had shown 
overwhelming support for substantial student representation on 
the Board. The Union's quiescent behaviour was explained by 
the fact that the Hill Committee's proposals for student 
representation were consistent with the views put forward by 
the Union President to the Committee on 7 October 1971. 
At its meeting held on 30 October 1972 the Professorial 
Board debated the composition issue having regard to the 
comments of the various respondents. The meeting also debated 
Lyons and Christa's rescission motion. In an atmosphere 
charged with considerable tension, Lyons reiterated his 
argument that the principle underlying membership of the 
senior academic body should be academic attainment as 
reflected in a person's academic rank rather than electoral 
popularity. However in an unguarded moment Lyons also made an 
utterance which was seen by his opponents as a clearer 
exposition of why the traditionalists were so opposed to 
democratisation: 
What was at stake was the power of professors 
both collectively in the Professorial Board and 
individually in the University (PBM, 
30/11/72:6). 
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Seconding Lyons' motion, Christa argued that the int oduction 
of the electoral principle in determining Board membarship 
would result in the politicisation of the Board on meuny issues 
which would cause the Board to lose credibility in the eyes of 
the Senate (PBM, 30/11/72:7). The one area where the Board 
had a legitimate and pre-eminent claim was in the fostering of 
academic excellence and the levelling effect of democratic 
methods of selection might cause a lowering of academic 
standards and mediocrity to replace what Clark Kerr has called 
the "aristocracy of intellect" (1966:121). 
Some Board members were alarmed at what they considered 
to be the extreme views of the Improvements Committee and the 
Staff Association. Although the Improvements Committee was 
prepared for the present to tolerate a continuation of 
automatic membership of the professoriate, the Committee saw 
its support of the Hill Committee's recommendation for the 
addition of thirty non-professorial staff as merely the first 
step in the ultimate reformation of the University's total 
system of governance. Similarly the Staff Association's view 
was that the Hill Committee's recommendations should be seen 
as interim only, pending the major democratic reforms outlined 
by the Association earlier (PBM, 30/11/72:8). (The chairmeun of 
the Improvements Committee and the President of the Staff 
Association were present at the meeting by invitation.) 
The radical nature of these ideas stood in sharp 
contrast to the conservatism of the Board, some members of 
which had become disenchanted with the effects of 
democratisation on professorial rights of decision-making at 
the departmental level during Webb's regime as President 
(Interview, C.S. Davis, 26/7/84). This disenchantment had 
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manifested in an anti-egalitarian prejudice. Whereas during 
Webb's tenure of office, some 50% of the membership of the 
Board's ad hoc committees had been filled by non-
professorial staff, since his departure from that office only 
seven non-professorial staff had been appointed to forty nine 
places (PBM, 30/11/72:8). That exaggerated oligarchical 
response was eun attempt by the professoriate to reclaim some 
of its sphere of influence which, in addition to being 
threatened from below was also, with the recent appointment of 
two Deputy Vice-Cheuncellors, being squeezed from above. 
Given the Professorial Board's frame of mind at that 
time the recommendations of the various faculty boards had 
little influence on the Board's deliberations. Accordingly by 
forty five votes to seventeen the Board resolved to rescind 
its earlier decision that twelve non-professorial academic 
staff down to senior tutor status be elected to the Board, 
The meeting also resolved to inform the Senate that the Board 
accepted a continuation of its natural increase eund that it 
did not wish to alter its membership, (At the same time the 
Board had no inhibitions about requesting the Senate to open 
up the membership of some of its committees to nominations 
from the Board,) Discussion on whether the President eund 
President-elect of the Union should be ex officio members 
of the Board was deferred (PBM, 30/11/72:9-10), 
The Board's action in first deciding to extend its 
membership to include non-professorial academic staff and 
students, then seeking reaction to the proposals from the 
University conununity and finally rescinding its earlier 
decision in the face of wide faculty board support for the 
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Hill Committee's proposals was both provocative and unusual. 
Normally the use of power in sophisticated knowledge-based 
organisations such as universities is hidden behind a 
subterfuge of civility eund is moderated by systematised 
bureaucratic procedures. What had been exposed here was the 
raw power of a resurgent professoriate and in particular the 
ability of key individuals such as the conservative coalition 
headed by Lyons to manipulate the internal environment to 
achieve their preferred policy outcome. 
This blatant use of power sparked the beginning of an 
intense struggle between the protagonists for greater 
democratisation who wanted to colonise the Board and the 
conservative elements of the professorial oligarchy still 
clinging to this last bastion of privilege. The battle 
between these two groups for control of the Professorial Board 
will be analysed in the next chapter. 
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fflAFTER NINE 
THE DAVIES REPORT AND THE BATTLE FOR THE PROFESSORIAL 
BOARD. 1973-1976 
Hawker, Smith and Weller concluded after analysing the 
findings of a number of Australian policy case studies that: 
whatever the kind of problem ... the processes 
are muddled and complex ... Explanations in 
terms of muddle and complexity will always 
enter into rounded accounts of the policy 
processes (1979:279). 
That conclusion is highly relevant to the present chapter 
which could equally appropriately have been entitled "The 
Triumph of Politics" with apologies to David Stockman (1986). 
Like Stockman's recent account of the American policy process, 
it exposes how political considerations often operate in 
complex organisations within an elaborate subterfuge of pseudo 
technical-rationality. 
Although there had been strong support on the 
Professorial Board for the rescission motion, the incoming 
President for 1973 (Professor G.N. Davies) was very concerned 
at the prospect of presiding over a Board which, in his view, 
had acted precipitately and had opened up deep divisions 
between professorial and non-professorial staff. He pointed 
out to the Vice-Chancellor and the Standing Committee that 
urgent action would need to be taken to repair the damage that 
had been done and to counter the uproar that would inevitably 
follow when news of the rescission motion spread. During the 
lull before the expected storm, Davies and another member of 
the Standing Committee (Professor B. Zerner) together with a 
former member of the Hill Committee (Professor E.G. Saint), 
spent some time during November 1972 lobbying members of the 
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Board to support the setting up of an ad hoc committee of 
the Professorial Board to exeunine the role of the Board and 
the organisational structure best suited to that role 
(Interview, L.E. Lyons, 2/8/84). Notwithstanding the fact 
that the central policy problem so far as the wider University 
community was concerned was unambiguously the Board's 
composition, some members of the Standing Committee were 
anxious to redefine the problem more in terms of the Board's 
role in the University's decision-making processes. The 
recent reforms at the departmental and faculty board levels 
together with the proposed reconstitution of the Senate were 
seen by the Standing Committee as providing legitimate reasons 
to reopen the question of the Board's duties and 
responsibilities (Interview, G.N. Davies, 24/7/84). Whilst it 
was not publicly stated at the time, by emphasising the 
Board's future role in the University it was hoped that 
attention would be diverted away from the rescission motion. 
In this connection, it was felt that the question of the 
Board's composition would be absorbed into the context of 
these wider issues rather than serving as the sole focus of 
attention as it had in the faculty board responses to the Hill 
Report. 
At the last meeting of the Professorial Board for 1972, 
Davies drew attention to the fact that in recent years there 
had been a trend towards greater democratisation in the 
University at the departmental and faculty board levels. 
Moreover at the Senate meeting on 19 October 1972 it had been 
agreed to recommend to the State Government that the 
constitution of the governing body be widened to include three 
persons appointed by and from the full-time graduate staff of 
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the University as well as the President of the Student Union 
plus two additional students. Against that background the 
Professorial Board's rejection of proposals for some limited 
democratisation of its constitution was bound to be strongly 
contested within the University community (PBM, 27/11/72:13). 
To be seen to be taking the initiative, the 
Professorial Board on 27 November 1972 accepted the Standing 
Committee's advice that: 
(a) During the first half of 1973, a detailed study be made 
of the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Professorial 
Board in relation to those of Senate, faculties and 
departments and, that investigation having been completed, the 
organisation most appropriate to those powers, duties and 
responsibilities be considered; 
(b) An ad hoc committee of the Professorial Board be 
set up forthwith to undertake this study and to make 
recommendations (PBM, 27/11/72:12-13).(1) 
The composition of the Hill Committee was seen by 
conservative members of the Professorial Board as having been 
excessively pro-democratisation and it was felt that their 
reforming zeal had dominated that Committee's deliberations 
and had led to the present embarrassment (Interview, L.E. 
Lyons, 2/8/84). For that reason the Board was anxious to 
avoid any further unwelcome proposals and accordingly the 
ad hoc Comn-iittee was selected with an eye to greater 
(1) Eight members of the Board tried unsuccessfully to 
amend the motion for the establishment of the 
ad hoc committee by including in the terms of 
reference "without re-opening proposals rescinded by 
the Board on 30.10.72". However the Standing 
Committee's motion was approved by 46 votes to 7. 
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balance. No member of the ad hoc Committee was known to 
be ideologically committed to extensive democratic reform and 
indeed, some members possessed reputations as staunch 
protagonists of the status quo. 
The ad hoc Committee (hereinafter referred to as 
the Davies Committee) consisted of eight professors plus one 
non-professorial head of department - Professor G.N. Davies 
(chairman); Professor W. Burnett, Head of Department of 
Surgery; Professor C.S. Davis, Professor of Mathematics; 
Professor R.C. Gates, Deputy President of the Professorial 
Board (from 1 January 1973) and Dean of the Faculty of 
Commerce and Economics; Professor C.A. Hughes, Professor of 
Political Science; Professor L.E. Lyons, Professor of 
Physical Chemistry; Professor H.W. Peter, Head of Department 
of Management and Dr. A.J. Coles, Head of Department of Physical 
Education. 
As mentioned earlier, Davies was one of the first 
professors to stand down voluntarily as a permanent head of 
department in the wake of the Lahey Committee recommendations. 
A politically astute man, Davies had come to recognise that 
the momentum for reform of the Professorial Board was 
irresistible and that it was now the time to formulate a 
pragmatic solution which did not violate too seriously the 
values and attitudes of some of his more conservative 
colleagues on the Board nor at the same time quash the rising 
expectations of the non-professorial constituency. 
Burnett was known as a conservative head of department 
who, unlike most clinical professors, was keenly interested in 
academic administration, but had not been able to secure 
enough electoral support among his colleagues on the Board to 
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obtain a place on the Standing Committee. Burnett was 
critical of the present Professorial Board composition and 
committee structure aund he supported reform so that decision-
making processes would be based more on discipline 
representation than on the elected "cabal" principle. 
Davis had been a formidable political figure within the 
University over a number of years with a ubiquitous presence 
in many aspects of University governeunce. He had served as 
the Staff Association appointed senator from 1961-1971, 
Chairman of the Research Committee (1969-1971), a member of 
the Fineunce Committee (1969-1971) and, until 1972, he had been 
head of a large department. However as mentioned earlier, 
following the loss of his place on the Senate and the 
departmental headship, he had become one of "yesterday's men", 
alienated from the radical non-professorial constituency which 
had in recent years come to dominate the Staff Association and 
somewhat dispirited by the challenge to oligarchic authority. 
Gates was eun unasheuned academic elitist who strongly 
supported the continuation of the traditional role of the 
professoriate. He had not been at ease with the recent 
challenges to the professoriate's position by activists. 
Gates believed that many of the staff and student radicals who 
demanded reform were anti-authority demagogues and that their 
calls for the democratisation of the Professorial Board were 
really a means of promoting anarchy. Out of the power vacuum 
the demagogues could gain power through the electoral process 
and in the fullness of time their rejection of traditional 
values would result in a collapse of ideas about achievement 
based on merit eund academic excellence. 
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As a former member of the Hill Committee, Hughes' 
presence on the Davies Committee was designed to provide some 
continuity in the recent deliberations concerning the 
composition of the Professorial Board. At the seune time his 
academic interest in university governance, the practical 
knowledge derived from his recent membership of the Steunding 
Committee (1971-1972) and his openness to the need to explore 
opportunities for reform outweighed any suggestion that he 
might have been wedded to the conclusions reached by the 
former committee. 
As a Professor of Management, Peter had a strong 
academic interest in organisational structure and processes. 
It was felt that in view of the difficulties faced by the Hill 
Committee in articulating some sort of theoretical connection 
between organisational structures eund their effect on 
decision-making processes, the Davies Committee might benefit 
from having someone like Peter who could inform the 
Committee's deliberations on such matters eund, perhaps, give 
the Committee's report eun aura of technical credibility. 
As a Reader, Coles had been appointed to the Committee 
to head off euny criticism that eun otherwise all-professorial 
committee might be too prejudiced in its review of the role 
and composition of the Professorial Board. At the same time 
Coles was open to the idea of reform and, with four 
conservatives on the Committee, his presence provided some 
balance to a composition that might otherwise have been seen 
to be too committed towards preserving the status quo. 
The Committee's secretary was Dr. Rayner. Rayner had a 
fairly open mind on the question of the Professorial Board's 
composition. His main objectives were that the Board did not 
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grow any larger than its present size and that students 
continue to be excluded. Beyond that, Rayner saw the 
composition of the Board as an internal issue for the Board to 
grapple with. At the same time he held reservations about the 
"territorial ambitions" harboured by the Board, since this 
would almost inevitably bring it into conflict with the 
domains of the Senate and the Central Executive.(2) 
The Davies Committee met on twenty six occasions over 
the period 14 December 1972 to 17 August 1973, At its first 
meeting the Committee considered a draft questionnaire 
developed by Davies to be sent to all members of the 
Professorial Board to elicit data on: 
(a) the powers and duties of the Board as set out in 
Statute No. 7; 
(b) the manner in which the Board conducted business at its 
meetings; 
(c) the functions and operations of the Board's committees; 
(d) the division of responsibility among the Board eund its 
committees, the Senate, Vice-Chancellor, Administration, 
faculties, departments and other bodies; 
(e) communication between the Board and the University 
community; 
(f) any other matters. 
From the outset the Committee's procedures were beset 
with methodological defects. There was no specific mention of 
the issue of the Board's composition and indeed there was 
considerable confusion initially within the University 
(2) Biographical data on Lyons were supplied in chapter 
eight and thus have been omitted here. 
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community as to whether that issue would be addressed at all 
(UQSA, Concerning University Governance, 6/4/74:2), The 
questionnaire data being collected sought to inform discussion 
on the division of responsibility among the Board eund a wide 
range of other organisational units. Nevertheless the 
questionnaire was sent only to members of the Professorial 
Board, exposing the Committee to the inevitable criticism that 
it had made the false assumption that the members of the Board 
were the repository of all knowledge within the University eund 
that little would be gained by seeking a broader cross-section 
of opinion. Further, the distribution of the questionnaire at 
the start of the Christmas vacation period was unlikely to 
generate a high response rate. 
These methodological defects, serious though they were, 
were quickly overtaken by the atmosphere of crisis which 
engulfed the Committee almost from the beginning. 
Unprecedented votes of no confidence were passed by the Staff 
Association on 22 March 1973 eund by the Student Union, Post-
Graduate Students' Association, Council of the Department of 
External Studies eund the Board of the Faculty of Arts (Davies 
Report, 17/8/73:2). Davies had made a special plea for 
members of the Professorial Board to attend the Staff 
Association meeting eund, although some twenty five professors 
including Davies participated at that meeting, the vote of no 
confidence was carried by 44 votes to 39 (UQSA, Concerning 
University Governance, 6/4/74:2). In addition to its vote of 
no confidence in the Professorial Board by 37 votes to 18, the 
Board of the Faculty of Arts also recommended to the Senate: 
... the elimination of the Professorial Board 
eund its speedy replacement by a body, the 
nature and functions of which shall be 
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determined by the members of such bodies as the 
various faculties, the Staff Association and 
the Students' Union (FBAM, 20/3/73), 
The Senate was also asked to appoint a broadly representative 
committee to examine the role, constitution eund functioning of 
the Professorial Board, faculty boards eund departments with 
the view to enabling staff and students to participate 
"appropriately" at all levels of government. Recognising that 
the Davies Committee was already at work and that the Senate 
might not be disposed towards setting up a separate inquiry, 
the Faculty Board also requested that the Davies Committee 
consult with each faculty board and that the Professorial 
Board refer the Committee's report to them for comment before 
any recommendations were submitted to the Senate (FBAM, 
20/3/73). 
The Professorial Board had been acutely embarrassed by 
these votes of no confidence and Davies was anxious to avoid 
any further polarisation between the Board eund non-
professorial staff. So that the Committee's report would not 
be prejudiced, there was eun urgent need to rebuild trust in 
the Board. (3) In transmitting the report of the Faculty of 
Arts to the Senate the Professorial Board resolved: 
that the Senate be advised that the 
Professorial Board notes the disquiet that has 
been expressed at the slowness and 
inconclusiveness of its deliberations on these 
(3) As Wildavsky has noted: 
The relative objectivity of analysis depends on people 
living together in reasonable trust within a common 
culture ... If trust declines, the framework of facts 
that can be taken for granted declines with it. 
Without agreement on a starting place, there is no end 
to debate. Theories harden into dogma, and assertion 
replaces evidence. Policies then are judged not by 
their merits but by the motives of their proposers 
(1979:7), 
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questions but, because of the importance of the 
matters under consideration, requests that the 
Senate not initiate any action until the report 
of the ad hoc Committee (expected by August 
1973) has been considered by the Professorial 
Board (PBM, 30/4/73). 
The Senate agreed to the Professorial Board's request subject 
to undertakings given by Davies that the Board would deal 
expeditiously with the report when it was received in August 
1973 eund that the report would address the question of the 
Board's composition (SM, 10/6/73). 
In the preface to the Committee's report the 
signatories state that: 
Soon after its inquiry began, the Committee 
realised that it could cover its terms of 
reference only if it examined the entire 
governance of the University. It began by 
considering the general functions of a 
university in modern society eund defined five 
objectives which the University of Queensland 
should aspire to reach. 
The Committee went on to review the 
relationship of the Professorial Board to other 
bodies within the University's present 
organisation. Attention was drawn to some 
deficiencies and to nine propositions and 
principles that should form the basis of 
reform (Davies Report, 17/8/73:v). 
One could be excused after reading that introduction for 
believing that the Committee's deliberations were a model of 
rational pleunning with the conclusions flowing inexorably from 
premises and principles which informed the Committee's 
deliberations throughout. Yet there is little evidence to 
suggest that the Committee's discussions were informed by the 
ex ante articulation of objectives or principles. Indeed 
apart from assigning to the members of the Committee the task 
of preparing working papers on various aspects of the terms of 
reference, the first few meetings were concerned mainly with 
machinery matters relating to improving the efficiency of the 
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conduct of Professorial Board meetings. These included proxy 
and postal voting procedures and even such trivia as a request 
for the Registrar to devise a suitable system to facilitate 
the location of items on Board agendas (Davies Committee, 
Minutes, 14/12/72-16/2/73). 
The early meetings tended to be discursive because a 
consolidated summary of the replies to the questionnaire was 
not available until 27 March 1973. What started to emerge 
after those initial meetings was a heightened awareness of the 
fact that the University was very untidy in eun organisational 
sense and that this untidiness was probably dysfunctional 
(Davies Committee, Minutes, 27/2/73-3/4/73). The main problem 
was the lack of euny coherent eund articulated system of line 
eund functional responsibility between departments eund the 
Senate. The whole system seemed to be based on eun 
extraordinary arreungement of divided responsibility and 
partial or fragmented control. As one respondent remarked: 
The organisation of the University reminds me 
of a small piece of delicate crochet work which 
has become badly tangled and then mixed up with 
a large lump of chewing gum (Davies Committee, 
Questionnaire Reply No. 39). 
Departments had major responsibilities for teaching and 
research but had little flexibility in the use of their 
financial resources; faculties had major responsibilities 
relating to course matters but no authority concerning 
resource questions; the Professorial Board had a major 
responsibility to advise the Senate concerning academic 
matters but such advice in relation to resource matters was 
limited essentially to academic staffing, academic promotions 
and study leave; ten central resource committees were 
involved in an examination of requests from fifty nine 
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academic departments but such a fragmented review militated 
against resource optimisation. 
The Committee was uncertain as to how to resolve those 
problems. Only sixty three responses to the questionnaire out 
of a possible 101 were received and the comments were critical 
of many aspects of the University's structure eund processes. 
A major concern expressed was that if the present confused 
organisational structure was allowed to continue, the Central 
Administration would, de facto, usurp power by performing 
a much stronger coordinating role; it would be forced to 
impose more uniformity and systemisation just to enable the 
University to function. Thus various respondents spoke darkly 
about the "uniformity in administrative procedures" being 
increasingly required of departments by the Senate and the 
"detailed control by administration" that was "creeping into 
this University" (Davies Committee, Questionnaire Reply No. 
30), 
Indeed much of the critical comment was directed 
towards the Central Administration although the University's 
complex and extensive committee network also attracted its 
share of criticism: 
In the present system the membership of 
governing committees changes frequently and 
fresh people are continually being partially 
trained on a part-time basis to deal with the 
same basic decision-medcing areas with the 
result that fluctuating ad-hoc decisions are 
frequently made (Davies Committee, 
Questionnaire Reply No. 51). 
The worry was that the committee system consumed a large 
amount of academic time as individuals concentrated not on 
teaching and research but "on the gaining of political power 
through dominance of such groups" (Davies Committee, 
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Questionnaire Reply No. 61). 
Suggestions on how to overcome these problems varied 
considerably. Some argued for greater powers to be given to 
reorganised faculties to coordinate the activities of 
constituent departments given that the present faculty boards 
in the main were "apathetic bodies" headed by deans whose 
powers were "lamentably weedc" (Davies Committee, Questionnaire 
Reply No. 56). However at the same time there were those who 
were worried about euny centralisation of power away from the 
departmental level: 
A final ... argument for departmental hegemony 
is that departments vary enormously and no 
centralised system of administration could 
possibly suit all of them. Some are big, some 
small, some use a lot of space, some little, 
some use a lot of costly equipment, some little 
or none, some work mainly on courses created 
eund mostly run by themselves, some act mainly 
as service departments ...(Davies Committee, 
Questionnaire Reply No. 39). 
The responses had shown that while there was considerable 
support for the view that the entire system of governance and 
not just the Professorial Board needed to be examined, there 
was much less agreement on what should be done to address the 
problems identified. It was possible, however, to discern 
from the responses a general feeling that: 
o the Professorial Board should remain fairly large and 
concentrate on addressing major policy issues with 
support from a strong executive committee; 
0 the question of resource acquisition eund allocation 
were central issues and the present "system" should be 
modified so that departments - groups of departments -
Professorial Board - Finance Committee - Senate were 
linked together in a coherent and articulated manner. 
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Given the parochialism and inconclusiveness of the 
questionnaire responses, the Committee was greatly assisted by 
the preparation of working papers by various members of the 
Committee. For example at the tenth meeting held on 22 Meiy 
1973 the Committee considered a paper prepared by Gates which 
examined the main issues on resource allocation and by Davies 
which canvassed the possibility of establishing six to eight 
schools comprising constituent departments for resource 
acquisition eund allocation purposes (Davies Committee, 
Minutes, 22/5/73:1-2). 
Blau has suggested that increases in euny organisation's 
size as reflected in greater horizontal differentiation (more 
departments in this case) was invariably accompanied by the 
need for better coordination. The usual response to achieving 
better coordination was to add leiyers of hierarchy (vertical 
differentiation), using a combination of executive officers 
and committee structures (1973:49-51), Within the University 
of Queensland the means of coping with the problem of 
coordination had included both of those techniques. In 
addition to the appointment of two Deputy Vice-Chancellors, 
the University had gradually expanded the use of area sub-
committees which covered groupings of departments so that 
requests from constituent departments could be reviewed and 
resources allocated by participants who were more 
knowledgeable about the specialised resource needs of 
departments than more remote central committees. For example 
the Research Committee and the Promotions and Reappointments 
Committee each operated four distinctive area sub-committees 
and the Planning Committee had five separate working parties 
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to plan academic developments for the 1976-1978 triennium. 
Although there was no uniformity in the groupings for these 
diverse purposes, the precedent clearly existed for Davies to 
develop the concept into school resource committees. 
There was general agreement on the need for a system of 
departmental groupings for budgeting and resource allocation 
purposes but no consensus could be reached on whether the 
groupings should be based on a reorganised faculty system 
(Davies Committee, Minutes, 25/5/73:2), Such a reorgeunisation 
would have enabled integration of academic and resource 
decision-making but, if departments were to become primarily 
associated with only one school or faculty, there was a risk 
that the educational advantages of the present system would be 
lost. There was also some concern that if faculty boards 
obtained the power to allocate resources to departments, this 
would cause them to interfere with the independence that 
departments had enjoyed since 1955 (Davies Committee, Minutes, 
8/6/73:2). This potential interference was of special concern 
to professorial heads of departments, given that some faculty 
boards were dominated by egalitarian interests which were 
actively hostile to the professoriate (Interview, W.E. Fox, 
10/7/86). (In 1969 all twelve deans of faculties had been 
professors; in 1973 there were four non-professorial deans.) 
Whereas faculty boards were perceived as collegial bodies in 
which professors exerted relatively slight influence, most 
academic departments were still dominated by professors 
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despite recent reforms.(4) 
During 1972-1973, faculty boards were engaged in 
revising their courses in preparation for the introduction of 
semesterisation in 1974. In order to avoid further conflict 
over the issue of whether to give faculty boards control over 
reviewing departmental resource submissions, the Committee 
opted for separate school resource committees. The excuse 
given was that faculty boards were too heavily engaged in 
planning for semesterisation to be the subject of possible 
reorganisation and then burdened by additional 
responsibilities (PBM, 27/8/73). However, given the problem 
identified earlier of a lack of coherence and articulation in 
academic and resource decision-making, the amalgamation of 
faculty boards and school resource committees was foreshadowed 
as a possible future development (Davies Committee, Minutes, 
8/6/73:3). The Committee also felt that by devolving resource 
acquisition and allocation functions to representative school 
and departmental levels, there might be less demand for 
representation of non-professorial staff on the Professorial 
Board (Davies Committee, Minutes, 22/5/73:2). 
The question of the Professorial Board's composition 
was held in abeyance pending clarification of its powers, 
duties and responsibilities. This strategy was undertaken 
because Davies was keen to depoliticise the question of 
composition and to try to place it in a broader context 
(Interview, L.E. Lyons, 2/8/84). He was aided in this by 
(4) Of the fifty nine departments, forty eight were 
headed by professors and in the other eleven 
departments only two were headed by non-professorial 
staff when there were professors on staff. This was so 
even though following the 1970 reforms only thirty one 
permanent heads remained (Davies Report, 17/8/73:32). 
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Peter's meunagement science principle "form follows function" -
an elliptical aphorism which asserts that given certain 
goals, orgeunisational structures and processes are dependent 
variables which can be modified as required to maximise the 
likelihood of achieving those goals (Interview, G.N, Davies, 
24/7/84; Davies Report, 17/8/73:28), This suggests a 
somewhat mechanistic eund deterministic relationship which 
stresses the scientific-technical dimension but places less 
emphasis on socio-political factors which affect the 
relationship between organisational design and performance. 
The Davies Committee implicitly argued that if the 
primary objectives of the University were essentially to 
pursue excellence in teaching and research then all secondary 
support functions should be subordinate to the primary 
academic function (Davies Report, 17/8/73:15,28,89). It could 
then be argued that the Professorial Board should be at the 
apex of the University's system of governance and that 
recommendations submitted to the Senate on academic matters 
should include not only advice on course and academic resource 
matters but also advice on those secondary non-academic 
activities whose purpose was to support the primary academic 
activities. (The relevant organisational theory is derived 
from Etzioni, 1964:81-87). 
In order to provide a rationale on why the 
professoriate was endowed with the special qualities which 
would, pursuant to the "form follows function" principle, 
maximise the probability of goal achievement, Lyons was given 
the task in collaboration with Coles and Burnett of drafting a 
paper on the role of the professor in the University. At its 
meeting on 28 June 1973 the Committee considered Lyons' paper. 
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The main thrust of that paper was to argue that the 
professoriate, by virtue of the rigorous selection procedures 
and the members' academic attainments, was better qualified to 
provide academic leadership theun non-professorial aceuiemic 
staff who tended to be of uneven quality. Lyons was concerned 
at the "levelling" effect on standards which might follow a 
situation where non-professorial staff achieved positions of 
power within the University by dint of their electoral 
popularity rather than by virtue of their selection on merit 
(Davies Committee, Minutes 22/5/73:2; 28/6/73:1; Interview, 
L.E. Lyons, 2/8/84). 
Lyons' views were not without some substeunce. There 
was strong evidence that during this period in the University 
of Queensleund, research and scholarship productivity was 
directly related to academic rank.(6) 
Although Lyons received some support for his views from 
Burnett and Gates, a majority felt that his assumptions 
regarding the calibre of non-professorial academic staff were 
untenable and that some of his observations were 
"paternalistic" eund could be regarded as being "offensive" 
(Davies Committee, Minutes, 28/6/73:3). 
(5) Academic Rank % of staff who published 
Professors 90.6 
Readers 85.2 
Senior Lecturers 71.5 
Lecturers 58. 1 
Senior Tutors 43.7 
Total 68.8 
Table 9.1: University of Queensland. Academic Staff who 
published in the years 1970-1973 (Burnett 
Report, July 1977:49). 
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In the debate which followed over whether the 
membership of the Professorial Board should be widened to 
include non-professorial staff there was considerable division 
of opinion. Lyons and Gates argued strongly eigainst adding 
elected non-professorial staff but others advocated such a 
reform. In an inspired move, Davies proposed the compromise 
of adding sub-deans of faculties to the Professorial Board 
(Davies Committee, Minutes, 28/6/73:1). This accommodated 
some of the objections from both sides. On the one heund it 
respected the wishes of the conservatives that there should be 
no directly elected representatives of non-professorial staff 
on the Board; on the other hand it allowed some seventeen 
non-professorial staff who were elected as sub-deans by their 
faculties and who were directly engeiged in implementing 
academic policy to play a part in the formulation of that 
policy on the Board. It was hoped that such a reform would 
appease the demands for non-professorial representation 
without at the same time appearing to conservative Board 
members as a "sell out". Lyons' paper had generated a fairly 
divisive debate and it confirmed Davies' earlier judgement 
that it would be a good tactic to defer further discussion on 
the Board's composition until after the Committee had 
finalised its views on the Board's functions and its committee 
structure (Interview, G.N. Davies, 24/7/84). 
By mid-June 1973, time was starting to run out on the 
Committee. Davies was concerned that unless the pace of 
decision-making was stepped up there would be difficulty in 
meeting the undertaking he had given the Senate for the 
Committee to report to the Professorial Board by August 1973. 
At that steige the only substantive decisions that had been 
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made by the Committee were that: 
o heads of departments should set up departmental 
resource committees to advise them on the preparation 
of submissions to school resource committees eund on the 
subsequent allocation of resources within departments; 
o faculty boards would continue to be responsible for 
academic matters and would be separate from the 
groupings of departments comprising the school resource 
committees; 
o a university resource committee should be established 
to coordinate resource acquisition and allocation 
across the University as a whole; 
o sub-deans should be added to the Professorial Board, 
The Professorial Board planned to hold a 
special meeting on 27 August 1973 to discuss the Conamittee's 
report. In view of the desirability of circulating the 
report a fortnight in advance of that date, Davies and Reiyner 
undertook the task of preparing a draft report which included 
tentative conclusions on matters yet to be discussed. The 
draft report was tabled at the Committee's fourteenth meeting 
on 4 July 1973 (Davies Committee, Minutes, 4/7/73:1; 
Interview, S.A, Rayner, 24/7/84). The Committee then 
commenced an intensive series of thirteen meetings over a 
period of six weeks endeavouring to refine the draft report. 
In his general study of committees of inquiry, 
Cartwright has noted the great influence that the author of 
the initial draft of a committee's report has on the theme and 
final form of the report. He argued that in effect, the draft 
report was largely a fait accompli which forced the other 
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members of the committee to be reactive instead of creative, 
usually modifying the report at the margin in lieu of 
proposing fundamental cheunges (1975:178). Most of the 
Committee's draft report was written by Davies but was edited, 
and where necessary redrafted, by Reo^er. Although the 
substance of the report and the unifying theme that it 
embodied bore witness to their interpretation of the 
Committee's earlier deliberations extrapolated to fill the 
many decision-making gaps that were evident in the process to 
date, it would overstate matters to suggest that the draft was 
received as a fait accompli. 
Rather, the difficulties often faced by joint authors 
in achieving consistency was reflected in the section which 
examined the "Administration" and its relationship with the 
Professorial Board, Thus in discussing the "less than optimal 
relationship between the Professorial Board eund the 
Administration, " the draft report drew attention to the 
Central Administration's alleged propensity to engeige in 
bureaucratic systemisation and inflexible standardisation 
which sometimes seemed to be "designed primarily to serve the 
convenience of administrative staff rather than to provide ... 
service to academic staff in achieving educational objectives" 
(Davies Report (Draft), 20/6/73, Section 3:7). Yet in the 
same report a quite different perspective appeared, describing 
the Professorial Board as "an integral part of mid-management 
and of administration." The Professorial Board and its 
members were said to be: 
... governed by the Administration (top 
management), and provided with a rich 
assortment of administrative and support 
services from other parts of the 
Administration. Perhaps it is the apparent 
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failure of the Professorial Board to recognize 
where it really is in the University hierarchy 
that underlies some of the problems of Board -
Administration relationships (Davies Report 
(Draft), 20/6/73, Section 3:4). 
These critical references to Administration - Professorial 
Board relations were toned down in the final report eund the 
remedy was expressed in terms of the need for "better 
communication(s)", 
Despite Davies' efforts to try and impose order on the 
process by presenting the Committee with draft sections of the 
report to react to, there was still no eigreement on quite 
fundamental matters three deo^ s before the scheduled day for 
circularising the draft report to the Professorial Board, For 
example at meetings on 9 and 10 August 1973, the central issue 
of the Professorial Board's composition was addressed eund it 
was confirmed (by 3 votes to 2) that professors who were not 
otherwise qualified as head of departments or deans should 
retain automatic membership of the Board (Davies Committee, 
Minutes, 9-10/8/73:1), Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Senate less theun a year earlier had proposed that the 
University Act should be eunended to enable three full-time 
graduate members of staff to be added to the Senate (which 
allowed for non-academic representation) eund had recommended 
to the Government a substantial increase in student 
representation, the Davies Committee still held to the view 
that only academic senators should be added to the 
Professorial Board and that no students should be appointed 
(Davies Committee, Minutes, 11/8/73:1). 
The basic premise of the Davies Report was that the 
achievement of the goal of excellence in teaching eund research 
was most likely if those quintessentially selected on the 
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basis of their excellence in teaching and research, the 
professoriate, were given the capacity to dominate decision-
meJcing within the University. An explicit reference to that 
reasoning was contained in the report: 
The Professorial Board, more than euny other 
single body in the University, has a 
responsibility for formulating eund coordinating 
academic policy and for ensuring that resources 
are applied to optimize achievement of 
university objectives. Its capacity to do this 
effectively results from its composition 
(Davies Report, 17/8/73:22), 
Thus the tone of the report stressed the leadership role of 
the professoriate eund gave scant attention to alternative 
forms of governance. Not surprisingly, the logical corollary 
of the report was the subordination of virtually all policy 
making (academic eund non-academic, fineuncial eund non-
financial) to the Professorial Board in its role as the senior 
academic adviser to the Senate - echoes of an earlier era of 
ambit claims. However, because the reconstituted Board was 
expected to restrict its debates to matters of major policy 
importance, it was scheduled to meet only twice per semester 
and its day-to-day responsibilities were to be discharged by 
two executive committees, a university resource committee and 
an academic executive committee (Davies Report, 17/8/73:67). 
The University Resource Committee was to operate in 
lieu of the Standing Committee and was to be responsible for 
reviewing the submissions from eight school resource 
committees and advising the Professorial Board so that the 
latter could, in turn, advise the Senate's Finance Committee 
of the University's overall resource needs. Under the 
existing arrangements the Senate's Library Committee was 
responsible for advising the Vice-Chancellor and the Finance 
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Committee on the budgetary needs of the Library and the Vice-
Chancellor was responsible for advising the Finance Committee 
on the general university services budget. However in 
accordance with the Davies Committee's rationale that all 
support activities should be subordinate to academic control, 
it was reconunended that two central service conraiittees (one 
covering academic support services such as the library and the 
other covering other central services such as the Central 
Administration) were also to submit their budgetary proposals 
direct to the University Resource Committee. In the annual 
budget cycle it was envisaged that the Finance Committee would 
receive the draft budget from the University Resource 
Committee for the first time around mid November and that the 
Senate could approve the budget at its last meeting for the 
year less theun three weeks later (Davies Report, 17/8/73:79). 
In the past the Fineunce Committee had been responsible 
for determining the allocations eunong the major University 
activities: 
o academic (teaching and research; research only); 
o academic services (for example, libraries, computing); 
o student services (for exeunple health, counselling); 
o general university services (for example central 
administration, buildings and grounds); 
o public services (for example public lectures and the 
Institute of Modern Langueiges) . 
In their study of British universities, Moodie and Eustace 
have noted that the task of deciding what proportion of 
resources should be allocated for academic developments and 
what proportion should be set aside for other purposes is a 
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fundamental one that has often been reserved for the more 
neutral ground of the governing body (1974:111), However 
under the Davies Committee proposals, the Finance Committee and 
the Senate were to be given very little opportunity to medce a 
meaningful contribution to that decision. Rather they were to 
be presented essentially with a fait accompli. 
Moreover although the Pleunning Committee would continue 
to report in the first instance to the Vice-Chancellor, the 
Davies Committee proposed that the University Resource 
Committee would comprise its core membership in lieu of the 
Standing Committee (Davies Report, 17/8/73:80), Given the 
scope of the University Resource Committee's responsibilities 
it could be expected that it would also come to dominate the 
triennial budgeting eund triennial pleunning process. In 
addition to dominating the resource acquisition process the 
University Resource Committee was to control the resource 
allocation process by distributing funds to the school and 
central service resource committees for allocation to their 
constituent departments. In order to provide greater 
flexibility for departments in managing their resources, each 
department was to receive a block grant to cover all outlays 
except full-time staff eund items tied to external specific 
purpose funding constraints (Davies Report, 17/8/73:79). 
The University Resource Conamittee was to comprise 
fifteen members, namely, the Vice-Chancellor (chairman), both 
Deputy Vice-Chancellors, President and Deputy President of the 
Professorial Board, the eight chairmen of the school resource 
committees and the two chairmen of the central service 
resource committees. No specific recommendation was made 
concerning the composition of school resource committees or 
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central service resource committees except to suggest that the 
relevant heads of departments should meet to work out a 
constitution to enable representation of the constituent 
departments so that no committee exceeded fifteen members 
(Davies Report, 17/8/73:96-97). However in view of the 
specific recommendation that each head should be responsible 
for departmental financial management, it was anticipated that 
the school resource committees would be comprised essentially 
of heads of departments. Each head was to be advised on 
resource matters by a departmental resource committee. 
On the academic side, an Academic Executive Committee 
was to be established in lieu of the Education Committee for 
the purpose of advising the Board on major new policies eund to 
take executive action on routine academic matters within the 
Board's jurisdiction. This Committee in turn was to be 
advised by the Board's existing specialised committee system 
enlarged by the transfer of the Senate's Library and Research 
Committees. Faculty boards were to maintain their existing 
responsibilities eund were to report to the Professorial Board 
through the Academic Executive Committee. The membership of 
the Academic Executive Committee was to consist of fourteen 
members, namely, the President of the Professorial Board 
(chairman), Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic), Deputy President of the Professorial Board, four 
deans of faculties elected by the Professorial Board and six 
members elected by and from the Professorial Board (Davies 
Report, 17/8/73:87,92,93). 
Rousseau, (The Social Contract:55. 56.60-75) and 
Michels (1915:407) have both noted the inherent tendency of 
300 
larger legislative-type bodies to become dependent on smaller 
executive bodies in the interests of efficient execution of 
business but at the cost of wealcened democratic control. At 
the organisational level, Wheare has suggested that the 
inclination for larger decision-medcing bodies to form smaller 
executive committees eund the letter's propensity to expeund 
their spheres of influence while the parent bodies become more 
remote are substeuntive problems: 
The result of this kind of behaviour is that a 
(parent) committee's meetings can become mere 
formalities . . . the tendency towards oligarchy, 
which the use of smaller and smaller bodies 
within a committee exhibits, makes committees 
at the best a screen and at the worst a 
sham (1955:195). 
It is against this background that three crucial points 
emerged from the establishment of the two executive committees 
recommended in the Davies Report. First, given that there 
would be only two scheduled meetings of the Professorial Board 
each semester and that any unfinished business could be 
referred by the President to the Academic Executive Committee 
or the University Resource Committee as appropriate for final 
determination, major decis ion-making and advisory powers 
affecting the entire University would be concentrated among a 
relatively small number of persons. Second, referral of 
business to the University Resource Committee and the Academic 
Executive Committee would defeat the purpose of trying to 
integrate academic and resource decision-making at the 
Professorial Board level, notwithstanding the fact that there 
was some overlapping membership on both bodies. And, third, 
because of the overlapping membership involving four members 
(Vice-chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic), President 
and Deputy President of the Professorial Board) an 
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institutionalised oligarchy would be constituted which would 
possess the inherent potential to monopolise decision-meiking 
across the University. 
This concentration of power was underlined by the 
proposed extension of the Professorial Board's jurisdiction to 
cover non-academic staffing. Some 1,977 or 66.1% of the 
University's 2,990 filled full-time positions in 1973 were 
occupied by non-academic staff (Statistics, 1976:97). In 
addition to proposing that the University Resource Committee 
assume responsibility for reviewing non-academic staff 
establishments, the Davies Committee proposed that the Vice-
Chancellor's Technical, Administrative eund Laboratory Staffing 
Committee be abolished and replaced by a Staff Affairs 
Committee to report to the Professorial Board through the 
Academic Executive Committee. That Committee was to be 
responsible for all academic eund non-academic staffing matters 
(excluding those relating to establishments eund promotions) 
but its proposed composition did not include a single member 
of the non-academic staff. Similarly the Promotions and 
Reappointments Committee which was also to report to the 
Professorial Board through the Academic Executive Committee 
was to extend its jurisdiction to cover non-academic staff but 
again, there was no accompanying proposal to alter the 
constitution of that Committee to include representatives of 
the non-academic staff. 
Included among the Davies Committee's recommendations 
was a proposal to amend the constitution of the Professorial 
Board, details of which are contained in Appendix (1). It was 
not possible to calculate precisely the proportion of non-
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professorial staff representation because that was a variable 
which depended on the number of such staff serving as heeuls of 
departments, deeuns and as chairmen of school resource 
committees. What was certain, however, was that out of a 
proposed membership in 1973 of 126, there were no 
gyaranteed places for non-professorial staff although it 
was reasonable to suppose from past practice that the 
seventeen sub-deans would be from that category as would at 
least one of the staff senators. It was clear that this 
provision was much less than the additional thirty non-
professorial staff recommended by the Hill Committee and 
supported by a majority of the faculty boards. 
In eun attempt to appease the inevitable unfavourable 
comparisons, the Davies Committee recommended that a 
Professorial Board/Staff Association Liaison Committee be 
established. Moreover, in eun effort to compensate for the 
omission of students on the Professorial Board, the Davies 
Committee proposed that a Professorial Board/ University of 
Queensland Union Liaison Committee should also be created 
(Davies Report, 17/8/73:98-99). Clearly the proposals for the 
establishment of further liaison committees were no substitute 
for actual participation in decision-meiking. As Presley 
remarked, although liaison committees might serve as a safety 
valve and temporarily relieve tensions they: 
... are like pieces of wire added to a circuit 
that has to do things that it was not designed 
to do: they are useful, but one would not 
expect to find them in a newly designed 
circuit (1971:5). 
The Davies Report was a milestone in the saga of the 
governance of the University of Queensland. Here was a 101 
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page report (plus appendices) which, for the first time, had 
formulated a considered opinion on what the University's 
objectives were and, in addition, had developed principles 
upon which reform should be based. The report made only 
incidental reference to the composition of the Professorial 
Board. That issue was presented as an objective consequence 
of the Board's expeunded functions; most of the report was 
devoted to a description of those functions and the committee 
structure needed to discharge them. 
The managerial cliches contained in the report provided 
an ostensibly scientific-rational basis upon which to base its 
recommendations. For example, in addition to the feuniliar 
"form follows function" concept, the report celebrated the 
principle of devolution - "no decision meiking goes higher theun 
necessary to resolve conflicting interests" as well as the 
need to promote the integration of individual eund 
organisational goals in the interests of greater efficiency. 
The report talked of fostering "the stronger identification of 
and commitment to the group task at ... the department or 
administrative section level ... as a powerful tool for 
voluntary self-control and cooperation by staff members" 
(Davies Report, 17/8/73:28). 
These views reflected the pervasive influence of 
management science values in the design of organisational 
structures. But as Abrahamsson has noted, they were based on 
the notion of pseudo-participation whereby the extent of 
member's participation was limited essentially to decisions 
taken at the lower operational as distinct from the higher 
strategic levels (1977:190). The attitude of mind which 
favoured this limited notion of participation was reflected in 
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the report's observation that participation in the process of 
organisational reform should apply only "... to conditions and 
tasks in one's immediate working environment, recognizing that 
many policies eund rules must be externally determined and 
standardized" (Davies Report, 17/8/73:27). Such views stood 
in sharp contrast to the more radical democratic theory of 
writers such as Pateman from which were derived the claims of 
the Staff Association for substantial elected representation 
of all grades of academic staff in strategic level decision-
making (1970:35-111). 
Pfeffer has suggested that when managerial rationality 
is stressed in the reform of policy associated with a 
contentious issue, it is sometimes a screen for the subtle and 
unobstrusive use of political power (1981:142). It would not 
be an overstatement to contend that the Davies Report amounted 
to eun elaborately disguised "grab for power" on behalf of the 
Professorial Board. Although the proposed composition of the 
Board reflected only incremental change, the new powers 
envisaged for the Board and its committee system represented a 
sharp discontinuity with the past. In this connection Pfeffer 
has also argued that the use of symbolic language in reports 
is often a means of obfuscating the exercise of power 
(1981:194). 
Much of the Davies Report's use of symbolic language 
took the form of self justification for the Board's intended 
role, glossing over those aspects of University governance 
which the Committee found inconvenient to address. For 
example after eliminating from the draft report the admission 
concerning the "widespread frustration among Board members 
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with the inefficiencies of the (Professorial) Board's 
functioning" (Davies Report (Draft), 20/6/73, Section 3:7) the 
Committee found it more congenial to argue in the final 
report that the Board's influential role was due to "the 
quality of its debates". This was gratuitously attributed to 
"the expertise of its members, drawn from every department of 
the University, representing over sixty different disciplines, 
based on degrees gained from some forty different 
universities, with a wide variety of teaching, research and 
administrative experience, and au fait with the current 
work of the University" (Davies Report, 17/8/73:23,56). On 
the other hand the report contained implied criticisms of some 
large democratically constituted faculty boards as being 
inefficient and undisciplined and unable even to maintain a 
quorum (Davies Report, 17/8/73:43,52). 
Two major omissions in the report which purported to 
have " exeunined the entire governance of the University" were 
a review of the interface between the Senate and the 
Professorial Board eund the role of senior officers in the 
Central Executive. In view of the criticisms in the 
questionnaire responses concerning the University 
Administration it was curious to note the perfunctory formal 
descriptions of the duties of the Deputy Vice-Chancellors and 
the Registrar (Davies Report, 17/8/73:20). Chapter five has 
shown how the Central Executive in fact played a dominant role 
in University policy making and that the Registrar's 
de facto involvement was of crucial importance. Having 
regard to this, it is necessary to ask why the Central 
Executive's role was downplayed and given such a low profile. 
Part of the answer is that the Central Executive and 
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Rayner in particular were quite happy for academic self-
governeunce to operate at a symbolic level eund for the reality 
of executive decision-making to continue behind the 
rhetoric. (6) It was importeunt, however, to perpetuate the 
myth of academic self-governance and Rayner's drafting of that 
section of the report was careful not to disabuse the 
University community on that point. At the same time, Davies 
was anxious to ensure that the criticisms that excessive 
bureaucratic systemisation had sometimes inhibited the 
achievement of the University's academic goals were not 
ignored. He concluded, however, that to have pursued the 
contentious issue of Administration - Professorial Board 
relations would have distracted the Committee from its main 
objectives. Davies felt that there was a need for a separate 
inquiry into the role and functions of the Central 
Administration after his Committee had completed its work 
(G.N. Davies, Private Communication, 19/5/87). 
The special meeting of the Professorial Board called on 
27 August 1973 (the first day of third term) to consider the 
Davies Report was attended by seventy three members. Because 
of the delays in finalising the report it was circulated only 
five days before the meeting and many members who had been 
away from Brisbane had had little opportunity to study its 
contents carefully (UQSA, Concerning University Governance, 
(6) Rayner was privately quite candid about the difference 
between the rhetoric and the reality of decision-
making. The different roles ascribed to the Central 
Executive and academic structures were not in his view 
the result of conscious manipulation on the part of the 
Executive but were more the result of complex 
environmental and structural conditions (Interview, 
S.A. Rayner, 24/7/84). 
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6/4/74:3). Davies argued that the report had been framed by 
the Committee on the basis that: 
, , . we believe that the organization eund 
regulations of the institution should reflect 
the conception of the functions of the 
University and the social outlook which its 
members hold (PBM, 27/8/73:2). 
Given that the Committee had surveyed only the members of the 
Professorial Board, this assumed that their opinions reflected 
the "social outlook" of the rest of the University, This was, 
of course, a false assumption. The Board realised that on the 
sensitive issue of its composition, the Committee's 
recommendations, by proposing the addition of sub-deans and 
chairmen of school resource committees, had missed the 
essential point which was to add a proportion of directly 
elected non-professorial academic staff. As one member 
put it: 
The Professorial Board should be representative 
of the academic community in the University, 
The Committee had been established to explore 
ways and meeuns of making the Professorial Board 
a representative body of the University 
community. The report now released seemed to 
recommend steps for efficient control of the 
University. Efficiency would not makie the 
Board more representative (PBM, 27/8/73:8). 
Despite Davies' protestations that the Committee's 
proposals enviseiged that up to 30% of the Professorial Board 
would comprise non-professorial staff (assuming that the 
present number of non-professorial heads of departments and 
deans would continue and assuming also that the sub-deans and 
chairmen of school resource committees would not be 
professors), the Board resolved (by 37 votes to 1) to 
substitute provision for the direct election of nineteen 
members by and from the faculty boards in lieu of the proposed 
sub-deans. Moreover in recognition of the Senate's recent 
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decision to add students to the governing body, some members 
felt that it was somewhat incongruous for the Davies Report 
not to recommend the addition of student representation to the 
Board. Accordingly the Board resolved (by 31 votes to 10) 
that the President of the University of Queensland Union, 
President of the Post-Graduate Students' Association plus two 
other students be added to the Board's membership (PBM, 
27/8/73:12). 
Apart from those amendments to the proposed composition 
of the Professorial Board, details of which are contained in 
Appendix (1), most of the other reconunendations embodied in 
the Davies Report were approved by the Board. Some approvals 
were qualified as being "in principle" because the Board had 
not had sufficient time to study the implications of the 
proposals. The only other substantive changes to the report's 
recommendations were to suggest that the University Resource 
Committee should choose its own chairmeun so that the Vice-
Chancellor could retain his independence and to recommend that 
in lieu of establishing a Professorial Board/University of 
Queensleund Union Liaison Committee, the Senate be requested to 
add two representatives of the Board to the existing 
Senate/Student Liaison Committee (Davies Report, 17/8/73:xi). 
The Professorial Board supported the Davies Report's 
recommendation that the Senate should refer the report and the 
revisions proposed by the Board to departments, faculty 
boards. Staff Association and Student Union for comment but 
added that the Senate should give the Professorial Board eun 
opportunity to consider any further amendments in the light of 
those comments. Notwithstanding the major changes being 
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contemplated for the administration of non-academic staffing 
policy, no consideration was given to referring the Davies 
Report to the Technical eund Laboratory Staff Association or 
the University of Queensleund Employees Association for 
comment. 
At the Senate meeting on 20 September 1973 Davies eigain 
argued the familiar theme that: 
. . . the cheunges proposed would enable the 
University to do a better job in the pursuit of 
excellence in teaching and research (SM, 
20/9/73:124). 
While Davies' views might have been sustainable in narrow 
technical-rational terms, they failed to recognise the 
political implications of the Board's transgression into the 
domain of the Senate especially in its control of fineuncial 
resources. As the Senate noted: 
.., implementation of the proposals would 
change the role of Senate ,., it would become a 
"rubber steunp" to the decisions of the 
Professorial Board (SM, 20/9/73:124), 
In view of the deep concern expressed at the meeting over what 
was perceived to be the Professorial Board's presumptuous 
transgression in attempting to usurp the Senate's authority, 
the Senate resolved to establish a committee to examine the 
Davies Report and to investigate the role of the Senate in the 
University. The Committee (hereinafter referred to as the 
Cowen Committee) comprised ten members, eight of whom were 
members of the Finance Committee. They were - the Vice-
Chancellor (chairman); both Deputy Vice-Chancellors; Mr. 
J. A. Barton (State Manager of the Bank of New South Wales and 
Chairman of the Finance Committee); three external senators 
on the Finance Committee (Mr. Justice W.B. Campbell, Mr. D.W. 
Longland, who was Chairman of the State Public Service Board 
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and Mr. L.J. McCray, a company director); Dr. D. Henderson (a 
physician elected to Senate by Convocation); Professor G.N, 
Davies and Mr, M. English (President of the University of 
Queensland Union) (SM, 20/9/73:124). 
Whereas the Davies Committee's membership had been 
narrowly based on academics who were members of the 
Professorial Board, the Cowen Committee was dominated by five 
non-academic and three University administrators and included 
only one academic plus one student representative. Cowen made 
a point of including a student representative even though by 
1973 the student body had become politically apathetic. In 
noting that only 16.78% of the eligible students had bothered 
to vote in the 1973 elections, the Union's electoral officer 
expressed concern at the lack of interest among students in 
the Union's affairs (UQU, Electoral Officer's Report, July 
1973:5). Nevertheless the symbolic importance of including 
student representation on such a Committee was fully 
appreciated by the Senate, even though it was doubtful that 
one person could be expected accurately to reflect the views 
of such a heterogeneous student body. 
Even before the Cowen Committee had held its first 
meeting there had been a vigorous reaction to the Davies 
Report. One of the strongest criticisms came from Mr. F.D.O. 
Fielding, the University Librarian and Staff Association 
appointed senator. Fielding wrote to Davies and the Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) expressing grave concern 
over what he interpreted to be the inclusion of the library 
grant among the proposed departmental block votes instead of 
the present system which involved a single library vote being 
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allocated by the Library Committee for the use of departments. 
The prospect of having a significant proportion of the library 
vote split up among fifty nine departments would, in 
Fielding's view, be "disastrous" and would cause the library 
service to be "crippled" (Corres., F.D.O. Fielding to G.N, 
Davies, 12/9/73; Corres,, F.D.O. Fielding to J.E. Ritchie, 
12/9/73). The Library Committee supported Fielding and 
resolved that that Committee should remain as a Senate 
Committee rather than be transferred to the Professorial Board 
and be subject to the interdepartmental haggling over 
resources that would follow such a move (LCM, 25/10/73:6-7), 
Davies was alarmed at Fielding's threat to resign if the 
proposal to alter the library's budgetary arrangements was 
proceeded with but it was eun indication of the confusion 
exhibited during the policy formulation process that no one 
was certain as to whether the Davies Committee had had in mind 
the scenario envisaged by Fielding or whether the proposal 
merely referred to the 5% or so of the departmental block 
votes that might be allocated by departments to purchase books 
and journals for housing in departments (Cowen Committee, 
Minutes, 14/12/73:1). Davies made the latter interpretation 
and further conflict on that point was avoided (Corres., G.N. 
Davies to F.D.O. Fielding, 13/9/73). 
The Staff Association considered the Davies Report on 
26 October 1973 and resolved: 
That the Staff Association informs the Senate 
of its profound dissatisfaction with the Report 
of the Committee on the powers, duties and 
responsibilities of the Professorial Board and 
the ensuing recommendations, which do little to 
remove the causes which previously have led to 
the Staff Association to express lack of 
confidence in the Professorial Board. The 
Report does not analyse realistically the 
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philosophy and current problems of academic and 
administrative structure and of decision-medcing 
processes facing the University community, and 
the adoption of the Recommendations will not 
remedy the weedcnesses and deficiencies in the 
governeunce of the University of Queensland 
(Corres., President UQSA to G.N. Davies, 
31/10/73). 
Although this was a strong condemnation it should be noted 
that the Association's meeting was attended by only fifty 
three persons and the resolution was carried by a vote of only 
35 to 11. 
The Improvements Committee argued that it had been 
inappropriate for the Professorial Board to examine its own 
powers eund functions and that a more detached eund objective 
review would have been undertaken by a committee of the Senate 
(ICM, 27/11/73:10). The Improvements Committee's influence, 
however, was on the wane at that stage largely because of its 
political insensitivity eund its increasingly adversarial 
relationship with the University hierarchy. Just six weeks 
earlier the Vice-Chancellor had reprimanded the Committee for 
taking it upon itself to refer back to the faculty boards for 
further consideration, the Professorial Board's decision not 
to appoint a Director of General Studies. The Improvements 
Committee therefore resolved to wait and see what the Cowen 
Committee had to say before making its views known to the 
Senate. 
Perhaps one of the most damning indictments of the 
Davies Report came from the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and 
Finance) in a paper sent to the Vice-Chancellor three days 
before the Cowen Committee was due to meet for the first time. 
Ritchie reminded the Vice-Chancellor of the proposed 
amendments to the University Act presently before the 
313 
Parliament which placed a statutory responsibility on the 
Senate for the adoption and control of the annual budget, a 
responsibility which could not be delegated. The Senate's 
responsibilities in this regard were exercised on the advice 
of its Fineunce Committee, pursuant to Statute No. 4. 
Ritchie's main concern was the Professorial Board's attempt to 
assign to itself "an executive authority over financial 
allocations to all sections of the University", including non-
academic activities, by the University Resource Committee 
dominating the budget formulation process from April-November, 
then leaving the Finance Committee less than three weeks to 
submit the budget to the Senate: 
One difficulty in all this is to discover what 
is to be the role and responsibility of the 
Finance Committee, other than to formally 
endorse action already taken to construct a 
budget (Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 11/12/73). 
Ritchie argued that it was the Finance Committee's role to 
assess competing demands from all sections of the University. 
He concluded that the Davies Committee had interpreted the 
Professorial Board's advisory role too widely and in so doing 
it had intruded on "... the role of the Senate and the 
University 'administration' ... which is responsible to the 
Senate" (Memo, DVC(F&F) to VC, 11/12/73). 
Amid the general condemnation surrounding the Davies 
Report, little comfort could be taken from the positive tone 
of the Standing Committee of Convocation's blandishments "... 
to congratulate those responsible on the excellence of the 
report" (SCCM, 12/10/73:2). That vote of confidence was 
irrelevant to the Realpolitik of influencing the policy 
process and, if anything, merely served to reinforce the 
prejudice that Convocation was excessively remote from the day 
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to day life of the University. 
At the Cowen Committee's meeting on 14 December 1973 
the overriding concerns were the Davies Report's implied 
conviction that the Professorial Board was the centre of the 
universe and the Board's endorsement of the proposals to 
subordinate virtually all substantive University activities to 
Professorial Board control. This sort of arrangement was 
designed to preempt the Senate's ability to play a 
constructive part in policy formulation and its effect would 
have been to limit the Senate's role to formal endorsement or 
veto of Professorial Board recommendations on a wide range of 
matters, academic and non-academic, financial eund non-
financial. Thus the report was criticised as being: 
.., inadequate in so far as it did not attempt 
to assess the implications of its 
recommendations in relation to the role of 
Senate (Cowen Committee, Minutes, 14/12/73:3). 
The Cowen Committee reiterated the point that the Senate would 
become a "rubber stamp" if the Professorial Board obtained 
effective control over the budgetary process as well as the 
Library and Research Committees; for the Senate to be well 
informed, the Committee felt that senators had to be 
immediately involved, through the Senate's own committees, 
rather than merely receive and endorse reports submitted by 
other University committees comprised mainly of academics. 
Faced with mounting hostility to his Committee's 
recommendations, Davies conceded that they might have gone too 
far in the role suggested for the University Resource 
Committee and the Professorial Board. He indicated, however, 
that the proposals had been based on the need to integrate 
financial and academic advice to the Senate since in the past 
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the Professorial Board had meuie some mistakes in proposing 
academic developments in isolation from their financial 
implications. Unconvinced by this rationalisation, the Cowen 
Committee felt that the Professorial Board and the Senate each 
had a distinctive set of responsibilities and it was important 
that they did not overlap; the Professorial Board's advice on 
academic matters could be prejudiced if it became preoccupied 
with financial considerations. Davies was perspicacious 
enough to realise belatedly that the Finance Committee's sense 
of importance had been damaged by the recommendations 
contained in his report. His pragmatic compromise, which was 
aimed at heading off counter proposals from the Cowen 
Committee, argued that the main objections to the report could 
be overcome if the University Resource Committee reported 
direct to the Finance Committee rather than to the 
Professorial Board. Although this change violated the central 
logic of the Davies Report, the Committee eigreed that the 
change would ensure that "the needs of the University as a 
whole" were "objectively considered" while at the same time 
preserving an equitable balance "between the primary and 
secondary functions of the University" (Cowen Committee, 
Minutes, 14/12/73:2-4). 
What was especially interesting about the response to 
the Davies Report was that the question of resource maneigement 
and the roles of the Senate and the Central Executive in this 
process had started to displace the original concern over the 
Professorial Board's composition as the dominant issue arising 
from the report's recommendations. It would be wrong to 
conclude from this, however, that the primary concern was 
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confined to achieving a more effective structural integration 
of academic eund resource decision-making. Rather, the hidden 
agenda was the distribution of power. In this connection Blau 
has suggested that organisational power rests on control over 
economic resources: 
In academic institutions no less than in other 
org eun iz at ions, the most importeunt decisions 
concern the allocation of economic resources 
... the allocation of economic resources 
determines the structure of the university and 
the academic work being carried out in it 
(1973:278). 
The allocation of resources in universities had traditionally 
been reserved for the governing body acting on the advice of 
the finance committee and the first meeting of the Committee 
had revealed the Finance Committee's sensitivity to be seen to 
be exercising de jure control in this area. In reality, 
however, that control was more mythical theun real with the 
budgetary process being dominated de facto by the Central 
Executive. The mythology surrounding the Finance Committee's 
importance was a hangover from the days when Story wielded 
real power as Vice-Chancellor and as Chairman of the Finance 
Committee but that was before the creation of the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) position. 
According to a member of the Davies Committee who 
subsequently served as a member of the Finance Committee, 
perhaps the biggest tactical error committed by the Davies 
Committee was to disturb that myth and be seen to be 
challenging the authority of the Finance Committee and 
therefore, indirectly, the power of the Central Executive 
(Interview, R.C. Gates, 1/8/84). With Ritchie's assistance, 
the challenge was effectively put to rest on 17 April 1975 
when the Finance Committee adopted the report of an ad hoc 
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sub-committee which it appointed on 22 August 1974 to examine 
the implications of the Davies Report (FCM, 17/4/75:7-9). The 
Sub-Committee's report, which was drafted by Ritchie, 
described the Davies Committee's view of the Finance 
Committee, yet again, as a "rubber-stamp" and it pointed out 
that quite apart from the breadth of financial expertise on 
the Finance Committee, its composition had gradually evolved 
so that by 1975, it was a broadly representative body 
comprising eight external senators, Vice-Chancellor, both 
Deputy Vice-Cheuncellors, three academic staff senators and one 
student senator: 
One of the major reasons for objection to the 
role of the Board proposed by the Davies Report 
is that the Finance Committee brings together a 
reunge of differing points of view both from 
within the University and from without. The 
members of the Committee from commerce and 
government bring to its deliberations special 
expertness and a breadth of experience which is 
not matched within the University (McCray 
Report, 8/4/75:5). 
In a candid acknowledgement of the highly centralised 
nature of the University's budgetary processes, the Sub-
Committee's report noted that after allowing for centrally 
controlled staffing and fixed overhead costs, the proportion 
of discretionary spending available was very small; that was 
the reason why "highly centralised decisions are needed before 
additional activity in these areas can be approved" and also 
why the devolution and flexibility imagined to be possible by 
the Board was "somewhat illusory" (McCray Report, 8/4/75:9). 
The Finance Committee concluded therefore that it did not 
believe that the changes to the budgetary procedures 
recommended by the Davies Report were warranted. 
The Cowen Committee did not meet again until 9 July 
318 
1975 because it was necessary to wait for the responses of the 
faculty boards. Staff Association and the Student Union. 
Whereas the Davies Report was based on the values of elitism, 
meritocracy and hierarchy, the Staff Association's response 
was based on the values of democracy, collegiality and 
community. The response was prepared by a sub-committee 
appointed by the Association although the actual drafting of 
the document was undertedcen primarily by Fielding and 
O'Donnell, both of whom had been members of the Hill Committee 
(Interview, F.D.O. Fielding, 23/7/84). In contrast to the 
relatively unsophisticated attempts by the Staff Association 
in the past to formulate submissions on aspects of University 
governance, the present response was an articulate if 
vitriolic statement based on historical eund cultural data as 
well as information on trends elsewhere, which was designed to 
present an apparently objective alternative to the model of 
university governance contained in the Davies Report.(7) It 
condemned the spirit of the Davies Report as being designed to 
perpetuate the "God-Professor" syndrome and alleged that the 
report exhibited eun arrogant disregard for the contributions 
that could be made by directly elected non-professorial 
academic staff, non-academic staff as well as students in 
decision-making (UQSA, Concerning University Governance, 
(7) The vitriolic nature of the Association's response 
reflected a deep-seated antipathy between conservative 
elements of the professoriate and other sections of the 
University. Such antipathy can cause organisations to 
be preoccupied with symbols and processes rather than 
the substance of the organisation's mission. As Burns 
and Stalker have argued, political and status 
consciousness can have a corrosive influence in 
organisations and eventually the conflict which is 
generated can diminish organisational performance 
(1961:146). 
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5/4/74:6-7). 
The literature on moral philosophy suggests that the 
principles of equality and efficiency are powerful ideologies 
which are frequently used in attempts to discriminate between 
competing claims in the interests of justice. The 
Association's assertion of egalitarieun principles stood in 
sharp contrast to the principles of efficiency which 
underpinned the "form follows function" approach advocated in 
the Davies Report. In reacting to the Davies Report the Staff 
Association was careful also to assert that its egalitarian 
ideology was entirely compatible with greater decision-making 
efficiency. It has to be realised, however, that the 
advancement of parochial interests is often obscured by 
reference to ostensibly "rational" argument. As Burns eund 
Stalker have suggested, the characteristic feature of conflict 
over participation rights in organisational decision-making: 
... is that political ends are pursued as being 
in the interests of efficiency ... both sides 
of such political conflicts would claim to 
speak in the interests of the community as a 
whole: this is, indeed, the only permitted 
mode of expression in the maneigerial 
legislature (1961:145) 
It is fair to conclude that both the Staff Association 
and the Davies Conamittee were guilty of what Pfeffer has 
called "selective perception" where competing interests look 
for support for their ideological positions among the complex 
multi-dimensional facets of policy problems (1981:141). This 
process however prejudices the rational examination of 
alternatives and, as a consequence, the decision premises that 
are articulated tend to generate biased conclusions. For 
example the Association readily cited the Oxford and Cambridge 
models of democratic egalitarianism but were less candid about 
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the major historical, social eund fineuncial, not to mention 
staff quality differences between those ancient universities 
and the University of Queensland; moreover, the Association's 
reference to recent democratic trends in selected British 
civic universities was not balanced by reference to the 
bureaucratic trends that were evident in many North American 
universities. 
The Association's response on the composition of the 
Professorial Board was not finalised until 7 August 1974 and, 
as foreshadowed in the earlier document, it represented a 
radical alternative to the Davies Report. The proposed 
membership of seventy six was achieved by proscribing 
automatic professorial eund head of department membership and 
substituting instead fifty staff members elected on a faculty 
basis plus four students and various other representatives as 
set out in Appendix (1) (Corres., Exec.Sec. UQSA to Reg, 
12/8/74). 
At the same time the Association was not so 
ideologically blinkered that it was incapable of constructive 
criticism. It properly drew attention to the Davies Report's 
abortive attempt to fuse academic and resource decision-making 
and the inevitable concentration of power in the University 
Resource Committee and Academic Executive Committee that would 
arise from restricting the Professorial Board to two scheduled 
meetings per year. The Association favoured resource 
acquisition and allocation being integrated throughout the 
department - faculty - Professorial Board - Finance Committee 
- Senate chain rather than being divided by superimposing 
unrepresentative school resource committees on the system 
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thereby excluding the collegial faculty boards from the 
process (UQSA, Concerning University Governance, 5/4/74:16-
19). 
However the Association's proposals were made to appear 
relatively conservative compared with those adopted by the 
Student Union on 13 June 1974. The Union's response, which 
was limited to the composition of the Professorial Board, had 
abandoned its earlier unsuccessful attempts to have the Board 
consist mainly of elected chairmen of academic departments and 
instead advocated the establishment of an Academic Board of 
about 100 members comprised almost entirely of elected 
members. Approximately half were to be elected by eund from a 
"Common Roll" in which all members of the University 
(including non-academic staff and students) could have the 
same voting eund candidature rights. The other half of the 
Board were to be elected by the faculties and other groups on 
a proportional basis. 
Although the Union's proposals were imprecise eund 
somewhat ambiguous there was no doubting their hostility to 
bureaucratic authority; ex officio membership was to be 
limited to the Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(UQU, On University Governance, 13/6/74:5-7). The submission 
was a crude, dogmatic diatribe, complete with doctrinaire 
cliches about the University being comprised of "pluralistic 
social organisms": 
The principle of the common roll does not 
recognise that any member of the campus 
community has by virtue of academic position 
any special powers of perception to judge over 
the conditions under which other people work. 
This process of removing administrative and 
political hierarchy must be accompanied by the 
introduction of new teaching and learning 
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situations, until the campus can be regarded as 
a community (UQU, On University Governance, 
13/6/74:8). 
Cowen was appalled at the unwillingness of the Union to grasp 
the concept of the authority of knowledge eund to accept the 
consequential distinction between "teacher eund taught". While 
he was prepared to concede some token representation to 
students at the highest levels of University decision-making, 
at no stage did the Union's submission carry any real weight 
in the policy process (Interview, Z, Cowen, 8/5/85). 
Indeed the unrealistic tone of the official Union 
response was even an embarrassment to a number of executive 
officers of the Union who made a separate, private submission 
to the Registrar on 21 August 1974. That submission was far 
more moderate. For example, on the central issue of the 
Professorial Board's composition, the respondents accepted the 
essence of the Professorial Board's amendments to the Davies 
Report with the exception that they rejected automatic 
membership of the professoriate as well as academic senators. 
Whilst not agreeing with all of the views put forward, Davies 
considered the submission to be "a constructive and helpful 
document" (Corres., G.N. Davies to W. Abrahams, 1/10/74); it 
reinforced his view that the Union was a heterogeneous group 
of interests and that official submissions from that body by 
no means necessarily reflected the opinions of the student 
body. 
During 1974 the majority of the faculty boards 
considered the Davies Report and the Professorial Board's 
amendments. Three faculty boards (Arts, Science, Law) offered 
no comment; Arts and Science had been unable to obtain 
quorums to discuss the report and hence the matter had lapsed 
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(FBAM, 23/9/74; Corres., Dean, Fac. Science to G.N. Davies, 
6/9/74; FBLM, 7/3/74). Of the remaining faculty boards, 
there was strong support for the establishment of an Academic 
Executive Committee but there was no consensus on the other 
substantive matters (FBM (Various) 19/3/74-1/7/74). The 
diversity of responses certainly called into question the 
claims by the Staff Association that it represented the views 
of the University community on such matters. 
With the appointment of a new Senate pursuant to the 
revised University Act, the Cowen Conamittee was reconstituted 
on 27 February 1975. Of the fourteen members, seven had 
served on the previous Committee and although the Finance 
Committee was still well represented, there was now a much 
stronger reform presence with the inclusion of the co-authors 
of the Staff Association's response to the Davies Report as 
well as two student representatives. 
The Committee met briefly on 9 July 1975 and expressed 
concern over the delays that had occurred as a result of the 
failure of the Faculties of Arts and Science to comment on the 
Davies Report. It was not until the 14 August 1975 that the 
reconstituted Committee began its work in earnest. That 
meeting exposed the wide variety of views on the Davies 
Report's recomnaendations. O'Donnell adopted his 
characteristic approach of trying to give the Staff 
Association's policy more legitimacy by placing it in a 
historical context and making comparisons with selected 
overseas universities. He argued that the choice in relation 
to the Professorial Board was essentially to have either a 
large board in which all of the professoriate had a 
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jg jure right of membership (which would be so unwieldy 
that most of its functions would need to be devolved to small 
unrepresentative executive committees) or to have eun academic 
board comprised mainly of elected members which was large 
enough to be fully representative yet sufficiently small to 
operate effectively without abrogating its responsibilities in 
favour of small executive committees (Cowen Committee, 
Minutes, 14/8/75:4-5). Fielding returned to the theme of the 
submission that he had made to the Cowen Committee in December 
1974 regarding the "exclusive attitude" of the Davies Report 
in seeking to concentrate power in two unrepresentative 
executive committees and he condemned the report's failure to 
provide adequately for the participation of senior 
professional non-academic staff in University policy making 
(Cowen Committee, Minutes, 14/8/75:7). 
Conservative views opposing radical change to the 
Professorial Board and its committee structure were also 
strongly represented. Gates, the new President of the 
Professorial Board, was reported as having stated that: 
This was a large, old University with 
established traditions eund ways of doing 
things. While being prepared to make changes 
perhaps in a piecemeal way at a marginal level, 
he would strive to maintain continuity in the 
system (Cowen Committee, Minutes, 14/8/75:4). 
Mr. Charles Porter, the Liberal Party member for Toowong was 
on the Committee as a member of the Finance Committee. He had 
long been a strong critic of student and staff radicalism at 
the University and the apparent inability of the Senate to 
deal effectively with it. Porter was therefore concerned at 
the prospect of activist groups gaining control of the 
Professorial Board and he issued the ominous warning: 
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... that the time might not be too far off when 
the community might wonder if the amount of 
funds it made available to the University 
justified the results (Cowen Committee, 
Minutes, 14/8/75:7).(8) 
The critics were not restricted to spokesmen for the 
Staff Association eund other disaffected interests. Both the 
Vice-Cheuncellor and Justice Campbell gently chided the 
Professorial Board for its failure on occasions to advise the 
Senate on substantive matters and for its permissiveness in 
relation to proposals coming from the faculties (Cowen 
Committee, Minutes, 14/8/75:8). 
Davies' main concern, two years after his Committee had 
reported, was to try to find some common ground between the 
Committee's recommendations and the responses from other 
constituencies within the University and to salveige what he 
could from what was left standing in the Committee's Report. 
The only substantive area of common ground was the suggestion 
in the Davies Report that future consideration be given to 
integrating academic and resource decision-making at the 
faculty board level. That concept was supported in principle 
by the Staff Association, the Fineunce Committee and Ritchie 
and now that the semester system had been introduced, faculty 
boards would have been more able to take on the additional 
responsibilities (Cowen Committee, Minutes, 14/8/75:1,2,9). 
However Cowen was not convinced that the structural 
integration of academic and resource decision-making at the 
faculty board and Professorial Board levels would be an 
(8) This review of values and attitudes serves as a 
reminder to Cohen eund March's suggestion that many 
decision-making processes are characterised by the 
participants looking for opportunities to air their 
prejudices (1974:81). 
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improvement over the present system. Some commentators felt 
that Cowen's views were not necessarily based on a conviction 
that the present arrangements produced better educational 
outcomes. They suggested that his approach was derived more 
from a philosophy of "divide and rule"; this enabled him to 
take advantage of the confusion arising from the freigmented 
advice coming from a variety of competing sources to impose 
his own priorities. While anecdotal evidence can be adduced 
to support that contention, it is probably too cynical to be a 
totally accurate representation of reality. Other evidence 
suggests that Cowen was disdainful of "managerialist" models 
of integrated academic and resource decision-making; he 
believed that the best decisions came from having the right 
people strategically placed to consult trusted senior 
colleagues. Indeed Cowen felt that the best way to improve 
academic and resource decision-meiking would have been for 
himself as Vice-Chancellor to simultaneously hold the office 
of President of the Professorial Board (Interview, Z.Cowen, 
9/5/85). Given that such a reform was not on the political 
agenda, Cowen saw no advantage in seeking to enhance the power 
of the academic structure in resource decision-making while 
his personal influence over the Professorial Board was so 
heavily circumscribed. 
According to Cohen and March, in complex organisations 
characterised by system overload, problem resolution tends to 
be the exception rather than the rule. Rather, the tendency 
is for problems to be avoided or overlooked ("oversight") or 
to be attached to other problems for which a more congenial, 
less problematic choice can be made ("flight") (1974:83-86). 
In 1975 the University of Queensland was still suffering from 
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high system overload and the problem of the Professorial Board 
and its committee structure was a latent problem that had 
become active following the recission motion of October 1972. 
The Senate and Cowen were keen for the matter to be settled 
because of the divisive nature of the debate and the 
distraction that it posed for busy decision-makers in 
addressing the substeuntive business of the University. As 
Katz and Kahn have remarked: 
As increasing proportions of organizational 
input are utilized to maintain and energize the 
organization itself, eund are therefore absorbed 
rather theun transformed into product, the 
organization becomes less efficient (1966:458). 
Cowen was a person who liked to win issues and he 
tended to distance himself from lost causes. The general tone 
of the responses to the Davies Report convinced him that there 
was too much division of opinion on the major recommendations 
to justify pressing ahead with them (Interview, E.C. Webb, 
16/8/84). However whereas the Professorial Board's attempt to 
gain effective control over budgeting had been so discredited 
that it could be settled by a combination of "oversight" and 
"flight", Cowen realised that the original policy problem of 
the Board's composition was an issue that possessed continuing 
political salience and which would not go away. The 
conditions were therefore ripe for a shift in the focus of 
attention away from the "function" issue of resource 
management back to the "form" issue of composition. 
Cowen's 1961 views on university decis ion-making 
processes as "an abominable waste of talent" had been strongly 
reinforced by his experience at the University of Queensland 
(1961:55). Early in 1975 he observed in connection with the 
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demand for participation in decision-making that: 
It is a matter for real concern that there are 
so many and such onerous demands on so many 
good scholars because they make formidable 
inroads upon the time available for research 
eund associated academic pursuits. That is a 
serious matter; teaching eund scholarship are 
the raison d'etre of the University and if 
many of its best and ablest are so deeply 
involved in other matters however important, 
however intellectually taxing, scholarship must 
inevitably suffer. 
I worry very much about a situation in which 
too many are too deeply embroiled in many 
things far removed from those which bring 
distinction to universities and enlightenment 
and stimulation to students (VC's Report to 
Convocation, 1974:16). 
Holding these sentiments, Cowen was receptive to the advice of 
the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) (Professor Webb) that 
the weiy forward was to propose the establishment of an 
Academic Board with membership restricted to around 100 
members which would be widely representative of all the major 
constituencies within the University but which would not give 
de jure membership rights to the professoriate over the 
rest of the University community. The professoriate would 
still be well represented among ex officio heads of 
departments and deans; if the Professorial Board was in fact 
providing academic leadership as the Davies Report claimed, 
then some of its members would no doubt be successful 
candidates in an election by and from all academic staff. 
Importantly, a Board of that size could afford to meet monthly 
and would not need to abrogate its responsibilities to small 
unrepresentative executive committees (Interviews, E.C. Webb, 
16/8/84; F.D.O. Fielding, 20/8/84). 
At the Cowen Committee meeting on 9 October 1975, the 
Vice-Chancellor turned the "form follows function" concept on 
its head and stated that the central issue to be addressed was 
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the composition of the senior academic body not its functions. 
Members agreed with his view that that body should be renamed 
as the Academic Board eund that it should comprise 
approximately 100 members eund have broadly the same functions 
and committee structure as at present. Cowen argued that some 
seventy six members (Vice-Cheuncellor, both Deputy Vice-
Chancellors, the sixty heads of departments and the thirteen 
deans) had to be ex officio members of the Board because 
of their legal responsibilities aund, given the size 
constraints, this placed limitations on the balance of the 
composition. Full details of Cowen's proposal, which was 
adopted by the Committee, are given in Appendix (1). At this 
point, however, it is appropriate to note that there was no 
provision for automatic professorial membership although it 
was agreed that the Academic Board should include sixteen 
persons elected by eund from the full-time teaching staff down 
to tutor level as well as the President of the Union and four 
elected students (Cowen Committee, Minutes, 9/10/75:1-5). 
Davies and Gates were both upset at the Cowen 
Committee's recommendation to the Senate to refer the proposal 
on the composition issue to the Board for comment without 
bothering to address the other related matters raised in the 
Davies Report. They felt that the elimination of automatic 
professorial membership would "be a bitter pill for many of 
our colleagues to swallow" and that it was therefore important 
to "sugar it with a clear statement on the total context in 
which the reforms are recommended" (Corres., G.N. Davies to 
VC, 14/10/75). 
One week after receiving this advice, Cowen received a 
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memorandum from Fielding in which he indicated that he would 
support the Library Committee becoming a committee of the 
reconstituted Academic Board provided that it was a widely 
representative committee which was able by virtue of that 
representation to provide advice to the University Librarieun 
on all matters associated with the Library (Corres., F.D.O. 
Fielding to VC, 21/10/75). This followed the Research 
Committee's advice to the Senate that it should become a 
committee of the Professorial Board subject to it continuing 
to have a substantial representation from the Senate (ROM, 
29/10/74:7). 
In the light of this support for two of the Davies 
Report's recommendations, Cowen felt that it would be possible 
to deliver something to the Professorial Board which might 
"sugar" the "bitter pill" it was about to receive. On 28 
October 1975 he submitted a draft report to the Committee 
which addressed the other major recommendations of the Davies 
Report and which sought to make the recommendations concerning 
the Board's composition less stark by putting them into some 
sort of context. The draft report supported the Davies 
Report's recommendations that the Research Committee and 
Library Committee be transferred from the Senate to the 
Professorial Board. However Cowen moderated the Board's 
influence by making the transfer subject to the Senate having 
four members on the Research Committee and conditional on the 
Library Committee being in the first instance advisory to the 
Librarian as well as being widely representative (Cowen 
Committee, Minutes, 28/10/75:7-8). 
The draft report argued that the Davies Committee's 
proposals were based on the assumption that two new executive 
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committees of the Board plus the Staff Affairs Committee would 
be necessary because an enlarged Professorial Board would be 
meeting only twice per semester. As the draft report was now 
proposing a smaller more representative Academic Board which 
would be meeting monthly, those assumptions no longer applied 
and thus the present committee structure could be retained for 
the time being. The possibility of future reform was not 
ruled out however and it was recommended that the new Academic 
Board might observe the present committee structure in 
operation for a year or two before considering whether changes 
were required (Cowen Committee, Minutes, 28/10/75:6). In 
accepting all of the draft report's proposals, the Committee 
recommended to the Senate that it be referred to the 
Professorial Board for comment and made available to other 
groups in the University for their information. The Senate 
agreed with the Committee's recommendations and allowed the 
Professorial Board until 31 May 1976 to respond (SM, 
27/11/75). 
The Professorial Board considered the Cowen Committee's 
report on 9 February 1976 and resolved to form an ad hoc 
Committee to examine it and advise the Board by 5 April 1976. 
The Committee consisted of - the President and Deputy 
President of the Professorial Board (Professor Gates and 
Professor S. Lipton respectively); Dr. G.W. Beck (Dean of the 
Faculty of Commerce and Economics); Professor W. Burnett (a 
former member of the Davies Committee); Dr. I.A. Harley (Head 
of Department of Surveying and a member of the Education 
Committee, 1975-1976); Professor T.J. Heath, (Dean of the 
Faculty of Veterinary Science and member of the Standing 
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Committee, 1975); Professor L.C. Holborow (Head of Department 
of Philosophy and a member of the Improvements Committee); 
Miss J.M. Line (Head of Department of Occupational Therapy); 
Professor K.W. Ryan, (Dean of the Faculty of Law, 1971-1974) 
and Professor B. Zerner (a former member of the Committee on 
Administrative Procedures, 1971-1972). Davies declined 
nomination to the Committee but made it clear that he felt the 
major outstanding issue was the need to establish effective 
coordination of academic and resource decision-making so that 
the Board would be better able to advise the Finance Committee 
of its priorities (PBM, 9/2/76:14). The Committee's first 
meeting on 15 March 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Gates 
Committee) was marked by strong opposition to the Cowen 
Committee's recommendations. Although in other forums the 
revised constitution of the Senate had been used by some as an 
argument for liberalising the membership of the Professorial 
Board, Gates argued that the Board should: 
... be representative of senior and mature 
academic opinion within the University ... The 
Senate was a representative body, its 
membership covering a fairly wide spectrum of 
interests both within the University and 
outside ... In view of the differing roles of 
the two bodies it was to be expected that they 
should be constituted differently. Members of 
the Professorial Board should be people who 
were senior in an academic sense, who had 
thoroughly absorbed the tradition of the 
University and who possessed an on-going 
responsibility for the maintenance of academic 
standards (Gates Committee, Minutes, 15/3/76). 
Notwithstanding the Cowen Committee's implicit rejection of 
the "form follows function" concept, the Gates Committee again 
took up the comfortable theme that the Board's composition was 
directly linked to the nature of its role. The concern was 
that under the Cowen Committee's proposals, professors would 
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lose their automatic membership on the Board and that because 
some professors would not be prepared to stand for election, 
the proportion of professorial representation could be 
expected to decline sharply. Doubts were also expressed over 
the ability of a few students to represent almost 18,000 of 
their colleagues and there were fears that they might simply 
follow the "party line" of the Union Council (Gates Committee, 
Minutes, 15/3/76). 
The Gates Committee's line stood in sharp contrast to 
the Improvements Committee which met to consider the Davies 
Report and the Cowen Committee's response. The Improvements 
Committee fully supported the Staff Association's proposals so 
far as the fifty four elected staff were concerned and, while 
a majority of the Committee was prepared to support the 
addition of the same number of students to be elected by and 
from the Union, the number unanimously agreed to was sixteen. 
While rejecting the Cowen Committee's proposals concerning 
elected staff representation, the Improvements Committee 
generally agreed with that Committee's proposals for 
ex officio membership subject to the addition of the two 
elected student senators. This composition provided for a 
membership of 156 but the Committee argued that there was no 
evidence to show that an Academic Board of 100 was any more 
effective than one of 200 (ICM, 11/3/76). 
The Improvements Committee supported the proposal for 
the Research Committee and Library Committee to become 
committees of the proposed Academic Board and eigreed also with 
the Cowen Committee's rejection of the proposition that the 
Academic Board should meet only twice per semester and refer 
its unfinished business to the University Resource Committee 
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and Academic Executive Committee as appropriate. 
On 8 March 1976 O'Donnell and a Mr. P. Wertheim (a 
staff activist from the late 1960s who had served on the Sub-
Committee which prepared the Staff Association's response to 
the Davies Report) wrote to the Dean of the Faculty of Arts 
claiming that the Cowen Committee's rejection of most of the 
substantive proposals contained in the Davies Report was "a 
striking vindication of the policies of the University of 
Queensland Academic Staff Association ..." and that it was now 
important to add weight to the momentum for reform that was 
starting to build up by having the Faculty of Arts reaffirm 
its October 1972 policy on the composition of the proposed 
Academic Board (Corres., M.P. O'Donnell and P. Wertheim to 
Dean, Faculty of Arts, 8/3/76). At a meeting of the Board of 
the Faculty of Arts it was pointed out that the Faculty had 
missed the opportunity to influence the policy process during 
1974 through its failure to gain a quorum to discuss the Davies 
Report. Many members of the Faculty Board had not read the 
Cowen Committee's Report but, as the present meeting was the 
last opportunity to make its views known to the Professorial 
Board, the Faculty Board agreed to reaffirm the substance of 
its October 1972 policy. That policy supported the 
establishment of an Academic Board to include representatives 
of academic staff elected by and from academic staff of the 
rank of tutor and above, equal in number to the number of 
heads of departments. However a student representative on the 
Faculty Board who was also a member of the Improvements 
Committee successfully moved that the number of student 
representatives on the Academic Board should be increased from 
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seven to sixteen, the same number suggested by the 
Improvements Committee (FBAM, 15/3/76). Thus, like the 
Improvements Committee, the Faculty of Arts advocated eun 
Academic Board of over 150 members and in common with that 
Committee, the Cowen Committee, Staff Association and the 
Student Union, did not support the automatic membership of the 
professoriate. 
At its meeting on 26 March 1976 the Gates Committee had 
before it the Improvements Committee's recommendations but 
was divided on what to do. Conservative members reasserted 
the "form follows function" principle which justified in their 
minds the most senior academic staff collectively acting as 
the senior academic advisory body to the Senate in the 
interests of efficiency. At the same time the reformers 
called for more "realism" in the interests of democracy, 
arguing that the reconstituted more representative Senate 
would wish to receive advice from a reconstituted senior 
academic body that was also more representative (Gates 
Committee, Minutes, 26/3/76). 
Unfortunately orthodox organisational theory is 
inconclusive on the validity of the "form follows function" 
principle as a basis for designing an appropriate 
organisational structure eund there is a great deal of 
ambiguity and uncertainty over the nature of the relationship 
between sub-unit size/composition and sub-unit performance. 
Hence in order to find a path through this ambiguity and 
uncertainty there is often a tendency to fall back more onto 
political (bargaining and negotiating) interaction and to rely 
much less on the intellectual cogitation of the rational-
scientific school except as an ex post facto 
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rationalisation of political behaviour (Wildavsky, 
1979:92,107). Thus the process of seeking to resolve the 
central issue of the Professorial Board's composition 
witnessed intense bargaining as the Board sought to reconcile 
the demands for more democratic participation with the 
pressures to maintain oligarchical control. 
After four lively meetings during the early part of 
1976, Gates prepared eun interim report in order to assess the 
direction of the Board's thinking in the hope that this would 
help crystallise opinion on the Committee. One thing that had 
become clear in the Committee's discussions to date was that 
the question of the most appropriate size for the Board was 
starting to have a major influence on the composition issue. 
Whereas the Gates Committee felt that the Cowen Committee's 
proposal to limit membership to 105 was too restrictive, a 
size of between 140 and 150 was believed to be too large 
(Gates Committee, Interim Report, 5/4/76:5-6). A number of 
factors affected the size consideration. First, the Committee 
agreed almost unanimously that the Vice-Chancellor, Deputy 
Vice-Chancellors, deans and heads of departments should be 
ex officio members (a total of seventy six members). 
Second the Cowen Committee's proposal to eliminate automatic 
professorial membership would affect forty eight professors 
who were not heads of departments or deans. Third, the Board 
needed to be large enough and have a sufficient spread of 
disciplines on it to be able to man all of the Board's 
committees effectively. And fourth, the size of the board 
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room had to be taken into account.(9) 
Three members of the Committee indicated a preference 
for a Professorial Board composed entirely of professors, 
heads of departments and deans but a majority felt that 
whatever the technical-efficiency arguments in support of that 
option, it was politically not feasible. Accordingly, six 
supported a compromise second option involving a 
"preponderance" of senior academic staff together with 
"representation" from other levels of academic staff. Whereas 
it had been readily possible to make generalised non-
quantified distinctions, the Committee was more evenly divided 
when it came to finer, quantified discriminations. In 
canvassing the second option further, four members of the 
Committee favoured all professors plus twenty four 
representatives of other academic staff being appointed to the 
Board while five members supported twenty foxit professors 
(other than heads of departments and deans) together with an 
equal number of representatives of other academic staff being 
appointed (Gates Committee, Interim Report, 5/4/76:5). Only 
two members favoured academic staff members of the Senate 
being ex officio members of the Board eund the Committee 
was evenly split over the Cowen Committee's proposal to extend 
ex officio membership to the President of the Student 
Union. At the seune time the meeting conceded that some 
student membership was unavoidable but felt that it should be 
less than that suggested by the Cowen Committee (Gates 
(8) The present room seated seventy six members comfortably 
and this coincided with the average attendance even 
though the total membership was 126. The University 
Architect had drawn up plans to show how the seating 
capacity could be increased to ninety or 114 seats 
(Memo, Uni. Architect to R.C. Gates, 7/4/76). 
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Committee, Interim Report, 5/4/76:8,11). 
Thus by the end of the meeting on 26 March 1976, the 
Gates Committee was reconciled to having some elected staff 
and student representation on the Board and, therefore, made 
the symbolic gesture of agreeing to the Board's name being 
changed to Academic Board. The recommendations made by the 
Cowen Committee concerning the other matters were eigreed to by 
the Gates Committee with little debate. 
Straw votes were used by the Professorial Board at the 
meeting on 12 April 1976 to clarify its thinking on the 
recommendations contained in the Committee's interim report. 
A majority of the Board was opposed to the motion that the 
Board should remain constituted as at present (24 votes to 45) 
but at the same time a larger majority (51 votes to 19) 
favoured all professors remaining on the Board. Only eight 
opposed the neune of the Professorial Board being changed to 
Academic Board eund it eventually emerged that the most popular 
option was for all professors plus twenty four representatives 
of other academic staff to constitute the Board along with the 
ex officio members and student representatives (PBM, 
12/4/76). There was almost unanimous support for the Vice-
Chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellors, heads of departments and 
deans being ex officio members and a majority (36 votes to 
29) supported the inclusion also of the academic staff 
senators. A large majority (57 votes to 12) eigreed that the 
President of the Student Union should be admitted to 
membership although like the Gates Committee, the Board felt 
that student representation should be less than the level 
proposed by the Cowen Committee (PBM, 12/4/76). The 
Professorial Board endorsed the Committee's support for the 
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other recommendations of the Cowen Committee and agreed, 
without debate, to forward the recommendations of the Faculty 
Board of Arts concerning the composition of the Board to the 
Senate along with the Board's recommendations when they were 
finalised. 
At its meeting held on 15 April 1976 the Gates 
Committee reviewed the Professorial Board's straw voting 
figures alongside the Improvements Committee's proposals. The 
latter proposals were set aside because they did not make 
specific provision for guaranteed professorial membership 
whereas the Professorial Board had indicated a strong 
preference for its continuation. The problem was that if up 
to twenty four non-professorial academic staff were also to be 
included, the Board would comprise 153 members. Because the 
Committee had by now imposed a limit of 130 on the maximum 
size, it was agreed that a reduction in the size implied by 
the Board's straw votes was warranted (Gates Committee, 
Minutes, 15/4/76). 
Although the Committee's argument that a membership of 
130 would be satisfactory but that one of 153 would be too 
unwieldy was somewhat spurious, the need to find somewhere 
where they could all sit was literally of more concrete 
significance. Accordingly, allowing for the usual less than 
maximum attendance at meetings, the Committee calculated that 
the University Architect's plan to provide seating for 114 
members would be sufficient for a membership of 130. While 
this may have resembled the Greek legend of the 
Procrustean Bed, the reduction of twenty three members 
provided yet another example of political compromise which 
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bore little resemblance to the scientific rationalism of "form 
follows function". Thus the Committee agreed that half of 
those professors who were not heads of departments or deeuns 
(i.e. twenty three professors) should cease to be eligible 
(Gates Committee, Minutes, 16/4/76). This outcome also gave 
the illusion of rationality and symmetry since the number of 
elected professors (other than heads of departments and deans) 
would equal the number of elected non-professorial academic 
staff. During the following two meetings, the Comffiittee 
refined its views and at its seventh and last meeting, the 
Committee settled on a membership of 123 including two elected 
representative groups (professors other than heads of 
departments and deans and tenured non-professorial academic 
staff) with each group comprising twenty members. Student 
representation was restricted to the President of the Union 
(Gates Committee, Minutes, 4/5/76). 
This was a carefully contrived plan by the Committee to 
balance the range of competing interests. Whereas the Cowen 
Committee's report was flawed by its failure to acknowledge 
the professoriate as a special constituency, the Gates 
Committee corrected that omission while at the same time 
allowing for greater non-professorial representation. The 
main casualty in the Gates Committee's deliberations were 
students. With impeccable precision, however, the Committee's 
almost slavish devotion to the size constraint had resulted in 
a membership equal in size to the existing Board. 
At its meeting on 17 Meiy 1976 the Professorial Board 
considered the Committee's draft report. However before it 
could be debated, six members including Lyons made a last-
resort attempt to frustrate the process and provide a further 
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opportunity for them to lobby behind the scenes in order to 
put a halt to the proposed liberalisation of the Board's 
membership. They moved successfully that the Board should 
conduct a postal preferential ballot on the various proposals, 
including: 
o the present composition of the Board (Option A); 
o the Cowen Committee's proposal (Option B); 
o the Gates Committee's proposal (Option C); 
o any other proposals approved by the Board for 
inclusion. 
The Board approved the inclusion of three further options: 
o the proposal for 153 members which had emerged from the 
straw voting at the Board meeting on 12 April 1976 
(Option D); 
o a proposal suggested by Professor C. O'Connor for a 
representative smaller Board of eighty seven members 
(Option E);(10) 
o a proposal for a Board of 113 consisting of all 
professors plus senior academic administrators but 
excluding ex officio membership of heads of 
departments and deans (option F).(PBM, 17/5/76:67-72). 
Protagonists at that meeting rehearsed yet eigain the 
time-honoured arguments in support of selection from above on 
the basis of merit vis-a-vis election from below according 
to democratic egalitarian principles. Confronted with the 
(10) Option E comprised the Vice-Chancellor, both Deputy 
Vice-Chancellors, academic senators, deans. President 
of the Student Union, 50% of the heads of departments 
and 50% of the remaining professors with representation 
of the heads and professors being based on a system of 
rotation with the view to each department being 
represented on the Board at any one time. 
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very real prospect of democratic reform, conservative Board 
members sought to preempt the outcome of the ballot: 
... the present composition of the Board 
represented the outcome of a natural and 
gradual development to meet the needs of a 
constantly changing situation. The conclusion 
was that no major change was necessary or 
desirable (PBM, 17/5/76:73). 
This statement reflected the way the systems model of 
organisational theory is open to abuse by actors with a vested 
interest in the policy outcome; the status quo is often 
justified by them on the basis that it is a "natural" 
condition which is in harmony with structural and 
environmental demands. However as Child observed, the choice 
of organisational structure is more usually the choice of 
powerful actors who are able to manipulate the environment as 
well as internal organisational opinion (1972:10-17).(11) In 
the period before the postal ballot both the conservatives and 
the reformers engaged in further lobbying to convert the 
waverers to their cause. However there was by this late 
stage in the policy process a general feeling among a majority 
on the Board that limited reform was probably desirable. In 
the interests of achieving evolutionary change which avoided 
both the divisiveness associated with a continuation of 
oligarchical control and the dysfunctions associated with an 
(11) Rose has observed that when faced with reconciling 
equally compelling claims, policy makers often seek to 
resolve the dilemma by trading-off one objective 
against another according to the political climate of 
the moment (1976:16-19). Thus cyclical change might 
occur as policy makers try to reconcile the competing 
claims for greater democratic participation 
vis a vis greater oligarchical control. Over time, 
there might be a net increase in the movement towards 
one of those goals which in effect is the resultant of 
the trade-off between internal structural needs, 
environmental pressures and the preferences of key 
decision makers. 
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excessive swing towards egalitarieunism, compromise was almost 
inevitable. Indeed the results of the ballot bore witness to 
the phenomenon of incremental change which sought to maintain 
continuity while at the same time conceding something to 
ameliorate a persistent policy problem: 
Options A B C D E F 
Votes 27 7 29 21 10 5 
Table No. 9.2: Results of Ballot to Determine Preferred 
Composition of the Professorial Board 
(Gates Report, 28/6/76:7). 
It can be seen that the Gates Committee's proposal was 
the most preferred but that almost as many members would have 
been content with the status quo. At the same time the 
results showed that the majority, probably in the interests of 
compromise, sought to balance the need for efficiency (which 
it was believed would be put at risk by the large board in 
option D) against the political need to include both 
professorial and non-professorial representation. 
The Gates Report embodying the results of the ballot as 
well as the other resolutions eigreed to on 12 April 1976 were 
submitted to the meeting of the Cowen Committee on 13 July 
1976. Gates felt that the Vice-Chancellor had unceremoniously 
deserted the conservative cause on the composition issue and 
he was concerned that Cowen's self-conscious liberalism might 
lead him to hold firm on his 1975 stand that there should be 
no provision for automatic professorial membership on the 
Board (Interview, R.C. Gates, 1/8/84). In warning against 
taking such "extreme measures". Gates argued that "a great 
university was an 'elitist' institution and not a wholly 
democratic one. The rigour of university standards and 
insistence on academic excellence should not be put at risk" 
344 
(Cowen Committee, Minutes, 13/7/76:2). 
At the same time the Staff Association had recently 
reasserted its view that the University should be seen as a 
community eund that the Academic Board should therefore consist 
of approximately eighty members including fifty academic staff 
elected on a faculty basis. O'Donnell indicated however that 
a compromise position might be to accept the inclusion of 
heads of departments and deans provided that the 
discrimination inherent in having separate electorates for the 
twenty professorial and twenty non-professorial staff 
representatives could be replaced by a common academic staff 
electorate to choose forty representatives (Cowen Committee, 
Minutes, 13/7/76:2). The Professorial Board had not favoured 
a common academic electorate because some members felt that 
non-professorial staff would not vote for professors. It had 
to be acknowledged, however, that the Professorial Board's 
proposals envisaged some 74% of the professoriate serving on 
the Board whereas only twenty out of approximately 825 tenured 
non-professorial academic staff (2.42%) would be directly 
represented. 
While these arguments for and against extensions of 
non-professorial representation were all based on quite valid 
ideological and organisational principles, no one on the 
Committee was prepared to singlemindedly press his position. 
At this late stage in the policy process after the ritualistic 
expression of differences had been aired, there was a 
preparedness to compromise - to give ground in order to win 
back some so that every constituency would get something out 
of the process. Cowen perceived that the process was now ripe 
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for closure. Having tested the water with his 1975 proposals 
and noted the Board's wholehearted rejection of them, he was 
anxious to bring this long seiga to a conclusion which would 
have the support of all the major constituencies. The meeting 
was therefore receptive to his decisive support for a Board of 
about 123 members with separate professorial and non-
professorial electorates as recommended by the Professorial 
Board (Cowen Committee, Minutes, 13/7/76:4-5). 
The capricious nature of political bargaining was 
further revealed on the question of student representation. 
In 1973 the Professorial Board had recommended that four 
students be appointed to the Board whereas in 1976 there was 
support for only one such representative. This shift had 
occurred largely because the student body had become quiescent 
and was no longer perceived to be a political force to be 
reckoned with and because any increase in student 
representation would have to had been at the expense of other 
groups such as the professoriate which were much better placed 
to mount effective campaigns to protect their interests. Thus 
the Professorial Board's restriction of student representation 
to the President of the Union was pure power politics -
students were seen to be the weakest constituency in which to 
contain the demands for reform. However the Cowen Committee 
was more disinterested in the outcome of the composition issue 
and had witnessed on the Senate the useful contribution made 
by students to the functioning of that body. Accordingly, a 
majority supported Cowen's advocacy for the Board to include 
four students, including the President of the Union (Cowen 
Committee, Minutes, 13/7/76:5). This was a reduction of one 
student representative from the Committee's recommendation of 
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9 October 1975 and reflected the willingness to concede ground 
in order to win support. 
The other point of contention concerned the nature of 
the Senate representation on the Board. Whereas the Cowen 
Committee on 9 October 1975 had recommended that all staff 
senators should be ex officio members of the Board, the 
Professorial Board had argued that membership should be 
extended only to academic staff senators. This was a 
provocation to Fielding who had earlier taken it upon himself 
to champion the cause of professional non-academic staff in 
the University. Indeed Fielding had been the driving force 
behind the Senate's decision to add three full-time graduate 
staff in the 1973 amendments to the composition of the Senate 
(SM, 19/10/72:714). Confronted with what he felt was the 
Board's offensive discrimination against graduate non-academic 
staff, Fielding successfully pressed for the Cowen Committee 
to confirm its earlier recommendation (Cowen Committee, 
Minutes, 13/7/76:5). 
In submitting the Comrflittee's report to the Senate, 
Cowen made the point that the central issue concerned the 
recommendations on the Professorial Board's composition 
(SM, 22/7/76:92). In effect the wheel had turned full circle -
from the composition issue being the main policy problem 
arising from the rescission motion on 30 October 1972 to the 
attempts by the Davies Committee and the Professorial Board to 
redefine the policy issue more in terms of the Board's 
functions and finally to the efforts by the rest of the 
University community (and especially the Vice-Chancellor and 
the Cowen Committee) to focus attention back on the original 
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policy problem. Unsuccessful attempts were made by the 
President of the Staff Association to win support for a common 
academic staff electorate and by O'Donnell for eun extension of 
the non-professorial academic staff electorate to include 
tutors. The President of the Student Union eund the Chairman 
of the Improvements Committee both sought, unsuccessfully, to 
have student representation increased to sixteen (SM, 
22/7/76:94-95). 
However as almost four years had elapsed since the 
Davies Committee had been established and almost six years had 
passed since the Hill Committee had been set up to examine the 
composition of the Professorial Board, the Senate was 
determined to bring the matter to finality. As Mr. Justice 
Campbell said: 
... as a great deal of work at all levels of 
the University community had preceded the 
development of the proposals, it was preferable 
to accept the recommendations of the Report as 
a package deal (SM, 22/7/76:95). 
Accordingly the Cowen Committee's recommendation for an 
Academic Board comprising 129 members as summarised in 
Appendix (1) together with the other recommendations on which 
the Professorial Board and the Cowen Committee had agreed on 
28 June 1976 and 28 October 1975 respectively, were approved 
by the Senate. 
In concluding this chapter, it can be seen that 
environmental and structural factors continued to play a 
significant role in providing the framework within which the 
policy process unfolded. Environmental factors included the 
traditional academic values of collegial decision-making as 
expressed in recent reforms at departmental and faculty board 
levels and the traditional public accountability values as 
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expressed in the reassertion of strong centralised control 
over resources. Structural factors included the overriding 
consideration of the Professorial Board's size, the problem of 
how best to coordinate extensive horizontal differentiation 
and a growing awareness of the inefficiencies derived from the 
lack of comprehensive integration of academic and non-academic 
resource decision-making. 
It can be seen that these factors did not always pull 
in the same direction. The confusing policy environment was 
subject to various interpretations as to whether environmental 
and structural factors should be viewed as constraints to or 
as opportunities for reform. Thus although such factors were 
important, their main impacts were in the interpretations 
given to them by key actors such as Cowen, Webb, Ritchie, 
Davies, Gates, Lyons eund Fielding in the light of their own 
values, definitions of the situation and stedce in the outcome. 
In particular, Ritchie's behind the scenes intervention to 
reaffirm the role of the Central Executive and the Finance 
Committee in relation to budgeting and Webb's iconoclastic 
advice to Cowen to do aweiy with automatic professorial 
membership of the Professorial Board (also given outside the 
formal committee system) were highly influential. However 
Cowen, by virtue of his pivotal position as chief executive 
and chairman of the Senate Committee appointed in effect to 
sort out the chaos which followed the submission of the Davies 
Report, exercised the most decisive impact. Most of the 
impact of the other key actors was exercised through the 
committee network and was subject to their ability to bargain 
and compromise at the margin without insisting on ideological 
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purity. 
The main prima facie outcome of the policy process 
was undoubtedly the achievement of a more balanced 
Professorial Board composition. Certainly this was the most 
obvious direct consequence but as Rhodes has suggested, a 
common dilemma in trying to assess whether the policy process 
has been effective is due to the ambiguity which frequently 
surrounds the original policy problem and the need to take 
account of the indirect consequences of the policy process 
(1975:128,138). One of the policy problems which emerged from 
the outset was the perception held by some members of the 
Professorial Board that the Board should play a more central 
policy role within the University. While the Board was 
partially successful in this quest (to the extent that the 
Research and Library Committees became Board rather than 
Senate Committees), the Davies Coffimittee was spectacularly 
unsuccessful in its bold attempt to make the Professorial 
Board the key body in the coordination of academic and 
resource decision-malcing. 
If, however, account is taken of the indirect 
consequences of the Davies Committee, for example whether it 
was able to condition or influence the climate of opinion held 
by members of the relevant community, then it could be argued 
that the Committee was highly successful. In this connection 
the Davies Committee placed the crucial issue of the need for 
more effective coordination of academic and resource decision-
making firmly on the political eigenda for the first time in 
the University's history. Because of its relevance to 
efficiency, accountability and the distribution of power, this 
was the issue which dominated the policy process concerning 
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the University's decision-making structures and processes for 
the whole of the remaining period covered by this study. This 
was a major achievement. 
Chapters ten and eleven will examine how the need 
to improve the coordination of academic eund resource decision-
making served as the unifying theme for the various proposals 
to reorganise the University's decision-making structures and 
processes which were made between 1976 and 1982. 
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^APTER TEN 
THE CULT OF ACGQUMTABTLITY: INTERNAL QRQANISATIQHAL 
RESPONSE. 1976-1980 
This chapter will examine the period 1976-1980 and 
trace the transition from the issue of democratic 
participation dominating the political agenda to the issues of 
efficiency and accountability occupying centre stage in the 
debate surrounding the reform of the University's system of 
governance. 
Many authors have noted that the modern preoccupation 
with efficiency is the common thread which links all the calls 
for more accountability (Nilsson, 1979:143; Burke eund 
McKenzie, 1979:81). Hyde has suggested that the demands for 
increased accountability in higher education have followed two 
distinct stages. The first stage (the pre-1976 period) 
coincided with the years of rapid growth and optimism where 
institutions could afford to indulge demands by staff eund 
students for greater democratic participation in decision-
medcing. The second (post 1975) stage coincided with a period 
of at best "steady state" and at worst, economic contraction. 
In this latter phase the "pragmatism of economics" reigned 
supreme eund there were demands for greater accountability in 
order to demonstrate that scarce public resources allocated to 
post-secondary education were being utilised in the most 
efficient manner (1979:11). 
Hence a key factor in understanding the dynamics of 
this transition is to comprehend the impact of the cheunges in 
the political-economic climate surrounding Australian 
universities, from the relative expansionary affluence of the 
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early 1970s to the severe budgetary restraint and pessimism of 
the latter half of that decade.(1) 
The effects of budgetary cutbacks were sharply 
reflected in the funding made available to the University of 
Queensland. Over the period 1969-1971 the recurrent income 
(general fund) per student increased at eun annual avereige rate 
of 6.55% compared with 22.21% (1972-1975) and 8.89% (1976-
1980) (Statistics, 1976:169; Annual Reports, 1977:10; 
1978:14; 1979:23; 1980:32).(2) 
Despite the relative affluence of the 1972-1975 period, 
the University of Queensland entered the contractionary second 
half of the decade with a very weak financial base. The 
University's plight was finally recognised by the Australian 
Universities Commission in its Sixth Report. However the 
Commonwealth Government did not accept that report's 
recommendations and the accumulated funding shortfalls were 
(1) Whereas during the period 1968/69-1972/73, Commonwealth 
outlays for recurrent expenditure on universities 
increased at an average annual rate of 14.9%, following 
the abolition of .tuition fees and the assumption of 
full responsibility by the Commonwealth from the 
beginning of 1974, the avereige annual rate of increase 
over the 1973/74-1974/75 period jumped to 95.01%. This 
compared with an average rate of increase in annual 
outlays of only 11.03% between 1975/76-1978/79 
(Tomlinson, 1982:78). (These calculations include 
moneys paid to the States under States Grants 
1 eg i s 1 at i on) . 
(2) The higher level of funding made available over the 
1972-1975 period as a factor in explaining the 
democratisation of the Professorial Board needs to be 
kept in perspective. While it may have fostered a 
favourable psychological environment for more 
democratic participation, it should be remembered that 
the University was still funded during the 1970-1975 
period at approximately 19% below the average of the 
other large Australian universities (UQTS,1982-1984, 
1980:3). As chapter nine has suggested, the influence 
of key actors was at least as important in the reform 
process. 
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thus not corrected (AUC Sixth Report, 1976:231,296). 
The University's financial problems were compounded by 
a decision-making structure which did not comprehensively 
integrate academic and resource decision-making. Coordination 
was made difficult by the ritual of many academic departments 
invariably seeking to maximise their share of resources eund 
the Central Executive invariably stressing the need for 
economy. Notwithstanding the meagre resources available, 
resource optimisation was the exception rather theun the rule. 
Nilsson (1979:140,145) has drawn attention to the 
"accountability movement" which has been active in higher 
education since the mid 1970s and Scott (1981:103) has noted 
that this has led to pressure on universities to demonstrate 
"value-for-teixpeo^ ers' money". These pressures for greater 
efficiency and accountability have contributed, in turn, to a 
greater awareness of the need to reform decision-making 
structures eund processes (Hyde, 1979:12-13; Ramsey eund 
Hewlett, 1979:59,79). According to Baldridge et al, the most 
likely orgeunisational response derived from such pressures is 
increased managerial control: 
When the legislature demands "accountability" 
from the faculty, the administration is given 
the power to enforce it. When resources are 
short ..., the administrators use that 
dependency to dictate educational policy 
(1978:97). 
The present study takes the position that, especially at a 
time of economic restraint, the pressures for accountability 
increase and hence bureaucratic control measures gain the 
ascendancy. Such measures include a greater stress on 
economic efficiency rather than democratic participation, 
management by individuals rather than collective 
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responsibility, executive selection rather than executive 
election, centrally determined guidelines rather than 
decentralised judgement and uniformity rather than diversity. 
An important element in the University's efforts to 
improve efficiency in the face of budgetary cutbacks was the 
increasing use of Vice-Chancellorial rather than Professorial 
Board committees for ad hoc advisory as well as for 
academic and resource coordination purposes. This strategy 
gave the Vice-Cheuncellor more flexibility in choosing the 
membership and the terms of reference of such committees as 
well as more discretion in deciding what action to take in 
response to their reports theun if ad hoc or standing 
committees of the Professorial Board had been used. Indeed 
some of the Vice-Cheuncellor's committees such as, for example, 
the inquiry into the teaching and administration of Journalism 
(1975), Pharmacology (1975), Fine Arts (1975), Anthropology 
(1977), Management (1978), Oral Biology and Dentistry (1978) 
as well as the review of research and postgraduate study 
(1977) were in areas which one might have expected committees 
of the Professorial Board to have been more involved.(3) 
However it was in the area of resource acquisition and 
allocation that Vice-Chancellor's committees had their 
greatest impact on policy making. The success of the Pleunning 
Committee in formulating the 1976-1978 triennial submission, 
that Committee's work in pleunning for the introduction of 
(3) Statute No. 7 was revised and gazetted with effect from 
1 January 1977 to reflect the change in composition 
from a Professorial Board to eun Academic Board. 
However the name of the senior academic body did not 
change from Professorial Board to Academic Board until 
the 1981 eunendments to the University of Queensland 
Act 1965-1973 were proclaimed on 1 September 1981, 
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first year quotas in 1975 and especially its role in planning 
for the introduction of budgetary outbacks after 1976 were 
especially significant. There is no doubt that the years of 
budgetary restraint enabled the Vice-Cheuncellor and the rest 
of the Central Executive to exercise a more interventionist 
role in policy making. 
This extended into all fields of University activity 
including areas which hitherto had been allowed to develop in 
an ad-hoc way without any proper evaluation. An exeunple 
of this trend towards greater systemisation was the Vice-
Chancellor's decision in 1976 to review the University's non-
academic staffing policies with the twin objects of 
reallocating resources to meet changing priorities and 
developing guidelines to assist heads of departments to make 
"realistic submissions" in a period of no growth (Milns 
Report, 5/ll/76:v). The University's budgetary situation was 
so severe that in the case of administrative and clerical 
staffing the Vice-Chancellor's ad hoc committee was also 
requested to make recommendations as to where reductions of 
from l,5%-2,5% in the staff establishment might be made. 
Indeed, faced with the prospect of negative growth for the 
first time, the Vice-Cheuncellor established eun ad hoc 
committee in 1976 to review overall budget priorities for 
1977, By enabling this Committee to consider appeals by 
departments eigainst eunomalies which occurred in the 
centralised resource allocation process, it was hoped that 
more effective use of resources could be made (CRBPM, 
11/2/77:4). This Committee was used only during 1977 but the 
fact that it was required at that critical time was tacit 
acknowledgement of the difficulties faced by centralised 
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resource committees in trying to ensure that resource 
allocations corresponded with departmental priorities. It 
also served to emphasise the fact that ad hoc "band aid" 
procedures were not remedies for the more fundamental problem 
of the lack of structural integration of academic eund resource 
decision-making from basic unit to governing body. 
In eun attempt to improve the effectiveness of the 
central resource committee system, the concept of area sub-
committees was extended to the Equipment and Maintenance 
Committee in 1974. These area sub-committees were based on an 
almost identical grouping of departments as was developed by 
the Davies Committee for the eight school resource committees 
and the concept was that they would allocate equipment eund 
maintenance funds to their constituent departments according 
to whatever criteria they chose. 
Although this arreungement represented eun improvement 
over the previous centralised system, it still did not provide 
eun effective meeuns of coordinating academic eund resource 
decision-making. The lack of opportunities for trade-offs 
among the various resource categories to reflect different 
departmental priorities was a major impediment to resource 
optimisation. Moreover, as with the area sub-committees in 
other budget fields, there were problems with the 
compatibility of some departments in area grouping. For 
example the Department of Physical Education, as a "newly 
establishing scientifically oriented department", was acting 
as a drain on the equipment allocations to the other 
departments in its area sub-committee eund the Head of the 
Department of Geography felt that as a result of that 
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Department being located in the Social Science grouping, its 
maintenance funding was much lower theun it should have been 
(Corres., Head, Dept. Phys.Ed. to DVC(F&F), 8/5/76; Corres,, 
Head, Dept. of Geog to DVC(F&F), 20/10/77). Whereas the 
Department of Geography believed that it was suffering from 
the "levelling" effects of being grouped with departments with 
which it had little in common, the Department of Regional and 
Town Planning was more worried about being dominated by the 
political strength of the more coherent Engineering 
departments. As the Head of that Department observed: 
The meeting, about Mainteneunce money, of the 
Technological Sciences group last Friday was a 
farce, wholly dominated by the Engineering 
departments. Having a meeting with them was 
like sitting down to the table with a family of 
vultures. All you can say for them is that 
their self-interest was at least candid eund 
naked (Corres., Head, Dept. Reg. & Town Planning 
to DVC(F&F), 16/11/74). 
The University's academic structure had in the past 
experienced considerable difficulty in formulating advice on 
academic developments which took account of budgetary reality. 
In 1976, for example, the Professorial Board referred to the 
faculty boards for comment, proposed academic developments 
estimated to cost $2 million. However at a time of extreme 
budgetary restraint, the faculty boards had suggested 
additional new proposals estimated to cost $2.6 million but 
had been unable to suggest euny areas where savings might be 
made (PCM, 24/6/77:6). 
One academic committee that was able to pleo^  a major 
role in the post-1975 period was the Steunding Committee, Over 
the 1970-1980 period, the Steunding Committee had been 
responsible for suppressing 137 academic positions (Reiyner, 
1980:5), Under Professor Gates, (whom many observers felt had 
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allowed himself to be coopted to the ranks of the Central 
Executive), the Committee became extremely active and in one 
year (1976) no less than forty one academic positions were 
suppressed (Rayner, 1980:5), Gates enjoyed the managerial 
role and, during his Presidency of the Professorial Board eund 
chairmanship of the Standing Committee, he was able at least 
to preserve the relevance of the academic structure in the 
face of an increasingly dominant Pleunning Committee, For 
example during 1977, the Standing Committee for the first time 
requested departments and faculty boards to submit plans for 
their academic developments over the following three years eund 
to place them in priority order (PCM, 28/7/77:1). These type 
of data proved to be extremely useful to the Vice-Chancellor 
and the Pleunning Committee and on 6 September 1978 the 
Standing Committee provided the acting Vice-Cheuncellor with a 
detailed report on the priorities for academic developments 
for the 1979-1981 triennium (PCM, 6/9/78:2-3). 
The budgetary constraints of the 1976-1980 period eund 
the consequential need to make more efficient use of scarce 
resources meeunt that the Planning Committee eund the Standing 
Committee were increasingly being used as extensions of the 
Central Executive. At a time when triennial pleunning, quotas 
eund control over academic staffing were even more importeunt 
than usual, these two committees ceune to emphasise the 
managerialist values of creative resource optimisation; 
reallocation rather than incremental ism was becoming more the 
norm. 
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that with this 
increased emphasis on technical-rationality eund efficiency. 
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political bargaining ceased to play an important role in 
decision-making. If anything, with the competition for scarce 
resources becoming more intense, political bargaining and the 
use of power became even more evident. Nowhere was this more 
so than in the allocation of space in the University's 
building program where accommodation deficiencies had now 
reached crisis point. In its report for the 1977-1979 
triennium, the Universities Commission conceded that the 
University of Queensland's building progreun was suffering from 
"the largest deficiency in absolute terms" of euny Australian 
University (AUC, Report for 1977-79 Triennium, 1976:124), 
However after recommending $19,470,000 and $9,500,000 for the 
University of Queensland's building progreun for the 1976-1978 
and 1977-1979 trienniums respectively, the actual amounts 
expended over the period 1976-1980 were only a fraction of what 
was needed. Actual outlays are illustrated in Table 10,1: 
$ 
Year ($,000) 
1976 1,218 
1977 798 
1978 401 
1979 752 
1980 506 
Table 10.1: University of Queensleund. Expenditure on 
Building Program 1976-1980 (Annual 
Reports,1977:11; 1978:14; 1979:23; 1980:32). 
Because of the long history of capital underfunding eund 
the consequential backlog of accommodation needs which had 
accumulated by 1978, building priorities totalling $16,581,000 
were identified. However as hardly any building funds were 
expected in 1979 the intensely political question arose as to 
which department would obtain space when funds did become 
available (PCM, 25/5/78:7), To overcome the space shorteige 
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the University contemplated leasing accommodation off-campus. 
One of the departments seeking additional space, the 
Department of Education, was in a politically weak position 
because of the reduced intedces into its teacher education 
progreun as a result of eun alleged Australia-wide oversupply of 
teachers. The Department of Education was prepared to move 
off-campus only if it received a firm assurance that the 
University would not abeundon education eund if the Department 
was given first priority on any new building (PCM, 12/7/78:2). 
The Planning Committee eigreed that any department that did 
help relieve the accommodation crisis by moving off-campus 
temporarily should get first priority on stage I of the next 
major building. However in the political bargaining that 
ensued, the Department of Psychology and the Department of Law 
were given first and second priority respectively. This 
outcome reflected the greater political leverage of those two 
departments compared with the Department of Education and the 
fact that the Planning Committee felt that whereas the 
Tertiary Education Commission might recommend funding for a 
major new building for Psychology or Law, it would be 
reluctant to support such expenditure on a department that was 
perceived to be in decline (PCM, 12/7/78:2). 
By mid-1977, there was a general air of pessimism 
pervading the University. Whilst most of this atmosphere was 
attributed to the budgetary restrictions there was also a 
feeling among some opinion leaders that the academic structure 
was becoming increasingly marginalised and that the real 
decision-medcing power in the University was drifting into the 
hands of the Central Executive. Baldridge et al contend that: 
,.. the basis of a faculty's influence and 
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power is its expertise - ... the more complex 
and esoteric the tasks of the institution, the 
higher the degree of expertise exhibited by the 
faculty. This increased expertise, translated 
into faculty power, leads to more professional 
autonomy and influence (1978:160), 
As noted in the preceding chapter, the degree of expertise 
exhibited within the University of Queensleund during the 1970s 
(measured in terms of research output) was less than 
impressive. Not surprisingly, the University's ability to 
compete for Australieun Research Greunts Committee (ARGC) 
funding was limited in comparison with other Australian 
universities of a similar size, as shown in table 10,2: 
Total ARGC Grants 
($ million) 
University Triennium 1977 
1973-1975 
Queensleund 1.63 0.67 
Melbourne 1,93 0.91 
Monash 2.06 0.96 
New South Wales 1.90 1.06 
Sydney 3.08 1.66 
Table 10.2: Total ARGC Grants 1973-75 eund 1977 at five 
large Australian Universities (Burnett 
Report, July, 1977:60). 
As the Burnett Report concluded: 
It appears from available sources of 
information that the academic staff of the 
University of Queensland do not perform well. 
This lends support to the suggestion that our 
short-fall in postgraduate enrolments is to 
some extent associated with poor staff 
performeunce in research (July, 1977:60). 
The pattern at the University of Queensleund closely 
followed the chain of events described by Baldridge et al 
where a relatively weak faculty at a time of budgetary 
cutbacks witnesses a drift in decision-making power towards 
the Central Executive. That drift tends to be accompanied by 
increasing systemisation and evaluation of activities in eun 
effort to improve the University's efficiency. That in turn 
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is legitimised as being in response to political demands for 
more accountability. But increased bureaucratic intervention 
into academic affairs can contribute to a lowering of academic 
morale. And a growing mistrust concerning the motives of the 
Central Executive results in a heightened industrial 
consciousness (1978:154-174,209-214). 
With the introduction of budgetary cutbacks in the 
post-1975 period and the failure to renew a number of limited-
term academic staff appointments, a protective industrial 
consciousness emerged within the Staff Association. The 
formal manifestation of this was the December 1976 
registration of the Association as a Union under the 
provisions of the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Acts 1961-1974.(4) Wliereas the objects of the 
Staff Association's constitution in 1969 had assumed a 
community of interests between academic staff and the 
University, the objects of the new Association contained no 
such assumption. Instead they reflected an adversarial 
employee-employer stance: 
To act as an intermediary between members of 
this Association and their employers, the 
University of Queensland ... 
and 
To protect and advance the interests generally 
of members of this Association by industrial, 
political or other means (UQASA, Constitution, 
1977:1). 
Notwithstanding these structural and environmental changes. 
(4) The unionisation of the Staff Association was also 
designed to preempt any attempts by existing unions to 
cover academic staff given that in December 1976, a 
range of professional and industrial unions had secured 
a State Industrial Agreement with the three Queensland 
universities to cover non-academic staff. 
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the roles of key individuals were still decisive. For 
example, during 1976-1977, the President of the Association 
was Mr. R.W. Byrom, a lecturer in law who understood the 
problems being faced by the University. Despite the 
occasional strains, especially over the effects of budgetary 
cutbacks in departments, Byrom was able to maintain harmonious 
relations between the Association eund the Central Executive. 
The Improvements Committee, however, was less 
conciliatory in view of what it believed was a lack of 
cooperation by the Central Administration. An examination of 
the Committee's Minutes for 1976 reveals that the Committee 
was investigating eun extraordinary range of items including 
the University's landscape master pleun, the availability of 
budget data eund the internal mail system. The Central 
Administration had attempted to counter the Committee's 
interventions by delaying or omitting to respond to the 
Improvements Committee's requests for information (ICM, 
10/11/76:8). Following the announcement of Cowen's departure 
to become Governor General eund Gates' resignation to take up 
the position of Vice-Chancellor of the University of New 
England, the Improvements Committee received a notice of 
motion from a member of the Committee that there should be a 
review of the Central Administration to include the roles of 
the Vice-Chancellor, Deputy Vice-Chancellors, President of the 
Professorial Board, Registrar, Bursar and other senior staff. 
The proposed review was to be undertaken by a body of persons 
"no less representative of the University as a whole than the 
present Improvements Committee" and the draft terms of 
reference were to be prepared by that Committee (Corres., I.F. 
Nicolson to Sec. Improvements Committee, 18/7/77). The 
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Improvements Committee resolved to recommend that the Senate 
initiate a review of the University's "senior administrative 
structure" since: 
... as a large publicly funded institution we 
should be prepared to follow the recent 
examples of the Public Service eund the 
University of London eund review ourselves 
before being reviewed by outsiders. 
Administration was expensive and it might be 
that savings could be made .,,(ICM, 20/7/77:4). 
It is interesting to note that at least some academic 
staff believed that the University of Queensleund had a large 
and top-heavy Central Administration. In fact the opposite 
was the case. In 1976, for example, the number of Central 
Administration staff per 100 student load employed by the 
University of Queensleund as a percentage of the corresponding 
category of staff in all Australian universities per 100 
student load was 84% whereas the equivalent figure for 
academic staff was 99%. Similarly in 1975 the salaries paid 
to Central Administration staff per student load employed by 
the University of Queensland as a percentage of the 
corresponding category of staff salaries per student load in 
seven large Australian universities was only 72% whilst the 
equivalent figure for academic staff was 95% (Rayner, 
1980:14). Notwithsteunding this reality there was considerable 
agitation at a time of cutbacks in academic staffing for the 
Central Administration's staffing to be reviewed. 
The recent activities of the Improvements Committee had 
convinced Davies, who was now acting Vice-Chancellor, that 
that Committee had become a nuisance and at the Senate meeting 
on 2 March 1978 he pointed out that the Committee had 
discussed matters: 
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without a sound factual background and there 
have been ill-considered proposals. The 
Committee proposed, for example, that the 
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor should be 
held up until there had been a complete review 
of the senior administrative structure of the 
University (G.N. Davies, Unpublished Minute, 
2/3/78), 
Although one senator argued that the Improvements Committee 
helped "to keep the Senate on its toes" eund to make the 
"dictators feel less comfortable theun they ought to" the 
Senate accepted Davies' recommendation that the Improvements 
Committee should not be reconstituted (SM, 2/3/78:60-61).(5) 
Although the Senate had rejected the Improvements 
Committee's recommendation, the cause was taken up by the 
Professorial Board. Davies attempted to head off this latest 
intrusion into the affairs of the Central Executive; he made 
it clear that: 
It was the job of the senior executive to look 
into matters such as this (PBM, 1/8/77), 
Davies indicated that the Senate felt that it would be 
inappropriate for such a review to tedce place before the 
appointment of the new Vice-Chancellor. Nevertheless Dr. D.K. 
Dignan, a Senior Lecturer in History eund eun outspoken elected 
member of the Professorial Board, argued that there was 
concern in the University at the excessive concentration of 
(5) The Senate's decision provoked considerable reaction 
from the Student Union because for years that body had 
used the Committee as a means of having grievances 
investigated. The Union sought to have the Committee 
reconstituted but Davies was able to have the matter 
put to rest by suggesting that no action should be 
taken until the Senate Conamittee set up to inquire into 
the desirability eund practicability of appointing a 
University Ombudsman had reported (SM, 11/5/78:97-98). 
The issue finally lapsed when that Committee 
recommended against the appointment of a University 
Ombudsman and the Senate endorsed that recommendation 
on 26 July 1979 (Corres,, G.N. Davies to Sec. GSA, 
7/6/80). 
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responsibility at the apex of the organisation; he sought a 
redefinition of roles within the University and a devolution 
of responsibility throughout the structure (PBM, 12/9/77:187), 
Concern was also expressed by other members over: 
,.. the proliferation of offices that had taken 
place within the University, particularly in 
the higher echelon in the last ten years. A 
process of ad hoc bureaucratization had 
created an overlap and duplication in decision 
making. There was a need for a thorough look 
at the higher administrative sector and the 
Board was one of the few bodies in the 
University capable of initiating such a 
review (PBM, 12/9/77:188). 
This debate was critical of the whole of the 
University's decision medcing structure which was perhaps not 
surprising given the orgeunisational inefficiencies identified 
by the Davies Committee in 1973 eund the virtual absence of any 
remedial action since then. As well as attacking the Central 
Administration, the Head of the Department of Law (Professor 
R.S. 0'Regan) argued that there should be much more devolution 
of authority to deans and heads of departments. Having failed 
in its earlier attempts to expand its influence and 
increasingly conscious of the Central Executive's more dynamic 
role in University governance, the Professorial Board felt 
that a review of the senior administrative structure to make 
it more accountable might be timely. It was resolved, 
therefore, that the Board recommend to the incoming Vice-
Chancellor that he establish a working party to review the 
University's "higher administrative structure" (PBM, 
12/9/77:188-190). (Davies investigated 0'Regan's list of 
grievances involving alleged maladministration eund discovered 
that with one exception all arose from the activities of the 
Professorial Board eund its committees and not the Central 
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Administration (PBM, 17/10/77).) 
The Professorial Board's thwarted attempts to expeund 
its influence eund its relative decline vis-a-vis the 
Central Executive as the senior academic advisory body to the 
Senate had damaged the Board's morale. Gradually the 
realisation spread, especially among those who had fought for 
elected non-professorial and student membership of the Board 
and who believed that it was the centre of the educational 
policy making universe, that their victory had been a hollow 
one. At a time of resource contraction, educational policy 
making more than ever before was contingent on resource 
management considerations taken by a range of central 
committees and coordinated by the Central Executive. 
With what must have been a sense of deja vu. the 
Deputy President of the Professorial Board (Professor S. 
Lipton) suggested to the Steunding Committee that it would be 
good for the general morale of the Board if a review of the 
Board's committee structure was undertedcen so that the 
impediments which prevented the Professorial Board from 
providing comprehensive policy advice to the Senate could be 
removed (Dep. Pres. PB Paper, Establishing a Working Party to 
Review the Committee Structure of the Professorial Board, 
15/6/77). The need for such a review had been foreshadowed by 
the Senate on 22 July 1976 when it was suggested that the 
reconstituted Professorial Board should observe the existing 
committee structure for a year or two before initiating any 
action to change it (SM, 22/7/76:93). 
Any examination of the Professorial Board's committee 
structure without simulteuneously considering the nature of the 
Board's relationship with the Central Executive clearly ran 
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the risk of being conducted in a vacuum. Nevertheless at the 
Professorial Board meeting on 27 June 1977, an attempt to 
widen the review to include an examination of the executive 
powers of the Deputy Vice-Chancellors was frustrated. It was 
resolved instead: 
111 that a working party be appointed to investigate and 
report on: 
{aj any desirable cheunges in the structure, composition and 
functions of the committees of the Board; 
(b) any consequential changes in the Board's procedures for 
handling business at its meetings; 
(2) that the working party be requested to pay particular 
regard to the meeuns by which academic and resource 
recommendations of the Board can be more effectively 
coordinated, and to the responsibilities of the Board as the 
senior academic advisory body to the Senate; 
(3) that the working party consist of the President or 
Deputy President of the Professorial Board, the Chairman of 
the Research Committee (Professor W. Burnett), two present or 
recent members of the Standing Committee (Professor E.G. Saint 
and Professor B. Zerner) and three other members of the Board 
(Professor G.J.A. Clunie, Mr. F.D.O. Fielding eund Dr. M.C, 
Grassie) (PBM, 27/6/77:105). 
The Committee to Review the Committee Structure of the 
Board (popularly known as the Committee on Committees) met 
only seven times over the period 25 October 1977 - 23 March 
1981, It was distinguished by its inability to achieve 
anything of consequence and because of this and also because 
there were many changes in the Committee membership over its 
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four year life, biographical details of the membership will be 
dispensed with.(6) 
Despite Lipton's enthusiasm to achieve something 
through the Committee, there was a delay of four months 
following the Committee's establishment while the Registrar 
gathered data on the operations of the existing conamittees of 
the Board. During this period the deeuns of the University met 
at the instigation of the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering 
(Professor D.J. Nicklin) and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts 
(Dr. R.A. Seckold). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
the problems faced by faculty boards, especially their limited 
influence in pleunning academic developments as a result of 
their lack of control over resources. The meeting had invited 
the Sub-Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of 
Melbourne to discuss the coordination of academic eund 
financial decision-making at the faculty level which had taken 
place at that University some five years earlier. It was 
noted that deeuns at the University of Melbourne were full-time 
positions supported by sufficient senior administrative staff 
to cope with the work associated with reviewing eund allocating 
resources among the constituent departments of each faculty. 
There was a coherent line structure which linked departments -
faculties - Committee of Deans - Professorial Board - Central 
Budgets Committee - University Council. Considerable 
discretion was devolved to faculties in the selection of staff 
and the system was designed to give maximum flexibility to 
(6) It should be noted, however, that following Gates' 
resignation from the University, Lipton took over as 
President of the Professorial Board and served as 
Chairman of the Committee until the end of 1979. 
Professor L.C. Holborow replaced Lipton as Chairman in 
1980. 
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faculties and departments to trade-off resources in a meunner 
which best reflected local rather theun centrally determined 
priorities. Since budgetary powers had been devolved to the 
faculty level, the University of Melbourne no longer 
experienced any problems in gaining quorums at meetings of the 
faculty boards (Report of Meeting of Deeuns, 26/9/77:1-7). 
Whereas in earlier years deanships at the University of 
Queensland had usually been held by senior professors eund were 
seen as positions of considerable prestige and influence, by 
1977 only three of the thirteen deanships were occupied by 
professors. With the exception of the two full-time 
professorial Deans of Medicine and Veterinary Science, the 
position had ceased to have much influence in planning 
academic developments.(7) Whilst this was partly due to the 
lower status of the majority of the deans, it was also due to 
the legal-structural relationship between the dean eund the 
heads of those departments whose staff taught subjects in 
courses administered by the faculty. Under Statute No. 10 the 
head was responsible for the efficient performance of the 
department's teaching, research and other functions. Moreover 
in accordeunce with the recommendations of the Davies Report as 
approved by the Senate on 22 July 1976, the head was also 
responsible for the department's financial management. Deeuns 
had no legal authority to coordinate the affairs of 
departments eund this had caused considerable problems for the 
full-time Deeun of Veterinary Science, Professor T.J. Heath, 
(7) These two deanships were appointed by the Senate for 
five year renewable terms on the recommendation of 
Senate selection committees whereas all other deanships 
were appointed by the Senate for one year renewable 
terms following election by the members of the relevant 
faculty boards. 
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As a full-time academic administrator. Heath was 
responsible for the coordination of matters of staffing, 
equipment, and mainteneunce necessary for the academic 
departments to provide existing and projected courses within 
the Faculty (SCM, 17/12/70:6-7). However because Heath had 
no authority over the activities of the heads of the 
Veterinary Science departments, he felt that his work was 
seriously handicapped in that he had not been given the 
necessary authority to enable him to discharge his 
responsibilities: 
,,, while the dean was made responsible for 
these areas, the relevant decision-making power 
remained with heads of departments, eund with 
members of the appropriate University 
committees. At best, the dean could be 
consulted and his advice talcen and he could be 
given feedback on the decision tedcen eund the 
reasons. Alternatively, he could be neither 
consulted nor advised on decisions taken within 
areas for which he is responsible. Committee 
chairmen have generally made eun obvious effort 
to adopt the first of these alternatives in my 
case , , , The second alternative has also been 
adopted on occasions during the last year 
(Corres,, T,J, Heath to VC, 24/11/74). 
Heath's concern led to the Vice-Cheuncellor establishing 
a committee to review the Veterinary School and in its report, 
the Committee proposed a major strengthening in the authority 
of the Deeun: 
As chief executive officer of the Faculty, the 
Dean is responsible for the coordination of the 
work of the constituent departments eund for 
medcing submissions on behalf of the Veterinary 
departments. Faculty, Clinic and Hospital, 
Farm eund Communal Facilities to appropriate 
University authorities eund committees on 
academic policy, research, staffing, equipment, 
maintenance and buildings eund accommodation 
generally (Report of the Committee on the 
Veterinary School and the Future, July 
1976:42). 
Whilst this proposal might have been desirable from a 
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practical viewpoint, the University Legal Officer pointed out 
that it was illegal as there were no such things as 
"constituent departments" in Statute No. 9. Moreover it could 
be argued that the responsibilities accepted by heads of 
departments pursuant to Statute No. 10 meant that deeuns could 
not interfere in the meunner contemplated by the Committee 
(Memo, ULO to VC, 13/4/77). 
The Dean of Veterinary Science was not alone in wanting 
a strengthening of the role of the deans vis-a-vis heads 
of departments in the coordination of academic and resource 
decision-medcing and accordingly the meeting of the Committee 
of Deans on 26 September 1977 was a receptive audience to the 
news of the University of Melbourne experience. Despite the 
fact that the Committee on Committees had been requested to 
pay particular regard to the means by which the academic eund 
resource recommendations of the Professorial Board could be 
more effectively coordinated, there was confusion over whether 
the report of the Committee of Deans eund the question of 
devolution of authority to the faculties should be considered 
by the Committee. Davies sought the advice of the Steunding 
Committee on this point since although he personally supported 
the idea, there were sixty heads of departments on the 
Professorial Board who could be expected to have reservations 
about the prospect of deans and faculty boards being 
interposed between themselves eund central University 
authorities. The Standing Committee considered this matter on 
3 April 1978 and although two members felt that it had not 
been the intention of the Professorial Board in setting up the 
Committee on Committees for it to examine a matter as broad as 
the devolution of authority to faculties, a majority supported 
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referral of the matter to the Committee (CC Agenda Paper, 
1/8/78). 
At the first meeting of the Committee some members 
indicated that the key issue to be examined was the role of 
faculty boards. Members were asked to write to their 
associates in the Universities of Sydney, New South Wales, 
Monash, Melbourne and Adelaide to obtain information on their 
systems of resource allocation and in particular on the 
balance between centralised and decentralised decision-medcing 
(COM, 25/10/77:2-3). Foreshadowing the gathering of further 
data, the President also advised the Professorial Board that 
the Committee would be seeking submissions from the University 
community at the appropriate time (PBM, 17/10/77). However no 
call for submissions was ever made. 
The next meeting of the Committee had to wait nine 
months but on 1 August 1978 the Committee received the report 
of the Committee of Deans and the Chairmeun reported that the 
acting Vice-Chancellor had agreed that eun examination of the 
question of devolution of authority to faculty boards was 
within the Committee's terms of reference. The Committee held 
an initial discussion on that matter which, although 
inconclusive, was fairly critical of the concept of 
devolution. This attitude was ostensibly based on the higher 
costs involved (on the twin assumptions that full-time deans 
would be paid professorial level salaries and there would be 
additional faculty administrative staff) and there were also 
worries that the success of such a system would be dependent 
to a significant extent on the executive ability of the 
deans. The Committee decided however that rather than 
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become bogged down from the outset on the vexed question of 
devolution of decision-making to faculty boards, it would 
concentrate initially on reviewing the structure, composition 
and functions of the present conamittees of the Board (COM, 
1/8/78:1-2). (The hidden eigenda in that deferral centred on 
the opposition expected from heads of departments on the 
notion of faculty boards having authority over their resource 
management responsibilities and because some members of the 
Committee, like many of their colleagues on the Professorial 
Board, were not comfortable with the idea of faculty boards, 
as presently constituted, having such powers (Interview, M.C. 
Grassie, 31/7/84).) 
This review was aimed primarily at finding ways of 
enhancing the roles of the Professorial Board and its 
committee structure in the coordination of academic and 
resource decision making without impinging on the domains of 
the Fineunce Committee and Central Executive. The lessons of 
the Davies Committee had been well learnt and at the following 
meeting the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) was 
present by invitation to explain how the annual budget was 
formulated. Ritchie lost no time in emphasising that the 
budget was the Vice-Chancellor's responsibility. It was the 
Vice-Chancellor who had to balance proposals for expenditure 
from the Professorial Board against the requirements of other 
bodies ancilliary to teaching eund research. In formulating 
the budget, the incrementalist approach was followed with the 
Bursar calculating the cost of continuing existing operations 
at a "stand-still" level. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric 
and Fineunce) then tentatively allocated any surplus having 
regard to priorities identified in triennial submissions, 
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Senate resolutions, Professorial Board proposals as well as 
claims from ancilliary services. It had been Cowen's practice 
to consult with both Deputy Vice-Chancellors, the Registrar 
and on occasion the President of the Professorial Board as 
well as the Chairmeun of the Finance Committee before 
submitting the draft budget to the Finance Committee aund the 
Senate. Because the University did not receive advice on the 
funds available until late in the year it was not possible to 
refer the draft budget to the Professorial Board for comment 
and indeed it was not normally available to the Finance 
Committee before the end of October meeting. Ritchie argued 
that whilst there might appear to be a lack of structural 
integration of academic and resource decision-making, in fact 
this was not the case. This was because the Vice-Cheuncellor 
and his colleagues participated in all major policy committees 
and, where necessary, the Vice-Chancellor consulted the 
Planning Committee on priorities (COM, 4/8/78:1-2). 
Jenkins has suggested that the budgetary process was 
crucial to the distribution of political power in 
organisations. The exercise of political power was embedded 
in the budgetary process (1978:182). Thus the need to improve 
the coordination of academic and resource decision-making was 
not just concerned with improving the quality of decision-
making. Rather it concerned the allocation of power. Hence 
the Committee sought to extend the boundaries of academic 
influence in the budgetary process whereas Ritchie sought to 
preserve that traditional Central Executive domain, Ritchie 
had proved to be a formidable protector of the Central 
Executive's role in controlling the budgetary process. 
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Notwithstanding the technical-rational arguments in favour of 
the comprehensive integration of resource and academic 
decision-making, the Committee realised that there was no 
future in pursuing the matter. Accordingly the matter was 
allowed to lapse like the closely related question of 
devolution of decision-making to the faculty boards had been 
shelved earlier (COM, 19/10/78:1), As Pfeffer has 
observed: 
, , . cheunges which do entail shifts in the 
distribution of influence are rare events, 
brought about chiefly by major cheunges in the 
organization's environment which create 
problems or constraints which are too pervasive 
to ignore (1981:329). 
Fielden eund Lockwood have alluded to the propensity 
for organisational actors to place contentious issues in the 
"too-hard" basket (1973:37). This action was taken even 
though the agenda papers for the Committee meeting on 19 
October 1978 included recommendations from the Faculty Boards 
of Architecture eund Veterinary Science for the devolution of 
academic and resource decision-making to the faculty board 
level (CC Agenda Paper, 19/10/78). In relegating these 
importeunt policy problems to the status of avoidable problems, 
problem latency within the University increased. As Cohen and 
March noted, by running away from the issue (decision by 
"flight"), the problem could be expected to remain in its 
latent form until changed circumstances provided a more 
propitious environment for problem resolution to be attempted 
(1974:83-84). 
The Committee was now able to concentrate on the 
committees of the Professorial Board and at its meeting on 19 
October 1978, the Committee resolved to recommend that the 
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existing Entry Committee and Quota Committee be abolished and 
their functions amalgamated into a new Entry Committee (CCM, 
19/10/78:2-3). The Committee also recommended the 
establishment of a Study Leave Committee to consider 
applications for study leave as well as to review study leave 
reports. This was to rationalise the existing arrangements 
whereby the Steunding Committee considered applications and the 
Education Conamittee reviewed the reports. Other 
recommendations were mainly of a machinery nature concerning 
the need to steundardise the number of elected members on 
certain Board committees (CCM, 14/11/78:1-3). The Committee 
met on one other occasion during 1978. There was eigreement 
that the President of the Professorial Board should serve as 
chairmeun of the Promotions eund Reappointments Committee but no 
conclusions were reached on how to overcome the problem of 
all-day Professorial Board meetings when many members left the 
meeting by the afternoon session (CCM, 16/11/78). The 
Committee's meetings had degenerated into desultory 
discussions on relatively pedestrieun matters eund it was not 
surprising that the next meeting scheduled for 30 November 
1978 failed to convene for want of a quorum. 
The Committee languished until its existence was 
queried at a meeting of the Professorial Board on 16 September 
1980. It was suggested that as the Committee on Committees 
had been overtaken by the Committee appointed by the Senate on 
1 May 1980 to review the academic organisation of the 
University, it should be dissolved (PBM, 15/9/80). By now 
the Committee's lack of achievement resembled a Gilbertian 
farce and the President of the Professorial Board (Professor 
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L.C. Holborow) was anxious to salvage what he could from the 
Committee's earlier deliberations to give the illusion that 
the Committee had served some useful purpose. To facilitate 
this illusion, Holborow prepared a draft report. However by 
the time the Committee came to consider the draft on 23 March 
1981, its thunder had been stolen. 
The Conamittee's earlier recommendation to establish a 
Study Leave Committee had been superseded by the Vice-
Chancellor's creation of a Special Studies Progreims Committee 
and the plan to review the role of the Computing Policy 
Committee had been preempted by the December 1980 report of 
the Vice-Chancellor's Committee to Review the Provision of 
Computing Resources. The Committee's original intention to 
examine the possibility of devolving academic and resource 
decision-making to faculties in order to provide for more 
effective coordination was now redundeunt in view of the fact 
that that issue was a central focus of the recently appointed 
Senate Committee to review the academic organisation of the 
University. The Promotions and Reappointments Conamittee had 
decided during 1980 that the current arrangements whereby the 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) chaired that Committee when 
it considered reappointments should stand. In view of that 
resolution, the Committee on Committee's earlier decision that 
the President of the Professorial Board should chair that 
Committee when it considered both promotions and 
reappointments had lost its force and was not proceeded with 
(CCM, 23/3/81:1-4). 
The final report of the Committee was drafted in a 
form which made the policy process appear almost rational. 
The Committee's failure to examine the central issues relating 
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to the improved coordination of academic and resource 
decision-making through the devolution of authority to the 
faculties was rationalised as a logical outcome following the 
establishment of the Senate Committee. The fact that the 
Committee had eighteen months before the arrival of the new 
Vice-Chancellor and almost three years before the 
establishment of the Senate Committee to finalise its review 
was not mentioned. Incredibly, the only substeuntive 
recommendation contained in the Committee's report was for the 
amalgamation of the Entry eund Quota Committees as agreed by 
the Committee some two eund a half years earlier. The role of 
the Committee on Committees had been an embarrassment to the 
Professorial Board and the dithering associated with it stood 
in sharp contrast to the decisiveness which marked the 
behaviour of the new Vice-Chancellor, Professor Brian Wilson, 
when he took up duty in Jeunuary 1979. 
Wilson came to the University of Queensland having 
served since 1970 as Vice President (Academic) eund Professor 
of Astronomy at Simon Eraser University in Canada eund as Dean 
of the Faculty of Arts and Science at the University of 
Calgary from 1967. Although Wilson's research interests were 
in x-ray astronomy, he also had a keen practical interest in 
university administration. As a dean under the typical North 
American model, he had enjoyed executive responsibility 
devolved from the University's chief executive for the 
coordination of the academic and resource decision-making of a 
major division of that University. Later, as Vice President 
(Academic) at Simon Eraser University he had been responsible 
for the coordination of academic and resource decision-making 
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across the entire academic structure of the University. 
Unlike the University of Queensland, the North American 
model with which Wilson was feuniliar was characterised by a 
clear line of responsibility and authority from the governing 
body through the President to the Vice President (Academic) 
and then to the deans of the various faculties and finally to 
the chairmen of academic departments. Having studied the 
material on the University of Queensland's organisation made 
available to him prior to the selection interview process, 
Wilson had made a point of speaking to the deans during his 
interviews with various groups within the University. At 
those discussions some of the deeuns made it clear that there 
was a need for a major devolution of responsibility eund 
authority to the faculty board level. They argued that 
faculty boards should be given the necessary authority to pleun 
academic developments by coordinating departmental submissions 
regarding both course and resource matters. 
After serving as Vice-Cheuncellor for only a very short 
time, the impressions Wilson had formed during the interviews 
were confirmed. He was alarmed to find that under the system 
of ten central resource committees, it was possible for a 
department to receive funding for a major piece of equipment 
but miss out on getting a technician to run it. Departments 
might receive funding from one committee for expenditure on an 
item of relatively low priority but fail to receive funding 
from another committee for an item of high priority. Under 
this system it was not possible to provide for an overall 
assessment of departmental needs nor for trade-offs to be made 
between items of low eund high priority. Because departments 
were engeiged in competitive bidding, the emphasis was on 
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mayimising resource acquisition irrespective of 
priorities rather than optimising resource utilisation 
using opportunity cost criteria. As a consequence there was 
evidence of inefficient resource allocation. 
Because of the widespread use of formulae using staff 
strength or weighted student unit (WSU) indices rather than 
merit criteria, some departments with a poor research eund/or 
graduate output were consuming disproportionately large 
volumes of resources whereas relatively productive departments 
were suffering from resource shortfalls. A report by 
University of Queensland economists on the resource allocation 
procedures used by the University in relation to research 
found that: 
Most of the University of Queensland's huge 
research resources is currently wasted on staff 
who do little or no research (MacDonald et al, 
1980:79). 
Noting how the University tended to use mainly equity and 
pseudo-efficiency formula rather than merit assessments as the 
bases for allocating research resources, the researchers 
concluded that: 
The administration of research funding in the 
University of Queensland is currently carried 
on to suit the convenience of committees and 
administrators, and pays little regard to the 
needs of researchers (1980:84). 
Here was an institution whose record of achievement in terms 
of resource acquisition, research output and ability to 
attract its share of postgraduate research students was not 
impressive relative to comparably sized Australian 
universities. At the same time, the University's extensive 
committee system which presided over this state of affairs did 
not come cheaply; indeed it was estimated to have cost some 
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$704,974 to operate in 1979 (DVC(Ac) Paper, Costs Relating to 
Reorganisation of the University, [Sept. 1981]). 
Remedies to the problems outlined above clearly 
required behavioural change. For example external funding 
sources had to be persuaded to provide a larger proportion of 
resources to the University than in the past, more promising 
researchers had to be motivated to compete for additional 
research greunts eund more bright prospective postgraduate 
students had to be convinced that studying at the University 
of Queensland would be advantageous. A major problem 
encountered however was that even if positive behavioural 
change was achieved, there was still no assurance that 
performeunce would be improved because meuny of the variables 
which need to be systematically manipulated in order to 
improve university performeunce are not fully under the control 
of key decision-medcers (Cohen and March, 1974:3). Given the 
problems of seeking to improve university performance by 
fostering behavioural change eund controlling what Verry and 
Davies (1976:239) call the "educational production function" 
(that is, the technological relationship between resource 
inputs and knowledge outputs), it is perhaps not surprising 
that chief executives often supplement their efforts by 
attacking the problem at one remove by seeking to reform the 
organisation's decision-making structure and processes. By 
defining the problem of the university's performance gap 
partly as eun organisational problem, it becomes possible for 
the chief executive to manipulate structural and process 
variables that are within his control in the knowledge that 
even if the substantive underlying problem is not remedied. 
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then at least something will have been achieved (Wildavsky, 
1979:47-60). 
Being an outsider, Wilson enjoyed a major advantage over 
some long-serving members of the University in terms of his 
recognition of the need for administrative reform. As Caiden 
remarked: 
The symptoms of administrative ill-health are 
not obvious to those who know nothing beyond 
the administrative culture into which they were 
born and have lived all their lives ... An 
outsider would instantly perceive the outward 
signs of administrative ill-health such as, for 
example, postponement of controversial problems 
... (1969:129-130). 
Certainly the postponement of controversial problems such as 
the lack of structural integration of academic eund non-
academic resource decision-medcing as well as the confused line 
and functional responsibilities within the Central Executive 
had caused problem latency to rise to a level where the need 
to resolve some of them could no longer be ignored. Moreover 
by 1979, additional factors had emerged which exacerbated the 
University's situation, further damaging staff morale and 
adding to uncertainty. These factors included: 
o the very limited budgetary flexibility to fund new 
academic deve1opments; 
o eun ageing staff with the negative consequences that 
that implied for research output and promotion 
opportunities; 
o the proposed reduction in study leave entitlements; 
(Dunbar Report, 1978:15); 
0 the prospect of increased numbers of early retirements, 
limited term appointments, staff evaluation and the 
need for redundancy schemes if universities were unable 
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to improve their staffing flexibility (Williams Report, 
1979:200, 210), 
At the same time these conditions provided fertile ground for 
an energetic leader who could persuade others that he was 
prepared to tackle the University's problems and that his 
motives for introducing reforms were not self-interested, 
Pfeffer has suggested that the decisions made in the 
policy process are in large measure determined by the premises 
used in making them. By articulating the goals and values and 
controlling the alternatives that are admitted to the process, 
a leader ceun define reality eund to some extent dictate the 
terms of the policy debate (1981:116-116). By stealing the 
initiative and preempting the issues on which the debate is 
focused, other participeunts (if they are not too apathetic) are 
forced into a reactive position. 
Wilson's strategy of initiating reform was fourfold. 
In essence it consisted of: 
o raising the spectre of a hostile external environment 
in order to create an atmosphere of crisis eund 
uncertainty as well as a heightened awareness of the 
need for urgent internal reform; 
o highlighting the deficiencies in the University's 
existing operations which were having a negative effect 
on its performance; 
o outlining reforms which would correct existing 
deficiencies and improve the University's performance; 
o convincing the University community that by following 
his suggestions not only would the University be 
rescued from its steadily deteriorating position but 
it would become a more satisfying place in which to 
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achieve personal goals through work and study. 
At the Professorial Board meeting on 12 March 1979 
Wilson spoke of the public disenchantment with universities, 
the "at best" steady state of the University's budget eund the 
possible threat to traditional university freedom through 
increasing public intervention in the future. The University 
had to become more efficient. This would require 
"optimisation of academic resources" as well as a "re-
organisation of the administrative structure of the 
University" (PBM, 12/3/79:4-5). 
Wilson's experience of democratic participation in 
universities had not been a happy one. At Simon Eraser 
University during the early 1970s he had witnessed the 
administrative chaos which accompanied weak chairmen of 
departments who were popularly elected for short terms. 
Although the University of Queensland had not experienced the 
Simon Eraser situation, Wilson was not pleased with the 
quality of some of the heads who had been nominated for 
appointment following departmental elections. Wilson argued 
that: 
There would be greater opportunity for 
devolving a significant proportion of central 
decision making if heads carried the support of 
both their staff and higher University 
personnel, and could therefore provide greater 
leadership (PBM, 12/3/79:5). 
Wilson followed up this statement with a continuation 
of the theme in addresses to Convocation eund at graduation 
ceremonies which were reported in University News: 
There is a tendency among governments 
everywhere not only to make universities 
accountable, which they should be, but to 
manage them and police them and restrict their 
freedoms to do their business (26/4/79:1). 
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Wilson's statement signalled a managerialist response to the 
University's problem of having to face zero growth and 
increased accountability. He advocated research allocation on 
the basis of merit rather than egalitarian principles eund 
argued that the University would need to find a method "to 
optimise our human resources" and obtain flexibility "to 
exploit high leverage situations" (UN, 26/4/79:1). With 
regard to the University's organisational structure Wilson 
observed that: 
One of the surprising features of the 
University is the lack of a significant 
academic middle management. 
Only in two faculties out of 13 does the Deeun 
play a major role in presenting the needs of 
departments within the Faculty eund convey 
concerns eund issues that are common within the 
departments while, in the other direction, 
communicating the bad news about fineunce to 
academic staff members within the Faculty (UN, 
26/4/79:1). 
Wilson's views on the need for a middle management 
structure had earlier received support from the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Academic). Davies felt that the present 
arrangements whereby sixty three heads of departments had 
direct access to him and at the same time required him to 
participate as a member of forty committees made his task 
impossible (SCM, 24/1/79:9). Davies had tried during January 
and February 1979 to reorganise his committee involvement so 
that he would be able to maintain closer contact with 
departments. As Davies informed the Standing Committee: 
... the actual work load of the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Academic) as at the present time 
... made it impossible for him to perform 
within the guidelines as laid down by 
Senate (SCM, 21/2/79:6). 
During this early period, Davies played an important 
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role in helping the new Vice-Chancellor, who had no experience 
of Australieun universities, to settle into an unfamiliar 
environment. In easing Wilson into Queensland's socio-
political milieu, Davies was also invaluable. For example in 
May 1979 he was able to advise Wilson that the guest list to 
five Vice-Chancellorial cocktail parties which did not include 
certain members of Parliament would, if not corrected, 
represent a major faux pas (VCCCM, 30/5/79), Town and 
gown politics in Queensland was a serious business. But it 
was in the University's internal system of bureaucratic 
politics that Davies' performed perhaps his most valuable 
service to the new Vice-Cheuncellor in guiding him through the 
traps which awaited even the most experienced person intent on 
initiating major administrative reform. In this connection 
Davies provided Wilson with a copy of his 1973 report on the 
powers, duties and responsibilities of the Professorial Board 
in which the concept of school resource committees had been 
recommended and reorganised faculty boards with academic and 
resource decision-making responsibilities had been 
foreshadowed as a possible future development (Interview, B.G. 
Wilson, 31/7/84). 
After spending six months visiting departments, meeting 
staff and generally getting to know the way the University of 
Queensland operated, the Vice-Chancellor submitted a statement 
to the Senate on 26 July 1979 in which he outlined his 
impressions and his ideas on future developments. Wilson 
reiterated his earlier message that Commonwealth funding 
levels would not improve and that at a time of falling morale 
"when a natural reaction is to become depressed about the 
future" it would be "a formidable undertalcing to improve the 
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quality of the University over the next twenty years" 
(Statement, VC to Senate, 24/7/79:1). He identified six broad 
areas in need of reform: 
o Resource acquisition - the need to raise more funds 
from private sources; 
o Resource allocation - the need to "optimise" resource 
allocation on the basis of merit rather than formula; 
o Research and postgraduate studies - the need to give 
priority to developing these activities; 
o Staff evaluation - the need for a systematic review of 
staff performeunce for the purposes of staff 
development; 
o Decision-making structures eund processes - the need for 
organisational reform as a meeuns of increasing 
efficiency and accountability (Statement, VC to Senate, 
24/7/79:1-6). 
Any doubts as to whether the new Vice-Chancellor had 
sympathies towards further democratic reform or favoured more 
effective executive control were unambiguously answered in 
that statement. Wilson made it clear that he favoured the 
identification of responsibility and authority with 
individuals rather than committees. He indicated that it was 
not possible for the Vice-Chancellor to communicate 
effectively with sixty three departments in the absence of an 
intermediate management structure. Wilson supported the 
proposals for an intermediate structure of the type 
recommended by the Davies Committee in 1973 although in his 
view full-time deeuns rather than part-time deeuns would be 
necessary. The Vice-Chancellor argued that this structure 
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would enable decentralisation of resource allocation closer to 
the departmental level. With each dean being advised by a 
committee comprising the heads of constituent departments and 
the Vice-Chancellor being advised by a committee of deans 
there would be simple reporting paths instead of the complex 
and inefficient arrangements which currently existed. The 
Vice-Chancellor also foreshadowed the need to give attention 
to the Central Executive structure to clear up the "eunomalies" 
which involved most Central Administration staff having a line 
responsibility to the Registrar but a functional 
responsibility to one or other of the Deputy Vice-Chancellors 
(Statement, VC to Senate, 24/7/79:4-6). The Senate endorsed 
the Vice-Chancellor's proposals eund encoureiged him to explore 
them further (SM, 26/7/79:96). 
At the Professorial Board meeting on 6 August 1979 
there was no substantive opposition to the Vice-Chancellor's 
report and the President even went so far as to congratulate 
him on it. In the discussion, Wilson suggested that one of 
the reasons why the responsibilities associated with heads of 
departments and deeuns at the University of Queensland had 
gradually eroded (and by implication had been transferred to 
the Central Executive) was that the most suitable appointees 
were often not prepared to nominate for election.(8) He 
argued that the present electoral procedures should be 
replaced by a careful selection process as this would 
(8) Although heads and deans were formally appointed by the 
Senate, the reality was that with the exception of the 
Deeuns of Medicine eund Veterinary Science, all other 
nominees for deanships were chosen following faculty 
elections. In a significant number of departments as 
well, nominees for headships were chosen following 
departmental elections rather than selected on the sole 
criterion of merit. 
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facilitate the devolution of responsibilities to those levels 
(PBM, 6/8/79:142). In agreeing to circulate his report to all 
academic staff, Wilson became the first Vice-Chancellor to 
seek directly the views of all academic staff on such a wide 
range of major matters. 
Although the volume of responses to the Vice-
Chancellor's invitation to comment was not large, it was clear 
that there was, on balance, general agreement with the 
direction being proposed. Much of the comment concentrated on 
the dysfunctions of the present system. The University's 
recent efforts to increase democratic participation were 
criticised as having resulted in a "tyranny of committees" 
which had "been responsible for some unfortunate decisions and 
consequences" (Corres., H.Tiffin to VC, 18/9/79). The present 
relationship between heads of departments eund deans was seen 
as an impediment to coordination: 
... with the exception of the permanent Deans 
in Medicine and Veterinary Science, Deans are 
virtually ignored by departments, which deal 
directly with the central administration.,. 
There is eun overwhelming need for an 
intermediate level between the departments and 
the central administration (Corres., D.S. 
Kettle to VC, 22/8/79). 
Respondents opposing the Vice-Chancellor's views were 
concerned primarily with two aspects. Firstly schools were 
expected to have a negative impact on departmental autonomy: 
The strength of the University lies in its 
diversity eund the strength of a department is 
its ability to organise its own affairs ... 
(Corres., V.B.D. Skerman to VC, 21/8/79). 
And secondly, there was some concern that the Vice-
Chancellor's proposals seemed to be stressing efficiency 
rather than democracy: 
We do not believe that democracy should be 
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sacrificed for the sedce of "efficiency" 
(Corres., Education Vice-Pres., UQU to VC, 
9/10/79). 
The Vice-Chancellor was encouraged by the overall tone 
of the responses eund on 14 September 1979 he attended a 
special meeting of the Academic Staff Association to discuss 
his proposals. Wilson possessed an optimistic belief that the 
persuasion of technical-rational argument would eventually 
overcome political opposition based on parochial interests and 
the report of that meeting revealed that he was more 
interested in the substance of the proposed reforms than in 
the process by which the reforms were to be formulated. 
Accordingly he was not keen on the idea of extensive 
committees spending large amounts of time as had been the case 
with earlier reforms. Wilson's approach, whilst very direct, 
was also provocative eund meuny participeunts at the meeting were 
antagonised by his views for example on election vis-a-vis 
selection: 
He is opposed to the electoral system and 
believes in appointing people of high calibre. 
The Vice-Chancellor said that there are quite a 
number of senior people with a lot of 
experience who are not prepared to run in an 
election eund lose, eund he wants to optimise 
this unused expertise (UQASAM, 14/9/79:3). 
Wilson's emphasis on executive authority taking precedence over 
democratic participation, his stress on the need for staff 
evaluation eund his belief that the proportion of recurrent 
expenditure on staffing should be reduced in order to provide 
additional resources for postgraduate study and research, were 
seen by some staff as being threatening. 
Wilson was concerned that the proportion of the 
recurrent budget spent on salaries and related costs had 
increased from 85.9% in 1976 to a projected 87.2% in 1980. He 
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was anxious to reduce this figure to 84% since this was the 
extent to which the University was supplemented for salary 
increases in its recurrent grant (SM, 4/10/79:133). This was 
a difficult task given that incremental creep between April 
1979 and April 1980 had cost $130,000 and this, together with 
the estimated cost of promotions in 1981, ($100,000 plus) was 
expected to offset the savings made from reductions in staff 
establishment over that period (ECM, 19/12/80). 
On 4 October 1979 the Vice-Chancellor advised the 
Senate that it would be necessary to reduce the number of 
staff employed. In addition to the Steunding Committee being 
requested to reduce academic staffing costs by approximately 
$100,000 for 1980 the Vice-Chancellor requested that 
reductions be made in the general staff establishment over the 
1980-1982 period so that by the end of 1982, a reduction at 
the rate of $300,000 per annum would be achieved (Rayner, 
1980:3; Plowman Report, 21/10/80:1). The Senate was also 
reassured that, on balance, there appeared to be widespread 
support for many of the proposals outlined in the document 
which he had circulated to all academic staff (SM, 
4/10/79:133). 
On the same day the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Education in Queensland published its Sixth Interim Report.(9) 
This report had been prepared because of the "many 
representations from industry, educators in the post-secondary 
(9) This Committee had its origins in a statement by the 
Premier on 13 October 1977 that the Government would 
establish a conamittee to review secondary school 
assessment procedures. Although the other five interim 
reports were concerned with a broad range of issues 
related to aspects of schooling, the Sixth Interim 
Report focused on post-secondary education. 
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field, parents and the community at large": 
... urging the need for co-ordination and 
rationalization of the courses offered by post-
secondary educational institutions in 
Queensleund (Ahern Report, (Sixth Interim Report), 
1980:1). 
The report stated that because of the "wasteful duplication" 
and the increasingly tenuous links between the Minister and 
the tertiary institutions: 
We are persuaded that greater co-ordination of 
post-secondary education in Queensland is 
urgently required (Ahern Report, (Sixth Interim 
Report), 1980:3). 
Earlier in 1979 the Willieuns Committee had drawn the 
Queensleund Government's attention to its view that efficient 
coordination and rationalisation of post-secondary education 
activities depended on the existence of post-secondary co-
ordinating authorities in the states as a parallel to the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) (Williams 
Report, 1979:334). While rejecting the concept of a statutory 
post-secondary education commission of the type common in the 
other states, the Select Conamittee considered also that the 
present Joint Advisory Committee on Post-Secondary Education 
(JAC) was not adequately meeting the need for planning and co-
ordination of post-secondary education in Queensleund.(10) 
Accordingly the Select Committee reconamended the creation of a 
(10) The JAC was established by the Queensleund Minister for 
Education in 1976 as a non-statutory body for the 
purpose of advising the Minister on desirable 
developments in post-secondary education in Queensland 
and to explore ways of ensuring effective cooperation 
and coordination of present and future operations. The 
Committee comprised the three Vice-Chancellors, the 
Chairman of the Board of Advanced Education (the body 
with responsibility for coordinating the activities of 
Queensland's ten colleges of advanced education) eund 
the Director General of Education (JACM, 9/9/76:3). 
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Ministry for Post-Secondary Education for that purpose (Ahern 
Report, (Sixth Interim Report), 1980:4). 
Wilson seized on this development as a means of adding 
greatly to the sense of crisis that he had cultivated. He 
pointed out in a paper sent to members of the Professorial 
Board that the Select Committee's report showed that the 
"storm signals" were there. The report had suggested that 
universities for the first time, should send copies of their 
triennial submissions to the Universities Council to the 
Queensland Department of Education for comment and that 
Commonwealth funds for universities should be channeled 
through the Queensleund Government rather theun direct to the 
universities (Memo, VC to PB, Appendix I, 9/10/79). 
The Vice-Chancellor argued that because of this 
"potentially serious external bureaucratic intervention" the 
University of Queensland needed to be reorgeunised. The 
additional planning eund coordination required and the demands 
for statistical data expected to arise from this bureaucratic 
assault on the University would have to be met by an 
efficient, responsive orgeunisational structure involving more 
selected full-time academic administrators who were appointed 
for a term of several years with possible reappointment after 
review. Wilson considered that the present reliance on quasi-
elected part-time academic administrators who held office for 
short terms would be unable to cope effectively with the 
demands expected in the future (Memo, VC to PB, 9/10/79). 
Wilson had already initiated reforms within the Central 
Executive and planning areas. He had established an Executive 
Committee comprising the Vice-Cheuncellor, both Deputy Vice-
Chancellors eund the Registrar for the purpose of advising the 
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Vice-Chancellor on any matter which was of concern to members 
of the Central Executive. In 1979 and 1980 that Committee met 
eighteen and twenty nine times respectively and although much 
of the agenda tended to be of a "housekeeping" nature, 
significant matters such as the University budget were also 
discussed. Whereas the Pleunning Committee under Cowen had 
grown to eighteen members by 1975, Wilson had reduced the 
membership to eight in 1979-1980. 
This contrast illustrated a major difference in the 
operating style of the two men. Cowen was very much cast in 
the chairman of committees mould rather than the managerial 
mould. Aided by his advocacy skills as well as his undoubted 
political sagacity, Cowen knew how to use the University 
committee system to get the outcomes that he weunted. He 
believed that if the procedures eund processes for meiking 
decisions were correct (meaning the opportunity for 
appropriate persons to influence the process) then the correct 
decision would invariably emerge from that process. Wilson on 
the other hand was more of a managerial technocrat who placed 
greater emphasis on the technical substance of decision-malcing 
eund gave much less stress to the value of political processes. 
The task faced by the Vice-Chancellor was to develop an 
efficient bureaucratic response to external bureaucratic 
pressures while at the same time provide opportunities for 
participation at various levels within the University. Davies 
had been examining possible groupings of departments into some 
intermediate structure in early September 1979 (Corres., H.W. 
Peter to VC, 5/9/79). However as Davies had found in 1973, 
there were a considerable number of constraints to be observed 
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in that process. At this stage, however, the constraints were 
mainly of a structural or technical nature rather theun 
political. They included: 
o the need to have no more than eight faculties in order 
to facilitate coordination at the Committee of Deans 
eund Central Executive levels; 
o the need for constituent departments in faculties to be 
compatible on a range of academic and resource 
criteria; 
o the need to avoid large disparities in the sizes of 
faculties; 
o the need for existing professional faculties to retain 
some separate identity; 
o the need to retain the existing well-established degree 
nomenclatures. 
The starting point was the 1973 Davies Report's 
proposals which the Vice-Cheuncellor described as "sound in 
principle but did not go far enough" (Interview, B.G. Wilson, 
31/7/84; Memo, VC to PB, 9/10/79:1). Having regard to 
Davies' latest thoughts on the matter eund adding his own 
insights, Wilson proposed a reorganisation of the sixty three 
departments into six, seven or eight faculties each headed by 
a full-time dean. Existing professional departments would be 
subsumed as schools within the new faculties and each would be 
headed by eun associate dean. The present faculties would be 
abolished eund their powers concerning the administration of 
specified degree courses would be taken over by some fourteen 
boards of studies each chaired by the relevant dean. 
Faculties would be responsible for coordinating submissions 
from departments and faculty submissions together with 
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submissions from the Library and General University Services 
would be coordinated by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and 
Finance) who would make recommendations to the Executive 
Committee. The Steunding Committee would become an Academic 
Staff Committee, Recommendations from that Committee and the 
General Staff Committee concerning staff establishments eund 
promotions as well as from the Research Committee in relation 
to research allocation would be submitted to the Executive 
Committee. The Executive Committee would comprise the Vice-
Chancellor, both Deputy Vice-Chancellors, President of the 
Professorial Board and Registrar and would be responsible for 
the coordination of all University activities and for advising 
the Vice-Chancellor. In discharging its responsibilities, the 
Executive Committee would meet regularly with the deeuns. The 
Vice-Cheuncellor, in turn, would meike recommendations to the 
Finance Committee and that Committee would advise the Senate. 
Following approval of the budget by the Senate the 
Finance Committee, on the reconamendation of the Vice-
Chancellor, would determine block allocations of resources to 
the faculties. Library Committee, Academic Staff Conamittee and 
General Staff Conamittee. Permanent staff and library 
allocations would be allocated to departments by the relevant 
central committees while general funds eund research moneys 
would be distributed to departments by faculties. Although 
the Vice-Chancellor's paper made it clear that decisions 
concerning expenditure on permanent staffing would not be 
devolved to faculty or departmental level, it did not spell 
out exactly how much discretion would be given to heads of 
departments to optimise the use of departmental resources 
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beyond stating that: 
A head of department should have as much 
flexibility eund freedom as practicable to use 
the funds allocated to the department to 
promote the best interests of the department 
and to tedce account of unexpected 
developments (Memo, VC to PB, 9/10/79:4), 
Both Davies eund Wilson would have ideally preferred 
fewer theun eight faculties with each having devolved authority 
to coordinate academic eund resource decision-meiking and to 
have eliminated the need for boards of studies (Interview, 
B,G. Wilson, 31/7/84; G.N. Davies, 24/7/84). However a 
smaller number of faculties of roughly equal size and 
reasonably compatible on academic and resource useige criteria 
could be achieved only by splitting the existing large Arts 
and Science faculties and eunalgamating others. But if 
existing BA and BSc degree nomenclatures were to be retained, 
that would have resulted in more than one faculty being 
responsible for the administration of each of those degrees. 
The problem of coordination especially where two faculties had 
conflicting views about the same degree course meeunt that that 
option was not viable. Hence boards of studies had been 
introduced to enable the existing degree nomenclatures to be 
maintained and to enable existing professional disciplines to 
preserve a separate organisational identity. The trade-off 
cost of the proposed structural arrangement was the 
perpetuation of separate academic and resource decision-making 
with boards of studies formulating academic policy and 
faculties formulating budgetary policy. 
Wilson was confident that these proposals would be 
generally acceptable and on 22 October 1979 he confided in a 
fellow Vice-Chancellor that his plans "appear to be going OK" 
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and that he hoped to ask the Professorial Board for "in 
principle" endorsement in November (Corres., VC to B.R. 
Williams, 22/10/79). At the meeting with heads of departments 
and deeuns on 29 October 1979, however, it emerged that there 
were some fundamental problems associated with the Vice-
Chancellor's proposals. These problems concerned the 
difficulty in reconciling the Vice-Chancellor's wish to have 
no more than eight faculties with the desire of meuny of the 
deans eund heads in professional faculties to retain the 
professional identity of their discipline by preserving 
separate professional faculties. However if the latter path 
was followed it would not be possible to limit the number of 
faculties to eight. Any larger number would, in Wilson's 
view, militate against effective coordination of faculty 
business (Memo, L.C. Holborow to VC, 21/11/79). 
Because the Vice-Chancellor's proposals as contained in 
his memorandum of 9 October 1979 were far more detailed theun 
the views that he had ceunvassed with the University in August 
and because the second document contained three models which 
outlined the departmental composition of each faculty, 
respondents had much more to teike issue with. The most 
vigorous opposition again came from the professional 
faculties. For example the Dean of the Faculty of Dentistry 
and the three professors of dentistry totally opposed the 
proposed abolition of that faculty and its replacement by a 
board of studies to be chaired by a non-dental dean. They 
pointed to the situation at the University of London where 
Dentistry was in a subordinate position to Medicine; this had 
allegedly led to a stifling of development and it was feared 
that the same could occur at the University of Queensland if 
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the Vice-Cheuncellor's proposals were implemented (Corres., 
K.F. Adkins et al to VC, 26/10/79). At the same time, the 
Faculty of Medicine wished to retain its separate identity eund 
to preserve the seune level of external professional 
participation in it (Corres., R.L. Doherty to Asst. Reg., 
14/1/80). 
Most respondents argued against the proposals on 
ostensibly academic grounds pointing out that the present 
faculties had evolved in accordance with academic needs eund 
that to break, them up for reasons of administrative efficiency 
would be educationally dysfunctional. As the Dean of 
Agricultural Science pointed out, grouping the faculties of 
Agricultural Science and Veterinary Science together because 
they both operated research farms was no more logical than 
grouping the faculties of Medicine and Veterinary Science 
together because both were concerned with the health of their 
respective clients (E.J. Britten, Unpublished paper, 24/1/80). 
Nevertheless some responses were unashamedly political. The 
Head of the Department of Architecture was worried at the 
prospect of his department being included within a 
Technological Sciences Faculty. This was because the 
Engineering departments in the past had used their numbers in 
the Technological Sciences Area Sub-Committee of the Equipment 
eund Maintenance Committee to develop biased formulae which 
worked to their advantage eund to the disadvantage of other 
constituent departments such as Architecture (Corres., B.S. 
Saini to VC, 1/11/79). To add weight to his case Professor 
Saini coalesced with eun external pressure group, the Royal 
Australieun Institute of Architects. The President of that 
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Institute argued that: 
Competition with the various departments of 
engineering with their greater weight in terms 
of numbers usually results in inadequate 
funding provision for architecture (Corres., 
E.T. Codd to VC, 26/3/80). 
In summary, the majority of responses opposing the 
Vice-Cheuncellor's proposals did so because they were concerned 
at the location of their department eund/or faculty in the 
suggested groupings of departments. This raised the problem 
of a loss of identity especially in the case of professional 
faculties eund the likelihood that in some cases the deeun would 
be drawn from outside the releveunt professional field. In 
such circumstances it was asserted that the dean might not 
possess the expertise to comprehend the complexity of the 
professional field concerned. Therefore the deeun would find 
it difficult to weigh up competing claims for resources from 
other departments as well as represent the faculty adequately 
in discussions with the proposed Executive Committee eund with 
the external community. 
At the same time there were some supportive responses, 
mainly from academics in departments whose proposed location 
was not seen by them to be problematical or who felt that the 
need for strong deans to bring about greater efficiency in the 
University outweighed any disadvantages. A number of 
respondents saw the Vice-Chancellor's proposals as a means of 
overcoming some of the dysfunctions associated with 
democratisation: 
In the past 10 years this University has been 
turned upside down by a crash programme of 
democratization. In the process we have 
acquired the disadvantages of democracy without 
its advantages, principal of these being that 
unsuccessful academics are the ones with time 
for politics and in effect they now run the 
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show (Corres., F.D. Stacey to VC, 12/10/79). 
The Deeun of the Faculty of Veterinary Science supported the 
Vice-Chancellor's proposals for strong deans in view of his 
first-hand experience of having been given considerable 
responsibility to coordinate the activities of the Veterinary 
Science departments but not having the commensurate authority 
to require the cooperation of heads of departments (Corres., 
T.J. Heath to VC, 17/10/79). One of the more penetrating 
analyses ceune from the University Librarian. While supporting 
the reorganised faculty structure eund the concept of full-time 
deans. Fielding doubted the wisdom of creating boards of 
studies because they would continue the separation of academic 
and resource decision-making "which has pleigued this 
University" (Corres., F.D.O. Fielding to VC, 16/10/79). 
The Academic Staff Association was conscious of the 
fact that the Vice-Chancellor's proposals were now starting to 
gather momentum. However since 1974 the Association had been 
preoccupied with such matters as the University's funding 
cutbacks, staff reductions, study leave restrictions, civil 
liberties issues eund gaining registration as eun industrial 
union. Very little attention had been given to updating the 
Association's policy on University governance. All that was 
possible following the Association's meeting on 31 October 
1979 was to send the Vice-Chancellor details of the 
Association's policy on departmental governance (which was 
based on its submission to the Improvements Conamittee in 1969) 
and, in addition, to enclose a copy of the Association's 1974 
response to the Davies Report (Corres., D.S. Barrett to VC, 
31/10/79). In recognition that these policies might no longer 
be relevant to the changed circumstances, the Association set 
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up a sub-committee to prepare a report on the structure of the 
University (UQASAM, 31/10/79:2).(11) 
In studying the responses to his proposals, Wilson 
concluded that the major unresolved issues were structural, 
namely, the location of departments in faculties eund the need 
to ensure that academic eund resource decision-making were 
properly coordinated. Wilson saw these problems essentially 
in technical rather than political terms. The main thing that 
was required was more intellectual cogitation and a structural 
solution which was defensible on technical-rational grounds 
would be found. The Vice-Chancellor advised the Senate on 1 
November 1979 that he hoped to be able to present more refined 
proposals for the reorganisation to the Professorial Board eund 
the Senate for consideration early the following year (SM, 
1/11/79). In order that these proposals could be formulated, 
Wilson appointed in December 1979 a Committee to "review 
possible groupings of departments into 'Schools' or revised 
'Faculties' to facilitate both academic functions and 
associated resource allocation mechanisms". The Committee 
comprised Dr. B.L. Adkins (chairman). Dr. M.C. Grassie, 
Professor T.J. Heath and Professor H.W. Peter (Adkins Report, 
24/3/79 (Sic):l). (The report should have been dated 
24/3/80). 
Adkins was a former Head of the Department of 
Mathematics who, after having served on the Standing Committee 
from 1978-1979 had been elected Deputy President of the 
(11) The Vice-Chancellor had endeavoured to maintain good 
communications with the Academic Staff Association eund 
in this connection, he had established fortnightly 
liaison meetings between representatives of the Central 
Executive and the Association. 
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Professorial Board for 1980, the first non-professorial person 
to have received that distinction. 
Grassie, a former Dean of the Faculty of Education 
(1975-1978) was a member of the Education Committee (1976-
1979) who had been elected to the Standing Committee for 1980, 
the first non-professorial person to achieve that accolade 
since Adkins had been elected in 1978. 
Heath had written to the Vice-Chancellor supporting the 
proposals for reform. At the seune time, he had been outspoken 
in his criticism of the present system; uneven development 
had occurred within the Veterinary Science Faculty because the 
Deeun did not have the authority to coordinate the academic and 
resource decision-making of the Veterinary Science departments 
(Corres., T.J. Heath to VC, 17/10/79). 
A former member of the Davies Committee, Peter had 
written to the Vice-Chancellor indicating his support for the 
proposals. He had volunteered to help with their development 
given his professional interest in organisational structure 
and processes as Head of the Department of Management 
(Corres., H.W. Peter to VC, 5/9/79). 
The Committee met on six occasions before reporting on 
24 March 1980. Heath wrote on behalf of the Committee to 
members of the Professorial Board on 17 December 1979 asking 
members for eun indication of their preferences for the 
grouping of departments as it affected their department or 
faculty. The memorandum asked for an indication of any 
concerns that members might have if the regrouping of 
departments went ahead. The three models developed by the 
Vice-Chancellor in his proposal of 9 October 1979 were 
enclosed for guidance. Like a number of other surveys on 
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aspects of University governance in the past, this survey 
coincided with the Christmas vacation period. However as the 
Vice-Chancellor had requested the Committee's report by 29 
February 1980, the Committee was obliged to request Board 
members to respond by the end of January (Memo, T.J. Heath to 
PB, 17/12/79). The Committee received fifty four replies to 
its questionnaire and eighty additional submissions from a 
total of ninety seven individuals (a response rate of 73.48%). 
Six heads eund two deans were also interviewed by the Committee 
(Adkins Report, 24/3/79:1). 
At its first meeting for 1980, the Committee examined 
the responses to the questionnaire. As a result of that 
analysis, nine groupings of departments were tentatively 
identified on the basis of their ties. They were: Medicine, 
Dentistry, Veterinary Science, Biological Sciences, Physical 
Sciences, Engineering, Humanities, Social Sciences and Law 
(Adkins Committee, Minutes, 5/2/80:1-3). The groupings were 
based as far as possible on the wishes of departments. 
However such parochial interests were baleunced against the 
need to keep the numbers of groupings small for resource 
allocation purposes and the desirability of retaining as far 
as possible the present faculty groupings in order to preserve 
the academic decision-making processes which had evolved over 
the years. 
The biggest concern voiced by respondents was that the 
regrouping might result in their resource base being eroded 
and in the case of the professional faculties there was also a 
strong desire to retain their existing structure in order to 
preserve their professional identity eund links with the 
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external professional community (Adkins Report, 24/3/79:8). 
Thus in the case of the major professional faculties of 
Medicine, Dentistry and Law the traditional faculty structure 
was retained. However under the Committee's proposals, the 
smaller faculties such as Music and Social Work were to lose 
their separate faculty status and were to be absorbed into 
Humanities eund Social Science faculties respectively. The 
Committee spent four meetings juggling "problem" departments 
which did not enjoy close ties with others nominally in their 
faculty. Agriculture had been tentatively grouped with 
Veterinary Science and the Committee had consistently opposed 
the former's claim for independent status (Adkins Committee, 
Minutes, 11/2/80:2; 21/2/80:1,3). However on 28 February 
1980 the Vice-Chancellor indicated that in many universities 
it was "traditional" to have a separate Faculty of Agriculture 
and, largely as a result of that intervention. Agriculture won 
separate faculty status (Adkins Committee, Minutes, 
28/2/80:1). 
Other decision-making was equally idiosyncratic. For 
exeunple a few years earlier the Biological Science departments 
had sought to break a\fay from the Faculty of Science because 
the formulation of rules by the Faculty was dominated by the 
academic staff from the Physical Sciences (Corres., J.M. 
Thomson to VC, 24/10/79). The Committee's tentative 
separation of these two science groups remedied that situation 
but subsequent considerations concerning the location of the 
rapidly expanding Department of Computer Science and the 
problems associated with the administration of the B Sc degree 
if the Science Faculty was split resulted in the two groups 
being remerged into a single Faculty of Science. In so doing, 
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the Faculty of Science dwarfed all of the other proposed 
faculties with 36.1% of total staff and 32.2% of direct 
departmental costs. The next largest of the proposed 
faculties was Social Sciences with 15.7% and 17.2% 
respectively (Adkins Report, 24/3/79:10). Yet the Committee 
had argued that the proposed Social Science Faculty was too 
large (Adkins Committee, Minutes, 11/2/80:3). The Committee's 
proposals envisaged a very wide range of faculty sizes eund at 
the other end of the scale the single department Faculty of 
Law employed only 1.8% of total staff eund accounted for a mere 
2.2% of direct departmental costs. Indeed four of the nine 
proposed faculties employed 75.3% of the total staff and 72.4% 
of direct departmental costs were attributed to those 
faculties (Adkins Report, 24/3/79:10). 
From a technical-rational perspective the Committee's 
proposals were unsatisfactory. Quite apart from violating the 
principle of having faculties of roughly comparable size in 
order to provide flexibility, ease of coordination eund 
equitable representation at the centre, the proposals still 
envisaged a need for boards of studies. These would be 
necessary in those faculties which included a mixture of 
academic and professional departments and would be required, 
in addition, for the administration of the BA degree given 
than the Arts Faculty was to be split into Humanities and 
Social Sciences. 
At the same time, the Committee's proposals were 
politically astute. Seven of the thirteen faculties, 
including almost all of the powerful professional faculties, 
were essentially unaltered by the proposals while the 
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splitting of Arts was not problematical because no 
professional disciplines were involved and no corporate 
identity was at stedce. The weaker professional faculties such 
as Social Work and Architecture were in effect "sacrificial 
lambs" whose absorption into broader groupings was necessary 
for structural reasons. By paying close attention to the 
wishes of deans eund heads of departments, the Committee had 
ended up with a mixture of parochial interests which reflected 
the political and status considerations of departmental and 
faculty constituencies rather than the efficiency and 
accountability preoccupations of the Central Executive. As 
the following chapter will reveal, because of this the 
influence of the Committee's report on the policy process was 
negligible. 
During the three years prior to 1980, the Student 
Union's main concerns had focused on the proposed 
incorporation of the Union under the University Act eund with 
trying to overcome its financial difficulties. By January 
1980, however, the Vice-Chancellor's proposed reorganisation 
of the University was becoming a political issue within the 
Union. The Union asked the Vice-Chancellor a series of 
questions about the procedures he would follow to ensure that 
any changes would reflect staff and student opinion. Advice 
was also sought on the level of student participation in 
decision-making within the new structure (Corres., Sec. UQU to 
VC, 10/1/80). 
Pfeffer has noted that key actors in the policy process 
often seek to make issues less political by labelling them in 
non-political terms and by attempting to downplay their 
importance to potential sources of opposition (1981:89-92). 
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In this connection, the Vice-Chancellor advised that he had 
not sought student opinion because the proposals would have 
little direct relevance to students since courses would not be 
affected. Wilson took the line that his proposals were merely 
extensions of past directions tedcen by the University; the 
full-time dean concept was nothing new because the University 
already had two full-time deans. He blandly pointed out that 
students were already represented on the Professorial Board 
and Senate eund that those bodies would be considering the 
proposals for reorganisation (Corres., VC to Sec. UQU, 
15/2/80). Similarly the Vice-Chancellor advised the 
Post-Graduate Students' Association that its proposed seminar 
topic "The University Structure, Schools or Traditional?" 
would not be appropriate because the reorganisation proposals 
would have negligible impact on postgraduate students. Wilson 
suggested instead a number of safer topics for the seminar 
such as the value of course work versus research degrees 
(Corres., Sec. PGSA to VC, 20/12/79). 
However student bodies were not so easily diverted. 
There was some limited cooperation between the Student Union 
and the Academic Staff Association over the reorgeunisation 
issue. For example, the Union requested the Association's 
views on the Vice-Chancellor's proposals and arranged a 
meeting between representatives of both bodies to discuss a 
strategy for responding (Corres., Sec. UQU to Pres. UQASA, 
10/1/79 (sic)). (This correspondence should have been dated 
10/1/80). One Academic Staff Association activist, Mr. D. 
O'Neill addressed an open forum attended by 400 staff and 
students on 2 April 1980 and informed the audience that: 
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... a decision was tedcen by staff and students 
in the early 70s to move towards 
democratisation of the University ... the 
Vice-Cheuncellor's proposals aimed to reverse 
this trend (UQU, Report on Open Forum, 2/4/80). 
One of the concerns of activists was that the proposed 
Executive Conamittee would undermine the power of the 
Professorial Board and faculty boards. This was seen as an 
anti-democratic move because faculty boards were the only 
bodies where there was a relatively broad representation of 
non-professorial staff and students. The appointment of the 
Adkins Committee was seen as eun ominous indication that Wilson 
had made up his mind on what the reorganisation would involve 
and that the Conamittee was concerned merely with the details 
of how the changes should be implemented (UQU, Report on Open 
Forum, 2/4/80). 
During the early months of 1980 the Vice-Chancellor 
continued his campaign of stressing the impact of budgetary 
cutbacks and the need for reorgeunisation to facilitate more 
efficient use of resources. Wilson advised the Professorial 
Board that if the present financial stringencies continued for 
the next ten years, the University could be operating with 
only 85% of its current staff by 1990: 
Consequently, the need for more rigorous 
internal planning was obvious if the University 
was to maintain its objectives (PBM, 10/3/80). 
A similar messeige was conveyed to the Faculty of Arts where it 
was pointed out that with the effects of inflation, 
incremental creep and "pipeline" increases, the University had 
suffered a real loss of $1 million in 1979-80. The Vice-
Chancellor argued that a structure which allowed scarce 
resources to be channelled into areas of most pressing need 
through full-time deans who were familiar with the real needs 
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of departments, was the key to resource use optimisation (FBAM, 
17/3/80:8). At a meeting with Social Work students on 9 April 
1980, Wilson was reported to have said that: 
The fabric of the University will collapse 
within eight months if no changes take 
place (Semper, No. 3, 24/4/80:6). 
The Student Union's Social Action Committee argued that 
the Vice-Chancellor was using "scare tactics" to precipitate 
sweeping changes. Indeed the Union's main concern was with 
the methods being used to promote change: 
The problem with the proposals of course, is 
that they are the V.C.'s. It is not the role 
of a V.C. to present a narrow set of 
proposals in this way. He should present a 
wide reunge of options and ensure that other 
people have the chance to do the same. A 
committee which is representative of staff, 
students and administration should be set up to 
investigate the need for change. Any proposals 
which the committee makes should be widely 
debated and only then should change take place 
(Semper, No. 3, 24/4/80:5-6). 
The Committee appointed by the Academic Staff 
Association on 31 October 1979 to prepare a report on the 
structure of the University had decided that rather than react 
to the Vice-Chancellor's proposals, it would develop its own 
pleuns ab initio. During 1979 the Federation of Australian 
University Staff Associations had produced a policy on the 
internal government of universities. That policy stated, 
inter alia, that: 
For a university to discharge its 
responsibilities properly, the bodies within 
the university which take decisions and made 
policy on behalf of the whole community of 
scholars should be democratically based eund 
should be open and consultative in their 
operation; government within universities 
should be by representative bodies with a 
majority of elected representatives and the 
university community should have access to the 
deliberations of these bodies. 
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Members of staff with an executive function, 
such as vice-chancellors, deans and 
chairpersons of departments, should be selected 
by those over whom they will exercise 
authority, preferably by election, and should 
be regarded as being responsible to their 
electorate, as well as responsible to the 
higher boards of the university (FAUSA Paper, 
The Internal Government of Universities, 1979), 
This statement was used by the Academic Staff Association's 
Committee as a basis upon which to formulate its response. 
Although the Committee divided into four working parties to 
prepare its response, the main document entitled A Staff 
Association Critique of the Vice-Chancellor's Proposals 
for Structural Change Within the University, dated 26 March 
1980, was drafted largely by one of the Committee's members, 
long-time activist Mr, D, O'Neill (D. Whyte, Private 
Communication, 1/5/84; Interview, P.L. Reynolds, 14/8/84). 
This document was a twenty eight page polemic which was 
remarkable for the way it attempted to redefine the policy 
problem. 
In order to understand the Association's response, it 
is necessary to recall Pfeffer's observation concerning the 
relationship between decision-making discretion and power: 
... decision making discretion is the result of 
a political contest for control within 
organizations. Decision making authority is 
seldom granted or given in an effort to enhance 
decision making quality or organizational 
efficiency. Rather, decision making discretion 
is provided to those with enough power in the 
organization to effectively demand and claim 
that discretion (1981:274). 
The Association's redefinition of the policy problem was that 
the real issue was not one of promoting greater efficiency and 
accountability by way of structural reorganisation but rather 
it concerned power. The problem was that the hard-won 
democratic reforms of the 1970s were under threat by a 
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managerial elite who were attempting to stampede the 
University into reforms that were designed to enhaunce their 
control. The Association failed to acknowledge the existence 
of a performeunce gap and in euny case could see no connection 
between the sort of structural reform advocated by Wilson and 
achieving the aims of the University. 
The Association argued that given that the aims of the 
University were centred on the creation, dissemination and 
criticism of knowledge, all University activities should be 
intrinsically geared towards the achievement of those aims 
rather than have them displaced by a preoccupation with the 
efficient management of the means. The achievement of those 
aims was said to require the collective, mutually critical 
modes of discussion that were the essence of democracy. This 
was because teaching and learning recognised no authority that 
could not argue to sustain its rationality. Such rationality 
only occurred through the process of achieving a consensus by 
free and open discussion among peers in an environment that 
was free from the domination of irrational hierarchical 
authority (UQASA, Critique of VC's Proposals, 26/3/80:19). 
The Association argued that it was not logically possible to 
separate the administration of academic affairs from the 
practice of teaching and research since to do so would lead to 
an overconcentration with the means of achieving the 
organisation's ends rather than with the ends themselves 
(UQASA, Critique of VC's Proposals, 26/3/80:19-20). This 
epistemology was hostile to the concept of bureaucracy or 
managerial ism because they were based on legal and 
hierarchical authority rather than the authority of knowledge 
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and with technological efficiency in the manipulation of means 
rather theun with knowledge as eun end in itself. 
In addition to criticising the substance of the Vice-
Chancellor's proposals, the document ridiculed the process 
followed by Wilson in creating a false sense of urgency to 
push reforms through with a minimum of consultation: 
The Association believes that it is a false 
sense of urgency, eun urgency only there for 
those who have already come to a decision that 
increased maneigerial efficiency at the expense 
of democratic process is a necessary corollary 
to the contraction of funds from Government 
sources (UQASA, Critique of VC's Proposals, 
26/3/80:25). 
The fundamental difference between the approach taken 
by the Academic Staff Association and that of the Vice-
Chancellor was that the former regarded the University as a 
community under which the principles of political association 
applied whereas the latter thought of the University as eun 
organisation in which the principles of management were the 
most relevant. In attempting to redefine the policy problem 
as an alleged managerial threat to the University's version of 
representative democracy the Association had presented eun 
alternative well argued, if polemical statement, which could 
not be lightly dismissed. The statement was distributed to 
all members of the Association and the retiring President 
tried to generate some enthusiasm among a generally apathetic 
body to become interested in what was happening: 
... this matter is one of the most significant 
issues to come before the University community 
in recent times (Memo, P.L. Reynolds to UQASA, 
16/4/80). 
Unlike Cowen and Rayner, Wilson had not built up an 
extensive informal network of confidants scattered throughout 
the academic community and he was therefore not well informed 
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of the strength of the opposition that was mobilising against 
his plans. Wilson therefore pressed ahead developing his 
ideas eund on 11 April 1980 he advised the Pleunning Committee 
that he was proposing to draft an outline of a proposal on the 
reorganisation. He wanted to get the Committee's advice on 
the draft before a fuller proposal was submitted to the 
Professorial Board. The Planning Committee was alarmed 
that the Vice-Chancellor was at such eun advanced steige of 
formulating his ideas on the reorganisation especially in the 
light of the Academic Staff Association and Student Union's 
concern that a final decision might be made with little 
discussion. Wilson was urged to conamunicate with staff on the 
steps he was taking on the restructuring (PCM, 11/4/80:2). 
ECnowledge of the existence of the Association's polemic 
was circulating and on obtaining a copy, Davies immediately 
wrote to the Vice-Cheuncellor "with mounting concern" at its 
contents: 
The fact that somebody has taken the trouble to 
compose a 27 page document rebutting what is 
read between the lines of your brief written 
and verbal statements is indicative of serious 
apprehension. The fact that it has been 
distributed as a Staff Association Critique 
should be of real concern to you, your 
Executive, the Planning Committee and the 
Heath/Adkins Committee (Memo, G.N. Davies to VC, 
17/4/80). 
Davies urged Wilson to send a "conciliatory Vice-Chancellorial 
statement to all staff" to explain in some detail what his 
proposals envisaged and to anchor the need for a review in the 
Professorial Board's resolution of 12 September 1977 that the 
incoming Vice-Chancellor should establish a working party to 
review the University's administrative structure. 
The Academic Staff Association's statement in many ways 
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did the Association considerable harm because it tended to 
personalise the attack on the Vice-Chancellor (Interview, P.L. 
Reynolds, 14/8/84). It was seen by some members of the 
University as eun elaborate subterfuge, under the guise of a 
concern for democratic principles, which was designed to 
protect the non-achievers from a more efficient system of 
accountability (Interview, D.K. Dignan, 26/8/84). Some senior 
members of the University resigned from the Association in 
response to the "absurd nonsense" contained in the statement. 
As one professor put it: 
... the University has far too many staff with 
too much time for politics and too little for 
real academic pursuits and I am not prepared to 
spend my life in interminable argument with 
entrenched interests that are committed to the 
maintenance of mediocrity (Corres., F.D. Stacey 
to Pres. UQASA, 6/5/80), 
What the Association's statement did however, was to act as a 
trigger. It forced the Vice-Cheuncellor to acknowledge that in 
contrast to many of the responses he had received to his 
earlier statements which had mainly been concerned with 
structural and technical matters, there was now a coherent 
ideological position which was fundamentally opposed to the 
reforms that he had adumbrated. 
But the final and decisive factor in causing the Vice-
Chancellor to concede that he ran the risk of alienating even 
some of his potential supporters and hence jeopardising his 
reforms was Davies' private advice to Wilson that he was 
pushing ahead with his proposals far too quickly; the 
establishment of the Adkins Committee had given the impression 
that matters had already moved beyond the consultation phase 
of the reform process to the first stages of implementation. 
417 
Davies had had long experience in reading the nuances in the 
University's climate of opinion eund Wilson respected his 
advice. The fact that Davies was worried over the way matters 
were developing caused Wilson to pull back from the brink and 
attempt to defuse the issue (Interview, B.G. Wilson, 7/8/84). 
Wilson abandoned his plans to use the information 
gathered by the Adkins Conamittee as a basis for developing a 
more refined proposal to canvass with the Planning Committee. 
Instead he decided that there was no politically acceptable 
alternative but to have the issue of reorganisation examined 
ab initio. Accordingly Wilson wrote to all members of the 
academic staff to advise that bearing in mind the Professorial 
Board's resolution of 12 September 1977 that the incoming 
Vice-Chancellor should review the administrative structure of 
the University as a high priority, he proposed to recommend to 
the Senate at its next meeting, the establishment of a Senate 
committee to undertake such a review (Memo, VC to Academic 
Staff, 24/4/80). 
This chapter has shown how during the 1976-1980 period, 
the political criticism of universities, the budgetary 
cutbacks eund the demands for more accountability generated 
pressures for greater bureaucratic control. This stood in 
contrast to the more expansive 1972-1975 period which was more 
tolerant of democratic experimentation. However although 
external environmental and structural factors had a major 
effect on the policy process, the study has also shown how key 
actors operating within the constraints imposed by the formal 
legal and organisational framework were able to project their 
policy preferences in a decisive manner. They did this by 
manipulating the perceptions of the various constituencies as 
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well as the views of other opinion leaders, citing 
environmental exigencies and structural imperatives and 
employing ideological and technical-rational argument. 
Nevertheless, despite the Vice-Chancellor's perceptions 
concerning the substance of the policy problem, the process of 
organisational reform got off to a shaky start because Wilson 
had clearly misread how others would interpret the situation. 
As a result, Wilson misread the nature of the opposition eund 
hence underestimated the need to develop appropriate processes 
for resolving conflict. In this connection it seems that the 
Vice-Chancellor's major tactical error was to attempt 
initially to present reorgeunisation proposals to the wider, 
unstructured University environment where they could provide a 
focal point for discontent eund be used by opponents as a 
convenient ideological vehicle to polarise opinion. Had 
Wilson given more weight to the political costs of his 
proposals and anticipated the opposition that was generated, 
he could have moved much earlier to set up an appropriately 
constituted committee to investigate the options for reforming 
the University's decision-making structures and processes. 
This would have provided a structured framework within which 
to absorb and bureaucratise conflict while at the same time 
being amenable to influence in developing a policy response 
that was generally in line with his personal preferences. 
The following chapter will examine how the Vice-
Chancellor overcame this initial set-back and will describe 
how his plans to enforce greater efficiency and accountability 
gradually gained the ascendancy over those who sought to 
defend earlier gains in democratic participation. 
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^pAPTER ELEVEN 
THE FIELDING REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY. 
Igfl0-lg62 
Chapter eleven will analyse the policy formulation 
process over the period 1980-1982 which flowed from the 
announcement of the Vice-Cheuncellor's decision on 24 April 
1980 to recommend the establishment of a Senate conamittee to 
review the organisation of the University. 
At its meeting on 1 May 1980 the Senate resolved to 
accept the Vice-Chancellor's recommendation that a Senate 
committee be appointed: 
o to review the present academic organisation including 
its interface with administrative and support services; 
o to advise the Senate on the desirability of greater 
delegation of functions and responsibilities; 
o to advise on mechanisms for the better integration of 
resource allocation eund academic decision-making; 
o to consider and report on such other matters as the 
committee deems relevant (SM, 1/5/80:41). 
The most obvious short-coming in the terms of reference 
was the concentration on the academic organisation of the 
University eund its interface with administrative and support 
services; there was no explicit provision for the Committee 
to review the Central Administration under the inomediate 
control of the Registrar. It could be argued that any review 
which was expected to examine such matters as delegation of 
authority and ways of improving the integration of resource 
allocation and academic decision-making should have commenced 
without euny restrictions on its scope. The question of 
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delegation of authority raised the possibility of higher costs 
arising from decentralised administration compared with the 
economies of scale which had been achieved by the existing 
centralised administration. Moreover if it was felt that some 
redeployment of centralised administrative resources would 
partially offset the higher costs of decentralisation, the 
need to include explicitly the Central Administration in the 
review was further underlined. After all it had been partly a 
reaction to the budgetary cutbacks in 1976-1977 which had led 
to the Professorial Board resolving on 12 September 1977 that 
the new Vice-Cheuncellor should establish a working party to 
review the University's "higher administrative structure", 
including senior officers within the Central Administration 
(PBM, 12/9/77:188-190). 
The Senate resolved that the Committee's membership 
should comprise - Mr. F.D.O. Fielding, University Librarieun 
and senator (chairman); one other senator nominated by the 
Senate (Mr. J. A. Barton); Deputy Vice-Cheuncellor (Academic) 
(Professor G.N. Davies); President of the Professorial Board 
(Professor L.C. Holborow); Chairmeun of the Research Committee 
(Professor B, Zerner); Chairman of the Education Committee 
(Dr. B.L. Adkins); two members of the Professorial Board 
nominated by the Board (Mr. R.W. Byrom eund Professor R.L. 
Doherty); President and nominee of the Academic Staff 
Association (Dr. B. Chiswell and Professor M. Darveniza); 
President eund nominee of the General Staff Association (Mrs. 
D.J. Bedwell eund Mr. D. Anderson); President of the 
University of Queensland Union (Mr. E. 0'Sullivan) and the 
President of the Post-Graduate Students' Association (Mr. C. 
Burger). The Vice-Chancellor was given the option of being a 
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member but he indicated that he would prefer to remain 
independent from the Committee's deliberations.(1) 
The Senate Committee (hereinafter referred to as the 
Fielding Committee) was requested to report if possible in 
time for the final meeting of the present Senate on 4 December 
1980. It was further agreed that the Committee's report 
should be referred for comment to the Vice-Cheuncellor, 
Professorial Board, Academic Staff Association, General Staff 
Association and the Student Union before decisions to 
implement any of its recommendations were made by the new 
Senate (SM, 1/5/80:41), Unlike earlier committees appointed 
to examine aspects of University governance the Fielding 
Committee, as a Senate conamittee, was far more representative 
of the various University constituencies; it comprised, in 
the main, moderate pragmatists who were not blinkered by euny 
known ideological commitment to reform the University along 
doctrinaire lines,(2) 
Holborow was Professor of Philosophy but was reported 
to be more interested in a career in academic administration 
theun with teaching eund research in his academic field. Within 
three years of his arrival at the University of Queensland 
Holborow was elected to the Standing Committee (1977) becoming 
Deputy President of the Professorial Board (1978-1979) and 
(1) The number of changes in membership over the period 
from when the Committee was appointed (1 May 1980) 
until it finally reported (27 April 1982) meant that 
twenty persons served as members at various times over 
the two year period. 
(2) Fielding, however, was known to have ideological 
sympathies for democratic reform. Biographical data on 
Fielding, Barton, Davies, Zerner and Adkins have 
already been supplied. 
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President in 1980, 
As noted in the previous chapter, Byrom was a Lecturer 
in Law who had been a moderate President of the Acewiemic Staff 
Association (1976-1977), In addition, he had served as 
Convenor of the Sub-Committee appointed by the Association on 
31 October 1979 to formulate a response to the Vice-
Chancellor's proposals for reform of the University's system 
of governance, Byrom (who became University Legal Officer in 
July 1981), was experienced in the art of bureaucratic 
politics having served as a member of the Professorial Board 
and as a member of the Senate (1976-1978 and 1979-1981), 
As Deeun of the Faculty of Medicine, Doherty was able to 
bring to the Committee the views of eun academic administrator 
in a professional faculty. Doherty had been critical of some 
of the Vice-Chancellor's proposals and he believed that the 
independent faculty status of professional disciplines such as 
Medicine should be preserved. Doherty also believed that any 
reorgeunisation had to take into account the weo' the present 
organisation had evolved in accordance with academic needs and 
that these should not be sacrificed solely for efficiency 
reasons. 
Chiswell was a Senior Lecturer in the Department of 
Chemistry eund President of the Academic Staff Association 
(1980-1981). He had also served on the Education Conamittee 
(1980-1981) and was regarded as a moderate President, a 
pragmatist rather than eun ideological purist. 
Darveniza had been awarded a personal chair in 
Electrical Engineering for his work on electrical transmission 
lines eund the effect of lightning. He had not been active in 
the University's committee system, but had been a long-
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standing supporter of the Academic Staff Association, serving 
as Vice-President during 1972, 1974 and again from 1980 to 
1981. Darveniza was also a member of the Academic Staff 
Association Sub-Committee convened by Byrom to formulate a 
response to the Vice-Chancellor's proposals for reform. 
Bedwell held the position of Departmental Secretary, 
Department of Studies in Religion; as President of the 
General Staff Association, she led eun organisation which was 
still struggling to gain acceptance within the University's 
formal system. This struggle for insider status carried with 
it the risk that the Association could become a "tame cat" 
body with its potential adversary role becoming incorporated 
into the existing administrative system. In thanking the 
Vice-Chancellor for the recognition given to the Association 
by allowing two of its members to participate on the Fielding 
Committee, the Association somewhat obsequiously noted that: 
It is the intention of the members of the GSA 
Executive to work with, eund give advice and 
assistance to, the Administration of this 
University, eund not to be disruptive (Corres., 
Pres. GSA to VC, 10/7/80). 
Anderson was the Vice-President of the General Staff 
Association at the time of his appointment to the Committee 
and his substeuntive position was that of Administrative 
Officer, Prentice Computer Centre. Shortly after his 
appointment as President towards the end of 1981, Anderson 
became the first elected representative of non-graduate staff 
on the Senate pursuant to the 1981 eunendments to the 
University Act. Both representatives of the General Staff 
Association on the Fielding Committee reflected the 
conservative outlook of their Association. 
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A lawyer, 0'Sullivan had served for two terms as 
President of the Student Union (1979-1980) and was a member of 
Senate (1978-1983). 0'Sullivan enjoyed a close rapport with 
the Vice-Cheuncellor and on a number of occasions he had 
defended Wilson's reform proposals at meetings of the Union's 
Council. However 0'Sullivan's role on the Conamittee was 
limited because he retired as President and as a member of the 
Committee at the end of 1980. 
O'Sullivan's replacement, Mr. D.P. Barbagallo, served 
on the Conamittee during 1981. After retiring as President and 
as a member of the Committee at the end of that year, he 
rejoined the Fielding Conamittee three months later as the 
representative of the Post-Graduate Students' Association in 
the place of Burger who had resigned. A surveyor by training, 
Barbagallo was regarded as a forceful advocate of the Union's 
views on University governance but at the same time was 
pragmatic enough to avoid the political isolation of 
uncompromising idealism. 
Burger was an honours graduate in physiology who was 
enrolled in a M.Sc. degree at the time of his appointment to 
the Committee. The Post-Graduate Students' Association which 
Burger represented prior to March 1982 was very much a 
sectional interest group that was primarily concerned with how 
the proposed reforms would affect postgraduate students. On 
the broader more technical aspects of structural reform Burger 
readily conceded that he had little expertise in that field. 
Accordingly he was amenable to influence by the views of key 
opinion leaders on the Committee eund was prepared to associate 
himself with the consensus which emerged from the Committee's 
discussions. 
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As Chairman of the Fineunce Committee, Barton was there 
to ensure that the Committee's examination of the 
practicability of devolving some budgeting authority did not 
lead to conflict with the Finance Committee as the Davies 
Committee had encountered in 1973. 
Davies' presence enabled the Committee to benefit from 
his unsurpassed familiarity with the administration of the 
University. Although Davies shared much of Wilson's concern 
that there was an urgent need for improved coordination of 
academic eund resource decision-making at the middle maneigement 
level, he was not an uncritical cheunnel for the Vice-
Chancellor's ideas. 
The Academic Staff Association was secretly delighted 
with the Committee's composition in that as well as having two 
formal representatives, a pair of former Presidents (Byrom and 
Fielding) were also members (Interview, P.L. Reynolds, 
14/8/84). Fielding in particular had been heavily involved in 
supporting the Association's views on University governance as 
a member of the Association's Executive Committee over the 
period 1969-1982. In this connection, Pfeffer has argued that 
by coopting to a conamittee a person with strong views which 
may not be consonant with those of the maneigerial elite, it is 
possible to quieten potential sources of opposition and also 
to facilitate acceptance of the Committee's report (1981:173). 
Indeed the Vice-Chancellor was delighted that Fielding had 
accepted the chair, believing the choice to be a 
"masterstroke"; it was felt that with Fielding as chairman, 
the chances of the report's acceptance by the University 
community would be significantly increased (Interview, B.L. 
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Adkins, 2/8/84), The only substantive criticism of the 
Committee's composition ceune from a coalition of staff and 
student activists who constituted themselves as the Queensleund 
University Restructuring Collective, That group claimed to 
comprise all those "concerned for the future of democracy at 
this University" (Corres,, Sec. UQ Restructuring Collective to 
F.D.O. Fielding, 6/6/80). The group was unsuccessful, 
however, in its bid to have the Fielding Committee 
reconstituted with a majority representation from the Student 
Union, Academic Staff Association and General Staff 
Association. 
Rhodes has suggested that studies of conamittees in 
operation are often inadequate because they tend to describe 
deliberations in eun idealistic fashion so that the conclusions 
reached appear to follow inexorably from the conamittee's 
rational examination of the policy problem: 
... what tends to be missing from study of 
published information is any indication of the 
process by which the committee proceeded from 
its first meeting to the day when it signed its 
completed report. The report itself naturally 
tries to malce the whole process appear to be 
orderly, logical and tidy, whereas anyone who 
has ever sat on a committee knows that things 
are frequently muddled and strong disagreements 
have to be papered over by compromise 
formulas (1976:121). 
The work of the Fielding Committee extended over two years, 
involved fifteen meetings of the Conamittee itself plus many 
more meetings of the Committee's six working parties. Each 
consisted of between four and seven members and were used 
primarily to undertedce the detailed technical analyses and 
constructive political bargaining that the full Committee 
would have found much more difficult to do. 
Of the individuals associated with the Committee over 
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the two year period of its operation, fourteen participated on 
working parties eund of the latter only five were members of 
more theun two. Those members were - Fielding (6), Doherty 
(4), Byrom (3), Chiswell (3) and Davies (3). Leaving the 
chairman's membership of all working parties to one side, 
those groups were dominated, in numerical terms at least, by 
representatives of the Professorial Board, Academic Staff 
Association and the Central Executive. It is significant that 
interviewees consistently reported the five members neuned 
above as having made the major inputs into the policy process 
although Darveniza and Barbagallo were also recalled as having 
made significeunt contributions. On balance, the roles of 
Fielding eund Davies were seen as the most influential. 
Bailey has observed that: 
... the readiness to compromise usually 
increases as groups get smaller ... as the 
numbers in a committee decrease so also does 
the incentive to pleo^  to eun audience (1977:63-
64), 
Representatives of the various university constituencies who 
might otherwise have felt obliged to assert uncompromising 
principles before a partiseun audience, tend to feel more 
comfortable when they are able to move off the "front stage" 
to the privacy of the "back sta^e" where it is possible to be 
flexible and to compromise in the pursuit of consensus 
(1977:114). As will be seen in the analysis which follows, 
the issues on which compromise was necessary related to the 
search for an accommodation between the need for efficient 
decision-making structures and the need for such structures to 
be politically acceptable to the major constituencies. 
At the same time compromise was not only facilitated at 
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formal meetings of working parties. In this connection, 
several of those interviewed were left with the clear 
impression that much of the real work of the Conamittee and the 
working parties was undertaken outside of formal meetings. It 
was suggested that many ideas concerning the restructuring 
were developed informally at private meetings, over the 
telephone and over lunch in the Staff Club. These ideas were 
then formulated into working papers for discussion at formal 
meetings of the Committee and/or working parties. 
Prior to the first meeting the Vice-Chancellor had 
forwarded a copy of the Adkins Report to Fielding but Fielding 
felt that it would be better for the Committee to start from 
the beginning and gather data on the University's perceptions 
of how the present system operated before examining specific 
proposals for reform. A working party consisting of Fielding, 
Holborow, Doherty and Byrom was appointed to develop a 
questionnaire for circulation to all staff and students 
(Fielding Committee, Minutes 30/5/80:2). As the Senate 
expected the Committee to submit an interim report by 4 
December 1980 no time was lost and on 6 June 1980 the 
Committee met to consider the draft questionnaire. 
The questionnaire's twenty seven open questions sought 
to elicit data on the organisation of academic departments, 
faculties. Professorial Board, central resource allocation 
committees, the Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Cheuncellors, 
Senate eund support services. The questionnaire tended to 
stress structural matters rather than the process of decision-
making based on such criteria as organisational or sub-unit 
goals, the composition of decision-making bodies or the flow 
of maneigement information. Some aspects of the questionnaire 
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design were surprisingly crude given the fact that members of 
the Working Party should have been knowledgeable about such 
matters. With regard to the senior executive structure, the 
questionnaire simply stated that the "Vice-Chancellor and 
Deputy Vice-chancellors are involved in various ways in the 
academic organisation of the University" and with this meagre 
background, staff and students were expected to comment on the 
"present arreungements" and make "suggestions for improving the 
present arrangements" (Fielding Committee, Request for 
Information:6). 
Some 3,500 questionnaires were distributed to staff; a 
further 2,000 were distributed to the Student Union with a 
request that was hardly calculated to encourage a high 
response rate. The Union was asked to: 
... make the questionnaire available to 
students in such a way that they will be taken 
only by those intending to complete and return 
them (Corres., Reg. to Exec. Sec, UQU, 8/7/80). 
In addition deans, heads of departments, Academic Staff 
Association, General Staff Association, Student Union eund the 
Standing Committee of Convocation were invited to medce 
submissions reflecting the corporate views of their respective 
orgeunisations. 
Fielding had prepared a letter to accompany the 
questionnaire which gave the background to the Committee's 
formation. The letter was interesting in the weiy it presented 
the policy problem in terms of the Vice-Chancellor's 
perceptions. Reference was made, for example, to the fact 
that "the University faces problems which the present 
organisation is not well designed to deal with efficiently" 
including an "inadequate" middle management structure and a 
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"lack of coordination between academic eund financial 
decisions". The letter noted ominously that: 
in the past few years there have been 
significant developments which have lessened 
the decision-making roles of individuals in 
favour of wider participation, largely through 
the use of conamittees: it may be time for eun 
assessment of these trends eund a consideration 
of whether they should continue, or perhaps be 
reversed (Memo, F.D.O. Fielding to all Staff, 
17/6/80). 
The Academic Staff Association was allowed to include a 
separate letter with the questionnaire exhorting as meuny 
academic staff as possible to complete the questionnaire eund 
suggesting that they comment on the composition of the various 
decision-making bodies even though the questionnaire did not 
explicitly seek information on that point. The Association's 
Sub-Committee on University Governeunce convened by Byrom which 
had compiled the letter had wanted to include reference to 
what it saw as bias in Fielding's memorandum. It felt that 
the background given on the formation of the Fielding 
Committee should have been exposed as the Vice-Chancellor's 
perceptions of the policy problem which in the Sub-Committee's 
view were not universally shared. However the Association's 
Executive Committee was still smarting from the rebukes it had 
received from some members as a result of the Sub-Committee's 
recently circulated critique of the Vice-Chancellor's 
proposals. Not wanting to provoke further conflict at that 
time euid confident that its policies would be forcibly 
advanced in the privacy of the Fielding Committee, the 
Executive Committee did not accept the Sub-Committee's 
suggestion and hence no reference to the alleged bias was made 
(UQASAECM, 25/6/80:1-2). 
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The questionnaires were circulated to the various 
constituencies over the period 4 July 1980 - 8 July 1980. 
However because of the time constraints faced by the 
Committee, the date for the questionnaire's return was set at 
31 July 1980, notwithstanding the fact that students would be 
away on mid-year vacation for much of that period. Even after 
allowing for this, no one had expected the very low response 
rate that was achieved - 337 or 9.88% from staff eund thirty or 
0.16% in the case of students (Fielding Report (Draft) 
20/7/81:2). 
A working party consisting of Fielding, Anderson, 
Byrom, Chiswell, Darveniza, 0'Sullivan and Burger was 
appointed to summarise the completed questionnaires. The 
Working Party's report identified lack of funds as the most 
pressing problem facing the University over the next decade 
but beyond that the comments on organisational matters 
suggested that many respondents had little understanding of 
the present system. Conaments often tended to be more or less 
baleunced with those in favour of reform in one direction being 
equalled by those opposed (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
3/11/80:2). Perhaps the best instance of divided opinion was 
exhibited in relation to resource allocation. Thirty nine 
respondents advocated a decentralised system whereas thirty 
two favoured centralisation. Further analysis on what 
respondents meant by centralisation however revealed that even 
on that issue there was no consensus; seventeen wanted 
resource allocation to be under the control of central 
executive officers while the remaining fifteen argued in 
favour of authority being handed to a central resource 
allocating committee. At the same time some unequivocal 
432 
indications did emerge. Some 140 respondents sought greater 
flexibility for departments in expending funds while 130 
advocated a strengthening in the powers of deeuns. A 
complicating factor was the variety of meaning given to 
advocating a strengthening of the dean's powers. Roughly 
equal numbers saw the remedy as full-time deans, longer 
appointments, more control over resource allocation eund 
increased powers over heads of departments. The working party 
concluded that: 
There is substantial agreement on the nature of 
the major problems most of which are 
substantially fineuncial rather than structural. 
Cheunges in academic orgeunisation are relevant 
only insofar as they might increase efficiency 
eund rationalise the use of resources. While 
meuny staff feel that they have contributions to 
medce but are not consulted there is no obvious 
push for greater formal democracy eund there is 
considerable support for increasing the powers 
of Deeuns. The only substeuntial vote of no 
confidence is in the Senate which is apparently 
too remote eund unconamunicative (Fielding Report 
(Interim), 25/11/80:5). 
The questionnaire response suggested that there was 
considerable apathy within the University about the reform of 
the University's decision-making structures and processes. In 
addition to the poor questionnaire response, however, there 
were other indications of apathy among academic staff 
including low attendances at meetings of the Academic Staff 
Association and falling membership levels. Membership had 
fallen from 90% of the possible maximum in 1968 to 67% in 
1981. The only issue that seemed to stir a strong response 
from staff in recent years related to resources when, for 
example, 230 had turned out on 30 July 1977 at an 
extraordinary meeting to discuss funding cuts in academic 
departments and 200 had attended an extraordinary meeting on 8 
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June 1978 to discuss proposed changes to study leave 
provisions (D. Whyte, Private Communication, 1/6/84), This 
compared with an attendeunce of only 124 at the meeting to 
discuss the Vice-Chancellor's proposals for structural reform 
on 14 September 1979, Some academics had become quite cynical 
about the whole question of structural reform and especially 
the Academic Staff Association's role in the process. As one 
professor noted, the issue had descended into "bureaucratic 
'politics'": 
It is about where (in whose hands) will be the 
power to decide on resource allocation rather 
than upon the priorities for which resources 
are being made available in the first place ... 
we have fallen into the most classic of all 
bureaucratic errors, the struggle for meeuns has 
itself become the end towards which we 
continually strive (Corres., E.D. Schofield to 
Dean, Fac. of Medicine, 28/7/80). 
In the Committee's eyes, however, the apathy within the 
University as evidenced by the poor response to the 
questionnaire also had a brighter side: 
... (it) suggested that many staff were not 
concerned with the form of University 
organisation. This gave the committee 
considerable freedom in the way it approached 
its task (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
3/11/80:2). 
The Academic Staff Association's submission was 
prepared by Byrom's Sub-Committee on University Governance and 
was approved at eun extraordinary general meeting on 25 July 
1980 attended by only forty six members. The Association's 
policy followed the familiar theme of endorsing full 
participatory democracy for academic staff at departmental and 
faculty board levels and representative democracy at 
Professorial Board level. The Association envisaged that 
executive officers at each of those levels would be elected by 
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and from the relevant body eund would be bound by the decisions 
of those bodies. A resource allocation role was also 
contemplated for the Professorial Board through the medium of 
a Resource Allocation Conamittee (UQASA, University Governeunce 
and its Implementation, 25/7/80). 
It was significant that the major sectional interest 
groups in the University, the Academic Staff Association, 
General Staff Association, Student Union and Post-Graduate 
Students' Association were primarily concerned with the 
composition of decision-making bodies and, in particular, the 
representation of the interests of their members. Thus the 
General Staff Association argued that the departmental 
governing body should ideally be open to all staff but that if 
that was not possible, then general staff should be fairly 
represented. Heads of departments were to be limited to 
merely implementing the departmental governing bodies' 
decisions (Corres., Pres. GSA to F.D.O. Fielding, 8/7/80). 
The Post-Graduate Students' Association pointed out that 
postgraduates had concerns which differed from undergraduate 
students and staff yet recent attempts by postgraduates to 
have representatives elected under the student electorate for 
the Professorial Board and Senate had been unsuccessful 
because undergraduate students outnumbered postgraduates 5:1. 
The Association therefore sought guaranteed postgraduate 
representation on the Professorial Board and Senate in 
addition to the existing student representation as well as 
representation on the Postgraduate Studies Committee (Corres., 
C. Burger to F.D.O. Fielding, 30/10/80). 
Wilson was less concerned than Cowen had been to win 
435 
the support of the student body. Following the Vice-
Chancellor's reform proposals advanced in 1979, the Student 
Union had established a Restructuring Committee which 
advocated the principle of "worker participation" based on the 
concept of not less than 26% of Senate being comprised of 
staff and students elected by staff eund students (UQU, Interim 
Report of Restructuring Conamittee, [1980]:10-11). Wilson saw 
no useful purpose in pandering to such doctrinaire idealism. 
He took the pragmatic view that since students were 
represented on the major decision-making bodies of the 
University and because his reform proposals "would have little 
direct relevance to students since courses offered by 
departments would not be affected", there was little need to 
consult students directly concerning his proposed reforms 
(Corres., VC to Sec. UQU, 16/2/80). 
As a consequence of the Vice-Chancellor's attitudes, 
the Student Union was more concerned about Wilson's methods of 
initiating reform theun with their substance. The Union's 
response to the Fielding Committee on 18 August 1980 extended 
the "worker participation" theme, this time to provide for 
25% student representation on all decision-making bodies of 
the University based on the existing academic structure. 
However erratic swings continued to characterise the Union's 
views on University governance. In addition to policy on the 
extent of "worker participation" altering in less than eight 
months, the Union's views on the role of faculty boards 
changed from advocating a resource allocation role for faculty 
boards to a policy of resource allocation being carried out 
directly from the Finance Committee to departmental 
consultative committees (UQU, Interim Submission on 
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Restructuring, August 1980:1-4). But as with most other 
submissions from the Union in the past, it was the 
uncompromising hostility to hierarchical authority eund the 
uncritical acceptance of democratic forms eund processes which 
diminished the Union's influence. Asserting that staff aund 
students should be given "control over resource allocation" 
because they were the people "most affected" exemplified the 
Union's strategy of elevating one principle to the almost 
total exclusion of equally valid principles such as, for 
example, the principle of vertical accountability which might 
be seen as equally releveunt in a publicly funded institution. 
As Lucas has noted: 
There is eun implicit totalitarianism in the 
demand for absolute justice according to some 
single principle ,,. (1980:184). 
What emerged from the submissions above all else was 
the concern to advance parochial interests but invariably 
behind the veil of a professed concern for efficiency. Some 
heads of departments were worried that any new middle 
management structure would diminish the powers of heads and 
suggested that this would foster "mediocrity" in the 
University. On the other hand some of the deans were anxious 
to ensure that their positions were strengthened at the 
expense of heads of departments. As the acting Dean of the 
Faculty of Veterinary Science noted: 
Unilateral action by some departmental heads, 
without consultation with the Dean or even 
advice to him, has given rise to problems of 
some magnitude from time to time (Corres., M. 
Rex to F.D.O. Fielding, 28/7/80). 
In arguing that full-time deans should have authorities 
commensurate with their responsibilities. Professor Rex 
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suggested that: 
This would inevitably result in a reduction in 
some of the powers at present exercised by 
department heads (Corres., M. Rex to F.D.O. 
Fielding, 28/7/80), 
One of the main impressions gained during the course of 
data gathering was that a considerable number of University 
staff resented what they saw as the Vice-Chancellor's desire 
to impose the so-called North American model of university 
management on the University of Queensleund, Whilst the Vice-
Chancellor had stated that he believed that orgeunisational 
structures should be fashioned to facilitate the academic 
enterprise rather theun teaching and research being constrained 
to fit preconceived organisational models, his detractors 
argued that Wilson's preoccupations with efficiency and 
meunagement cast doubts on such claims. As one professor 
remarked: 
The whole ethos of universities in North 
America is different from that in the United 
Kingdom and possibly Australia too, and I think 
we would be prudent to guard against the 
temptation of believing that euny one system is 
equally applicable to universities in all 
continents (Corres,, T.D. Glover to F.D.O. 
Fielding, 11/9/80). 
Organisational reform which has its origins in the need 
to promote economic efficiency especially where maneigers seek 
to justify their claims in terms of cost-benefit outcomes and 
resource optimisation need to be carefully examined. This is 
because such ostensibly neutral claims in fact are value-
infused and say nothing about the distribution of the costs 
and the benefits of reform. At the University of Queensland, 
for example, the dollar savings which might accrue from a 
reduction in the number of man-hours spent on committee 
meetings might be seen by managerially-minded central 
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executives as an economic benefit but be perceived by academic 
staff and students as a socio-political cost. As Wildavsky 
observed: 
... cost-benefit eunalysis ... is shot through 
with political eund social value choices . , , 
(1966:297), To expect ... that the (cost-
benefit) method itself (which distributes 
indulgences to some and deprivations to others) 
would not be subject to manipulation in the 
political process is to say that we shall be 
governed by formula eund not by men (1966:298), 
At the University of Queensland the restructuring 
proposals initiated by the Vice-Chancellor sought to reconcile 
his interpretation of external pressures for efficiency and 
accountability with internal strivings for participatory 
democracy. In doing this Wilson had stressed the benefits of 
economic efficiency but had given less attention to the socio-
political costs of reform. On the other hand many of the 
groups which opposed the Vice-Cheuncellor's proposals 
emphasised the socio-political costs of a greater emphasis on 
management but were dismissive of the possible benefits to 
economic efficiency. The Conamittee's task of reconciling 
these extremes was eun unenviable one. 
Not everyone in the University was overtly concerned 
with the question of power eund the preservation of parochial 
interests. The Professor of Management's professional 
commitment to technical-rationality was exhibited when he 
advocated application of the hoary old "form follows function" 
principle. Peter argued along the same lines as he had as a 
member of the Davies Committee. He suggested that the 
Fielding Committee had started off on the wrong foot by not 
first clarifying the University's mission: 
One of the few solid management principles is 
439 
that "form follows function" or "structure 
reflects eund supports organisational purpose". 
Meunagement of a university is the process of 
planning, organizing, leading and controlling 
the efforts of staff members and the use of 
other orgeunisational resources in order to 
achieve stated orgeunisational goals (Corres., 
H.W. Peter to F.D.O. Fielding, 11/8/80). 
Davies was also keen for the Fielding Conamittee to 
apply that principle and at the meeting on 3 November 1980 he 
tabled a paper on the functions of the University of 
Queensland based on the Davies Report. However because the 
functions of the University inevitably focus on the central 
role of academic departments, the Committee was unwilling to 
apply the "form follows function" principle since to do so 
would have preempted discussion eund biased the outcome towards 
a decentralised model favouring academic departments (Fielding 
Committee, Minutes, 3/11/80:4), In a delightful reversal of 
the form follows function principle, the Committee agreed that 
although it would eventually have to go through the motions of 
being seen to consider the objectives of the University, it 
would first develop various models of organisation eund then 
give consideration to the objectives underlying them (Fielding 
Committee, Minutes, 3/11/80:5). In other words the Committee 
intuitively did not wish to constrain open discussion by the 
straightjacket of technical-rationality. 
With only one month to go before the Conamittee was due 
to present its interim report to the Senate, members arrived 
at the worrying realisation that the questionnaire responses 
and the various submissions had confused rather than clarified 
the issue. One indication of this confusion was that after 
three meetings of the Committee and after having considered 
the Working Party's report, the main outcome was the rather 
440 
elementary conclusion that there were four possible models 
which literally covered the full range of options: 
o the present system with some modification; 
o a decentralised model; 
o a centralised model; 
o a middle management model (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
3/11/80:3-4).(3) 
In order to cast light on these options the Committee 
appointed a third working party consisting of Fielding, 
Davies, Doherty, Darveniza and Burger to formulate various 
models of orgeunisation. In an attempt to reduce some of the 
existing ambiguity and to provide a framework for the Working 
Party's deliberations. Fielding circulated a memorandum to 
members in which he advanced seven models for consideration. 
These covered a wide reunge of options across the centralised -
decentralised continuum. Wlnile the development of these 
models was useful as a means of facilitating discussion on the 
Working Party so that eun interim report would be ready for the 
Senate on 4 December 1980, the real value of Fielding's 
(3) Cullen's typology of strategy formulation has 
summarised the thinking implicit in these models. 
According to Cullen, strategy formulation in 
organisations could be conceptualised as being either 
"top-down", "bottom-up" or conducted by "middle 
maneigement". Top down systems had the virtue of 
decision-making being in the hands of senior management 
who were aware of environmental pressures but were 
relatively remote from the concerns of sub-units which 
produced the organisation's output. Bottom-up systems 
enjoyed the advantage of being sensitive to the needs 
of sub-units producing the organisation's output but 
they often suffered from a lack of perspective eund 
integration with the organisation's overall needs. The 
solution adopted by many complex organisations was to 
develop middle management structures which were capable 
of integrating and coordinating the perspectives of 
centralised senior maneigement eund decentralised sub-
units (1972:328-331). 
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memorandum was the way it extrapolated beyond the equivocal 
survey result and imposed the illusion of order eund direction 
in an otherwise eunbiguous situation. 
At the Working Party meeting on 13 November 1980, it 
was agreed that two of the models should be eliminated and 
that individual members of the Committee should be assigned to 
develop the remainder. In order to keep faith with the 
earlier request for the Committee to report if possible in 
time for the outgoing Senate's final meeting on 4 December 
1980, Fielding prepared a draft interim report on 25 November 
1980 which for the most part consisted of the summary of the 
principal issues raised in individual responses to the 
questionnaire. The draft also provided brief details of the 
five models being developed by the Working Party. Like 
Fielding's earlier memorandum, the interim report sought to 
impose order on an otherwise confused situation. It suggested 
that three themes had been identified from the survey 
responses: 
o The devolution theme - this would involve 
diminishing the scope and powers of central committees 
and delegating more to departments and faculties; 
o The democratic/equity theme - this stressed the 
overall fairness of a centralised system provided that 
those committees and executive officers were made more 
accountable to the University community; 
o The efficiency theme - this contemplated stronger 
executive leadership, less committee work and 
representation (Fielding Report (Interim), 25/11/80:6). 
Despite the obvious utility of the themes as organising 
principles for the purposes of report writing and the 
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Committee's reassuring confidence that two or three of the 
models would now be selected for reference to the University 
community, the conflicting ideologies which underpinned such a 
diversity of views revealed the highly political nature of the 
policy process which could be expected eventually to dominate 
the Committee's attempts to reconcile them. But as the 
interim report was essentially for information only and 
contained no substantive recommendations, there was little 
more that the outgoing Senate could do but to note its 
contents. The contentious work still lay ahead (SM, 
4/12/80:161). 
At its meeting on 24 February 1981 the Working Party 
discussed a document prepared by Fielding which embodied the 
three consolidated models that the Conamittee had agreed to on 
4 December 1980. These consolidations had produced some 
muddled hybrids which did little to clarify the Working 
Party's thinking. Wlnile narrowing the reunge of options for 
the Working Party's consideration, the consolidations had 
failed to provide for a middle management option which 
unambiguously reflected the Vice-Chancellor's preferences. 
The Vice-Cheuncellor was in attendance at the Working Party's 
meeting since with the aid of a well developed prescience, he 
had expressed the wish to discuss the models with members 
before they were finalised and circulated to the University 
community for conament. Following that discussion it was 
agreed to include the Vice-Chancellor's proposal for executive 
deans to coordinate the academic and resource decision-making 
of (ideally) a small number of faculties/schools and, for the 
sake of completeness, the existing system was also added. (WP 
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Minutes, 24/2/81). The Working Party resolved to recommend to 
the Committee that it select one or at the most two models for 
submission to the Senate and that the Senate request comment 
from the Professorial Board, Academic Staff Association, 
General Staff Association and the Student Union. When the 
Committee had considered those comments, one model would be 
recommended to the Senate for formal approval (WP Minutes, 
8/4/81), 
The Working Party's recommendations were considered by 
the Committee on 7 May and 14 May 1981 and the Vice-Chancellor 
ensured that he was present for both meetings. While 
supporting the concept of devolution, Wilson made it clear 
that the Senate would be unlikely to approve any proposal 
which did not incorporate adequate "safeguards". Devolution 
was only feasible where individual executives appointed by and 
responsible to the Senate exercised authority delegated by the 
Senate within the context of University-wide policy. The 
Vice-Cheuncellor indicated that because devolution implied a 
greater involvement by faculties in decision-making, a "quid 
pro quo" would be to allow the Central Executive more 
influence in the selection of the leaders of those bodies 
(Fielding Committee, Minutes, 7/5/81:2-3). After completing 
its examination, the models were effectively reduced to two -
the Vice-Chancellor's proposal which advocated strong 
executive control and another which envisaged a much stronger 
coordinating role for the Professorial Board (Fielding 
Committee, Minutes, 14/5/81:3). The significance of those two 
models was that: 
o integration of academic and resource decision-making 
was to be achieved through a faculty structure 
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reviewing budgets prepared by academic departments; 
o the number of faculties to be involved was seen to be 
important; 
o the on-going saga of whether the central coordination 
of academic and resource decision-making should be 
controlled by the Central Executive or the Professorial 
Board was again raised. 
The breakthrough occurred at the meeting of the Working 
Party on 12 June 1981 at which the Vice-Cheuncellor was in 
attendance. Fielding in consultation with Davies had prepared 
what was labelled as a composite of the two models. It 
provided for the establishment of five schools each comprising 
designated faculties. Each department was to choose its 
primary faculty affiliation as this would determine the school 
to which it would belong for resource purposes. The existing 
faculty structure was to be retained for academic decision-
making. Ideas for the coordination of academic eund resource 
decision-making were still being formulated but one notion 
envisaged steunding conamittees in each school advising the 
executive dean concerning the budgets prepared by constituent 
departments possibly within the parameters laid down by an 
Academic Resource and Planning Committee (WP Minutes, 
12/6/81:1-3). A careful exeunination of the composite model 
revealed however that it embodied a number of innovations 
which deviated from the ideas incorporated in the two previous 
models from which it had ostensibly been derived. For example 
athough faculties were to be incorporated within the schools 
they were to be limited essentially to academic decision-
making leaving the departments and schools to coordinate 
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academic eund resource decision-making. Moreover the reduction 
in the number of resource areas to five, although consistent 
with the Vice-Chancellor's preferences, was fewer theun had 
been contemplated by the Conamittee in the earlier models. 
Futhermore the arreungements for central coordination of 
academic eund resource decision-meiking were left curiously 
ambiguous, reflecting the difficulty in defining a mutually 
acceptable boundary between the Central Executive eund the 
Professorial Board in that sensitive policy domain. 
The Working Party's report was considered by the 
Committee on 23 June 1981 eund eigain the Vice-Cheuncellor was in 
attendance. Wilson supported the thinking behind the 
composite model and was quick to head off a suggestion that 
because the small number of schools had resulted in large, 
amorphous bodies there should be a survey to determine the 
appropriate number of schools. He made it clear that the 
small number of schools was one of the strengths of the model 
(Fielding Committee, Minutes, 23/6/81:1-2). With the 
Committee's thinking apparently clarified at last, a draft 
report prepared by Fielding was submitted to the Committee on 
20 July 1981. It was at this late stage that the issue of the 
University's goals eund purposes was again resurrected. Some 
members felt that the omission of such a reference would be 
criticised and that however perfunctory, it would be desirable 
to insert a statement on the University's goals in the 
preamble of the report (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
20/7/81:1). The rationalists would feel more comfortable if 
they were led to believe that what followed by way of 
reorganisation was in some way related to the University's 
mission. Fielding was given the task in consultation with 
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Byrom to develop this gx post facto rationalisation but 
with commendable ingenuousness, the final draft submitted to 
the Senate made it clear that it "did not think that to 
attempt to (define the purposes of the University) would be a 
profitable exercise". The draft report qualified that 
dismissal by the eixiomatic observation that if the purpose of 
the University was to develop and implement high quality 
programs of teaching eund research then it was "inevitable" if 
the University was to achieve that purpose for the impetus for 
such programs to come from the academic community through the 
teaching departments (Fielding Report (Draft), 20/7/81:1). 
The draft report was submitted to the Senate on 30 July 
1981. It identified the major problem in the interface 
between academic operations eund support services as the lack 
of a middle management structure. The Committee had 
considered the possibility of delegating some of the Vice-
Chancellor's authority to the existing thirteen deeuns but 
dismissed that idea ostensibly for structural reasons -
thirteen deans with delegated Vice-Chancellorial authority 
would be excessive and existing faculties differed markedly in 
size. (4) Too many middle maneigement directors could lead to 
problems of central coordination and great variability in the 
sizes of faculties would result in inequities with departments 
(4) Although it was not publicly stated at the time, some 
members of the Committee felt that the Vice-Chancellor 
did not have confidence in some of the existing deans 
to perform an executive role in the coordination of 
academic and resource decision-making. One of the 
theoretical attractions for having a small number of 
schools was the belief that whereas it might be 
possible to select five or so top-flight academic 
administrators to head them, it might not be possible 
to be so selective in choosing thirteen executive deans 
(Interview, B. Chiswell, 25/7/84). 
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in small faculties enjoying disproportionately high 
representation. Moreover single department faculties would 
not have the flexibility in resource trade-offs that were 
possible in muIti-department faculties; given that greater 
flexibility in the use of resources was one of the main 
objectives of the reorganisation, small faculties as resource 
allocating units would defeat that purpose (Fielding Report 
(Draft), 20/7/81:7,13). 
Greater delegation of functions and responsibilities 
was also to be achieved by enabling departments to prepare 
budgets which would be coordinated by the relevant school. 
Coordinated budget proposals would proceed from the five 
schools to the Vice-Chancellor's Academic Resource eund 
Planning Committee (ARPC) whereupon the ARPC would be 
responsible for consolidating the school budgets for 
submission to the Vice-Chancellor. After the budget had been 
approved by the Finance Committee and the Senate, block grants 
were to be allocated by the Finance Committee to the schools 
whereupon the schools were to distribute block grants to 
departments. While the Professorial Board, because of its 
size and composition, was seen to be inappropriate for budget 
coordinating purposes, it was to be given the opportunity to 
comment on the ARPC budget proposals submitted to the Vice-
Chancellor (Fielding Report (Draft) 20/7/81:13). Although 
faculty boards were to continue to be restricted to their 
existing academic responsibilities, improved coordination of 
academic and resource decision-meiking would be possible by 
virtue of deans becoming members of the relevant school 
council, along with the heads of constituent departments, for 
the purpose of advising the director. Further coordination 
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would be achieved through the mechanism of overlapping 
membership with the proposal to appoint the five directors to 
the ARPC and the Professorial Board and for the Professorial 
Board to elect four members to the ARPC. The creation of the 
five schools would also enable the area sub-committees 
relating to academic staff establishments, research, 
promotions eund reappointments as well as equipment and 
mainteneunce to be dispensed with (Fielding Report (Draft), 
20/7/81:9, 17, 19,20). 
In addition to the full-time directors of schools being 
appointed by the Senate on the advice of a Senate selection 
committee for five year renewable terms, the report envisaged 
a more bureaucratic form of selecting heads of departments. 
For the ostensible reason of the heads new responsibilities in 
financial maneigement, the report proposed that the Vice-
Chancellor should be advised of appointments to headships by a 
selection committee of the school concerned chaired by the 
director of the school (Fielding Report (Draft), 20/7/81:15). 
That proposal recognised the Vice-Chancellor's concern over 
the internal procedures used by many departments whereby the 
nomination of heads to the Vice-Chancellor followed a 
departmental election. 
This was not the only aspect of the report which 
reflected the Vice-Chancellor's preferences. It was true that 
in an ideal world Wilson would have preferred five 
reconstituted faculty structures with academic and resource 
decision-making powers. However the Vice-Chancellor 
acknowledged the constraints which prevented that outcome; 
given those constraints, Wilson was gratified by the 
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Committee's proposals. The proposals were clearly designed to 
enhance managerial control. By devolving much of the 
voluminous deiy to day administrative detail associated with 
staffing and budgetary matters onto the five directors, the 
Central Executive would have much more time to concentrate on 
strategic issues, especially planning and evaluation of 
University activities. The thrust of the report was to 
improve efficiency: 
... we believe that the structure which we 
recommend will work more efficiently eund reach 
better decisions (Fielding Report (Draft), 
20/7/81:26). 
While the report tried to appease the protagonists for 
greater democracy in the University by highlighting the fact 
that considerable budgetary power had been devolved to 
departmental and school levels and that heads and directors 
would consult representative advisory committees, the reality 
was that decision-making was now devolved more on individuals: 
The success of the arrangements will depend to 
a considerable extent on the quality of the 
Directors (Fielding Report (Draft), 
20/7/81:10). 
The report's attempt to sell the economic benefits of the 
reorganisation also inadvertently highlighted the diminished 
opportunities for collegial discussion on committees: 
... the principal economic benefit will be the 
release of time for teaching and research which 
many senior academics presently spend on 
committee work (Fielding Report (Draft), 
20/7/81:25). 
For impeccable reasons of planning and control, the 
report envisaged that authority over staff establishments 
would be retained by the Senate and the Vice-Chancellor. They 
were to receive advice from an Academic Staffing Committee 
(via the Professorial Board) in the place of the Standing 
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Committee and from three general staff conamittees covering 
academic departments, academic support services and general 
support services in lieu of the existing General Staff 
Committee (Fielding Report (Draft), 20/7/81:21-24). Given 
that in 1979, the proportion of the University's budget 
expended on salaries aund related costs was 88.37%, it can be 
seen that the extent of devolution was in fact quite limited. 
But perhaps the key to Central Executive control under 
the proposal was the Academic Resource and Planning Committee. 
Whilst the Professorial Board retained its role in advising 
the Senate on teaching and research within the University, the 
ARPC was to advise the Vice-Chancellor on the priorities in 
the annual budget and on the guidelines and priorities for the 
distribution of resources to support academic activities 
(Fielding Report (Draft), 20/7/81:18-19). This power was 
crucial given the reality that academic initiatives, 
especially at a time of budgetary restraint are subject to 
economic feasibility. Taking that into consideration and 
noting the line of communication between departments, schools 
and ARPC there was little doubt that, despite disclaimers to 
the contrary, the traditional academic structure of 
departments, faculties and Professorial Board would lose 
influence in policy formulation. It is true that in the past 
the faculties and the Professorial Board did not have 
budgetary responsibilities and that this function had always 
been concentrated in the Central Executive. What was 
significant about the Fielding Committee proposals, however, 
was that the conscious choice had been made not to devolve the 
coordination of academic and resource decision-making to a 
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reconstituted version of the traditional academic structure. 
Indeed one of the main indirect effects of the limited 
devolution contemplated would have been to strengthen the 
quality and legitimacy of Central Executive decision-making. 
This would enhance the Executive's policy advisory role to the 
Senate. Just as important, it would enable more effective 
control to be exercised by the Executive over resource 
utilisation eund, de facto, over academic developments 
within the University. 
At its meeting on 30 July 1981 the Senate approved the 
draft report's recommendation that it be circulated to the 
Professorial Board, faculties. Academic Staff Association, 
General Staff Association and Student Union for comment and 
reply by 23 October 1981. The Senate accepted the Committee's 
proposal that the final report, taking into account the 
feedback received, should be submitted to the Senate at its 
meeting scheduled for 10 December 1981 with the view to 
implementing the reforms from 1 January 1983. 
Davies observed that the problems experienced by the 
Vice-Chancellor earlier when the Academic Staff Association 
had attacked Wilson's initial proposals for reform had arisen 
partly because of the latter's tendency to be too brief in his 
descriptions of what he had in mind. The Davies Report had 
attempted to avoid that trap in 1973 by including: 
... a great deal of obfuscating detail (which) 
helped to focus discussion on specific issues 
rather than attracting polemical arguments on 
what was read between brief lines (Memo, G.N. 
Davies to VC, 17/4/80). 
Although the Fielding Committee's draft report at twenty six 
pages plus appendices was a much smaller document than the 
Davies Report, no amount of "obfuscating detail" would have 
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saved it from the unfavourable reaction that the report 
generated. 
What followed over the next six months was a period of 
intense consultation eund lobbying by some heads of departments 
who were concerned at the academic and resource implications 
of their departments being located in the faculties eund 
schools suggested by the Committee. Similar political 
manoeuvrings were undertedcen by some of the deeuns in 
professional faculties who objected to the concept of their 
faculty being "lumped in" with other faculties within schools. 
Concern was also expressed at the prospect of a director from 
outside their discipline making decisions which impinged on 
the professional activities of the faculty. A central issue 
not adequately addressed in the draft report was that the 
University had become used to departments being grouped into 
area sub-committees for equipment, maintenance and research 
resource allocation and for assessing promotions and 
reappointments. Even though some of the area sub-conamittees 
had produced some "strange bedfellows", individual departments 
had to be convinced that these new proposals would not 
disadvantage their existing resource base. Similarly, 
departments had become accustomed to being associated with 
particular faculties and the prospect of a sudden cheunge for 
resource purposes which violated principles of academic 
affinity was unacceptable to some heads. 
A major focus of discontent was the Department of Law, 
which had been preserved as a dominant department faculty 
under the Adkins Committee proposals, but now faced the 
prospect of losing that independent status. The Department 
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had for some years suffered from internal conflict and the 
possibility of a non-lawyer director having to intervene to 
get its house in order, especially now the Department no 
longer enjoyed a monopoly over the preparation of lawyers in 
Queensland, caused considerable anxiety. Following an 
unsuccessful attempt by the Faculty of Law to involve the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in commenting on the need 
to preserve the independence of the Faculty, support was 
forthcoming from the Queensland Law Society which found the 
proposed grouping of Law into a School of Applied Social 
Sciences "incongruous and offensive" (Corres., Sir Charles 
Wanstall to Dean, Fac. of Law, 18/2/81; Corres., Exec. 
Officer, Qld Law Soc. to VC, 23/10/81). Similar sentiments 
were expressed by the Bar Association of Queensland (Corres., 
Pres. Bar Assn. to VC, 8/12/81). The situation in Law was 
typical of the coalitions formed by other departments and 
faculties with their external professional associations to 
fight the Committee's proposals. 
No less theun ten faculties argued that there should be 
devolution of decision-making authority concerning the 
allocation of resources to the existing faculties and all 
thirteen indicated that they would tolerate incorporation into 
a school structure only if the existing faculties constituted 
the schools. Seven faculties together with the Education 
Committee and the Standing Committee felt that the 
organisational changes should be made through the existing 
structure (AB, Summary of Responses to Fielding Committee 
Draft Report, [Oct 1981]). 
Thinly veiled behind overt concern about academic 
affinities were the more covert manoeuvrings of departments 
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anxious to ensure that they were not economically 
disadvantaged by their assignment to a particular departmental 
grouping. The University's preoccupation with resource 
allocation eund departmental resource bases had been heightened 
over the years by the alleged inequities among some of the 
area sub-committees. A department's resource base depended to 
a significeunt extent on the resource allocation criteria used 
by the area sub-committee of which it was a member. Sub-
committees of the Research Committee, for example, distributed 
funds using pseudo equity eund pseudo efficiency formulae and 
the resources provided depended to some extent on the methods 
of resource allocation used. As one recent report to the 
Research Committee stated: 
The tortuous and contrived distribution 
formulae adopted by the Physical Sciences and 
Biological Sciences research sub-committees are 
testaments to ingenuity and self-interest 
rather than efficiency. Each formula is a very 
temporary compromise among departments, each 
department anxious to re-shape the formula to 
its own advantage (MacDonald et al, 1980:48). 
So called equity formulae based essentially on academic staff 
strength as used by the Hiamanities and Social Science research 
sub-committees were biased in favour of those departments with 
low student demand but employing a disproportionately large 
number of academic staff. Staff in such departments usually 
had more time available for research whereas departments with 
high student demand coupled with insufficient academic staff 
often had less time for research but fewer research funds 
available to employ compensating research assistance (Memo, 
HOD Commerce to DVC(F&F), 12/3/82). 
Responses from both Staff Associations and the Student 
Union were also highly critical of the proposals. The 
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Academic Staff Association concluded that: 
The emphasis in the Senate Committee's Report 
is on the management rather theun the 
government of the university community. 
.., The Academic Staff Association has grave 
concerns about the introduction of an appointed 
hierarchy with authority to deal with financial 
matters which could gain effective control over 
academic priorities (UQASA Response to Fielding 
Committee Draft Report, 16/9/81:9). 
Having fought successfully for substeuntial democratic reforms 
on the Professorial Board during the last decade, the 
Association was anxious to ensure that the gains made were not 
rendered meaningless by a major strengthening of executive 
power at the expense of the Board: 
In a period of competing claims for scarce 
resources it is not unlikely that power will 
accrue to those bodies which control finances, 
i.e., the appointed full-time Directors and the 
Schools with a consequent diminution in the 
authority of faculties and the Academic Board 
(UQASA, Response to Fielding Committee Draft 
Report, 16/9/81:3). 
In a closely argued document which drew heavily from its 1974 
response to the Davies Report as well as the 1980 critique to 
the Vice-Chancellor's proposals, the Association advocated the 
establishment of a structure in which the Academic Board was 
the "supreme decision-making body" with its own resource 
allocating body and with power devolved through subordinate 
academic groupings so that academic and resource decision-
making remained integrated at all levels. 
However the Academic Staff Association's capacity to 
mobilise interest eunong staff on the reorganisation issue as a 
means of showing a high level of support for its views had 
been weakened. Only forty two members attended the 
extraordinary meeting convened by the Association on 29 
September 1981 to consider the response to the draft report 
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(UQASAM, 29/9/81:1). A major consideration which emerged 
during the meeting concerned the cost of the proposals. By 
September 1981, costs and the need to make savings had become 
a highly political issue. The Vice-Chancellor was determined 
to reduce the proportion of the University's budget devoted to 
salaries and related costs to the Universities Council 
supplementation figure of 84% by a major reduction in staff 
levels so that additional funds could be reallocated in favour 
of postgraduate studies and research. Wilson argued that an 
annual reduction of $400,000 over the 1981-1985 period in 
order to achieve an annual reduction of $1.6 million by the 
end of 1985 was required. The Planning Committee eigreed that 
in order to achieve a rationalisation in the use of resources, 
a review of undergraduate courses with the object of reducing 
staff contact time especially in areas with very small subject 
enrolments would be necessary (PCM, 28/10/80:2; 16/12/80:2-
4). Faced with a possible deficit of $1 million in 1981 and 
$1.5 million in 1982, the Vice-Chancellor announced a freeze 
on the filling of staff vacancies from 7 September 1981 (PCM, 
2/9/81:1). The Standing Committee had also achieved savings 
in its 1981 academic staffing round of $430,000 for 1982 and 
$460,000 for 1983. Some 17.5 tutorial staff positions had 
been eliminated for 1982 (PCM, 23/9/81:2). 
With cutbacks of that magnitude coming at a time when 
recommendations had been made to appoint five new directors, 
the issue of costs became highly contentious. At the Academic 
Board meeting on 7 September 1981 the Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic) undertook to obtain an estimate of the cost of the 
Fielding Committee's proposals. An accurate estimate was 
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extremely difficult because it was not clear who would fill 
the positions eund, in the likely event that they were internal 
appointees, whether they would all be replaced in their 
departments by temporary staff. Nevertheless Davies advised 
the Academic Staff Association meeting that $50,000 would 
probably cover the cost of implementation but that it was 
expected that this would be offset to some extent by savings 
in the 25,000 person hours spent participating in the 
University's 125 conamittees operating at that time within the 
existing "inefficient" system (UQASAM, 29/9/81:3).(5) 
Some of the ideological purists at the Academic Staff 
Association meeting were concerned that the Fielding 
Committee's proposals were in conflict with the Association's 
policy. Darveniza pointed out, however, that the Fielding 
Committee had been made well aware of how far the Senate would 
be likely to go in devolving authority. Thus for tactical 
reasons he and Chiswell were not interested in pressing a 
narrow ideological line and they correctly anticipated that 
the Fielding Committee still had some way to go before the 
reorganisation would be finalised. A minority report for 
purist doctrinaire reasons at that stage would have foreclosed 
future discussions and would have damaged the goodwill shared 
among Committee members. The preservation of a measure of 
goodwill was vital if future bargaining was to lead to 
(5) The estimated net recurrent cost of the reorganisation 
was later calculated by the Bursar to be $132,932 plus 
"start up" capital outlays of $132,719 (Memo, Bursar to 
VC, 22/2/83). The estimated net recurrent cost was 
later revised downwards by the Vice-Chancellor to 
$107,532 (Statement by VC, AB Agenda Paper, 7/3/83). 
It can be seen that Davies' estimate was absurdly low 
and was possibly designed to allay academic hostility 
to higher expenditure on administration. 
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reasonably harmonious compromise later. Not being inhibited 
by such considerations, the Association endorsed its formal 
response to the draft report (UQASAM, 29/9/81:3). 
The issue of costs also preoccupied the General Staff 
Association partly because the recommendations for the 
appointment of five directors followed on the heels of a major 
review of general staff establishments completed on 21 October 
1980. In that review net savings in staffing of $102,000 eund 
$153,000 for 1981 and 1982 respectively had been recommended 
(Plowman Report, 21/10/80:55). Accordingly the General 
Staff Association argued that the Fielding Committee's "costly 
proposals" were not justified since it appeared that the 
savings made in general staff costs were now to be used to pay 
for the appointment of five new directors (Corres., Pres. GSA 
to F.D.O. Fielding, 21/10/81). 
Because only thirty students responded to the Fielding 
Committee's questionnaire it could be argued that most 
students were not concerned about the University's decision-
making structure and processes. Either because or despite the 
apparent lack of "grass-roots" interest, the Student Union 
submitted a substantial fourteen page response to the draft 
report. Predictably anti-establishment in its ideology, the 
Union's response was not prepared to accept the Fielding 
Committee's argument that even though the appointment of five 
directors had been recommended, this was necessary in order to 
devolve decision-making closer to the work-face. The Union's 
position was that devolution was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for democracy; the related question was 
- devolution to whom? Thus devolution to appointed directors 
advised by school councils comprised of ex officio deans 
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and heads of constituent departments in the place of a number 
of central resource committees and area sub-committees (some 
of which consisted primarily of members elected by the 
Academic Board) was seen to be an anti-democratic step in the 
interests of greater efficiency. In the Union's words: 
Another disturbing feature of this report is 
its move away from democratic decision-making 
towards more authoritarian structures. There 
has been an attempt to disguise this by 
referring to delegation of authority and 
devolution of resource planning power. But 
this delegation and devolution has not been to 
more representative bodies, but to a small 
number of individuals (UQU, Response to 
Fielding Committee Draft Report, 21/10/81:4). 
Much of the outcome of the draft report was attributed to the 
sinister "presence of the Vice-Chancellor". Perceiving 
Wilson's attendance at so many of the Committee and Working 
Party meetings as "very disquieting", the Union was not 
surprised that the thrust of the Committee's report for a 
"middle management" structure coincided with the Vice-
Chancellor's well publicised ideas (UQU, Response to Fielding 
Committee Draft Report, 21/10/81:1). 
Although more sophisticated than its other submissions 
on University governance made over the past decade, the 
Union's response was eigain flawed because of its uncritical 
acceptance of democratic values and its uncompromising 
opposition to non-elective leadership. Moreover the 
response's advocacy for elected heads of departments and 
elected middle management who would be bound by the decisions 
of their departmental and faculty bodies respectively, while 
being ideologically pure, was also out of touch with 
contemporary reality. Given a policy environment that 
increasingly seemed to equate maneigerial values with 
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efficiency and democratic values with disorder, the Union's 
influence was minimal. 
Given that the Academic Board's composition was 
dominated by heads of departments eund deans, it was clear that 
the key to winning the Board's support was to persuade both 
groups that the reforms would be beneficial to departments and 
faculties. The traditional academic structure of department, 
faculty. Academic Board had done badly out of the proposed 
reforms. Faculties had missed out on an opportunity to 
coordinate academic developments among constituent departments 
through devolved authority over resources. Heads of 
departments who previously enjoyed direct access to the 
Central Executive and central resource committees and who were 
politically astute enough to "work the system" to achieve 
resource meiximisation if not resource optimisation, did not 
relish the idea of having an additional layer of hierarchy in 
the form of directors interposed between them and the central 
authorities. Accordingly the Academic Board resolved (57 
votes to 15) not to support the restructuring as proposed by 
the Fielding Committee since it was believed that the 
desirable increased devolution of authority could be gained by 
using a traditional faculty and departmental structure. In 
view of that the Board resolved that the Committee be 
requested to further develop and submit for reconsideration, 
eun organisational model based on the earlier one which 
envisaged a much stronger coordinating role for the Academic 
Board and the traditional faculty structure. Acknowledging 
the need for some flexibility, however, the Board conceded 
that the Committee should not be constrained to regard the 
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existing faculties as completely immutable (ABM, 19/10/81:3-
4). 
At its meeting on 2 November 1981 the Fielding 
Committee reviewed the feedback received from the University 
community concerning the draft report. The meeting noted 
that: 
There seemed to be consensus within the 
University community that some restructuring 
was necessary and desirable in order to align 
academic and resource allocating decisions at 
faculty level (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
2/11/81). 
Fielding had prepared a new model which was based on the 
existing thirteen faculty structure and at the following 
meeting, he made it clear that the Committee would need to be 
absolutely convinced that the reorganisation could not be 
accomplished using the existing faculties as a basis before 
suggesting euny amalgamations (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
13/11/81:6). 
The structural problem was that small faculties such as 
those dominated by a single department would be unsuitable for 
resource allocation purposes because they would not be subject 
to the scrutiny of competing departments within the faculty 
and there would be fewer opportunities to foster resource 
optimisation through cooperative exchanges of resources, 
shared resource acquisitions and trade-offs. Moreover it 
would be difficult for single department faculties to have 
devolved authority over assessing applications for promotions; 
the scrutiny of other departments was an essential check and 
balance to ensure equity in that process. The Committee was 
evenly divided over whether the thirteen faculties with their 
great variability in size were too many for effective 
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devolution of authority or whether some amalgamations should 
be made. The crucial decider, however, was the threat that 
the price of small faculties retaining their separate identity 
would almost certainly be that they would not be given 
delegated authority over aspects of budgeting and promotions 
(Fielding Committee, Minutes, 13/11/81:6). Given that 
devolved academic control over those two matters was 
especially coveted, the price of small faculties retaining 
their separate identity was seen as being too much to pay. 
Accordingly the Committee felt that, consistent with the views 
implicit in the Academic Board's resolution of 19 October 
1981, some amalgamations of faculties should be attempted with 
the view to facilitating uniform devolution of authority 
across all of the faculties. 
A working party consisting of Fielding, Adkins, 
Barbagallo, Chiswell, Davies, Doherty and Professor Edwards 
(the latter having replaced Zerner as Chairman of the Research 
Committee) was appointed to develop appropriate organisational 
models (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 13/11/81:6). At its 
meetings on 16 and 17 November 1981, the Working Party 
considered three models prepared by Davies (Model 1), Chiswell 
(Model 2) eund Fielding (Model 3). Model 1 was based on the 
proposals contained in the Adkins Report and enviseiged nine 
faculties having academic and resource decision-making powers. 
Model 2 was derived from the draft July 1981 report of the 
Fielding Committee with faculties organised into five groups 
each under an executive dean. Model 3 was based on the 
existing thirteen faculty structure and acknowledged that 
deans in single department faculties would have less extensive 
powers than deans in multi-department faculties. The 
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Committee considered the Working Party's report on 24 November 
1981 and, after eliminating Model 2 eund distributing 
preferences, resolved (8 votes to 4) that Model 1 was 
preferable to Model 3. It was agreed, however, that details 
of all three models should be sent to the Academic Board eund 
that whichever model was adopted, it should be reviewed after 
five years operation (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 24/11/81:2-
3). 
A special meeting of the Academic Board had been called 
on 30 November 1981 to consider the Committee's draft report. 
Wildavsky has suggested that in examining the policy process 
it is important to examine the distribution of the benefits 
and burdens of the proposed reforms since this aids prediction 
of the type of response and the policy outcome (1979:400). In 
the case of Model 1 the costs were borne largely by the 
faculties which were to be amalgamated, namely, 
Commerce/Economics, Social Work, Engineering, Architecture and 
Music. Given that all faculty boards had recently supported 
the retention of their separate identity: 
It was suggested that the Fielding Committee 
had been selective in its consideration of 
comments from faculties as the Faculties of 
Law, Medicine, Dentistry, Veterinary Science 
eund Agriculture had now been listed as separate 
faculties while others had not (ABM, 
30/11/81:6). 
Wildavsky has observed that reform involves uncertainty 
because it is often difficult to show conclusively how a 
proposal will improve things and hence inertia rather than 
change tends to be the norm in most organisations (1979:394). 
At the University of Queensland one of the major problems was 
the difficulty faced by the Committee in showing how one model 
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would be superior to another in practice. Thus in order to 
win support for the proposals, incentives were now included. 
The new combined faculties would incorporate the names of the 
old faculties and the existing faculty boards would be 
retained as boards of studies; moreover the Standing 
Committee would now be retained in order to review the academic 
staff establishment eund it was no longer to be a requirement 
that the appointment of heads of department in future be 
subject to the recommendation of selection committees. 
The Vice-Chancellor eund Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric 
and Finance) both argued that in the present financial climate 
there was much to commend a smaller number of larger groups in 
order to facilitate resource optimisation. In what was a 
prophetic statement, Ritchie noted that the central issue was 
not how faculties were grouped together for resource purposes 
but rather the matter turned on how departments should be 
grouped together. Possibly because of the strong executive 
control enviseiged in the July 1981 draft report vis-a-vis 
the strengthened academic control inherent in a revised 
faculty structure, Ritchie urged that further consideration be 
given to the concept of schools under the control of 
directors. However a motion to include that proposal in a 
ballot was lost (32 votes to 48) and in the ballot that 
followed. Model 1 was adopted over Model 3 by forty six votes 
to thirty seven (ABM, 30/11/81:8-9). 
It can be seen that although Model 1 was marginally 
favoured there was a large minority which preferred Model 3. 
This unstable outcome spilled over into the meeting of the 
Fielding Committee on 1 December 1981 where, following strong 
informal representations from some of the disaffected 
465 
faculties, some members of the Committee expressed 
reservations concerning the viability of Model 1. Even though 
the Committee was due to submit its report to the Senate in 
nine days time those members felt that the proposals to 
amalgamate certain faculties and not others was discriminatory 
and that no such report should be made. Other members were 
more concerned about the need to preserve the illusion of 
rationality surrounding the policy process; they were worried 
about how it would look if, at this eleventh hour, yet another 
change of direction was embarked upon. 
In order to provide more time to sort out this 
confusion, the Committee decided to submit only an interim 
report to the Senate on 10 December 1981 and to establish a 
further working party consisting of Fielding, Adkins, Doherty 
and Dr. M.C. Grassie (who was due to replace Adkins as 
Chairman of the Education Committee in 1982) for the purpose 
of advising on a possible grouping of faculties not exceeding 
nine in number. Fielding was authorised to prepare the report 
in consultation with Davies eund Holborow and within the 
context of eight resolutions of the Committee. Those 
resolutions included a recommendation to the Senate that it 
endorse Model 1 "in principle" provided that the total number 
of faculties should not exceed nine and subject to further 
consultation by the Committee concerning the grouping of the 
present faculties and departments within the proposed new 
faculties. Also included was a recommendation for a 
tightening up of the procedures for the appointment of heads 
of departments and for the operation of departmental 
consultative committees (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
466 
1/12/81:2-6). 
The Fielding Committee now conceded that the 
appointment of heads by selection committees chaired by 
directors (as proposed in the July 1981 draft report) had been 
a provocative attack on traditional departmental autonomy 
under which departments were free to make their own internal 
arreungements concerning the procedures for nominating heads 
for appointment. At the same time the Vice-Cheuncellor was 
known to have strong views that the delegation of greater 
authority to heads of departments in relation to budgeting and 
financial management could only occur if there was more 
effective control exercised in the method of selecting heads. 
Indeed the quality of the corps of departmental heads assumed 
a particular importance in a more devolved decision-making 
model. Yet the Committee was confronted with the reality that 
the uneven quality scattered among the existing heads was due 
at least in part to the present de facto system whereby a 
significant number of heads were nominated for appointment on 
the basis of departmental elections from electorates of widely 
varying compositions. 
However notwithstanding the urgent need to resolve the 
method of appointing heads in view of the pervasive 
interconnection of that matter with other components of the 
decision-making system, the Fielding Committee simply avoided 
this central issue. It did this by proposing that after the 
reorganisation had been completed, the Senate should seek 
further advice concerning the composition of the departmental 
group eligible to nominate the head of department with the 
view to standardising the procedures (Fielding Committee, 
Minutes, 1/12/81:6). The Committee had also been made aware 
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that there were still problems in many departments with the 
operation of departmental consultative committees with some 
such committees having become moribund while others 
effectively bound the head by their decisions. It was 
therefore recommended that after the new academic organisation 
had been finalised, the Senate should seek further advice on 
the composition, functions and procedures of departmental 
consultative committees (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 
1/12/81:6). 
Fielding prepared the interim report on 2 December 
1981. The report was essentially a holding operation, 
designed to provide the Senate with feedback from the 
University conamunity concerning the July 1981 draft report and 
to obtain an endorsement in principle of Model 1. The latest 
interim report gave little hint of the disjointed route which 
had been followed in arriving at that Model although 
occasionally the confusion showed through. For example in 
relation to estimating the cost of the proposal the report 
noted that the number of imponderables made that task 
"especially difficult". Then in a rather insouciant 
non sequitur which presumably sought to justify the lack 
of attention given to the question of workload distribution 
and cost, the report concluded with what appeared to be more 
of an article of hope than a reasoned assessment: 
... the Committee has tended to take the view 
that the work is at present done somewhere in 
the University and will simply be done in a 
different way (Fielding Report (Interim), 
2/12/81:13). 
At the meeting of the Senate on 10 December 1981, 
Fielding laid the ground for Model I's advocacy for academic 
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and resource decision-making to be devolved to not more than 
nine faculties. The central problem at that time was 
presented as the poor coordination of academic and resource 
decision-making. It was pointed out that even the existing 
full-time deans who sought to promote academic developments 
which had financial implications ran the risk of having those 
efforts undermined by the right of individual heads of 
departments to refer such matters to the Vice-Chancellor or to 
central committees (SM, 10/12/81:206). The dilemma faced by 
the Committee had been that in seeking the advantages of 
devolved decision-making at the faculty level, the 
disadvanteiges inherent in eunalgamating some faculties had to 
be confronted. The nine faculty configuration had been 
adopted tentatively because in addition to conforming with the 
preferences identified by the Adkins Committee, it had been 
argued that any larger number might cause central committees 
with representation from each faculty to be too large. On the 
other hand any smaller number would extend the pain of 
amalgamation to other faculties. The reasons were both 
structural and political. Fielding personally favoured 
academic and resource decision-making devolved to the existing 
thirteen faculties (Model 3) but to his credit this did not 
show in his review of the three options nor in his 
presentation of the Committee's in principle support for Model 
1 (Interview, F.D.O. Fielding, 23/7/84 & 20/8/84). The Vice-
Chancellor was anxious to ensure that Model 1 and not Model 3 
was given in principle approval. He suggested that: 
While the government of the University was in 
the hands of the Academic Board and the Senate, 
management of the University should operate on 
sound business principles which became 
difficult if the number of groups exceeded 
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nine (SM, 10/12/81:208). 
With the Vice-Chancellor's preference made clear, the Senate 
approved all of the interim report's recommendations on the 
understanding that the Committee would submit a final report 
by 1 April 1982. 
By the end of 1981 the Vice-Chancellor was in a state 
of some despair. Although Model 1 in his view was superior to 
Model 3 it was still not his preferred option. Wilson's 
preference lay with a much tighter management system with 
perhaps five deans coordinating the academic and resource 
decision-making of their faculties (Interview, B.G. Wilson, 
31/7/84). The problem he faced was to get that notion across 
to the Committee without being seen to be interfering. 
Moreover even if the Committee adopted the idea, it still had 
to win the support of the Academic Board. Wilson was working 
up to ninety hours per week at that time to keep abreast of 
the many initiatives which he had been promoting and the 
amount of time that he could devote to influencing the outcome 
of the Fielding Committee's activities was limited. His 
concern, however, was that if the question of organisational 
reform which he had so conspicuously promoted was defeated by 
the Academic Board, his leadership standing would be damaged. 
A loss on such a fundamental issue and the diminished personal 
prestige that would have resulted, might have produced a 
domino effect on other reforms that he had initiated. These 
other reforms such as the new tutorial policy (which was 
designed to improve postgraduate support and reduce salary 
outlays) and the establishment of Uniguest (as an 
affiliated business agency aimed at facilitating the fuller 
utilisation of the University's research capacity) were also 
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seen as being fundeunental to the University's revitalisation 
(Interview, B.G. Wilson, 31/7/84 & 13/8/84). Accordingly the 
Vice-Chancellor continued to make himself available to 
Fielding and the Committee for consultation as required. 
Reaction to the news that the Fielding Committee was 
considering a model of orgeunisation which would involve a 
reduction in the number of existing faculties was swift. For 
example the Faculty of Veterinary Science, being one of the 
smaller faculties, felt vulnerable to any attempts being made 
to eunalgamate. This feeling was not helped by the Fielding 
Committee's earlier acceptance of the Department of Veterinary 
Anatomy's submission that that department should be relocated 
from the Faculty of Veterinary Science to the Faculty of 
Science. This issue resulted in a bitter struggle within the 
Faculty of Veterinary Science. The Head of the Department of 
Veterinary Anatomy believed that his Department had not 
received its fair share of resources in the allocation of 
equipment and maintenance funds through the Agriculture and 
Veterinary Science Area Sub-Committee which was dominated by 
other Veterinary Science departments. On the other hand 
Professor Glover felt that his Department had received more 
equitable treatment through the Biological Sciences Area Sub-
Committee for the allocation of research funds. Accordingly 
Glover had a preference for his Department to be included, 
like the Department of Anatomy with which it had an affinity, 
with the Faculty of Science. However the effect of such a 
transfer would have been for the Faculty of Science to 
comprise sixteen departments leaving the Faculty of Veterinary 
Science exposed to the possible criticism that with only four 
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remaining departments, it was only marginally viable and a 
ripe ceundidate for amalgamation (FBVSM, 7/12/81:19; 
10/3/82:6-7). A further problem concerned the negative 
external perceptions which arose from the proposed 
fragmentation in the offering of a professional course. Thus 
both the Australian Veterinary Association eund the Veterinary 
Surgeons Board of Queensleund wrote to the Vice-Chancellor 
pointing out the deleterious effect on the professional 
competence of future graduates if the proposed separation was 
approved. There was eun implied threat that the accreditation 
of the course for professional registration purposes might 
have to be reviewed if the Department of Veterinary Anatomy 
ceased to be part of the Faculty of Veterinary Science 
(Corres., Pres, Aust Vet Assn to VC, 11/2/82; Corres,, Pres. 
Vet Surgeons Bd to VC, 4/3/82). Other faculties and 
departments also coalesced with their external constituencies 
to protect their interests. 
It was eigainst this background of intense political 
activity that Fielding prepared a paper on 15 January 1982 for 
consideration by the working party. Fielding essentially 
argued that given that a nine faculty model envisaged the 
amalgamation of four existing faculties and having regard to 
the Vice-Chancellor's preference for fewer than nine 
faculties, it made sense to explore the feasibility of further 
amalgamation. This would overcome the problem of single 
department faculties as well as the untenable discrimination 
inherent in merging some already large faculties and leaving 
other small faculties unscathed. The objections of external 
representatives on faculty boards such as professional 
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associations could be met by having them continue on boards of 
studies for the administration of the various degree courses. 
Moreover because it was envisaged that the new faculties would 
have responsibilities for budgeting, resource allocation, 
promotions and research, external representation on such 
bodies was seen as being inappropriate. Once the constraint 
of trying to preserve as many of the existing faculties as 
separate bodies was removed and the consequential need for 
boards of studies was accepted, it became possible to be more 
flexible in relocating departments to meet some of their 
objections to earlier proposals and to achieve less 
variability in the sizes of the different faculties. 
The structural problem of variability in size had been 
intractable with the July 1981 draft report enviseiging a staff 
establishment reunge of from 242.50 to 1002.00 compared with 
from 45.00 to 789.75 in Model 1 contained in the December 1981 
interim report. In a new seven faculty model developed by 
Fielding, the range had been reduced to 111.00-706.00 (F.D.O. 
Fielding Paper, Grouping Faculties and Departments into not 
more than Nine new Faculties, 15/1/82:9). From a structural 
and technical perspective. Fielding believed that his proposal 
had much to commend it. Given that the basic Physical 
Sciences such as Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry were 
applied in the professional study of Engineering, it made some 
sense for the Engineering and Physical Science departments to 
constitute a separate faculty. Moreover by splitting the 
Physical Sciences from the Biological Sciences it enabled the 
basic Biological Sciences such as Botany eund Zoology which 
were applied in the study of Agriculture and Veterinary 
Science to be grouped as a separate Biological and Applied 
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Biological Sciences Faculty. Such a strategy would also have 
enabled the very large Faculty of Science with 789.76 staff to 
be split up so that a more even distribution of staff numbers 
would be possible. 
The Working Party considered Fielding's paper on 22 
January 1982 eund apart from reducing the number of proposed 
faculties down to six and eigreeing that there was a need to 
consult the Deans of the Faculties of Arts and Science 
concerning the implications of the proposed amalgeunations for 
the administration of existing degrees, there was general 
support for the direction being taken (WP Minutes, 22/1/82). 
The Working Party was uncertain as to the composition of the 
faculty boards eund was divided on whether external 
representatives of boards of studies, if they were also 
allowed membership of faculty boards, should be able to vote 
on such matters as funding. But this division of opinion was 
insignificant compared to the realisation which emerged during 
the meeting that the volume and level of responsibilities 
being contemplated for the deans would almost certainly 
require full-time "middle management" executives, 
notwithsteunding the opposition which the concept of directors 
had provoked after the circulation of the earlier draft report 
(WP Minutes, 22/1/82). 
At its meeting held on 25 January 1982 the Fielding 
Committee expressed some concern that the Working Party's six 
faculty proposal resembled the five school proposal contained 
in the July 1981 draft report which had been rejected by the 
Academic Board on 19 October 1981. A majority of members 
favoured the nine faculty grouping contained in Model 1. 
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Although Model 1 had generated some opposition, at least the 
Committee could point to the fact that it had been based on 
the study of departmental affiliations undertedcen by the 
Adkins Committee. Accordingly the Working Party was requested 
to bring forward a proposal based on nine faculties and, in 
addition, a second option based on a lesser number of 
faculties (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 25/1/82). 
At the meeting between the Working Party and the Deeuns 
of the Faculties of Arts eund Science on 29 Jeunuary 1982, the 
proposal to split Science and Arts in two and to combine those 
parts with other faculties was discussed. The Deans were not 
opposed to the idea provided that the existing BA and BSc 
degrees were retained eund administered by individual boards of 
studies (WP Minutes, 29/1/82). With that hurdle out of the 
weiy the Working Party turned its attention to developing a 
nine faculty model as requested by the Committee. Fielding 
proposed a nine faculty model which he felt might be least 
objectionable to the parties concerned. Under his proposal, 
five of the existing faculties (Dentistry, Law, Medicine, 
Commerce/Economics, Architecture) would retain their separate 
identity while the problem of Veterinary Anatomy would be 
overcome by combining the Agriculture, Veterinary Science and 
Biological Science departments. But at the same time as that 
proposal solved one set of problems, another set emerged. The 
incompatibility between the agriculturalists and the 
veterinary scientists was well known and it was expected also 
that the physical scientists would not welcome the prospect of 
a merger with the engineers. Another worry was that the 
Working Party and the Committee would look vacillating and 
indecisive in introducing yet another configuration of nine 
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faculties when the latest version differed so markedly from 
the Model approved in principle by the Senate on 10 December 
1981 eund which had been based on the Adkins Conamittee's 
findings (WP Minutes, 29/1/82). 
In order to find a way out of the myriad of conflicting 
interests eund principles, the Working Party undertook a series 
of interviews with the heads of departments and deans most 
affected by the proposals. These interviews conducted under 
the chairmanship of Grassie, starkly revealed the strength of 
the opposition to some of the proposed groupings. For example 
the Engineering professors were worried that if they beceune 
associated with the Physical Sciences, a non-engineer might 
become dean of the faculty (WP Record of Interview, 2/2/82). 
The feeling was mutual eund it was not long before the heads of 
the five Physical Science departments wrote to the Vice-
Chancellor opposing any union with Engineering because it was 
feared that the different philosophical approach of scientists 
and engineers would lead to conflict (Corres., HODs Chem, 
Maths, Computer Sc, Geology & Mineralogy, Physics to VC, 
23/2/82). Similarly the Department of Agriculture opposed any 
merger with the Veterinary Science departments because 
Agriculture had a large elective component in its course and 
had strong research and postgraduate study interests whereas 
Veterinary Science was more of a set course designed to comply 
with professional registration requirements. At the same 
time, the heads of the Veterinary Science departments 
(excluding Veterinary Anatoffiy) opposed being grouped with the 
Department of Agriculture because Veterinary Science was 
primarily concerned with clinical teaching in small groups and 
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had less time for research (WP Record of Interview, 2/2/82). 
The various participants were well aware that these 
differences would have major implications for resource 
allocation. The hidden eigenda was that each department could 
be expected to seek advantage by pressing for the development 
of resource allocation formulae that emphasised its strengths 
and deemphasised its weaknesses. The possibility of the 
selective use of criteria in assessing promotions which 
reflected the strengths and activities of the staff in 
dominant departments was also a worry. 
The Working Party's report made it clear that all of 
the professional faculties wanted to be left alone. The 
faculties had been quite shameless in their selective use of 
statistical indices which they felt might support their 
appeals for separate status (WP Report, 26/2/82:7). Their 
inflexibility reflected what Selznick has referred to as the 
process of institutionalisation (1957:16). Although 
organisations are formal technical systems set up to achieve 
certain goals, they are inhabited by individuals who, over 
time, develop personal and group goals which may not 
necessarily coincide with the organisational goals identified 
by management. Even if there is agreement on goals, there may 
be disagreement on the meeuns to achieve them. Thus "personal 
and group egotism" can interfere with management initiated 
reforms and unless there is some alignment between 
individual/group and organisational interpretation of reality, 
organisational rigidity is likely to occur (Selznick, 1957:8-
9). Leaders have to recognise that organisational groups 
become infused with values and, because of that, they become 
the embodiment of group identity which is often strongly 
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defended against attempts to reform them. The values of 
professional faculties within the University of Queensland 
which rejected the notion of directors or deans from other 
disciplines compromising their traditional independence eund 
the substeuntial degree of independence enjoyed by academic 
departments from close maneigerial scrutiny were well 
entrenched by 1982. 
Jenkins has suggested that one of the major 
characteristics of modern administrative behaviour has been 
the raising of rationality to the level of an ideology 
(1978:160-161). Whereas individual faculties could engage in 
private political manoeuvrings in order to protect their 
independent status, the Committee was obliged to produce a 
report for public scrutiny throughout the University. The 
Working Party was therefore anxious to be seen to be applying 
defensible structural and technical criteria in the analysis 
of competing claims. In doing so, the Working Party laboured 
under considerable difficulty in formulating its proposals. 
Eventually three proposals were adveunced, two with nine 
faculties and one with seven, but it soon became clear that 
there was no rational basis (technical or political) which 
could justify combining some faculties and leaving others 
untouched (WP Report, 26/2/82:5). Because of this 
uncertainty, the Working Party merely recoffimended that the 
Committee adopt one of the proposals on a tentative basis to 
facilitate further examination. 
The debate on the University's restructuring had by now 
been lengthy and intense and the Working Party had noted that 
its discussions with deans and heads had: 
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... added to a general feeling of unease and 
uncertainty throughout the University ...(WP 
Report, 26/2/82:13). 
The discussions had also exposed the considerable 
politicisation within the University as faculties eund 
departments jockeyed to advance their perceived self-interest, 
especially their resource base. However such instability eund 
uncertainty was potentially damaging to organisational morale 
(WP Minutes, 26/2/82:2; Interview, M.C. Grassie, 31/7/84). 
As Pfeffer has observed, in such circumstances: 
... there is less energy expended on the 
production of the collective product and more 
time and attention given to the political 
activity of dividing up the resources produced 
by the organization (1981:367). 
The Committee was therefore acutely aware of the need to bring 
the matter to finality eund at the meeting held on 5 March 1982 
Fielding had invited the Vice-Chancellor to attend the 
discussions. The Vice-Chancellor's feelings had regressed 
from despair to exasperation at the heavy work being made by 
the Committee in its ponderous progress towards reaching a 
viable conclusion. In an attempt to push the proceedings in 
an acceptable direction Wilson expressed disappointment at the 
"negative approach" of the Working Party's report. He felt 
that instead of the report effectively apologising for not 
being able to develop an equitable or rational nine faculty 
model it should have stressed the positive advantages of 
consolidation and rationalisation into a smaller grouping 
(Fielding Committee, Minutes, 5/3/82:2). 
Fielding felt that the Working Party's fixation with 
Model I's arbitrary nine faculty concept approved by the 
Academic Board on 30 November 1981 had distorted subsequent 
deliberations. The Working Party's discussions since then had 
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indicated nothing intrinsically logical about the nine faculty 
model even though it had been based on the Adkins Report. 
Indeed some departments which had earlier expressed no 
objections to being grouped with other departments to form new 
faculties had since expressed strong opposition to the idea. 
The recent interviews with senior staff in departments and 
faculties likely to be affected had left the Working Party 
with the impression that the Academic Board's decision of 30 
November 1981 had been the outcome of cynical self-interest 
with the decision for a consolidation to nine faculties being 
supported by those faculties whose independence was preserved 
and opposed by those faculties which were to be consolidated. 
Given the self-interested nature of the Board's reasoning. 
Fielding argued that not too much should be made of the result 
of the Board's ballot and that accordingly it would be 
appropriate to reconsider the models rejected at that meeting 
of the Board (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 5/3/82; Interview, 
F.D.O. Fielding, 20/8/84). 
What emerged from this somewhat ingenuous catharsis of 
feelings was a realisation that the Committee appeared to have 
"two clear-cut options". On the one heund if the Committee 
felt that a restructuring based on consolidation of existing 
faculties would provide a more cost-effective organisation for 
the University as a whole then it should recommend accordingly 
notwithstanding the self-interested objections of the 
faculties affected. On the other hand if the Committee 
thought that consolidation would be to little advantage and 
that the present organisation could be modified to enable some 
devolution of coordinated academic and resource decision-
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making, then a structure based on the present faculties along 
the lines of Model 3 rejected by the Academic Board on 30 
November 1981 should be considered further. In the light of 
that discussion, the Committee concluded that the Working 
Party's two nine faculty proposals should not be pursued but 
at the same time there was only minority support for 
Fielding's advocacy for Model 3. Instead a new working party 
(the sixth) consisting of Fielding, Byrom, Chiswell eund Davies 
was appointed to give further consideration to the seven 
faculty model developed by the fifth Working Party 
notwithstanding that model's ironic resemblance to the 
rejected schools proposal contained in the July 1981 draft 
report (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 5/3/82:3-5). 
By now Fielding was worried that the Committee was 
losing its way and that yet another foray up a blind alley 
would put what remained of its credibility at risk. Hence on 
19 March 1982 he wrote to the Vice-Chancellor indicating that 
he was not satisfied with the direction that the Committee nor 
the Academic Board had taken since the July 1981 draft report. 
Fielding lamented that he had been a minority on the Committee 
and the Board in his support for authority being devolved to 
the thirteen existing faculties. Fielding canvassed the 
advantages and disadvantages of the various faculty groupings. 
He indicated that given the lack of support for the thirteen 
faculty proposal as well as the structural and discrimination 
problems associated with the nine and seven faculty models, 
the Committee could probably be persuaded to vote for a 
structure based on a variation of the five schools contained 
in the July 1981 draft report. What was clear, however, was 
that the existing faculties had to be retained either with 
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devolved academic and resource decision-making powers or with 
their existing powers as constituent parts of larger units. 
Fielding felt that the Committee had been too anxious to 
respond to the parochial interests of the bodies it had 
consulted with the result that the outcome was likely to be 
inefficient and acceptable to no one. Fielding sought the 
Vice-Chancellor's advice on "... the political minefield in 
which we now find ourselves" since he believed that the 
Committee would be more confident in taking a stand if it knew 
more precisely what Wilson's current preference was (Corres., 
F.D.O. Fielding to VC, 19/3/82). 
The Vice-Cheuncellor was anxious to avoid the accusation 
that he had influenced the Committee unduly eund indeed the 
extent of his influence on this point is unclear. 
Recollections of events by the main actors involved were 
either incomplete or at odds with the perceptions formed by 
some other members of the Committee at that time. Placing 
together the pieces of the puzzle it appears that the Vice-
Chancellor, while being careful to avoid being seen to have 
forced his views on the Committee, reiterated his well-known 
belief that there should be a middle management structure. 
Wilson felt that the structure should be sufficiently small in 
number so that each executive, in addition to exercising 
certain delegated Vice-Chancellorial authority over more or 
less equal sized academic-administrative divisions, would be 
able to be members of the central Academic Resource and 
Planning Committee without that Committee being so large as to 
prevent effective coordination and planning. 
As co-author of the 1974 Staff Association response to 
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the Davies Report, Fielding had strongly argued that all 
academic decisions should be taken by representative bodies 
composed in major part by elected representatives and that 
since decisions on academic policy should not be made in 
isolation from their financial implications, the same bodies 
should be responsible for resource allocation and academic 
policy. It was consistent with Bailey's findings on committee 
behaviour (1977:63) that although these principles were held 
as strong convictions by Fielding and others on the Committee 
they did not prevent the search for compromise in the relative 
privacy and camaraderie of the small group working parties. 
Thus towards the end of the Fielding Conamittee's deliberations 
much of the initial interest in expressing the values of 
freigmentary group interests had all but disappeared as members 
became eunxious to find a viable, preigmatic solution even if it 
was not ideologically pure. The Academic Staff Association's 
views of 1974 which were still held in 1982 were not strongly 
pressed on the Fielding Committee and were especially muted in 
the more intimate sociability of the small working 
parties. 
No minutes were kept of the meeting of the sixth 
Working Party but its report and interviews of some of the 
participants suggests that an atmosphere of considerable 
frustration gripped that meeting. Members made yet another 
abortive attempt to find a combination or permutation of 
faculty groupings which would allow the structural integration 
of academic and resource decision-making while at the same 
time seeking to minimise the violence done to traditional 
faculty structures. The Working Party had eventually come to 
the realisation that it was not politically feasible to 
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achieve its objective of structural integration based on a 
revised "conglomeration of faculties" even though on 
technical-rational grounds that would have been the most 
efficient orgeunisational structure (WP Report, 4/4/82:1; 
Fielding Committee, Minutes, 8/4/82:2). The political costs 
of pursuing that strategy were perceived to be so great that 
consideration was given to a different organisational 
principle. 
Some weeks earlier Davies had discussed with Grassie 
over lunch the desirability of drawing a distinction between 
the external "public relations" role of faculties 
(referring to the involvement of external representatives on 
faculty boards) and the objective of the reorganisation which 
was essentially to foster more efficient internal 
management.(6) That conceptualisation suggested that the 
restructuring should not become "bogged down" grappling with 
the inflexibility of thirteen faculties and their external 
professional affiliations but rather that the Working Party 
would have greater flexibility if it focused on grouping the 
University's sixty three academic departments (Interview, M.C. 
Grassie, 31/7/84). 
The Working Party's proposals represented what 
Wildavsky has described as a retreat from objectives -
substituting a puzzle that can be solved for a problem that 
cannot (1979:57). After the hours of frustration experienced 
(6) The significance of the informal Staff Club lunch 
groups in acting as a sounding board for ideas on the 
reorganisation should not be underestimated. This 
group often included Davies, Adkins, Holborow and 
Grassie all of whom had served on the Fielding 
Committee. 
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by the Committee and previous working parties concentrating on 
the hitherto sacrosanct principle of seeking structural 
integration of academic eund resource decision-meiking, that 
principle was unceremoniously abandoned. Davies' more 
politically feasible concept was seized upon with alacrity. 
Under the Working Party's proposal the academic 
structure of departments, faculty boards and Academic Board 
was to be retained for the consideration of academic matters 
currently dealt with by those bodies. The major change was in 
the area of budgeting and resource allocation eund to enable 
those functions to be partially devolved, a separate line of 
decision-meiking involving departments, groups of departments 
and an Academic Resource and Planning Committee was proposed. 
Coordination of academic and resource decision-making beyond 
the departmental level was to be achieved by virtue of 
overlapping membership between the parallel academic and 
resource decision-medcing structures and by the academic 
structure being given the opportunity to conament on budgeting 
and resource allocation proposals. In a structural sense, 
therefore, the faculties were to be left alone to continue 
with their present responsibilities. The new organisational 
principle was based on departments rather than faculties. 
Under the proposal, departments were to be arranged 
into five groups aligned, mutatis mutandis. with the five 
area sub-committees of the Research Committee. Each group was 
to be headed by a Pro-Vice-Chancellor appointed by the Senate 
after it had received advice from a single selection 
committee. Pro-Vice-Chancellors were to be appointed at 
professorial level and paid a loading for a term of five 
years, renewable once. Administratively responsible to the 
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Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic), Pro-Vice-Cheuncellors were 
to represent their respective groups on University committees 
such as releveunt faculty boards. Academic Board and the 
Academic Resource and Planning Committee. 
Each Pro-Vice-Chancellor was to be advised by a group 
standing committee which would consist of, in addition to the 
relevant Pro-Vice-Chancellor as chairman, the deans of euny 
faculties in which constituent departments had a major 
affiliation plus five members elected by the Academic Board 
from the departments within the group. Each group standing 
committee would advise the Pro-Vice-Chancellor on budget 
estimates and resource allocation as well as on other matters 
affecting the group. In addition, each group standing 
committee would function in place of the present area sub-
committees of the Research Committee, Promotions and 
Reappointments Conamittee as well as the Equipment and 
Maintenance Committee. It was enviseiged also that the group 
standing committees would take over the responsibility for 
advising on academic staff establishments from the Standing 
Committee of the Academic Board (WP Report, 4/4/82:1-6). 
Deans were to inform group standing committees of relevant 
academic developments approved by the Academic Board and, in 
view of their expanded role, they were to be appointed for a 
term of three years, renewable. 
The Academic Resource and Planning Committee was to 
consist of thirteen members including the Vice-Chancellor, 
both Deputy Vice-Chancellors, President and Deputy President 
of the Academic Board, the five Pro-Vice-Chancellors, the 
Chairman of the Research Committee, a student representative 
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and a general staff representative both elected by and from 
the Academic Board. The Academic Resource and Pleunning 
Committee was described as having the function of long term 
academic planning and coordination of academic and resource 
submissions from group standing committees. Academic Board, 
academic support services and general support services.(7) 
As proposed in the July 1981 draft report, departments 
would be responsible for preparing consolidated budget 
proposals. Those proposals would proceed from departments to 
the relevant group standing committee which would coordinate 
them for submission to the Academic Resource and Planning 
Committee. Before being submitted the group budget proposal 
would be referred to the relevant faculty boards for comment. 
The Academic Resource and Pleunning Committee would then make 
recommendations through the Vice-Chancellor to the Finance 
Committee but before doing so it would refer them to the 
Academic Board for comment.(8) Funds approved by the Senate 
were to be allocated by group standing committees to 
constituent departments having regard to comments made on the 
proposed allocations by the relevant faculty boards. 
The greater degrees of freedom to rearrange departments 
rather than faculties meant that the intractable problem of 
where to relocate certain departments became less troublesome. 
Thus for example by forming a Biological Sciences Group it was 
(7) The details of the Dean's responsibility to inform 
group standing committees of relevant academic 
developments as well as the details of the composition 
and functions of the ARPC were worked out at the 
meeting of the Fielding Committee held on 8 April 1982. 
(8) The sixth Working Party failed to mention the role of 
the Academic Board in this process. This was clarified 
by the Fielding Committee as its meeting held on 8 
April 1982. 
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possible to bring together the Biological Science departments. 
Agriculture eund the Veterinary Science departments (including 
the Department of Veterinary Anatomy) eun achievement which had 
eluded previous working parties. Moreover the variability in 
the sizes of the intermediate groupings which had bedevilled 
earlier reform attempts was also largely overcome; each group 
now had a similar number of constituent departments and much 
less variability in the total number of staff employed. 
Having explored the path of technically-rational reform 
with little success and having resorted in desperation to what 
was seen as a politically viable solution, the Working Party 
concluded its report on the plaintive note that: 
If this proposal is not acceptable and given 
the range of proposals which have already been 
found unacceptable or unworkable, it may be 
decided to inform the Senate that the Committee 
has found it impossible to develop a 
reorganised structure in accordance with its 
terms of reference (WP Report, 4/4/82:8). 
With the Vice-Chancellor in attendance, the Working 
Party's report was considered by the Committee on 8 April 
1982. The report was accepted with only one significant 
amendment. That concerned the group standing conamittees where 
it was decided that it would be preferable for each group to 
elect five members from departments within the group rather 
than make the Academic Board responsible for the election of 
such members (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 8/4/82:2-4). The 
Working Parties' proposal for the Academic Board to elect five 
members to each group standing committee from the constituent 
departments within the group would have enabled the Academic 
Board to exercise a significant degree of indirect influence 
over the advice given to Pro-Vice-Chancellors. While this may 
have had some advantages as a means of strengthening the links 
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between the parallel academic and resource decision-making 
structures, it also suffered from the major disadvantage of 
diminishing the responsibility of the groups for the conduct 
of their internal affairs. If the emphasis of the 
reorganisation was on efficiency eund accountability, then it 
was important that the administrative unit in which the 
efficient utilisation of resources would be measured (that is, 
the groups) should have some say over the election of members 
to the group standing committees. In addition, members of the 
groups could be expected to have much more direct knowledge of 
candidates drawn from their number than the more remote 
Academic Board. Moreover by involving the various groups in 
the election of the group standing committees, participation 
would be extended throughout the academic structure rather 
than concentrated among the more oligarchical Academic Board. 
Thus, while conceding that the decision further sharpened the 
parallel rather than integrated nature of the two structures, 
there were sound efficiency and democratic reasons to justify 
the Committee's amendment. 
Fielding and Davies were requested to draft the 
Committee's report so that it could be considered by the 
Academic Board on 19 April 1982. Copies of the report were 
also to be sent to both Staff Associations and the Student 
Union for comment. 
Given that the new structure proposed some devolution 
of Vice-Chancellorial authority and more opportunities for 
academic staff in departments and faculties to participate in 
a wider range of decision-making, it is important to consider 
what shifts in power (if any) were likely to occur as a result 
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of the Fielding Committee's recommendations. Referring to the 
role of the Vice-Chancellor and his Deputies at that time, 
Davies noted that: 
At present we spend the bulk of our time 
dealing with administrative minutiae and the 
resolution of staffing problems (Corres., DVC 
(Ac) to VC, 30/4/82). 
In his own case Davies admitted that because he had in the 
past been so fully occupied dealing with routine 
administrative and personnel problems, he had invariably been 
prevented from attending meetings of faculty boards and 
Academic Board committees. As a consequence Davies felt that 
his influence on academic policy as Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic) had been "negligible" (Corres., DVC(Ac) to VC, 
30/4/82). The Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) had 
also been heavily involved in routine matters involving 
general staff and, in collaboration with the Bursar, Ritchie 
had been responsible for much of the detailed preparation of 
the eunnual budget. 
Under the new proposals, however, the Pro-Vice-
Cheuncellors would have delegated authority to deal with all 
staff matters which were beyond the scope of the head of 
department as well as authority to conciliate and mediate in 
disputes between departments within the group and between 
heads and members of their department. Much of the detailed 
preparation of the annual budget would now be undertaken by 
heads of departments and be coordinated by Pro-Vice-
Chancellors within guidelines developed by the Central 
Executive and the Academic Resource and Planning Committee. 
Pro-Vice-Chancellors were not seen as representatives of 
parochial group interests. As well as being selected by a 
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single Senate selection committee, it was envisaged that all 
five would be appointed from within the University and then be 
assigned to the groups by the Vice-Chancellor. The emphasis 
therefore was on generalist academic administrators who could 
be relied upon to act for and on behalf of the Vice-
Chancellor, taking a University-wide view unimpeded by 
specialised parochial interests. The expectation arising from 
the proposed reforms was that the Pro-Vice-Chancellors would 
take over much of the Central Executive's "fireman" role of 
putting out administrative fires. By enabling the Central 
Executive to exercise more effective planning, coordination 
and evaluation, the hope was that the University's maneigerial 
style would shift away from being weighed down by crisis 
management to a greater concentration on environmental control 
and hence crisis prevention. As Davies said: 
The important point is not the time we spend 
but what we do with our time (Corres., DVC(Ac) 
to VC, 30/4/82). 
Given that the main thrust of the proposed reforms 
involved changes to the methods of budgeting and resource 
allocation, it is appropriate to recall that there is a large 
body of literature which suggests that academic planning is 
frequently dominated by resource considerations. In order to 
maintain control and enforce accountability, decision-making 
power over university budgets more often than not is vested in 
the governing body and executive structure rather than in the 
more democratic academic structure. With the exception of 
classical democratic theory, the burden of much contemporary 
Political Science literature (especially theories of 
democratic elitism) appears to celebrate the advantages of 
elite control, provided that it is subject to appropriate 
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constitutional checks and balances. Excessive democratic 
participation by amateurs is seen as contributing to disorder 
and self-interested profligacy (Bachrach, 1967:2-9), 
Profligacy and amateurism were certainly inappropriate 
behaviours in policy making at the University of Queensland in 
the 1980s. Rather, the stress was on efficiency and 
administrative professionalism in order to cope with an 
increasingly complex and resource-poor environment. These 
latter characteristics were more likely to occur where 
responsibility and authority could be clearly fixed so that 
control could be exercised and vertical accountability 
enforced. Whereas the exercise of such control and 
accountability is possible in a bureaucratic executive 
structure it tends not to be as effective in collegial bodies 
where responsibility and authority are more horizontally 
dispersed. 
It was perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the 
report envisaged a strengthening of the executive structure 
while at the same time providing symbolic reassurance to the 
separate academic structure that its role in policy making had 
also been enhanced: 
There is coordination of academic and resource 
planning and decision-making at departmental 
level with a greater involvement in this 
process of the faculties and the Academic 
Board, and at the ARPC (Fielding Report 
(Draft), 13/4/82:8). 
In this connection while it was true that faculty boards and 
the Academic Board were to have a greater involvement in 
budget preparation and resource allocation, this was purely an 
advisory power to a separate executive structure. Moreover 
the proposed composition of the ARPC was dominated by the 
492 
Executive and its reporting path was to the Vice-Chancellor. 
Its description as a joint conamittee of the Academic Board and 
Executive was therefore somewhat spurious. In view of the 
potential that the proposed executive structure had to 
eventually marginalise the separate academic structure in 
policy making, it should be recalled that: 
It is not uncommon to give the rhetoric to one 
side eund the decision to the other (Pfeffer, 
1981:205). 
At the special meeting of the Academic Board on 19 
April 1982 interest in the Committee's report was high as 
reflected in eun attendance of 110 members. The Committee's 
report (nine pages plus appendices) gave only a bare outline 
of the proposed reforms and there was a good deal of confusion 
on the Academic Board as to exactly what was envisaged. One 
Board member saw the policy problem still in terms of 
insufficient devolved participation in decision-making whereas 
the main thrust of the report had been to increase the 
efficiency of the decision-making process: 
The report had not addressed the problem of 
participation on campus. The committee had 
moved away from the concept of devolution of 
authority to that of delegation of the Vice-
Chancellor's executive authority (ABM, 
19/4/82:69). 
The question of cost was perceived as a critical issue. 
The Committee had calculated that the additional cost arising 
from the reorganisation would be $40,000 but this figure was 
seen as an underestimate. Furthermore the opportunity cost 
(measured in terms of teaching and research output foregone) 
of senior academic staff becoming full-time administrators was 
seen as an even greater worry: 
The University was considering a very costly 
493 
administrative reorganisation which would 
involve five of its most senior staff being 
withdrawn from the research eund teaching pool 
to join the administration (ABM, 19/4/82:67). 
Whilst most of the heads of departments on the Board 
were receptive to the proposal for them to have authority for 
departmental budgeting and for the allocation and 
redistribution of certain funds, they were not happy with the 
Committee's concept of group standing committees. This was 
because the latter did not provide for their ex officio 
membership. The concept of such committees comprising deans 
and five elected members had been strongly pressed by Fielding 
on the Committee as a means of satisfying the democratic 
participation lobby on the Academic Staff Association and 
because it was also consistent with his own ideological 
beliefs. Nevertheless it departed radically from the concept 
of school councils contained in the July 1981 draft report 
which had provided for all heads to be members. Fielding 
argued that the academic structure of the University would not 
be weakened by the proposals and it was pointed out that any 
restructuring agreed to would be subject to review five years 
after implementation. 
Fielding was a plausible advocate and by now, some two 
years after the Committee had been formed, a significant 
number of Board members had become conditioned to the 
inevitability of reform along the lines proposed. 
Nevertheless there were still deep divisions concerning the 
perceived distribution of the costs and the benefits of the 
proposals and there was still considerable anxiety over the 
uncertainty of their impact on the traditional academic 
structure. This uncertainty was reflected in the closeness of 
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the voting on the motion that the Academic Board recommend to 
Senate that the report be not implemented. This was lost by 
42 votes to 47 (ABM, 19/4/82:69). Some observers at that 
meeting felt that the promise of a review of the new system by 
the end of 1986 to determine whether and in what manner it 
should continue and the "sunset clause" providing for the 
termination of Pro-Vice-Chancellors' appointments on 31 
December 1987 pending the outcome of that review were the 
"straws" that were needed to convince the waiverers to oppose 
the motion (Interview, B.G. Wilson, 31/7/84).(9) 
The Fielding Committee considered the Academic Board's 
comments at its meeting on 27 April 1982. There were few 
changes to be made to the draft report as a result of the 
Academic Board's comments. The area which had attracted the 
most ascerbic conament on the Academic Board concerned the 
estimated cost of the proposals. The draft report of 13 April 
1982 had commented on the difficulties in calculating the 
additional costs. These difficulties arose because many of 
(9) The unconvinced were still left dissatisfied by the 
review which was completed on 30 June 1986. 
Notwithstanding one recurring theme submitted by 
respondents to abolish the groups and combine the 
offices of Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Dean to give 
faculties both academic decision-making and resource 
allocating functions, the review committee felt that it 
was still too early to change the group system. More 
time was needed to evaluate its performance. 
Accordingly the review committee recommended that the 
group system not be radically altered before 1993 
(Parsons Report, 30/6/86:12-13). 
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the cost components were still imponderables at that time.(10) 
Given those imponderables, the Committee's estimate of $40,000 
was something of a non-seguitur. 
So that the debate on the substance of the report would 
not become bogged down over the question of cost, the 
Committee eigreed to eliminate any estimate and instead to 
describe more clearly where the additional costs and savings 
were likely to occur (Fielding Committee, Minutes, 27/4/82:4). 
The recommended salary loading payable to Pro-Vice-Chancellors 
was now specified as 5% of the professorial rate. By removing 
reference to a specific cost estimate and holding out the 
promise of greater efficiency, the Committee was able to make 
the issue of additional salary costs for administrators at a 
time of cutbacks in academic staffing less politically 
sensitive: 
... some additional costs will be an inevitable 
part of any reorganisation which seeks to 
improve the efficiency of the University 
(Fielding Report, 27/4/82:8). 
In a further attempt to avoid the confusion and ambiguity that 
had characterised the debate on the Academic Board, the 
Committee included in the draft report to the Senate, an eight 
page appendix outlining the principles of the proposed model 
which elaborated on the way the decision-making structure and 
processes were expected to operate. 
Although the Committee's report to the Senate had been 
(10) For example the Pro-Vice-Chancellors' salary loadings, 
the existing salaries of persons to be appointed as 
Pro-Vice-Chancellors, the extent to which temporary 
teaching and research staff would be employed to 
replace persons appointed as Pro-Vice-Chancellors as 
well as the extent to which secretarial and clerical 
staff could be redistributed to provide support in 
groups as a consequence of eliminating nineteen area 
sub-comrnittees were not known. 
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amended as outlined above in relation to the estimate of 
costs, the copies of the draft report dated 13 April 1982 
which included the somewhat whimsical estimate of $40,000 had 
been sent to both Staff Associations and the Student Union for 
comment. An extraordinary meeting called by the Academic 
Staff Association on 4 May 1982 to discuss the draft report 
was attended by 101 members. The Association's Executive 
Committee had submitted a motion that the draft report should 
be rejected: 
... on the grounds that it is incompatible with 
the democratic principles of university 
governance as adopted in previous policy 
statements of the Association (UQASA, 
Attachment to Notice of Meeting, 4/5/82). 
Activists in the Academic Staff Association persisted 
with their idealised view of the University as a political 
community where elected persons provided leadership with the 
consent of the governed. Vertical accountability was seen by 
them essentially as downwards to the academic community. 
Whereas downwards accountability is constitutionally feasible 
where a community through taxation provides funding for 
government or where an association of members in a club is 
sovereign because its self funding status makes it independent 
of outside support, such is not the case with a publicly 
funded university established by an act of parliament. In the 
latter case the university is, legally, a statutory authority 
with certain powers delegated by the parliament on behalf of 
the sovereign people. The corollary of authority being 
delegated from parliament to a statutory authority is that the 
latter must be accountable to the parliament for the manner in 
which it has discharged its responsibilities. Hence, in the 
case of the University of Queensland, it is possible to trace 
497 
the delegated authority chain from the Parliament to the most 
junior University staff member who is employed to prosecute 
the objectives of the institution as set out in Section 30 of 
the Act. Similarly it is possible to trace the accountability 
chain in the reverse direction from the various grades of 
staff through the chief executive and the Senate to the 
Minister for Education. The Minister for Education, under the 
Westminster system is responsible to the Parliament and the 
latter, as the supreme legislative body, is ultimately 
accountable to the teoc-paying electorate for the manner in 
which such taxation has been applied. 
The Academic Staff Association believed quite 
correctly, that the proposed appointment of selected Pro-Vice-
Chancellors to act as middle management coordinators of 
academic and resource decision-making involved the creation of 
a parallel system of executive government which was 
accountable upwards to the Senate rather than a genuinely 
devolved system of representative government that was 
accountable downwards to the academic community. Despite 
assertions in the Committee's report to the contrary, the 
Association claimed that the new structure would inevitably 
lead to a significant diminution of the authority of the 
Academic Board and faculty boards (UQASAM, 4/5/82:1). The 
University's priorities in increasing administrative costs at 
a time when funding cuts were eroding the capacity to 
discharge academic functions was also questioned. In a bid to 
head off outright rejection of the draft report, Chiswell 
submitted two motions to the meeting which proposed that 
implementation should be deferred pending the canvassing by 
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the Fielding Committee of the views of the whole University 
community eund until it could be shown that within three years 
of its implementation the extra salary expense could be fully 
recovered by cutting salary costs in other areas of 
administration (UQASA, Attachment to Notice of Meeting, 
4/5/82). 
Fielding also had a considerable personal stedce in the 
outcome of his Committee's report and at the same meeting of 
the Association, he sought to persuade the purists that it was 
pointless to make vacuous platitudes about democratic 
principles without at the same time recognising the 
constitutional framework within which the University was 
obliged to operate. He therefore made it clear that 
responsibility and authority for the governance of the 
University of Queensland were vested under the legislation in 
the Senate not the staff. From that legal reality there was 
no escape. He argued that while it was legally possible for 
departments and faculty boards to make many academic decisions 
on teaching and research without reference to the Senate, when 
it came to decisions concerning the acquisition and allocation 
of resources that was a different matter. In those 
circumstances, responsibility rested with the Senate and with 
those to whom it had delegated authority. Hence delegated 
authority had to be exercised by individuals appointed by the 
Senate. Moreover in the case of senior middle management 
executives such as Pro-Vice-Chancellors, it was appropriate 
that in view of the fact that they were exercising authority 
on behalf of the Senate and the Vice-Chancellor, that they be 
selected by a Senate selection committee rather than elected 
by staff. Thus it would be unconscionable for the Pro-Vice-
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Chancellors to be bound by the advice of group standing 
committees. However notwithstanding Fielding's efforts to 
justify the draft report, the meeting carried the Executive 
Committee's motion (77 votes to 6). Chiswell's motions then 
lapsed (UQASAM, 4/5/82:2). 
At the Senate Meeting held on 6 May 1982 the President 
of the Academic Staff Association, Dr. D.J. Murphy, indicated 
that a meeting of the Association had opposed the 
implementation of the report. The Student Union was also 
concerned at the cost of the proposals although the President 
(Mr. K. MacPherson who had replaced Barbagallo in 1982 on the 
Fielding Committee), indicated that he personally supported 
the proposals (SM, 6/5/82:47-48). 
Just prior to the Senate meeting, Davies wrote to the 
Vice-Chancellor to place on record his strong personal support 
for the Fielding Comnaittee's reconamendations. Lamenting how 
in 1980 academic staff had spent 23, 191 man hours 
participating in the University's committee system at a cost 
of $519,545, Davies saw the reorganisation as a ray of hope 
for achieving greater efficiency through the more productive 
use of staff resources. This was essential if the Vice-
Chancellor's objective of lifting the University's performance 
by reallocating resources from salaries to research and 
postgraduate studies was to be attained (Corres., DVC(Ac) to 
VC, 30/4/82). 
The Vice-Chancellor agreed with Davies' sentiments. In 
supporting the Fielding Committee's proposals at the Senate 
meeting, Wilson highlighted the fact that the University of 
Queensland had recently failed to obtain any of the 
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Commonwealth funded centres of excellence aund he again drew 
attention to the reality that the University's share of 
research funding was still much lower than it should have 
been. This state of affairs had arisen to a significeunt 
extent because management decisions had often in the past been 
based on "anecdote"; resource allocations were frequently 
based more on the quantity of students and staff rather than 
the quality of a department's offerings (SM, 6/5/82:47). 
Wilson was grateful that the Committee's agonisings had 
finally produced an outcome which at least had lines of 
communication through a middle-management structure although 
privately, he had been disappointed that the Committee had 
been unable to develop a formula for the structural 
integration of academic and resource decision-making based on 
a small number of faculties. Describing the separate 
executive and academic structures to one of his fellow Vice-
Chancellors as "a bit cumbersome", Wilson nevertheless paid 
the new system the somewhat backhanded compliment that at 
least "it has the merit of not requiring much rewriting of the 
Calendar" (Corres., VC to VC, Uni of Sydney, 24/5/82). Whilst 
not publicly articulating it at the time, Wilson took some 
comfort from the knowledge that the Fielding Committee reforms 
were merely the first step in the evolution towards more 
comprehensive organisational development over future years as 
the University became conditioned to the present arrangements 
(Interview, B.G. Wilson, 31/7/84). 
With the Central Executive solidly behind the proposals 
and having the majority support of the Academic Board, the 
Fielding Committee's recommendations now assumed the momentum 
of a juggernaut with Murphy being the lone voice of dissent on 
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the Senate. Any doubts harboured by other members were eased 
by the reassurance that the new arrangements would be subject 
to review in 1986. Accordingly the Senate had little 
hesitation in approving the Committee's recommendations (SM, 
6/5/82:48-49). 
In concluding the present chapter it is appropriate to 
reflect on the main themes which have emerged from the policy 
formulation process insofar as it related to the work of the 
Fielding Committee. There is no doubt that the proposals 
approved by the Senate provided for substantially greater 
bureaucratisation. The introduction of the Pro-Vice-
Chancellor structure as appointed rather than elected officers 
for five year terms, the appointment of deans for a minimum of 
three rather than the hitherto customary one year terms, the 
prospective diminution of the influence of the more 
democratically constituted faculty boards in relation to the 
much less representative group steunding committees, the 
emphasis on consultation rather than participation in the 
proposed decision-medcing structures, the proposed creation of 
an Academic Resource and Planning Committee as a Vice-
Chancellor's committee dominated by senior executive officers 
and the much smaller role enviseiged for the hitherto powerful 
Standing Committee were clear indications that the pressures 
for efficiency and accountability had triumphed over what 
remained of activist demands to maintain, and if possible 
extend, opportunities for more democratic participation in 
decision-making. To be sure, the proposals enviseiged greater 
involvement by staff in academic departments in the 
preparation of comprehensive budgets and there was provision 
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for the faculty boards as well as the Academic Board to 
comment on budget proposals, but all of this was limited to 
the proffering of advice either to executive officers or 
executive dominated conamittees. It allowed for increased 
consultation, not participation in decision-making. 
While environmental factors (such as the government 
imposed budgetary restrictions and the cultural ethos of 
efficiency) eund structural factors (such as the optimum number 
of faculties or groups and their relative sizes) had eun 
important influence on the way the policy process unfolded, it 
was the behaviour of key individuals that had the greatest 
impact. In particular Fielding, Davies eund Wilson were 
especially effective at interpreting environmental eund 
structural factors at those decisive moments when the 
Committee's deliberations were floundering because of 
uncertainty about how best to reconcile technical 
considerations with the self-interested aspirations of a 
heterogeneous range of internal constituencies. 
By defining "reality" prior to the Committee's 
establishment, Wilson had been able to create a climate which 
provided the domineunt decision premises. These premises were 
not hospitable to ideological sympathies for democratic 
participation except at the symbolic, rhetorical level. 
Nevertheless the political influence of key actors was to some 
extent moderated by the highly structured procedures adopted 
by the Fielding Committee and also by the regularised 
processes of review followed by the University's formal 
structure. 
This chapter marks the conclusion of the case study 
material. Having assembled the data in some detail within 
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fragmented time frames and within structural boundaries, the 
final chapter will attempt to paint the "big picture", 
synthesising the main themes of the policy formulation process 
which have emerged across the whole of the 1969-1982 period 
and drawing out the common patterns of behaviour which have 
spread across organisational boundaries within the University. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
THE POLICY PROCESS 1969-1982: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
The primary focus of chapters five to eleven has been a 
detailed eunalysis, within a sequential chronological 
framework, of the organisational reforms that occurred at 
various times during the 1969-1982 period. This final chapter 
will provide a synthesising overview that traverses the full 
sweep of the 1969-1982 period and which cuts across intra-
orgeunisational boundaries. This will enable the policy 
processes to be seen as a continuous rather than as a 
freigmented policy cycle. In so doing the episodic character 
that sometimes bedevils case studies will be avoided and the 
continuities and interconnections will be emphasised. 
One method of imposing a structure on this study would 
have been to adopt an existing policy model such as that 
posited by Anderson (1975:26) or Rose (1976:11-14) as a 
framework for such analysis. Although these two models differ 
greatly in their level of detail, a synthesis of the two 
analytical approaches shows that the policy process can be 
reduced to five common steiges, namely, pre-reform conditions, 
problem formation, policy formulation, policy implementation 
and policy evaluation. While it would have been a relatively 
easy matter to apply this synthesis to an examination of the 
policy process in tracing the reform of each organisational 
level, one at a time, across the 1969-1982 period, such a 
labelling would still leave the underlying dynamics of the 
process to be inferred. Moreover although the various stages 
of the policy cycle are clearly recognisable in the reform of 
each level of organisation, they should not be seen in 
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isolation from each other. Rather, all of the reform 
initiatives at the various orgeunisational levels are better 
understood as parts of eun interconnected whole. So, instead 
of analysing the policy process associated with addressing a 
range of separate policy problems at various orgeunisational 
levels (such as professorial dominance or lack of a middle 
management structure) this final chapter concentrates on 
showing that the policy process is a continuum. There was in 
reality only one underlying policy problem throughout the 
1969-1982 period, despite its various manifestations. That 
problem is the reconciliation of demands for greater 
egalitarian participation in organisational decision-making 
with the competing demands for more efficient bureaucratic 
control. 
The present study has shown conclusively that when 
examining a complex multi-dimensional issue such as university 
governance over a lengthy period, the various stages of the 
policy cycle are not necessarily sequential. Rather they are 
untidily tangled. It is preferable, therefore, to review the 
policy process by highlighting the underlying dynamics of how 
conflict and cooperation in the reform of the University of 
Queensland's system of goverance were generated. The primary 
means of doing this involves testing the main themes which 
have emerged from this study eigainst the hypotheses derived 
from the Model contained in chapter two, page 40 and 
reproduced overleaf. 
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The hypotheses to be tested are restated below: 
PrinQiPftl HypQthgsis 
That the policy process is influenced by environmental and 
structural factors but that within those constraints, policy 
outcomes are shaped primarily by the political behaviour of 
strategically placed participants moderated by systematised 
bureaucratic procedures. 
Subsidiary Hypothesis 
That the tension which exists in organisations between 
internal demands for autonomy through participation in 
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decision-making and the external demands for accountability 
through hierarchical control over decision-making will be 
worked out, on balance, in favour of greater bureaucratisation. 
The Principal Hypothesis will be tested having regard to four 
themes - environment, structure, leadership and systemisation 
while the Subsidiary Hypothesis will be examined under the 
themes of democratisation and bureaucratisation. 
Environment 
The Model suggests that environmental factors, (the 
historical, political, cultural, economic eund technological 
contexts of an organisation) are influential in the policy 
process in that they provide part of the context which 
strategically placed participants take into account in shaping 
policy outcomes. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that, at 
least to some extent, the University of Queensland's position 
on the democratic - bureaucratic continuum was influenced by 
the relative strength of various environmental factors. For 
example in 1969, the heavy centralisation of effective power 
at the level of the Senate and the Vice-Chancellor reflected 
the Queensland Government's political and economic concern 
(which had applied since 1909) to maintain control over the 
only university in the state so that the community's 
utilitarian needs could be met at an economical cost. On the 
other hand the significant degree of decentralised authority 
at academic department and faculty levels was in part the 
structural expression of the traditional values of the 
university culture. These were derived from the principle of 
academic autonomy in relation to those non-resource matters 
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associated with teaching eund research. 
Despite the high degree of academic autonomy in 
teaching eund research, there were only limited opportunities 
in the late 1960s for non-professorial staff to participate in 
policy formulation and few opportunities for students to 
participate in decision-making. The Queensland Government's 
concern over the perceived breedcdown in law eund order at the 
University of Queensland from the radical protests of the 1967-
1971 period which demeunded, inter alia, democratic reform 
of the University's system of governance, gave the issue of 
organisational reform a heightened political salience. This 
in turn provided a favourable climate for sympathetic leaders 
within the University to promote the need for democratic 
reform of the University's system of governance as the 
cause celebre of that period. 
The Commonwealth Government's assumption of 
responsibility for full funding of tertiary education from 
1974 occurred at about the same time as Australia began to 
suffer the effects of economic recession. The funding 
cutbacks to higher education institutions which resulted were 
accompanied by demands that universities demonstrate greater 
accountability for the way they utilised public resources. 
Public concern that higher education institutions might not be 
providing sufficient value for money led to a rash of 
inquiries into aspects of higher education. The reports from 
those inquiries together with a media which tended to 
sensationalise alleged inefficiencies in higher education, 
helped create an environment that beceune shrill in its demands 
for greater efficiency and accountability. The establishment 
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of the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission in 1977 
symbolised the perceived threat to institutional autononay eund 
academic freedom. The more intrusive external bureaucratic 
scrutiny that resulted from the Conamission's establishment 
provided some of the conditions necessary for the University 
of Queensleund's Central Executive, the group which interacted 
most regularly with the Commonwealth body, to emerge as the 
dominant coalition within the University. This internal 
organisational response to external environmental pressure was 
significeunt in that it continued the trend of the Central 
Executive becoming a power centre in its own right as distinct 
from merely deriving its authority as an appendage of the 
governing body as had been the case in the late 1960s. 
While it ceun be seen that these environmental factors 
were influential to the extent that they provided a climate 
which was compatible with the organisational reform 
initiatives taken, their effects were often partial and 
ephemeral and were sometimes conflicting. They do not suggest 
euny underlying environmental factor around which these other 
environmental influences cohere. Yet it seems that such a 
factor must exist in order to explain long term, as distinct 
from ephemeral, shifts along the democratic-bureaucratic 
continuum. 
There was also an internal dynamic - the search for 
efficiency in delivering the educational product. The 
proteigonists for democratic reform within the University of 
Queensland argued that it was not logically possible to 
separate the educational process of teaching and research from 
the development of policy in those areas including related 
resource policy (UQASA, Critique of VC's Proposals, 
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26/3/80:19-20). The rationale for strategic policy making in 
universities to be controlled by academics rather than full-
time administrators has been articulated by Arblaster: 
These natural and normal attitudes of 
bureaucrats and administrators are 
fundamentally at odds with the climate that 
education requires - a climate of openness and 
unfettered argument and controversy. Such a 
climate can only flourish when power in 
education is in the hands of those whose first 
commitment is to education, not to the needs of 
the state or the bureaucratic ideals of order 
and efficiency (1974:134). 
On the other hand Vice-Chancellor Wilson believed that 
academic administration should be separated from teaching and 
research because there was no logical connection between those 
activities. He argued that academic administration had become 
highly specialised and required a high level of 
professionalism as well as full-time commitment rather than 
the well-meaning eimateurism of elected part-time academic 
administrators (Memo, VC to PB, 9/10/79, Appendix I). 
This difference of views highlights the conundrum that 
it is extremely difficult to show a convincing connection 
between the structure and processes of decision-making and the 
quality of educational outcomes, although Habermas has 
suggested that the technological conversion process in 
universities, namely the application of reason, could only be 
carried out effectively by democratic structures and processes 
(1971:7). 
While this idealised view might have been valid in 
medieval times when tiny collegial guilds of scholars 
consuming few resources and studying only one or two 
disciplines had little if any economic impact on the 
surrounding society, it can no longer be justified as the sole 
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or even the primary organising principle in the design of a 
large, complex institution such as the University of 
Queensland. As a major institution consuming a significant 
share of public resources aund having a considerable impact on 
the surrounding environment, the University of Queensland was 
intimately connected to the capitalist economic system of 
production and excheunge and to the bureaucratic value system 
which celebrated the virtues of economic efficiency and 
managerial control. In this connection it is significant that 
Cowen, that conservative champion of traditional academic 
values who was somewhat disdainful of the values of 
managerial ism, admitted that as Vice-Chancellor, he was 
obliged to spend most of his time discussing financial, legal 
and organisational matters and had very little time left for 
debate about teaching and research (Interview, Z. Cowen, 
8/5/85). 
The maneigerial contribution to the technology used by 
the University of Queensland was to facilitate the process of 
teaching and research so that the latter could be pursued 
efficiently eund with minimum distraction from non-academic 
considerations. With more external intervention from funding 
authorities coupled with no prospect of relief from the 
continuing resource constraints, these non-academic 
considerations have caused the maneigerial functions of 
planning, coordination and control to become increasingly 
indispensable. This development was entirely consistent with 
Scott's view that the managerial ascendancy in large, complex 
organisations has occurred largely because of the perception 
that it has contributed so much to technological efficiency 
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(1969:43-53). 
The rhetoric of many leaders appears to reflect the 
Strategic Contingencies Theory view that efficient 
orgeunisational performance is dependent on there being an 
appropriate match between orgeunisational structure and the 
orgeunisation's environmental context. The environment is 
presented as a functional imperative, "reality", over which 
some leaders claim to have little control. Such a theory can 
provide a convenient rationale for leaders who wish to 
introduce organisational reform, including those who wish to 
redistribute power and authority. 
Struoture 
The Model outlined in the dieigram suggests that 
structural factors (organisational size, the nature eund extent 
of horizontal eund vertical differentiation, the degree of 
interdependence of sub-units as well as the extent of 
functional diversity and complexity) are influential in the 
policy process in that they provide part of the context which 
strategically placed participants take into account in shaping 
policy outcomes. 
Strategic Contingency theorists such as Greenwood et al 
have noted that the theory rests on the assumption that 
organisational structure tends to be shaped by "situational 
circumstances" such as the organisation's size and its 
environment (1975:2). For example large organisations which 
interact with a complex environment seek to cope with problems 
of scale and diversity by a process of extensive horizontal 
differentiation. This creates interdependencies which in turn 
call for more effective coordination and control. The 
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contentious policy problem, therefore, is who coordinates and 
who controls and how is this resolved? Is it resolved by the 
application of apparently value-neutral structural imperatives 
derived from management science or by the process of 
bureaucratic politics? 
It has been shown that the University of Queensleund was 
a large eund complex orgeunisation touching the surrounding 
environment at meuny points eund exhibiting extensive horizontal 
and vertical differentiation. Despite this complexity, it is 
possible to discern two underlying principles of organisation 
which have implicitly guided organisational developments 
especially since the onset of rapid growth in the mid-1950s. 
These are the principle of decentralised academic autonomy and 
the principle of centralised hierarchical control. The 
principle of decentralised academic autonomy was reflected in 
the fact that academic departments enjoyed considerable 
freedom to pursue their specialised interests in teaching and 
research without undue interference from central University 
bodies. On the other hand because the University was a 
statutory body, formal legal authority was heavily 
concentrated in the Senate and the Vice-Chancellor in 
accordance with the principle of centralised hierarchical 
control. Before 1970, there was minimal delegation of 
strategic decision-making authority. Thus although the 
academic departments enjoyed considerable discretion in the 
execution of their teaching and research roles, their function 
in relation to policy formulation involving resources was 
purely advisory to the Senate and the Vice-Chancellor. 
Probably the fact that these two principles tended to 
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pull in opposite directions was one of the reasons why the 
University's organisational structure was in many ways a 
contradiction, exhibiting both structural centralisation and 
decentralisation while at the same time displaying minimal 
devolution and very little integration of its academic and 
resource decision-medcing processes. 
At the same time these two principles highlighted the 
University's fundamental structural problem. With such a 
functionally diverse and interdependent institution, the need 
for effective coordination was paramount. Yet this was 
precisely where the University's structure was weakest. 
Efficient organisational performance was impeded by poor 
coordination of academic and resource decision-making because 
there was minimal articulation between academic departments, 
faculty boards. Professorial Board, Central Executive and 
Senate. Moreover integration of academic and non-academic 
decision-making was inadequate. While this had not been a 
major issue in 1950 when there were only twenty nine academic 
departments, it had become a serious problem in 1969 with 
fifty five departments. By 1982, the need to find an 
efficient way of coordinating the academic and resource 
decision-making of sixty four departments had become acute. 
Whereas the coordination issue had originally been seen 
in largely technical, structural terms, it became indirectly 
caught up in the political manoeuvrings associated with 
attempts to renegotiate the boundaries of spheres of 
influence during the 1969-1973 period. Its initial 
manifestation was the Webb Committee's unsuccessful 
recommendations for the conversion of a number of Senate 
committees into joint Senate/Professorial Board committees and 
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later in the Hill Committee's recommendation for greater 
Professorial Board representation on certain Senate 
committees, including the Fineunce Committee, Indeed the 
University's reliance on the principle of overlapping 
membership had for years served as a key means of coordination 
in lieu of coordination via structural integration. 
The coordination issue was further politicised by 
Teakle and later Cowen's interpretation of the problem as a 
lack of "top down" coordination rather than as an absence of 
"bottom up" structural integration at the academic 
department/faculty board levels. Thus new structures in the 
form of a Vice-Chancellorial Planning Committee and two Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor positions, (one designated "Academic" and the 
other "Fabric and Finance"), were established. 
The impact of these new managerial structures struck a 
further blow to the Professorial Board's ambitions to play a 
larger role in coordinating academic eund resource decision-
medcing. Thus, while the establishment of the Davies Conamittee 
in 1972 was supposed to provide an answer to activist outrage 
over the Professorial Board's rejection of proposals to 
liberalise its composition, the Committee's deliberations 
provided a good example of how ostensibly value-neutral 
structural considerations such as inadequate coordination were 
used as a justification for the Board to lay claim to a wider 
coordination role. At the same time, the expanded role 
enviseiged for the Professorial Board was advanced as a 
rationale ("form follows function") for preserving the 
professoriate's oligarchical domination in the face of demands 
by non-professorial staff and students for representation. 
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Along with the issue of coordination, the question of 
representation was the other dominant issue in University 
governance. The linkage between both issues was concern over 
the locus of control in relation to resource allocation. In 
this connection, the main efforts to address simultaneously 
the issue of representation and the problems of large size, 
functional diversity eund interdependence derived from 
extensive horizontal differentiation involved the use of 
representative committees based on function which subsumed 
academic area sub-groupings. However the use of different 
area sub-groupings for resource allocation institutionalised 
structural arrangements whereby some departments did well out 
of the distribution of benefits while others suffered. 
Accordingly the level of commitment to the existing structures 
tended to vary depending on whether a department perceived 
itself as a winner or a loser from the resource allocation 
arreungements. These concerns were at the heart of the 
widespread opposition to the Fielding Committee's various 
proposals for the structural integration of departments and 
faculty boards for resource allocation purposes. 
Because of the diverse values and goals of individual 
sub-units within the University there were severe limits on 
the extent to which structural uniformities could be imposed. 
The University had generally respected the need for some 
flexibility in devising academic structures as evidenced by 
its tolerance of wide variability in departmental decision-
making and in the composition of faculty boards. At the same 
time this diversity made it more difficult to introduce reform 
because few assumptions could be made about the way such non-
uniform structures behaved. Nowhere was the diversity in 
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values and goals more marked than between the University's 
academic and non academic structures. The tendency to see the 
University as an academic structure with a non-academic 
appendage was a divisive separation which militated eigainst 
any comprehensive review of the system of governance. Indeed 
none of the reviews addressed all aspects of the University's 
structures eund processes of decision-making. 
The Davies Committee's omission to examine adequately 
the interface between the Professorial Board and the Senate, 
Central Executive and non-academic organisation was a major 
shortcoming which contributed to the failure of the report's 
recommendations for the coordination of academic and non-
academic resource decision-making to gain acceptance. 
Similarly the Fielding Conamittee's failure to explore the 
relationship between the academic structure and the Central 
Administration meant that some importeunt organisational 
alternatives were not fully canvassed. 
Whilst acknowledging that structural factors were 
influential in the policy process, the extent of that 
influence was limited. Along with environmental factors, they 
provided part of the context which key actors interpreted in 
accordance with their own values and ideologies as a basis for 
making strategic choices. To understand how key actors 
exercised strategic choice and endeavoured to influence a 
policy environment which was characterised by heterogeneous 
values and goals, it is appropriate now to turn to the role of 
leadership. 
18 
Laadarahtp 
Although environmental eund structural factors were 
influential in providing the context for the policy process, 
the Model has suggested that policy outcomes are primarily the 
resultants of proposals for change based on interpretations of 
situations by key actors and the cycle of conflict and 
cooperation which follows such initiatives. 
In the University of Queensland, the observation has 
been made that the University possessed the ability to 
formulate policies and to make decisions despite rather than 
because of its organisational structure. The University's 
capacity to muddle through and to impose a semblance of order 
in the face of the ever-present threat of chaos was largely 
due to the dedication and personal ability of a handful of key 
people who occupied strategic positions during part or all of 
the period under review. These same actors played the most 
prominent roles in the reform of the University's system of 
governance over the 1969-1982 period. They comprised seven 
individuals, namely, Webb, Cowen, Rayner, Davies, Ritchie, 
Wilson eund Fielding. It is noteworthy that they were all 
full-time executive officers of the University rather than 
full-time teachers or researchers although it should be 
acknowledged that, in the earlier part of their involvement in 
the review process, Webb and Davies served periods in office 
as the elected President of the Professorial Board. Moreover 
with the exception of Fielding, all were members of the 
Central Executive for part or all of their participation in 
the reform process. 
Webb's major contribution to the reform of the 
University of Queensland's system of governance was 
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undoubtedly his work in persuading enough opinion leaders that 
decision-making structures needed to be modified so that they 
could become more representative of a wider cross-section of 
University opinion. This was the catalyst that was needed to 
advance the rights of non-professorial staff and students to 
participate in decision-making at a time when a substeuntial 
clique of traditionalist professors were intent on holding 
onto power. 
Whereas Cowen had not always been comfortable 
discussing proposals for reform with radical staff and 
students, Webb was able to communicate empathically at all 
levels and win the trust of activists and moderates in his 
efforts to secure change. These efforts included using the 
atmosphere of crisis created by the radicals as an opportunity 
to press for the introduction of democratic reforms which were 
consistent with his personal ideological preferences. By 
imposing his own interpretation on those events, eund 
highlighting the need to make adaptive changes while at the 
same time avoiding the conflict which could have arisen from 
more fundamental reform, Webb won the support of the 
moderates. 
Given the inertia that had characterised much of the 
professoriate's attitudes towards democratic reform in the 
late 1960s, it is arguable that had it not been for Webb's 
iconoclastic support, the changes which were made for greater 
non-professorial academic staff and student participation in 
decision-making would have been much delayed and might even 
have failed to materialise following the efficiency and 
accountability imperatives which descended upon the University 
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with the onset of the post-1975 era of resource contraction. 
In many ways the administrative styles of Cowen and 
Webb were quite different. Whereas Webb had taken positive 
steps to promote liberal reform, Cowen had displayed a more 
conservative attitude, preferring incremental ameliorative 
change instead of comprehensive reform. For example, although 
Cowen's efforts to auneliorate the worst effects of the 
confused line and functional responsibilities within the 
senior administrative structure met with some minor success, 
they fell far short of the comprehensive changes that were 
needed for optimally efficient administration. 
Given the difficulties associated with making 
structural changes, Cowen placed particular emphasis on 
refining the processes of decision-making. Indeed Cowen's 
penchant for due process and constitutional procedures for the 
purpose of fostering more orderly decision-making was a 
powerful stimulus to the process of bureaucratisation. In 
this connection, decision-making was increasingly based on 
appropriate management information which in turn called for the 
development of a comprehensive data base and systematised 
administrative procedures. 
Perhaps Cowen's greatest contribution to the internal 
governance of the University of Queensland was his willingness 
to consult and listen to the opinions of other key actors and 
then form a pragmatic view which attempted to balance the 
range of competing interests. Cowen's receptivity to Webb's 
views which led to a resolution of the conflict that occurred 
over the attempts to reform the composition of the 
Professorial Board illustrate this point. This reactive 
rather than proactive style of administration may have been a 
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cautiously pragmatic response to the turmoil of the early 
1970s and the need to minimise conflict and promote 
cooperation. 
At the same time, Cowen's administrative style could 
explain one of the most significant "non-decisions" of the 
Cowen era - his failure to resolve the latent problem of 
inadequate structural integration of academic eund resource 
decision-making, even at the risk of generating further 
conflict. This omission in the view of some observers had a 
deleterious effect on the University's performance. It is 
conceivable that had there been an attempt at comprehensive 
rather than piece-meal reform in the early 1970s, initiated by 
the Senate rather than the Professorial Board, then much of 
the subsequent conflict eund some of the more serious problems 
of poor coordination suffered by the University throughout the 
1970s might have been avoided. 
Whereas Cowen and Webb's administrative styles were 
quite different, Rayner and Cowen's administrative styles 
could best be described as complementary. Rayner's attitudes 
to organisational reform were premised on the need to maintain 
an economical Central Administration which would be able to 
impose a semblance of order on the University's operations. 
Given the University's multiple sources of power and the 
heterogeneous values and goals of its members, the threat of 
chaos was never far below the surface. 
Rayner's major contribution to organisational reform 
was to extend the process of bureaucratisation throughout the 
University. In this connection the systemisation of 
administrative procedures was so extensive and the development 
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of a meunagement information system became so comprehensive, 
that decision-making discretion at the periphery was 
significantly reduced. While these developments reinforced 
other centralising tendencies, their standardising effects 
also help explain why the University's Central Administration 
was able to operate with so few staff relative to other large 
Australian universities. The tensions between academic-
administration relations which accompanied this process 
reflected a clash of cultures between the academic desire for 
autonomy and the bureaucratic desire for orderliness and 
control. 
Rayner's continued resistance to attempts to review the 
Central Administration should be seen as an example of the 
process of institutionalisation whereby a well-entrenched 
actor develops such a stake in the organisation that any 
reform which threatens that stake is resisted notwithstanding 
technical-rational support for change. However Rayner's 
success in side-tracking efforts to review the Central 
Administration created a major "blind spot" in the reform 
process. While no observer could cavil with the economies 
achieved by the Central Administration, it is arguable that 
the University's failure to pursue the issue of administrative 
reform in the context of the Davies and Fielding Committee 
reviews was almost certainly dysfunctional. The effect of 
those "non-decisions" was that the efficiencies likely to have 
arisen from fostering more flexibility and cooperation through 
greater academic-administrative integration were denied to the 
University at a time when the issue of efficiency was becoming 
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one of the most pressing policy problems.(1). 
Davies' major contribution to organisational reform 
within the University was his success in placing the need for 
more comprehensive structural integration of academic and 
resource decision-making on the political agenda. Although 
this issue lapsed because it failed to attract enough support 
from Cowen, the need for improved coordination gained 
increasing political salience with the economic contraction 
which occurred after 1975, In replacing Webb as Deputy Vice-
Chancellor (Academic) in 1976, Davies was instrumental in 
helping to refocus the University's attention awe^ ^ from 
questions of democratic reform towards what had become the 
more pressing problem of how to make more effective use of 
declining resources. 
The continuity that Davies provided during the period 
prior to Wilson's arrival in 1979 served to condition the 
University to the desirability of achieving more effective 
hierarchical coordination eund this to some extent eased the 
path for the major reforms initiated by Wilson. Together as a 
loose coalition, Davies and Wilson were able to provide a 
credible definition of the key policy problem facing the 
University in the 1980s, namely, how to remove organisational 
impediments that were hindering the efficient utilisation of 
scarce resources and which were therefore inhibiting the 
University's performance. The decision premises on which this 
problem definition was based pointed inexorably towards a 
managerial ly rather than a democratically oriented remedy, in 
(1) A review of the Central Administration was initiated by 
the Senate in 1987 following Rayner and Ritchie's 
retirement in 1986. 
524 
this case improved coordination of academic and resource 
decision-making through a new middle-maneigement structure. 
This interpretation of reality turned out to be highly 
influential in shaping the Fielding Conamittee's 
recommendations. 
As a non-academic administrator whose experience of 
universities had been confined to being an external 
undergraduate student of the University of Queensland, 
Ritohie was able to bring a quite different perspective to 
interpreting the University's situation as it was in 1971. 
Having grown accustomed to the more orderly decision-medcing 
procedures of Papua New Guinea's Treasury Department, Ritchie 
had been shocked by the crisis management approach of the 
University whereby key decision-makers always seemed to be 
reacting to circumsteunces rather than taking steps in advance 
to control their environment. The absence of systematic 
planning, the preoccupation with economy rather than 
efficiency, the lack of eun adequate middle meunagement support 
staff and eun inefficient decision-making system were seen to 
have combined with the perennial problem of inadequate 
resources to produce a less than impressive performeunce. 
Like Cowen and Rayner, Ritchie's major contribution to 
organisational reform was to reinforce the trend towards 
increasing bureaucratisation. In Ritchie's case, the focus 
was on increasing the effectiveness of "top-down" managerial 
control over the coordination of academic and resource 
decision-making and thwarting the Professorial Board's 
eunbitions to gain control over that policy domain. This was 
of decisive importance in consolidating the Central 
Executive's ascendancy in policy making at the expense of the 
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Board. 
Although Ritchie's formal involvement on the 
University's ad hoc conamittees inquiring into aspects of 
orgeunisational reform was limited, his behind the scenes 
contribution as a principal adviser to Cowen, Davies and 
Wilson appears to have been influential. It is possible, 
though improbable, that the striking resemblance of the 
Fielding Conamittee's recommendations to the views expressed by 
Ritchie was just a coincidence. 
Whereas Cowen's administrative behaviour as Vice-
Chancellor resembled that of a cautious executive chairman, 
Wilson exhibited a more dyneunic managerial style which was 
comfortable in the role of personally promoting his own reform 
initiatives. Carrying no local historical/cultural baggage, 
Wilson was able to interpret environmental and structural 
conditions not so much as constraints but rather as 
opportunities - technical challenges to be overcome which 
would improve the University's performance. 
Wilson's interpretation of the situation was that the 
University's decision-making structures eund processes in 1979 
were a major impediment to the efficient achievement of the 
University's objectives. In particular, the lack of 
effective middle-maneigement coordination had prevented the 
optimal utilisation of scarce resources. More than any other 
single factor, this was perceived by Wilson to have been at 
the root of the University's relatively poor performance. 
This study has shown that the introduction of 
technological change such as new structures and processes for 
making decisions was resisted because it was seen to have the 
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potential to alter dependency relationships and hence power 
relativities. Wilson's strength in overcoming this resistance 
was his ability to cite apparently relevant Canadieun 
experience of increasing external intervention in university 
affairs to show that local demands for greater efficiency eund 
accountability were sure signs that the University of 
Queensland's autononay and academic freedom would be under 
threat unless adaptive changes were made. The burden of 
Wilson's argument was essentially that this threat could best 
be met by convincingly demonstrating that the University was 
providing value for money and more effective managerial 
control over resource utilisation was presented as the prime 
meeuns of achieving that objective, 
Wilson's major contribution to organisational reform 
was the way he was able to build on the ground-work laid by 
Davies for achieving better coordination of academic eund 
resource decision-making eund break through the constraints 
which had hitherto frustrated change. By defining reality in 
a way which was consistent with his policy preferences and 
publicly articulating decision premises which harmonised with 
those preferences, Wilson was able to set the political agenda 
and effectively limit the extent of the Fielding Committee's 
consideration of policy options. 
Fiftldintf*B main role in the organisational reform 
which took place before his appointment as chairman of the 
committee which bears his name was to confront the hegemonic 
ambitions of the Professorial Board and to champion the rights 
of other members of the University to participate in decision-
making. His attitudes were based on an ideological belief in 
the rights of individuals to have a say in decisions that 
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might affect them and were derived also from a rejection of 
the divisiveness caused by the professoriate's attempts to 
expeund its sphere of influence at the expense of others. 
As a staff-appointed senator enjoying strong personal 
support across a wide cross-section of the University, 
Fielding had a reputation for being a formidable person whose 
views had to be taken seriously by those in positions of 
power. Cowen's receptivity to Fielding's views concerning the 
impracticability eund divisiveness of aspects of the Davies 
Report was illustrative of Fielding's political leverage. 
Given his high profile as an activist, Fielding's role 
as chairman of the 1980 Senate conamittee to review the 
academic orgeunisation of the University raised a number of 
questions. On the one hand there were the expectations of the 
Academic Staff Association that he would be sympathetic to its 
policies while on the other hand the Vice-Cheuncellor hoped 
that by coopting Fielding to chair the review, it would not 
only provide symbolic reassurance to the Association and 
facilitate the reports accepteunce by the University community 
but also neutralise a potential eund influential critic of 
greater managerial control. Fielding however understood that 
it was his task to produce a workable, practical accommodation 
between widely divergent interests and to do this within a 
limited period of time. At no stage did he see the review as 
a means of pursuing a doctrinaire set of principles since such 
a partisan approach would undoubtedly have prejudiced the 
report's acceptance. 
Fielding's private consultations with Wilson when it 
seemed that the Committee's deliberations were going around in 
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circles should not be seen in conspiratorial terms. Rather, 
they represented an intelligent attempt to seek the views of 
the chief executive in the knowledge that if the Committee 
produced a report which in his opinion was not workable, it 
was likely to suffer the same humiliating fate as the Davies 
Report. Davies' eleventh hour appeal to the Vice-Chancellor 
seeking Wilson's support for the Fielding Conamittee's 
recommendations should be seen in the seune light (Corres., 
G.N. Davies to VC, 30/4/82), 
It ceun be seen from this review of the contributions 
made by key actors to the reform of the University of 
Queensland's system of governance that although the policy 
process was influenced by environmental and structural factors, 
policy outcomes were shaped primarily by the political 
behaviour of strategically placed participeunts. This finding 
is consistent with Child's proposition that: 
,,. when incorporating strategic choice in a 
theory of organization, one is recognizing the 
operation of eun essentially political process 
in which constraints eund opportunities are 
functions of the power exercised by decision-
makers in the light of ideological values 
(1972:16), 
It is importeunt to recognise, however, that a 
substantial part of this political activity was associated 
with the resolution of conflict within a highly structured 
system involving ad-hoc conamittees of inquiry together with 
regularised procedures for internal review. This 
systemisation facilitated tactical cooperation eund pragmatic 
compromise rather than a continuation of the more dogmatic 
political behaviour that was characteristic of the less 
structured conflict exhibited in the wider University 
environment. 
529 
Systemisation 
Bailey's personal observations of committees on which 
he had served at the University of California, San Diego 
concluded that they were: 
a curious blend of authority and subservience, 
of principled action and unprincipled 
compromises, and bureaucratic impersonality 
combined with a concern for persons (1977:66). 
He argued that the workings of university committees were 
dependent largely on their "mix of community and 
organizational characteristics" (1977:82); these in turn 
seemed to be contingent on whether committees were ad hoc or 
standing, large or small, representative or expert. Bailey 
has suggested that large representative standing committees 
often operated as political arenas which were concerned more 
with ceremonial posturing than practical substance. On the 
other hand while small ad hoc committees appointed to 
recommend solutions to particular policy problems also 
indulged in political behaviour such as bargaining and 
compromise, such behaviour was to some extent bureaucratised 
by the input of technical rationality, due process, and a 
concern to find practical and efficient as distinct from 
ideologically principled solutions (1977:70-82). 
The present study has found that the policy process 
associated with organisational reform was for the most part a 
highly political activity but that some of the more blatent 
characteristics of raw political power were moderated by 
systematised bureaucratic procedures. This process of 
bureaucratic politics focused primarily on the ad hoc 
committees of inquiry as well as the regularised procedures 
for internal review which were designed to structure 
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interaction by the application of constitutional procedures 
derived from the principle of due process. 
One of the importeunt roles played by formal ad hoc 
conamittees, especially small ones, is that they provide a 
structured meeuns of containing eund "washing out" conflict over 
matters referred to them. They do this by providing a 
mechanism for tactical cooperation in a more systematic meunner 
theun would be possible if the issues were left to the 
capriciousness of the larger orgeunisational environment. The 
achievement of consensus in small groups as a result of 
pragmatic compromise is valued more than dissension derived 
from a dogmatic insistence on ideological purity. In effect 
the process of conflict resolution becomes bureaucratised by 
the application of routinised technical-rational procedures. 
This study has shown that during the period 1969-1982 
there were no less than twelve ad hoc committees 
established to exeunine aspects of the University's system of 
governance (plus one relatively insignificant steunding 
committee, the Improvements Committee). A review of the 
evidence suggests that the participeunts on those committees 
who exhibited the greatest professionalism in terms of their 
willingness to do their homework for meetings, prepare 
position papers, be involved in sub-committees or working 
parties and assist in the drafting of reports invariably 
exerted the greatest influence on the policy process. This 
was partly because of the value placed on technical input in 
the face-to-face interaction of the small group (for example, 
the Fielding Committee considered no less than twenty four 
alternative organisational models) eund the devaluing of 
partiseun rhetoric and anecdotal evidence which some actors 
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were able to get &\fay with when playing before large groups. 
On the small ad hoc conamittees the goodwill, indeed 
ceunaraderie which often characterised their deliberations, was 
engendered by the fact that their discussions were held in 
private without being subject to the scrutiny of the 
conservative or reformist constituencies within the University 
and with all participants being exposed to the same 
information. The maintenance of the goodwill and sociability 
of the small groups depended in part on the preparedness of 
members to arrive at workable solutions to the specific 
problems referred to them within a reasonable period of time 
without euny recalcitrant individuals "digging their toes in" 
and insisting on ideological purity. The absence of any 
minority report and the existence of only one record of 
reservations (to the Hill Conamittee's report) suggests that 
the need for practical compromise and tactical cooperation, if 
not always uneunimity, was paramount, 
Cowen once commented on how conflict in universities 
was often the result of a "retreat from critical rationality" 
when some participants engaged in "spontaneous unstructured 
self expression" and emphasised judgement "based on surges of 
unexeunined emotional commitment" (1974:13). Whilst this may 
be partly true, this study found that the cycle of conflict 
and cooperation often had its genesis elsewhere. The origins 
of this cycle could also be attributed to the political 
behaviour of strategically placed actors interpreting 
environmental and structural factors and then imposing their 
own policy preferences on an organisation already disunited by 
heterogeneous values and goals. Because the issue of power 
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redistribution was perceived to be important and since it heul 
the potential to affect access to scarce resources, it was to 
be expected that euny proposals for major changes would provoke 
opposition from those who perceived that they would be 
d i s ad veunt aged, 
Given that conflict has the potential to cause disorder 
and as this is usually interpreted in organisations as being 
dysfunctional, the University of Queensland made frequent use 
of small ad hoc conamittees as a structured means of 
cheunnelling that conflict so that it would not spill over and 
adversely affect the University's ongoing activities. The 
systematised bureaucratic procedures followed by those 
committees coupled with the process of review by the various 
constituencies and hierarchical levels within the University, 
served to ensure that the views of key actors were subject to 
the checks and balances of alternative viewpoints. This was 
reflected in the fact that the policy outcomes were not always 
congruent with the first preferences of those actors. When it 
is recalled that this process of bureaucratic politics had 
been able to resolve conflict which in the wider University 
community had manifested in the form of disruptive radicalism, 
had resulted in votes of no confidence in the Professorial 
Board, had led to the distribution of vitriolic polemics 
highly critical of the University's system of governance and 
at times had divided the University, this was no mean 
achievement. 
Thus even though this study has drawn attention to many 
exeunples of where raw political behaviour has exerted the 
major influence on policy outcomes, there is no doubt that, on 
balance, the political behaviour exhibited by strategically 
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placed participeunts was moderated by the systematised 
bureaucratic procedures described in detail in earlier 
chapters. The evidence on which this finding is based thus 
provides support for the theoretical proposition contained in 
the Principal Hypothesis, 
Demooratisation - Bureauoratiaation 
In 1973 the Davies Report summed up the organisational 
structure of the University of Queensland in the following 
terms: 
The existing organizational structure of the 
University resembles a bureaucratic hierarchy 
rather than a collegial form of organisation 
(17/8/73:24), 
This view was widely shared among many of those interviewed in 
the present study. Some confirmation was provided in a survey 
by Western eund Roe of eighty two academic staff appointed to 
the University of Queensland in the three years prior to 1975 
which compared their perceptions on university governance with 
eighty five academic staff appointed to the nearby, recently 
established Griffith University up to 1976. The data showed a 
marked difference in the perceptions of the two groups. The 
University of Queensland appointees felt that their University 
was relatively centralised and hierarchical with a marked 
differentiation between administrators and academics whereas 
the Griffith appointees tended to perceive their University as 
far more decentralised, less hierarchical and having 
relatively little distinction between administrators and 
academics (1981:80-89). 
While these observations offer useful insights, they 
are relatively static and provide little evidence of trends. 
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Any assessment of the extent to which the University of 
Queensleund has moved towards greater democratisation or 
greater bureaucratisation must have regard to prescribed 
criteria. Baldridge has suggested that the best way to 
approach the question of determining the locus of control over 
decision-medcing is to seek answers to the questions, "Who 
decides what and how?" (1971:175) Criteria relating to 
the question of who decides would include for exeunple 
whether the effective sub-Senate decision point is a committee 
or an individual. Criteria covering the question of what 
is decided would include whether the decision has strategic 
importance or whether it is merely routine. Criteria 
concerning the question of how decisions are made would 
include whether they are the result of, for example, what 
Pateman calls full, partial or pseudo-participation (1970:68-
71). 
For there to be a tendency towards increasing 
democratisation and less bureaucratisation there would need to 
be signs of more strategic decisions being tedcen by 
representative committees rather than by individuals or by 
individuals in consultation with others as distinct from 
individuals acting by themselves. There would be less 
reliance on rules eund procedures to structure interaction. 
Conversely for there to be a shift away from democratisation 
towards bureaucratisation there would need to be evidence of 
more strategic decisions being tedcen by legally authorised 
individuals having regard to rules and due process. 
Participation by those outside the maneigerial elite would tend 
to be restricted to the provision of advice only. 
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An assessment of the nature and extent of any shifts 
along the democratic - bureaucratic continuum at each 
orgeunisational level turns on the degree of cheunge that has 
occurred over the 1969-1982 period as well as the relative 
extent of cheunge that has tedcen place at one level of 
organisation compared with other parts of the organisation. 
o Aoademio Departments 
In academic departments around 1969, the authority 
structure was concentrated at the bureaucratic end of the 
continuum in that they were controlled by permanent heads who 
were under no legal obligation to consult other members of 
their departments in decision-making. At the same time there 
were relatively few rules in place to regulate decision-making 
and because they did not prepare comprehensive budgets, 
permeunent heads played a relatively limited role in strategic 
decision-making except as members of the Professorial Board. 
Following the landmark reforms of 1969-70 to 
discontinue the practice of appointing permanent heads and the 
Senate's resolution to encourage the establishment of 
departmental consultative committees (DCCs) for the purpose of 
advising heads appointed for fixed terms, there were high 
hopes among the proteigonists for greater democracy that there 
would be increased opportunities for non-professorial staff 
eund students to participate in departmental decision-making. 
By the end of 1982 the composition of the corps of 
heads had become significantly less hierarchical. In 1969, 
the fifty five departments were headed by forty nine 
professors, five readers and one senior lecturer whereas 
fourteen years later the sixty four departments were headed by 
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thirty one professors, nineteen readers eund fourteen senior 
lecturers. However, concern over the quality of some of these 
appointments and continued perceptions of autocratic attitudes 
led Roe (1976:102) to record "frustration and disillusion" 
amongst some staff and students who found that their role in 
the consultative process to be much smaller theun they had 
expected. At the seune time some heads who shared decision-
medcing with their department were thought to be providing weedc 
leadership. 
In view of this variability, the operations of DCCs 
could also be expected to vary. As a survey of 170 University 
staff eund students concerning the operation of fifty eight 
DCCs undertaken by the Director of the University's Tertiary 
Education Institute (TEDI) noted: 
The way in which DCCs function, their 
significance in the life of University 
departments, were found in 1975 to be usually 
very dependent upon the attitudes eund 
personality of the Head of Department. Since 
Heads of Departments vary enormously as people, 
it follows that DCCs also vary enormously (Roe, 
1976:1). 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the existence of so much 
diversity at the academic department level, the evidence of 
more or less democratisation vis-a-vis more or less 
bureaucratisation is mixed. Roe found that although most 
departments had made an effort to comply with the 1969-1970 
reforms, there were signs that sometimes the letter rather 
than the spirit of the Senate's resolutions was being observed 
(1976:102). 
In this connection it needs to be acknowledged that 
non-professorial academic staff have been the main 
beneficiaries of these cheunges. Roe's survey and the 1983 
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Pro-Vice-Chancellor's survey of the functions and compositions 
of DCCs confirmed that representation of non-academic staff 
tended to be both irregular and proportionally small. Similar 
comments apply with regard to student representation (SM, 
1/12/83:159-160). It was this lack of systemisation in the 
role, composition and functioning of DCCs and in the lack of 
regularity in the method of nominating heads that caused Vice-
Cheuncellor Wilson to express concern and for the Fielding 
Committee in 1981 to call for a review of those matters. But 
apart from the Pro-Vice-Chancellor's survey in 1983 referred 
to above, little happened as a result of that call and in eun 
effort to keep the issue on the political eigenda, a similar 
recommendation was contained in the 1986 review of the 
Fielding Committee reforms (Parsons Report, 30/6/86:2), 
Notwithstanding their many structural imperfections and 
despite having some reservations about the wide variations in 
the actual decision-making processes followed in meuny academic 
departments, it is reasonable to conclude that, on baleunce, 
their formal structure and processes were significantly less 
bureaucratic in 1982 than they were in 1969. The fact that by 
1982, 
o heads were no longer permanent appointments;(2) 
o all academic staff (lecturer and above) were eligible 
to participate in the selection process; 
o the composition of the corps of departmental heads was 
less hierarchical in terms of academic rank; 
(2) University policy provides that headships should not 
normally be held for more theun two consecutive terms, 
except in special cases. Vice-Chancellor Wilson has 
interpreted this policy to mean that successful heads 
who also have the support of their departments should 
be encouraged to continue for a third (five year) term. 
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o departments had won the right to prepare and 
administer comprehensive budgets; 
O staff had greater access to strategic decision-making 
both at the departmental level and by virtue of being 
represented on group steunding committees, (3) 
suggests that overall, there has been a discernible shift 
along the democratic - bureaucratic continuum in the direction 
of greater democratisation. 
o Faculty Boards 
Whereas in the late 1960s, academic departments were 
generally regarded as being organised more along bureaucratic 
lines, faculty boards were considered to be relatively 
collegial. This appeared to be because most of those staff 
who at that time aspired to participate in decision-making 
were either directly or indirectly represented on faculty 
boards. 
Deans were elected by faculty boards on an eunnual basis 
eund their role was limited to executing faculty board 
decisions eund administering rules relating to courses. The 
only exception to this was the appointment in 1969 of a Dean 
of Medicine on a five year renewable term for the purpose of, 
inter alia, coordinating academic and resource decision-
making in clinical medical departments more effectively. 
(3) The access of elected staff to strategic level 
decision-making on group standing committees ended even 
before the Fielding Committee reforms were implemented. 
In this connection, the Vice-Chancellor persuaded the 
Academic Board and the Senate to do away with the 
concept of group steunding committees and to substitute 
group councils which provided for the ex officio 
membership of the heads of constituent departments 
in lieu of elected academic staff representation 
(SM, 23/9/82:113). 
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The 1969-1970 reforms to increase the representation of 
students and academic staff at all levels further enhanced the 
democratic status of faculty boards. At the same time, it 
contributed to the emergence of some very large bodies which 
were not appropriately constituted to seize later 
opportunities for expanding their role to include the 
coordination of academic and resource decision-making. 
On the other heund the existence of a number of small 
faculties each dominated by a single department provided the 
meeuns for self-interested groups to rehear decisions taken at 
the departmental level. Thus rather than such faculties 
providing a structure for the cross-fertilisation of ideas 
that was possible, at least in theory, with the broader peer 
review of larger faculties, they sometimes contributed little 
to the decision-meiking process except perhaps to lengthen it 
unnecessarily. 
The inefficiencies of faculty boards manifested in a 
variety of weiys. Meetings frequently lapsed for weunt of 
quorums, decision-making occasionally experienced lengthy 
delays and faculties found it difficult to agree on how 
academic developments could be realistically contained to make 
them commensurate with post-1975 financial stringencies. 
Partly as a consequence of their "debating society" reputation 
and the perception that some radical staff were using faculty 
board meetings to advance their political ideologies 
concerning University governance, a number of professors 
withdrew their nominations for deanships rather than face the 
ignominy of electoral defeat at the hands of the radicals. 
Whereas in 1969 all deanships had been held by professors, 
fourteen years later only five of the thirteen deans were of 
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professorial status. The reduced status of deanships further 
vitiated the political leverage of faculty boards in the 
University's decision-meiking network. 
As a consequence of faculty boards failing to adapt to 
the efficiency imperatives of the post-1975 era, a vacuum 
existed at the intermediate level between departments eund 
central policy making bodies where a pressing need heul emerged 
for the more effective coordination of academic eund resource 
decision-medcing. There is no doubt that the emergence of 
inefficient albeit democratically constituted faculty boards 
during the 1970s at a time when the main policy issue was 
shifting from democratisation to efficiency, contributed to 
the unintended consequence of faculty boards becoming less 
releveunt in strategic level policy making. 
Thus, although faculty boards preserved their 
democratic structure eund processes, they paid a high price -
the price of becoming marginalised as a result of the 
establishment of smaller, less representative group structures 
to undertedce the coordination of academic and resource 
decision-medcing at the intermediate level. 
o Professorial/Aoademio Board 
Whereas faculty boards tended to be self-consciously 
egalitarian in their structure eund processes, the Professorial 
Board in 1969 was the epitome of an oligarchy. It was 
comprised almost entirely of the professoriate and constituted 
the senior academic advisory body in the University, During 
the ensuing fourteen years the Board's composition was 
partially democratised as a result of the Senate's decision in 
1969 to extend membership to non-professorial heads of 
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departments and deeuns and in 1976 to provide for the 
representation of non-professorial academic staff eund 
students. 
Despite several attempts during the early 1970s to 
expeund its advisory role to the Senate especially in resource 
matters, the Professorial Board's eunbitions were effectively 
thwarted by the Central Executive and the Senate, The 
defensive attitude tedcen by the Central Executive eund the 
Senate to the Davies Committee's recommendations prevented the 
Professorial Board from pleiying a more decisive role in the 
crucial post-1975 era of economic contraction. This was when 
the domineunt policy issue unquestionably became the need to 
coordinate academic and resource decision-making more 
effectively in the interests of achieving greater efficiency 
eund being able to demonstrate accountability in value-for-
money terms, 
Like the faculties, the Professorial Board was unable 
to adapt its constitution to that of a smaller managerial 
body. Its continuation as a large collegial body at the head 
of the faculty boards laid the ground for the Senate's 1982 
decision to establish a small high-powered Academic Resource 
and Planning Committee (ARPC) at the head of the more 
managerially oriented Pro-Vice-Cheuncellor and group structure. 
The Academic Board's loss of its advisory role on academic 
staff establishment to these new bodies substantially 
diminished the Board's influence in determining the pace and 
direction of academic developments and more than outweighed 
the benefits gained by being given the right to comment on the 
University budget. 
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Thus although the Professorial Board's composition in 
1982 was clearly more democratic theun in 1969, the democrats 
victory was a rather hollow one. This was because the 1982 
reforms meant that the real power for coordinating academic 
and resource decision-meiking was transferred aweo^  from the 
Board eund the central academic committee system to less 
representative managerial bodies as well as to individual 
executive officers. 
o Central Exeoutive 
In the late 1960s university administration in 
Australia was essentially in the heunds of, in the words of one 
Vice-Cheuncellor, amateurs rather theun professionals (Matheson, 
1966:10). Universities were expanding rather than contracting 
eund the environment was relatively benign. With the goodwill 
and assistance of the Professorial Board and its elected 
President, the University of Queensleund had been able to 
survive, if not exactly flourish, with a Central Executive that 
consisted of only three senior permeunent officials supported 
by a Central Administration which cost less per EFTS than any 
other Australian university (Selby Smith, 1975:16). 
There was very little delegation of authority eund hence 
strategic and routine decisions alike, especially relating to 
resources, were referred to the Vice-Chancellor and the Senate 
for determination. Possibly because of this extreme 
centralisation, decision-making procedures were relatively 
unsystematised. Academic planning by the Central Executive 
was almost non-existent eund coordination of academic and 
resource decision-making lacked sophistication. As a 
consequence of this, the Senate was obliged to rely heavily on 
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the advice of the Professorial Board in planning academic 
developments. 
Following the reconamendations of the Loveday Report in 
1970 and the amendments to the University Act in 1973 
providing for delegation of the Senate's authority in certain 
circumsteunces, the legal authority of the Central Executive to 
act executively on behalf of the Senate was clarified. As a 
result of that, the Vice-Chancellor eund his senior officers 
were able to systematise large areas of University 
administration which previously had operated with only 
whimsical regard for due process and the Vice-Chancellor was 
authorised to act executively on a reunge of matters which in 
earlier times had to be submitted to the Senate for approval. 
With the more intrusive external environment associated 
with the Australian Universities Commission emerging during 
the early 1970s, the University begeun to strengthen its 
managerial structure with the appointment of eun additional 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor as well as additional professional 
staff at the middle management levels in the areas of capital 
project management, financial management and planning. This 
strengthening of the Central Administration and the continuing 
development of university administration as a profession 
during the 1970s resulted in even more emphasis being placed 
on systemisation and codification. 
Much of this was in response to external demands for 
information. For example the University of Queensland's 
contribution to the annual statistical collection (non-
financial) compiled by the Australian Universities Commission 
and later by the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
had increased from sixteen forms (forty eight pages) in 1969 
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to nineteen forms (115 pages) in 1983. The increase in the 
volume of data required on the financial side was even more 
dramatic rising from two forms covering the University's 
income and expenditure in 1969 to twelve forms (fifty two 
pages) in 1982. But quite apart from these external demands 
for data, some of the Central Administration's desire for 
systemisation appeared to be more a reflection of the 
bureaucratic desire for law and order.(4) 
With access to its extensive data base the Central 
Executive, as individual executive officers and as members of 
the Planning Committee, became much more active in the 
coordination of academic and non-academic resource decision-
medcing. Indeed a major focus of the trend towards increasing 
bureaucratisation concerned the Central Executive's expanded 
role in planning at the expense of the Professorial Board. 
Notwithstanding the Board's efforts during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s for eun augmented Standing Committee to oversee 
University planning, both Teakle and later Cowen insisted that 
this be the direct responsibility of the Vice-Chancellor. The 
managerial emphasis given to planning was accentuated by 
Wilson. From a relatively collegial body consisting of 
eighteen members under Cowen which never met more theun eight 
(4) A celebrated example of the extremes to which this was 
taken concerned the form devised by the Registrar to 
enable an application to be made by organisers seeking 
approval for the consumption of liquor on campus at 
social functions. This form required the applicant to 
calculate the amount of liquor needed having regard to 
the number and estimated body weight of guests, the 
type of liquor eund the duration of the function so that 
the volume of alcohol approved for consumption would be 
just sufficient to ensure that guest blood alcohol 
levels would not exceed 0.05 (See form. Procedure in 
Applying for Permission to Keep or Consume Liquor on 
Site, 1/2/80). 
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times annually over the 1970-1978 period, it was treunsformed 
into a maneigerial body comprising eight members under Wilson, 
averaging fourteen meetings eunnually over the 1979-1982 period 
until it was superseded by the ARPC. 
The creation of five Pro-Vice-Cheuncellors in 1982 with 
certain delegated Vice-Cheuncellorial authority and the 
establishment of group standing committees was designed, 
according to the rhetoric, to give academic staff greater 
access to strategic level decision-making although as has 
already been noted, these collegial advisory bodies were 
quickly replaced by more managerially oriented group 
councils. (5) However the more important aspect of this cheunge 
was the introduction of another level of hierarchy eund the 
opportunities that this has presented for a more specialised 
eund hence more effective hierarchical control within the 
Central Executive. With Pro-Vice-Cheuncellors appointed to 
oversee da^ ^ to day management of their groups, the release of 
Central Executive energies might be expected to enable senior 
officers to use their access to better information for more 
systematic forward pleunning eund more rigorous evaluation of 
academic performeunce, (6) 
In a 1982 paper which examined the shifting loci of 
effective power within the Australian university system since 
(5) It is interesting to note that by 1987, some group 
councils rarely met. In such circumstances, Pro-Vice-
Chancellors tended to teike decisions executively, with 
consultation being left to managerial discretion. 
(6) It is significant, for example, that one of the main 
functions of the new (1986) combined position of 
Secretary and Registrar is planning. Moreover since 
1985 the Vice-Chancellor has appointed, as part of an 
on-going program, a series of review committees to 
undertake evaluations of the performance of selected 
academic departments. 
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1969, Herman suggested that there had been a clear tendency 
towards greater centralisation from academic departments to 
central committees eund central administrations and from 
universities to government (1982:53). Because the University 
of Queensleund is a statutory authority funded almost entirely 
by taxpayer's funds for the purposes set out in the University 
Act eund the relevant Commonwealth State Grants legislation, 
there are limits in terms of doctrines of public 
accountability on the extent to which staff and students ought 
to be allowed to participate in strategic decision-making. 
While the Senate has generally accepted the principle of each 
constituency having legitimate spheres of influence, in 
practice the call for greater efficiency and for more 
accountability (especially to demonstrate value for money) has 
led to the Central Executive's influence becoming more 
pervasive. While it is true that academic departments now 
have authority to prepare and administer their own budgets, in 
effect their discretion is limited especially in relation to 
resources such as tenured staffing where long term commitments 
are involved. In assessing the extent of democratisation 
vis-a-vis bureaucratisation it is necessary, therefore, to 
distinguish between the rhetoric of devolution eund the reality 
of Central Executive control. 
In the final analysis the principles of ministerial 
responsibility and parliamentary accountability apply even in 
statutory authorities such as universities. This necessarily 
extends to a fiduciary responsibility entrusted to the 
University's governing body to serve as trustees on behalf of 
the Parliament, ensuring that those senior executive 
officers who are appointed to exercise delegated authority on 
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behalf of the Senate, manage the affairs of the University in 
eun efficient eund effective meunner. 
While not denying that there are traditional spheres of 
influence within the University of Queensland, at the academic 
department and faculty levels where decisions concerning 
teaching methods eund curriculum remain subject to egalitarieun 
participation involving academic staff (and to a minor extent 
students), there is some evidence of the phenomenon referred 
to by Baldridge (1971:182) of a "power elite" centred on the 
Central Executive. This "'dominant coalition' of 
administrators" (Baldridge et al, 1978:207) has gradually over 
the years seized environmental and structural opportunities to 
legitimise the extension of its control over strategic 
decision-making involving both academic and non-academic 
policy. 
This study finds, then, that in the University of 
Queensleund over the 1969-1982 period, the tension which 
existed between internal demands for autonomy through 
participation in decision-medcing and external demands for 
accountability through hierarchical control over decision-
making was reconciled, on balance, in favour of greater 
bureaucratisation. The evidence on which this finding is 
based thus provides support for the theoretical proposition 
contained in the Subsidiary Hypothesis. 
Epilogue 
The present study has sought to add to the body of 
knowledge on how policies are formulated and conflicts 
resolved in large, complex organisations. The essence of the 
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problem studied concerned the reconciliation of demands for 
egalitarian participation in organisational decision-medcing 
with the competing demands for efficient bureaucratic control. 
The study has extended the work of scholars such 
as Allison, Child, Dyson, Pfeffer, Wildavsky eund Jenkins to 
show that decision-making in organisations is the resultant of 
a complex interaction of environmental, structural eund 
internal political-bureaucratic variables. In particular this 
study has found that although environmental and structural 
factors were importeunt in providing the relevant context for 
organisational reform, they fell far short of euny 
deterministic relationship with the University of Queensland's 
system of governance. Rather it was the exercise of strategic 
choice by key actors and their related political behaviour 
which had the greatest impact on policy outcomes although the 
extent of that impact was moderated by systematised 
bureaucratic procedures such as the use of ad hoc 
conamittees of inquiry together with regularised procedures for 
internal review. 
The study has also provided evidence in support of the 
theoretical proposition that where there is tension between 
internal demands for autonomy through egalitarian 
participation in decision-making and external demands for 
accountability through hierarchical control over decision-
making, the resultant conflict tends to be resolved, on 
balance, in favour of greater bureaucratisation. 
In the process of arriving at these conclusions, the 
study has provided support for an analytical construct which 
outlined the conditions that were conducive to the 
exercise of bureaucratic politics in orgeunisations. In so 
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doing, it has placed the concepts of political conflict and 
bureaucratic cooperation into a more balanced perspective. 
This is importeunt because the ethos of legal-rationality 
inspired by the management science literature which dominates 
most complex formal orgeunisations has allowed the dangerous 
mythology to be sustained that internal political activity is 
an aberration to the norm of efficient goal-seeking 
organisational behaviour. Yet as Allison's seminal work in 
highlighting the role of organisational behaviour to explain 
the Cubeun Missile Crisis in 1962 has dreunatically shown, it is 
vital that such mythologies be exposed rather than perpetuated 
so that, in future, the processes involved in formulating 
policies ceun be better understood and, therefore, be more 
effectively managed. 
It is for reasons such as these that Jenkins concluded 
that policy makers ignored the internal political aspects of 
orgeunisations at their peril: 
If Organisational Development has a messeige, it 
is this: if policy improvement is to involve 
organisational redesign, then a strong 
theoretical framework from which to operate is 
essential. Proceed without one and the 
consequences are likely to be both interesting 
and unexpected (1978:80). 
While significant organisational reforms were achieved 
by the University of Queensland over the 1969-1982 period, 
there is little doubt that, had the policy formulation process 
been better understood by the key actors, further 
opportunities for positive change could have been maximised 
while at the same time unforeseen consequences could have been 
minimised. It follows from this that there remains scope for 
the further development of the University's decision-making 
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structures and processes with the object of improving policy 
formulation and contributing to better outcomes. 
If the findings outlined in this thesis have 
contributed to eun improved understeunding of the policy 
formulation process in complex organisations, thereby helping 
to reduce dysfunctional conflict eund increase productive 
cooperation, then they will have served a useful purpose. 
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Cotparison of Proposals to Revise the Coiposition of the Professorial Board 
APPENDIK (1) 
Heibership 
Category Coiposition 6 H I J 
EK Officio Chancellor 
Vice-Chancellor 
Deputy Vice-chancellor 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Acadeiic) 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fab./Fin,) 
President ( Dep. President of Board 
University Librarian 
Director of Tertiary Ed. Institute 
Director of Counselling Services 
President of Student Union 
President of Post Grad, Students 
Heads of Departments (a) 
Deans of Faculties (b) 
Sub-Deans of Faculties 
Chairmen of School Resource C/tees 
Harden of Uni. College of ToMnsville 1 
All profs, not in any other category 71 
Senators - full-ti«e teaching staff 
Senators - leibers full-tiie grad.staff 
Senators - students of the University 
Elected Reps of profs not in other categories 
Reps of tenured non-prof acadeiic staff 
Reps of non-prof acadeiic staff 
Reps of grad. library staff 
Reps of grad, staff of Ext.Stud,Dept, 
Reps elected by i froi Faculty Boards 
Reps of staff and students (cotion roll) 
Other students 
Coopted Kenbers co-opted on Pres. noiination 
1 1 
1 1 
30 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
56 
12 
26 
59 
12 
17 
B 
25 
1 
1 
59 
12 
e 
25 
1 
1 1 
12 
19 
2 
2 
50 40c 
50 
2 2 
1 
1 
1 
60 
13 
16 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
60 
13 
16 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
60 
13 
20 
20 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
60 
13 
20 
20 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
60 
13 
20 
20 
Total 76 129 126 132 76 92 107 156 123 129 129 
Notes 
A Actual 1969 
B Hill Report 1971 
C Davies Report 1973 
D Professorial Board 1973 
E Staff Association 1974 
F Student Union 1974 
G Cowen Coftiittee 1975 
H Itprovesents Cointittee 1976 
I Professorial Board 1976 
J Cowen Cossittee 1976 
K Senate 1976 
(a) After 1969, the actual nueber of heads of departments is shown. Before 1969 professors rather 
than heads of departients were ex officio tesbers, 
(b) After 1969, the actual nutber of deans is shown. Before 1969 professors rather than deans were 
ex officio aeibers, Where deans also served as heads of departments, the mansui rather than 
the net number has been shown. 
(c) The Union advocated that approximately forty members should be elected by the faculties and 
"other groups' on a proportional basis. 
552 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrahamsson, B. (1977) Bureaucracy or Participation. 
Beverly Hills, Seige. 
Allen, J.A. (1978) "Some Aspects of Higher Education Policies" 
in R. McCaig ed. , University Administration in Australia. 
Sydney, University of Sydney, pp. 115-130. 
Allison, G.T. (1971) Essence of Decision. Boston, Little, 
Brown. 
Anderson, J.E. (1975) Public Policy Making. London, 
Nelson. 
Andreski, S. (1976) "Remarks on Conditions of Creativity" in 
C. Page and M. Yates eds., Power and Authority in Higher 
Education. Guildford, Society for Research into Higher 
Education, University of Surrey, pp. 56-61. 
Apter, D.E. (1968) "Government" in D.E. Sills ed., 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 
6., New York, Macmillan eund The Free Press, pp. 214-230. 
Arblaster, A. (1974) Academic Freedom. Harmondsworth, 
Penguin. 
Aristotle. (ND) Politics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Armytage, W.H.G. (1955) Civic Universities. London, Ernest 
Benn. 
Ashby, E. (1966) Universities: British. Indian. African. 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Atkins, R. ed. , (1966) University Government. Sydney, 
Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, pp. 5-
9. 
Australieun Government/Parliamentary Documents 
Academic Salaries Tribunal 1976 Review. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976 
Australian Universities Commission. Fourth Report. 
Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printing Office, 1969. 
Australian Universities Commission. Fifth Report. 
Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printing Office, 1972. 
Australian Universities Commission. Sixth Report. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975. 
Australian Universities Commission. Report for 1977-79 
Triennium. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1976. 
Dunbar Report; Tertiary Education Commission, Study 
553 
Leave in Universities and Colleges of Advanced 
Educatjop. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1978. 
Gibb Report: Tertiary Education Commission, Entry 
Scores to Universities and Colleges of Advanced 
Education. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1979. 
Ministerial Statement. Review of Commonwealth Functions. 
Canberra, Australieun Government Publishing Service, 1981. 
Murray Report: Report of the Committee on 
Australian Universities. Canberra, Commonwealth 
Government Printer, 1957. 
Teague Report; Senate Standing Committee on Education 
eund the Arts, Report on Tenure of Academics. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982. 
Tertiary Education Commission Statement to Joint Committee 
of Public Accounts, Funding of Tertiary Education. 
Canberra, Austraian Government Publishing Service, 1979. 
Williams Report; Education. Training and 
Employment. Vol. 1., Canberra, Australieun Government 
Publishing Service, 1979. 
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, Constitutions of 
Professorial Boards. Circulars 12/71, 11/5/71 and 24/72, 
30/5/72. 
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Conmiittee, Academic Staff 
Development. Occasional Papers No. 4., Canberra, 
Australieun Vice-Chancellors' Conamittee, 1981. 
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, University 
Government Relations, Occasional Papers No. 5., Canberra, 
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, 1983. 
Bachrach, P. (1967) The Theory of Democratic Elitism. 
London, University of London Press. 
Bailey, F.G. (1977) Morality and Expediency, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell. 
Baldridge, J.V. (1971) Power and Conflict in the 
University. New York, John Wiley. 
Baldridge, J.V. Curtis, D.V. Ecker, G.P. and Riley, G.L. 
(1977) "Alternative Models of Governance in Higher Education' 
in G.L. Riley and J.V. Baldridge eds.. Governing Academic 
Organizations. Berkeley, McCutchan, pp. 2-25. 
Baldridge, J.V. Curtis, D.V. Ecker, G. and Riley, G.L. 
(1978) Policy Making and Effective Leadership. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
Barnard, C.I. (1968) The Functions of the Executive. 
554 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Barrow, R. (1975) piato. utilitarianism and education. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Becher, T. (1984) "Principles eund Politics: An Interpretative 
Freunework for University Meunagement", Journal of 
Institutional Management in Higher Education. 8:3, pp. 
191-199. 
Becher, T. eund Kogan, M. (1980) Process and Structure in 
Higher Education. London, Heinemann. 
Bensman, J. eund Rosenberg, B. (1977) "Socialization" in P.I. 
Rose ed., The Study of Society. New York, Random House, 
pp. 143-149. 
Blau, P.M. (1973) The Organization of Academic Work. New 
York, John Wiley. 
Braybrooke, D. and Lindblom, C.E. (1970) A Strategy of 
Decision, New York, The Free Press. 
Brett, P. (1978) "University Administration: Necessary Legal 
Structures and their Constraints" in R. McCaig ed., 
University Administration in Australia. Sydney, University 
of Sydney, pp. 90-97. 
Brown, J.D. (1969) The Liberal University: An 
Institutional Analysis. New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Bryan, H. (1966) The University of Queensland: 1910-1960. 
Unpublished Essay commissioned by the Department of History 
and Political Science, St. Lucia, University of Queensland. 
Bulmer, M. (1980) "Introduction" in M. Bulmer ed., Social 
Research eund Royal Commissions. London, George Allen eund 
Unwin, pp. 1-17. 
Burke, G. and McKenzie, P. A. (1979) "Academic Accountability -
Resources" in P. Sheldrake and R. Linke eds.. 
Accountability in Higher Education. Sydney, George Allen 
and Unwin, pp. 80-99. 
Burns, T. eund Stalker, G.M. (1961) The Management of 
Innovation. London, Tavistock. 
Caiden, G.E. (1969) Administrative Reform, Chiceigo, 
Aldine. 
Cartwright, T.J. (1975) Royal Commissions and Departmental 
Committees in Britain. London, Hodder and Stoughton. 
Chaffee, E.E. (1983) Rational Decisionmaking in Higher 
Education. Boulder, National Centre for Higher Education 
Management Systems. 
Chester, K.N.P. (1964) Some Aspects of the Structure and 
Use of Committees in the University of Queensland. M.Com. 
555 
(Qualifying) Thesis, St. Lucia, University of Queensland. 
Child, J. (1972) "Organizational Structure, Environment eund 
Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice" in Sociology. 
6:1, pp. 1-22. 
Clark, B.R. (1966) "Organizational Adaptation to 
Professionals" in H.M. Vollmer and D.L. Mills, eds.. 
Professionalization. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, pp. 
282-291. 
Clark, B.R. (1983) The Higher Education System. Berkeley, 
University of California Press. 
Clarke, E. (1973) The Establishment of the University of 
Queensland. Masters Qualifying Thesis, St. Lucia, 
University of Queensland. 
Cohen, M.D. and March, J.G. (1974) Leadership and 
Ambiguity. New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Conference of Queensland Vice-Chancellors, Minutes. 
21/12/79-13/3/84. 
Corson, J.J. (1975) The Governance of Colleges and 
Universities. New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Cowen, Z. (1961) quoted in "Report on Conference of Australian 
Universities", Vestes. IV:3, pp. 55-56. 
Cowen, Z. (1969) The Private Man. (The Boyer Lectures), 
Sydney, Australian Broadcasting Commission. 
Cowen, Z. (1972) "The Role and Purpose of the University" in 
G.S. Harman and C. Selby Smith eds., Australian Higher 
Education. Sydney, Angus and Robertson, pp. 15-28. 
Cowen, Z. (1974) The University in Times of Change. (Sir 
John Morris Memorial Lecture), Hobart, The Adult Education 
Board of Tasmania. 
Cowen, Z. (1981) "The Nature of Higher Education in Australia" 
in E. Gross and J.S. Western eds., The End of a Golden 
Age. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, pp. 10-19. 
Crossman, R.H.S. (1963) "Plato and the Perfect State" in 
Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat?, Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall, pp. 25-40. 
Cullen, R.B. (1972) The Administration of Complex 
Knowledge Oriented Organisations, PhD Thesis, University 
of Melbourne. 
Cullen, R.B. (1978) "The Objectives of a University and its 
Role in Society - An Organisation Theorist's Viewpoint" in R. 
McCaig, ed., University Administration in Australia. 
Sydney, University of Sydney, pp. 51-65. 
Dahl, R.A. (1961) Who Governs?. New Haven, Yale University 
556 
Press. 
Dahl, R.A. (1976) M"^ern Political Analysis. Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. 
Dahl, R.A. (1982) Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: 
Autonomy Vs. Control, New Haven, Yale University Press. 
Donnison, D. (1980) "Committees and Committeemen" in M. Bulmer 
ed., Social Research and Royal Commissions. London, George 
Allen and Unwin, pp. 9-17. 
Dressel, P.L. (1981) Administrative Leadership. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
Dror, Y. (1971) Design for Policy Sciences. New York, 
Americeun Elsevier. 
Droughton, M.J. (1977) The University of Queensland Acts 
Amendment Act of 1957: A Case Study. M.Pub.Ad. Thesis, 
St. Lucia, University of Queensleund. 
Dye, T.R. (1972) Understanding Public Policy. Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. 
Dyson, K.H.F. (1976) "Institutional Government: A New 
Perspective in Organization Theory" in The Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. XIII, pp. 131-151. 
Engel, A. (1974) "The Emerging Concept of the Academic 
Profession at Oxford 1800-1854" in L. Stone ed., The 
University in Society. Vol. 1., Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, pp. 305-352. 
Epstein, L.D. (1974) Governing the University. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 
Etzioni, A. (1961) A Comparative Analysis of Complex 
Organizations, New York, The Free Press. 
Etzioni, A. (1964) Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall. 
Federation of Australian University Staff Associations, (1979) 
The Internal Government of Universities. Unpublished 
Monograph. 
Fielden, J. (1976) "The Decline of the Professor and the Rise 
of the Registrar?" in C.F. Page and M. Yates eds.. Power 
and Authority in Higher Education. Guildford, Society for 
Research into Higher Education, University of Surrey, pp. 46-
55. 
Fielden, J. and Lockwood, G (1973) Planning and Management 
in Universities. London, Chatto and Windus. 
Fieldhouse, A.E. (1971) Accountability or Autonomy in the 
Universities?, Wellington, Price Milburn. 
557 
Finkelstein, M.J. (1984) The American Academic Profession, 
Columbus, Ohio State University Press. 
Flexner, A. (1930) Universities. American. English. 
German. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Ford, A.J.T. (1978) "Decision Malcing in Universities: 
Functions of Governing Bodies, Boards, Faculties, Committees 
and Heads of Schools or Departments" in R. McCaig ed., 
University Administration in Australia. Sydney, University 
of Sydney, pp. 81-88, 
Freidson, E. (1971) "Professions and the Occupational 
Principle" in E. Freidson ed., The Professions and their 
Prospects, Beverly Hills, Seige, pp. 19-36. 
Gallagher, A.P. (1982) Coordinating Australian University 
Development. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press. 
Gardner, W.J. (1979) Colonial Cap and Gown. Christchurch, 
University of Canterbury. 
Glotz, G. (1929) The Greek City and its Institutions. 
London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. 
Goode, W.J. (1977) Principles of Sociology. New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
Gouldner, A.W. (1957) "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an 
Analysis of Latent Social Roles - I" in Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 2:3, pp. 281-306. 
Gouldner, A.W. (1958) "Cosmopolitans eund Locals: Toward an 
Analysis of Latent Social Roles - II" in Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 2:4, pp. 444-480. 
Greenwood, E. (1966) "The Elements of Professionalization" in 
H.M. Vollmer eund D.L. Mills eds., Professionalization. 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, pp. 9-19. 
Greenwood, R. Hinings, C R . and Ranson, S. (1975) 
"Contingency Theory eund the Organization of Local Authorities, 
Part 1: Differentiation and Integration" in Public 
Administration. Vol. 53., pp. 1-23. 
Habermas, J. (1971) Toward a Rational Society. London, 
Heinemann. 
Harman, G. (1982) "Defining the issues in university -
government relations: mapping the shifting loci of effective 
power" in University Government Relations. Occasional 
Papers No. 5., Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee, 1983, 
pp. 48-62. 
Hartwell, R.M. (1961) "New Universities in Australia", 
Vestes. IV:4, pp. 35-38. 
Haskins, C.H. (1957) The Rise of Universities. Ithaca, 
Great Seal Books. 
558 
Haug, M.R. (1973) "Deprofessionalization: An Alternative 
Hypothesis for the Future" in P. Halmos, ed., 
Professionalisation and Social Change. The Sociological 
Review Monograph No. 20. , Staffordshire, University of Keele, 
pp. 195-211. 
Hawker, G. Smith, R.F.I, and Weller, P. (1979) Politics 
and Policy in Australia. St. Lucia, University of 
Queensland Press. 
Hickson, D.J. Hinings, C.R. Lee, C.A. Schneck, R.E. eund 
Pennings, J.M. (1971) "A Strategic Contingencies' Theory of 
Intraorganizational Power" in Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 16:2, pp. 216-229. 
Hinings, C.R. Greenwood, R. and Ranson, S. (1975) 
"Contingency Theory and the Organization of Local Authorities: 
Part II. Contingencies and Structure" in Public 
Administration, Vol. 53., pp. 169-190. 
Hinings, C.R. Hickson, D.J. Pennings, J.M. and Schneck, R.E. 
(1974) "Structural Conditions of Intraorganizational Power" in 
Administrative Science Quarterly. 19:1, pp. 22-44. 
Howie, G. (1968) Aristotle. London, Collier Macmilleun. 
Hyde, J.T. (1979) "The Structure of Higher Education in 
Australia" in R. Sheldredce eund R. Linke eds.. 
Accountability in Higher Education. Sydney, George Allen 
eund Unwin, pp. 1-16. 
Interviews 
Professor B.L. Adkins, Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Social 
Sciences), 2/8/84. 
Mr. D. Anderson, Administrative Officer, Prentice Computer 
Centre, 25/7/84. 
Dr. J.G. Atherton, Reader, Department of Microbiology, 
30/7/84. 
Mr. D.P. Barbagallo, former student member of Fielding 
Committee, 20/7/84. 
Mr. C. Burger, former student member of Fielding Committee, 
5/9/86 (telephone interview). 
Mr. R.W. Byrom, Legal Officer, 26/7/84. 
Dr. B. Chiswell, Senior Lecturer, Department of Chemistry, 
25/7/84. 
Sir Zelman Cowen, Vice-Chancellor (1970-1977), 8/5/85 and 
9/5/85 (resigned 1977). 
Mr. I.M.B. Cribb, Member of Senate 1972-present, 24/7/84. 
559 
Emeritus Professor G.N. Davies, Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic), 24/7/84 and 27/7/84. 
Emeritus Professor C.S. Davis, former Professor of 
Mathematics, 26/7/84 (retired 1983). 
Dr. D.K. Dignan, Senior Lecturer, Department of History, 
26/8/84. 
Mr. F.D.O. Fielding, University Librarieun, 23/7/84 and 
20/8/84. 
Dr. W.E. Fox, former Reader, Department of Agriculture, 
10/7/86 (telephone interview) (retired 1978). 
Emeritus Professor R.C. Gates, President of Professorial 
Board (1975-1977), 1/8/84 (resigned 1977). 
Dr. M.C. Grassie, Deputy President of Academic Board, 
31/7/84. 
Emeritus Professor G. Greenwood, former Professor of 
History, 6/8/84 and 20/8/84 (retired 1982). 
Professor K.G. Hamilton, Professor of English, 24/7/84. 
Emeritus Professor D. Hill, former Professor of Geology, 
27/7/84 (retired 1972). 
Mr. W.J. Humble, Director of Buildings and Grounds, 9/1/87. 
Dr. K.W. ECnight, former Professor of Government, 16/8/84 
(resigned 1975). 
Professor L.E. Lyons, Professor of Physical Chemistry, 
2/8/84. 
Mr. J.S. Macqueen, Assistant Registrar (Research), 24/5/84. 
Mr. D.F. O'Neill, Lecturer, Department of English, 26/7/84, 
Professor R.W. Parsons, President of Academic Board, 
3/8/84. 
Mr. C.R. Porter, Member of Senate (1975-1980), 30/7/84. 
Dr. S.A. Rayner, Registrar, 24/7/84 and 25/7/84. 
Dr. P.L. Reynolds, Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Government, 14/8/84. 
Professor M.I. Thomis, Professor of History, 23/7/84. 
Mr. J.L. Tolhurst, Bursar, 25/5/84. 
Emeritus Professor E.C. Webb, Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic) (1970-1975), 16/8/84 (resigned 1976). 
Mr. R.N. Wensley, former President of University of 
560 
Queensland Union (1969) eund Member of Senate, (1978-
present), 3/8/84. 
Professor B.G. Wilson, Vice-Chancellor, 31/7/84, 7/8/84, 
13/8/84. 
Professor B. Zerner, Professor of Biochemistry, 26/7/84. 
Jacoby, H. (1973) The Bureaucratization of the World. 
Berkeley, University of California. 
Jenkins, W.I. (1978) Policy Analysis. A Political eund 
Organisational Perspective. London, Martin Robertson. 
Johnston, W.R. (1982) The Call of the Land. Brisbane, 
Jacaranda Press. 
Joint Advisory Committee on Post-Secondary Education in 
Queensland, Minutes. (9/9/76-8/12/83). 
Kamenka, E. (1979) "What is Justice?" in E. Kamenka and A.E.S. 
Tay eds.. Justice, London, Edward Arnold, pp. 1-24. 
Katz, D. and Kahn, R.L. (1966) The Social Psychology of 
Organizations. New York, John Wiley. 
Kerr, C. (1966) The Uses of the University. New York, 
Harper and Row. 
Kochen, M. eund Deutsch, K.W. (1980) Decentralization. 
Cambridge, Mass., Oelgeschlager, Gunn, Hain and 
Konigstein/Ts., Verlag Anton Hain. 
Kouzes, J.M. and Mice, P.R. (1979) "Domain Theory: An 
Introduction to Organizational Behavior in Human Service 
Organizations" in The Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science. 15:4, pp. 449-469. 
Krause, E.A. (1971) The Sociology of Occupations. Boston, 
Little, Brown. 
Likert, R. (1961) New Patterns of Management. New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
Lindblom, C.E. (1959) "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" in 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 19., pp. 79-88. 
Lucas, J.R. (1980) On Justice. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
MacDonald, S. Mandeville, T. and Lamberton, D. (1980) 
Real Costs of University Research: The Case of the 
University of Queensland, Report to the University of 
Queensland Research Committee, St. Lucia, University of 
Queensland. 
Mackenzie, W.J.M. (1953) "Committees in Administration", 
Public Administration. Vol. XXXI, pp. 235-244. 
Massie, J.P. (1965) "Management Theory" in J.G. March, ed., 
561 
Heundbook of Organizations. Chicago, Rand McNally, pp. 
387-422. 
Matheson, J.A.L. (1966) "The General Freunework of University 
Government" in R. Atkins, ed., University Government. 
Sydney, Federation of Australian University Staff 
Associations, pp. 10-20. 
Mathews, R. (1972) "Financing Higher Education" in G.S. Harman 
eund C. Selby Smith, eds., Australian Higher Education. 
Sydney, Angus eund Robertson, pp. 73-88. 
Meek, V.L. (1982) The University of PaPua New Guinea. St. 
Lucia, University of Queensland Press. 
McAulay, H.R. (1968) Activists in Student Government - A 
Study of the Voting Members of the -th Council of the 
University of Queensland Union. BA (Hens) Thesis, St. 
Lucia, University of Queensland. 
McGregor, D (1960) The Human Side of Enterprise. New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
McQueen, H. (1979) "Queensland: A State of Mind", 
Meanjin. 38:1, pp.41-51. 
Michels, R. (1915) Political Parties. Glencoe, 111., The 
Free Press. 
Millett, J.D. (1962) The Academic Community, New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
Moodie, G.C. and Eustace, R. (1974) Power and Authority in 
British Universities, London, George Allen and Unwin. 
Murphy, D. (1978) "Queensland's Image and Australian 
Nationalism", The Australian Quarterly. 50:2, pp. 77-91. 
Myers, D.M. (1978) "University Structures in Total Concept" in 
R. McCaig, ed., University Administration in Australia, 
Sydney, University of Sydney, pp. 67-71. 
Newman, J.H. Cardinal, (1852) The Idea of a University. 
London, Longmans, Green. 
Nilsson, N.A. (1979) "Accountability: Philosophy and 
Practice" in P. Sheldrake and R. Linke, eds., 
Accountability in Higher Education. Sydney, George Allen 
and Unwin, pp. 138-150. 
O'Neil, W.M. (1961) "The Unsatisfactory Role of the Non-
Professorial Staff", Vestes. IV:4, pp. 39-43. 
O'Neill, D.F. et al, eds., (1970) UP the Right Channels. 
St. Lucia, James Prentice. 
O'Shea, J.A. (1975) Governance in Institutions of Higher 
Education. M.Ed. Admin Thesis, Armidale, University of New 
Eng1and. 
562 
Parker, R.S. (1965) "Departments eund God-Professors", 
Vestes. VIII:1, pp. 17-24. 
Partridge, P.H. (1969) "University Government in Australia" in 
A Report on the Conference on the Role and 
Responsibilities of Governing Bodies. Canberra, The 
Australieun National University, pp. 20-42. 
Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. 
London, Cambridge University Press. 
Pfeffer, J. (1981) Power in Organizations. Marshfield, 
Mass. , Pitmeun. 
Plato (N.D.), The Republic. New York, The Modern Library. 
Plowman, C.G. and Williams, W.R. (1978) "Establishment and 
Size of Committees" in R. McCaig, ed., University 
Administration in Australia. Sydney, University of Sydney, 
99-105. 
Presley, C.F. (1971) An Appraisal of the Operation of the 
University of Queensland. Unpublished paper. 
Private Communications 
Emeritus Professor G.N. Davies, Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic) (1976-1986), 19/5/87 (retired 1986). 
Mr. W.R.A. McAlpine, Warden of Convocation, 11/3/86. 
Dr. S.A. Rayner, Registrar (1970-1986), 12/4/87 (retired 
1986). 
Mr. K.H. Sheffield, Director of Personnel Services, 25/6/86. 
Mrs. D. Whyte, Executive Secretary, Academic Staff 
Association, 1/5/84. 
Pryor, D. (1966) "The University of Queensland Act", 
Vestes. IX:2, pp. 85-89. 
Queensleund Government/Parliamentary Documents 
Ahern Report: Queensland Legislative Assembly, 
Sixth Interim Report of the Select Committee on 
Education in Queensland. Brisbane, Government Printer, 
1980. 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates. Vol. 104., 9/11/1909, 
Brisbane, Government Printer, pp. 106-107. 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates. Vol. 242, 25/11/1965, 
Brisbane, Government Printer, pp. 1849-1863. 
The University of Queensland Act of 1909. Brisbane, 
Government Printer. 
563 
The Natjnpftl Education Co-Ordination and the University 
of Queensland Acts Amendment Act of 1941. Brisbane, 
Government Printer. 
The Univerp'"'"'-'V o^ Quensland Acts Amendment Act of 1957. 
Brisbeune, Government Printer. 
The University of Queensland Act of 1965. Brisbane, 
Government Printer. 
University of Queensland Act Amendment Act 1973. 
Brisbane, Government Printer. 
University of Queensland Act Amendment Act 1981. 
Brisbane, Government Printer. 
Ramsey, G.A. and Hewlett, J. (1979) "Institutional Structures 
and Internal Accountability" in P. Sheldrake and R. Linke, 
eds.. Accountability in Higher Education. Sydney, George 
Allen and Unwin, pp. 58-79. 
Rashdall, H. (1936) in F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, eds.. 
The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages. Vols. I, II 
eund III, Oxford, The Clarendon Press. 
Rawls, J. (1972) A Theory of Justice. Oxford, The 
Clarendon Press. 
Rayner, S.A. (1970) University Policy Making and Policies. 
Unpublished paper. 
Rayner, S.A. (1978) "An Administrator's View of the University 
as a Social System" in R. McCaig, ed. , University 
Administration in Australia. Sydney, University of Sydney, 
pp. 19-38. 
Rayner, S.A. (1980) Resource Allocation in the University 
of Queensland. Paper presented to the Twelfth 
Administrative Staff Course, Adelaide. 
Reiyner, S.A. (1983) External Influences Affecting Academic 
Policies in Tertiary Education Over the Quarter Century 
from Murray to Ryaun, Paper presented to the Australian 
Institute of Tertiary Educational Administrators Second 
Queensland State Conference. 
Rhodes, G. (1975) Committees of Inquiry. London, George 
Allen and Unwin. 
Rice, A.K. (1970) The Modern University. London, 
Tavistock. 
Roe, E. (1976) The Operations of Departmental Consultative 
Committees. St. Lucia, Tertiary Education Institute, 
University of Queensland. 
Roe, E. (1978) A Report on a Review of the Semester 
System, St. Lucia, Tertiary Education Institute, 
University of Queensland. 
564 
Roebuck, C. (1966) The World of Ancient Times. New York, 
Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Rose, R. (1976) The Dynamics of Public Policy. London, 
Sage. 
Rousseau, J.J. (N.D.) The Social Contract. London, Dent. 
Rowe, A. P. (1960) If the Gown Fits. Melbourne, Melbourne 
University Press. 
Samuel, P. (1977) "The Scandal of our Universities", 
The Bulletin. Sydney, Australieun Consolidated Press, 
12/3/77, pp. 14-18. 
Schaffer, B. (1966) "Committees and Co-ordination" in R. 
Atkins ed., University Government. Sydney, Federation of 
Australian University Staff Associations, pp. 41-60. 
Schein, E.H. (1970) Qrgeunizational Psychology. Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. 
Schonell, Sir Fred (1968) The University in Contemporary 
Society. Paper presented to the Tenth Commonwealth 
Universities Congress, Sydney, The Association of Commonwealth 
Universities. 
Scott, R.D. (1979) Education and Public Accountability. 
St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press. 
Scott, R.D. ed., (1980) Interest Groups and Public Policy: 
Case Studies from the Australian States. Melbourne, 
Macmillan. 
Scott, R.D. (1981) "Issues of Social Accountability" in 
Politics in Education. The Australian College of Education, 
pp. 91-105. 
Scott, R.D. (1984) "Committees of Inquiry and Alternatives in 
Higher Education", Journal of Tertiary Educational 
Administration, 6:1, pp. 15-23. 
Scott, W.G. (1969) "Organization Government: The Prospects 
for a Truly Participative System", in Public Administration 
Review, XXIX:1, pp. 43-53. 
Selby Smith, C. (1975) The Costs of Post Secondary 
Education. South Melbourne, Macmillan. 
Selznick, P. (1957) Leadership in Administration. New 
York, Harper and Row. 
Semper. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Union, 1980 
(various editions). 
Semper Floreat. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Union, 
1964-1976 (various editions). 
565 
Shattock, M. and Rigby, G. (1983) Resource Allocation in 
British Universities. Guildford, The Society for Research 
into Higher Education. 
Shonfield, A. (1980) "In the Course of Investigation" in M. 
Bulmer, ed., Social Research and Roval Commissions. London, 
George Allen and Unwin. 
Simon, H.A. (1965) Administrative Behaviour. New York, The 
Free Press. 
Spencer, M. (1976) Foundations of Modern Sociology. 
Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. 
Spigelmeun, J. (1968) "Student Activism in Australia", 
Vestes. XI:2, pp. 107-118. 
Stockman, D. (1986) The Triumph of Politics. London, 
Bodley Head. 
Tarlo, H. (1968) "Crisis on the Campus?" Vestes. XI: 2, 
pp.144-152. 
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, (1973) 
Governance of Higher Education. Berkeley. 
The Courier Mail. Brisbane, Queensland Newspapers, 9/9/67; 
14/9/67; 15/9/67. 
The Telegraph. Brisbane, Queensland Newspapers, 14/9/67. 
The Truth. Brisbane, Mirror Newspapers, 6/10/68. 
Thomis, M.I. (1985) A Place of Light & Learning. St. 
Lucia, University of Queensland Press. 
Thomis, M.I. [1985] The University of Queensland Academic 
Staff Association - A Historical Outline. Unpublished 
Monograph. 
Thompson, V.A. (1961) "Hierarchy, Specialization and 
Organizational Conflict", Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 5:4, pp.485-521. 
Tomlinson, D. (1976) "Finance for Education in Australia 
Developments 1969-75", The Australian Education Review. 5. 
Truman, T.C. (1963) "Departmental Government, Professors and 
Academic Values", Vestes, VI:1, pp. 3-9. 
Tucker, A. (1981) Chairing the Academic Department. 
Washington DC, American Council on Education. 
University of Queensland, (Committee Reports) 
Adkins Report; Report of Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 
Structural Reorganisation of the University, 24/3/79 (should 
have been dated 24/3/80). 
566 
Burnett Report: Report of Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 
Research and Postgraduate Study in the University of 
Queensland, July 1977. 
Committee on Administrative Procedures Interim Report; 
Report of Professorial Board Committee to Consider 
Administrative Procedures, November 1971. 
Cowen Report; Report of Senate Committee to Consider 
the Report on the Powers, Duties and Responsibilities of the 
Professorial Board, 28/10/75. 
Davies Report; Report of Professorial Board Committee, 
The Powers, Duties and Responsibilities of the Professorial 
Board, 17/8/73. 
Fielding Report; Report of Senate Committee, Review of 
Academic Organisation of the University, 27/4/82. 
Gates Report; Report of Professorial Board, The Powers, 
Duties and Responsibilities of the Professorial Board, 
28/6/76. 
Hill Report; Report of the Professorial Board Committee 
to Consider the Composition of the Professorial Board, 
October 1971. 
Holborow Report; Report of Professorial Board Committee 
to Review the Committee Structure of the Professorial Board, 
25/3/81. 
Holmes Report; Report of Vice-Chancellor's Committee to 
Review the Provision of Computing Resources, 1/12/80. 
Leihey Report; Report of Professorial Board Committee, 
Headships of Departments and the Functions of Professors who 
are not Heads of Departments and Related Matters, 6/8/69. 
Loveday Report; Report of Senate Working Party to 
Review Senate Committee Structure, 31/3/70. 
McCray Report; Report of Sub-Committee of Finance 
Committee which examined the Report of the Ad hoc Committee 
appointed by the Professorial Board to inquire into the 
Powers, Duties and Responsibilities of the Professorial 
Board, 8/4/75. 
McElwain Report; Report of the Professorial Board 
Committee to Consider the Committee Structure of the 
University and the Administrative Duties of Senior Members 
of the Academic Staff and to advise upon ways in which 
improvements might be effected, 5/11/62. 
Milns Report; Report of Vice-Chancellor's Committee to 
Review Administrative and Clerical Staff Requirements for 
1977, 5/11/76. 
Nunn and Keane Report; Report of Review initiated by 
the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Fabric and Finance) of Tea 
)67 
Services at the University of Queensleund, September, 1981. 
Parsons Report: Report of Senate Committee on the 
Review of the Academic Organisation of the University, 
30/6/86. 
Plowman Report; Report of Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
(Academic's) Committee to Review General Staff 
Establishments, 21/10/80. 
Professorial Board Report. Departmental Organisation; 
Lahey Report revised in accordance with the resolutions of 
the Professorial Board, 22/10/69. 
Report of Meeting of Deans; Meeting convened by Dean of 
Faculty of Arts to Consider Faculty Coordination of Academic 
and Resource Decision Making as Practised at the University 
of Melbourne, 26/9/77. 
Report of the Committee on the Veterinary School and 
the Future. July 1976. 
Standing Committee Report. The Role of Professors in 
the University. 1983. 
Thomson Report; Report of Vice-Chancellor's Committee 
to review the Conditions of Employment of Tutors in the 
University of Queensland, 30/8/79. 
Webb Report; Report of Professorial Board Working Party 
on Sub-Professorial Board Organisational Structure and 
Related Matters, 18/8/69. 
Wilson Report; Report of Senate Committee on the 
Conditions of Employment of Tutorial Staff, March 1982. 
Working Party Reports; Reports of the Fielding 
Committee Working Parties appointed to Review the Academic 
Organisation of the University, 26/2/82 and 4/4/82. 
University of Queensland. (Minutes of Meetings). 
Adkins Committee; Vice-Chancellor's Committee, 
Structural Reorganisation of the University, 5/2/80 -
13/3/80. 
Committee on Administrative Procedures; Professorial 
Board Committee to Consider Methods of Examining 
Administrative Procedures, 9/6/71 - 9/5/72 (chairman, D. 
Hill). 
Committee on Committees; Professorial Board Committee 
to Review the Committee Structure of the Professorial Board, 
25/10/77 - 23/3/81 (chairmen, S. Lipton and L.C. Holborow). 
Cowen Committee; Senate Committee to Consider the 
Report on the Powers, Duties and Responsibilities of the 
Professorial Board, 14/12/73 - 13/7/76. 
568 
Davies Committee: Professorial Board Committee to 
inquire into the Powers, Duties and Responsibilities of the 
Professorial Board, 14/12/72 - 17/8/73. 
Fielding Committee; Senate Committee - Review of 
Academic Organisation of the University, 30/5/80 - 27/4/82. 
Fielding Committee; Senate Committee Working Parties 
(Nos. 1-6) - Review of Academic Organisation of the 
University, 13/11/80 - 4/4/82. 
Gates Committee; Professorial Board Committee - Powers, 
Duties and Responsibilities of the Professorial Board, 
15/3/76 - 4/5/76. 
Hill Committee; Professorial Board Committee to 
Consider the Composition of the Professorial Board, 2/2/71 -
20/6/72. 
Lahey Committee; Professorial Board Committee to 
Consider Headships of Departments and the Functions of 
Professors who are not Heads of Departments and Related 
Matters, 19/5/69 - 13/11/69. 
Webb Committee; Professorial Board Working Party on 
Sub-Professorial Board Organisational Structure and Related 
Matters, 18/4/69 - 1/8/69. 
Webb Sub-Committee; Professorial Board Sub-Committee on 
Revised Faculty Board Structures, 1/4/70 - 26/10/70. 
Minutes of various other University bodies including 
Academic Board, Academic Committee, Combined Advisory 
Committee, Executive Committee, Faculty Boards and their 
executive committees. Finance Committee, Improvements 
Committee, Library Committee, Planning Committee, 
Professorial Board, Research Committee, Review of Budget 
Priorities Committee, Senate, Senate Committee to Consider 
the Revision of the University Act, Standing Committee, Use 
of Resources Conamittee, Vice-Chancellor's Consultative 
Committee and miscellaneous Vice-Chancellor's committees not 
specifically referred to above. 
University of Queensland. (Miscellaneous Published 
Documents) 
Acting Vice-Chancellor's Report to Convocation, 1968, 1969. 
Annual Reports, 1977-1981. 
Calendars, 1969-1983. 
Handbook of Administrative Procedures, 1963 (plus updates). 
Handbook of Administrative Information, 1973 (plus updates). 
Statistics, 1969, 1970, 1976, 1983. 
Submission to the Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness in 
569 
Higher Education, November 1985. 
Triennial Submissions, 1973-1975,1970; 1976-1978,1973; 
1978-80,1977; 1979-1981,1977; 1982-1984,1980; 
1985-87,1982. 
University News. 
Vice-Cheuncellor's Report to Convocation, 1970-1975. 
University of Queensland (Academic) Staff Association 
A Staff Association Critique of the Vice-Chancellor's 
Proposals for Structural Change Within the University. 
26/3/80. 
Concerning University Governance. A Critique of and 
alternative proposals to the Report, "The Powers, Duties and 
Responsibilities of the Professorial Board", 5/4/74. 
Constitution, 1969; 1977. 
Departmental Consultation. Report by the Committee 
established under the auspices of the Staff Association of 
the University of Queensland to conduct a questionnaire on 
consultation within departments, [1964]. 
Minutes 
Submissions on University Governance (Various). 
University Governance and its Implementation. Policy 
approved on 25/7/80 and 28/10/80. 
University of Queensland Employees Association 
Constitution and Rules, 1973. 
University of Queensland General Staff Association 
Constitution and Rules, 1977. 
University of Queensland Technical and Laboratory Staff 
Association 
Constitution, 1969. 
University of Queensland Union 
Annual Reports. 
Electoral Officer's Reports, 1967-1983. 
Submissions on University Governance (Various). 
Veblen, T. (1957) The Higher Learning in America. New 
York, Hill and Wang. 
Verry, D. and Davies, B. (1976) University Costs and 
570 
Outputs. Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific. 
Vollmer, H.M. and Mills, D.L. (1966) eds., 
Professionalization. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall. 
Walker, K.F. (1966) "Decisions, Democracy and Delegations" in 
R. Atkins, ed., University Government. Sydney, Federation 
of Australian University Staff Associations, pp. 27-37. 
Walker, W.G. (1978) "The University in History: The Emergence 
of the Administrator as Guardian of Academe" in R. McCaig ed. , 
University Administration in Australia. Sydney, University 
of Sydney, pp. 1-9. 
Weber, M. (1969) The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization. New York, The Free Press. 
Western, J.S. and Roe, E. (1981) "The Practitioners of Higher 
Education" in E. Gross and J.S. Western, eds.. The End of 
a Golden Age, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 
pp. 74-92. 
Wheare, K.C. (1955) Government by Committee, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Wildavsky, A. (1966) "The Political Economy of Efficiency: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis and Program 
Budgeting", Public Administration Review, XXVI:4, pp. 292-
310. 
Wildavsky, A. (1979) Speaking Truth to Power, The Art and 
Craft of Policy Analysis. Boston, Little, Brown. 
Wilensky, H.L. (1964) "The Professionalization of Everyone?" 
in The American Journal of Sociology. 70:2, pp. 137-158. 
Willett, F.J. (1972) "Special Problems of the Older 
Universities" in G.S. Harman and C. Selby Smith, eds., 
Australian Higher Education. Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 
pp. 107-115. 
Willett, F.J. (1978) "Study Guide: Structures of 
Universities" in R. McCaig ed. University Administration 
in Australia. Sydney, University of Sydney, pp. 74-79. 
Willett, F.J. (1981) "Universities and Traditional 
Bureaucratic Models" in E. Gross and J.S. Western, eds., 
The End of a Golden Age. St. Lucia, University of 
Queensland Press, pp. 61-67. 
Williams, B. (1972) "The Escalating Costs of Universities", 
The Australian University. 10:2, pp. 91-113. 
Williams, B. (1972) "The Fifth Report of the Australian 
Universities Commission", The Australian University, 10:3, 
pp. 214-237. 
571 
